Check the full MBIE length against the buffer length explicitly before
the debug print. This is for locally generated data, so the bounds
checking is not critical here, but it is better to use proper checking
anyway to avoid static analyzer complaints.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Avoid the somewhat confusing mechanism of determining the bitfield index
from the assigned IP address to make this easier for static analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Limit the GAS comeback delay to 60000 TUs, i.e., about 60 seconds. This
is mostly to silence static analyzers that complain about unbounded
value from external sources even though this is clearly bounded by being
a 16-bit value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the URL, i.e., pos[0], is verified here to be within the
bounds of the recieved message, but that seemed to be done in a manner
that might bee too complex for static analyzers to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use local variables and common checking of the selector (or vendor
specific IE header) to make the bounds checking easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
BIT(r) is not sufficient here since it does not cover 64 bit values.
Write this out with 1ULL to be large enough for the shift operation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EHT changes made this checking inconsistent. If he_cap can be NULL
in case of EHT being enabled, better make sure it does not get
dereferenced without an explicit check.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is testing code, but it's better to check the return value
explicitly even if this were not really able to fail in practice.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like fst_wpa_obj::get_hw_modes would have been left
uninitialized in hostapd. It is not obviously clear why this would not
have caused issues earlier, but in any case, better make this set
properly to allow unexpected behavior should that function pointer ever
be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Nul terminate the struct p2p_go_neg_results::passphrase explicitly to
keep static analyzers happier. This was already nul terminated in
practice due to the full array being cleared to zero on initialization,
but that was apparently not clear enough for some analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add a parameter (non_coloc_6ghz=1) to the manual scan command to disable
6 GHz collocated scanning.
This option can be used to disable 6 GHz collocated scan logic. Note
that due to limitations on Probe Request frame transmissions on the 6
GHz band mandated in IEEE Std 802.11ax-2021 it is very likely that
non-PSC channels would be scanned passively and this can take a
significant amount of time.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Set NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_COLOCATED_6GHZ in the scan parameters to enable
scanning for co-located APs discovered based on neighbor reports from
the 2.4/5 GHz bands when not scanning passively. Do so only when
collocated scanning is not disabled by higher layer logic.
Signed-off-by: Tova Mussai <tova.mussai@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com>
Without this, hostapd generates Probe Response frames with the null
destination address when hostapd enables unsolicited Probe Response
frame transmission. Fix this to use the broadcast address instead.
Fixes: 024b4b2a29 ("AP: Unsolicited broadcast Probe Response configuration")
Signed-off-by: MeiChia Chiu <meichia.chiu@mediatek.com>
This allows the debugging level to be reduced from hostapd command line
similarly to the already existing flag in wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor <o.mazor@genexis.eu>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Start and
EAPOL-Logoff are potential candidate for such attacks since those frames
could be used to terminate an authentication or initiate a new EAP
authentication. Such an attack could result in the station ending up
disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state
with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Start/Logoff/EAP frames on the AP/Authenticator when it is
known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is
enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that
does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force
disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all
drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL
frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate
whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one
potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to
initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not
allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be
injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack
could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum,
getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Key msg 1/4
is one potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be
used to initiate a 4-way handshake that the real AP might never complete
and the station might end up disconnecting because of that or at
minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAPOL-Key Request frame with Error=1 is not really a request for a new
key, so allow that frame to be sent even if PTK0 rekey is not allowed
since the supplicant is required to report Michael MIC errors to the
authenticator.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This information was already available from the nl80211 control port RX
path, but it was not provided to upper layers within wpa_supplicant and
hostapd. It can be helpful, so parse the information from the driver
event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
sm->pairwise_set needs to be set whenever the TK has been configured to
the driver to request following EAPOL frames to be encrypted (or more
specifically, not to request them to not be encrypted). The FILS case
missed this setting and that could result in rekeying or
reauthentication in an associated started with FILS not working
correctly.
Fixes: da24c5aa1c ("FILS: Set TK after association (AP)")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The wpa_supplicant check for whether a TK is configured into the driver
was broken during the time this information is needed for rekeying or
reauthenticating with another 4-way handshake. sm->ptk.installed is not
set at the point the EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 is sent and while that means the
initial 4-way handshake needs to prevent encryption, the consecutive
4-way handshake must not be doing that since the old key (TK) is still
in the driver. Fix this so that the EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 during rekeying
does not get transmitted without encryption.
Fixes: a79ed06871 ("Add no_encrypt flag for control port TX")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Currently a corrupted handshake message 1/4 causes the client to
disconnect from the network. This can lead to a denial-of-service
vulnerability allowing an adversary to forcibly disconnect a client from
protected networks even when Wi-Fi Management Frame Protection (MFP) is
enforced if the driver allows unencrypted EAPOL-Key frames to be
received after key configuration..
Fix this by discarding the corrupted handshake message 1/4.
This issue was discovered by Domien Schepers (Northeastern University)
and Mathy Vanhoef (imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven).
Signed-off-by: Domien Schepers <schepers.d@northeastern.edu>
The wpa_supplicant implementation for this functionality is going to be
changed to not require disconnection, so prepare the test case to not
fail.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_validate_wpa_ie() might update sm->* values, so it should not be
allowed for an existing STA entry if that STA has negotiated MFP to be
used for the association. Fix this by first checking whether an SA Query
procedure needs to be initiated. In particular, this prevents a
potential bypass of the disconnection protection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The driver can consider EHT specific parameters such as the puncture
pattern for ACS when this flag attribute is indicated by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Add a check to avoid sending VHT channel definition when EHT is enabled
in the 2.4 GHz band since the 2.4 GHz band isn't supposed to use VHT
operations. Also add EHT enabled info into debug prints.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
This adds wifi_generation=7 line to the STATUS output if the driver
reports (Re)Association Request frame and (Re)Association Response frame
information elements in the association or connection event with EHT
capability IEs.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Do not consider optional octets maximum lengths when validating EHT
fixed fields length. Furthermore, do not use the first two octets of the
PPE Thresholds field without explicitly confirming that these octets
were included in the element and fix PPE Thresholds field length
calculation.
Fixes: a6d1b4c46c ("EHT: Process (Re)Association Request frame capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Send the status code from the AP authentication response instead of
sending the hardcoded WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE when the external
SAE authentication failure is due to an explicit rejection by the AP.
This will allow the driver to indicate the correct status in connect
response.
For example, an AP can send WLAN_STATUS_AP_UNABLE_TO_HANDLE_NEW_STA in
SAE authentication response. With this change the driver gets the real
status for the SAE authentication failure and it can fill the correct
status in the connect response event.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
enum macaddr_acl is forward declared in wpa_supplicant/ap.h.
c++ compiler doesn't allow forward declaration. So to fix the
compilation error, moved the enum macaddr_acl declaration out
of struct hostapd_bss_config.
Signed-off-by: Sunil Ravi <sunilravi@google.com>
The OCSP check here is specific to TLS 1.3 and the TLS1_3_VERSION value
is not available in older library versions. Comment this check out from
such cases since it is not applicable with such an old library.
Fixes: 10746875e2 ("OpenSSL: Allow no OCSP response when resuming a session with TLS 1.3")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
LibreSSL does not seem have SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(), so comment out
these not really critical calls when building with that library.
Fixes: 81e2498889 ("OpenSSL: Limit the number of TLS 1.3 session tickets to one")
Fixes: decac7cd1e ("OpenSSL: Do not send out a TLS 1.3 session ticket if caching disabled")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md() does not seem to be available in
LibreSSL, so for now, comment out this functionality whenever building
with that library.
Fixes: 36b11bbcff ("OpenSSL: RSA-OAEP-SHA-256 encryption/decryption")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() is not available in boringSSL.
So protect the call to SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() under
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) to fix the compilation error.
Fixes: decac7cd1e ("OpenSSL: Do not send out a TLS 1.3 session ticket if caching disabled")
Fixes: 81e2498889 ("OpenSSL: Limit the number of TLS 1.3 session tickets to one")
Signed-off-by: Sunil Ravi <sunilravi@google.com>
Add a notification message to indicate reason for TLS handshake failure
due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The TLS protocol design for renegotiation was identified to have a
significant security flaw in 2009 and an extension to secure this design
was published in 2010 (RFC 5746). However, some old RADIUS
authentication servers without support for this are still used commonly.
This is obviously not good from the security view point, but since there
are cases where the user of a network service has no realistic means for
getting the authentication server upgraded, TLS handshake may still need
to be allowed to be able to use the network.
OpenSSL 3.0 disabled the client side workaround by default and this
resulted in issues connection to some networks with insecure
authentication servers. With OpenSSL 3.0, the client is now enforcing
security by refusing to authenticate with such servers. The pre-3.0
behavior of ignoring this issue and leaving security to the server can
now be enabled with a new phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1.
This should be used only when having to connect to a network that has an
insecure authentication server that cannot be upgraded.
The old (pre-2010) TLS renegotiation mechanism might open security
vulnerabilities if the authentication server were to allow TLS
renegotiation to be initiated. While this is unlikely to cause real
issues with EAP-TLS, there might be cases where use of PEAP or TTLS with
an authentication server that does not support RFC 5746 might result in
a security vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
