Use imsi_privacy_cert as the name of the configuration parameter for the
X.509v3 certificate that contains the RSA public key needed for IMSI
privacy. The only allowed format for this information is a PEM-encoded
X.509 certificate, so the previous name was somewhat confusing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This is an allocated resource so it needs to be free on the error path.
Fixes: 42871a5d25 ("EAP-SIM/AKA peer: IMSI privacy")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Disable a network profile that has set the imsi_privacy_key if a valid
key cannot be read from the specified file. Previously, this check was
done only after having associated, but there is no point in associating
just to see EAP authentication fail in such a case. This is needed for
avoiding connection attempts if the X.509 certificate for IMSI privacy
has expired.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Commit 9afb68b039 ("OpenSSL: Allow systemwide secpolicy overrides for
TLS version") with commit 58bbcfa31b ("OpenSSL: Update security level
drop for TLS 1.0/1.1 with OpenSSL 3.0") allow this workaround to be
enabled with an explicit network configuration parameter. However, the
default settings are still allowing TLS 1.0 and 1.1 to be negotiated
just to see them fail immediately when using OpenSSL 3.0. This is not
exactly helpful especially when the OpenSSL error message for this
particular case is "internal error" which does not really say anything
about the reason for the error.
It is is a bit inconvenient to update the security policy for this
particular issue based on the negotiated TLS version since that happens
in the middle of processing for the first message from the server.
However, this can be done by using the debug callback for printing out
the received TLS messages during processing.
Drop the OpenSSL security level to 0 if that is the only option to
continue the TLS negotiation, i.e., when TLS 1.0/1.1 are still allowed
in wpa_supplicant default configuration and OpenSSL 3.0 with the
constraint on MD5-SHA1 use.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Unfortunately, some objects (WlantestCapture, WpaSupplicant
and wpaspy.Ctrl) use __del__ and actually have some logic
there. This is more or less wrong, and we should be using
context managers for it. However, cleaning that up is a
pretty large task.
Unfortunately, __del__ can cause reentrant logging which is
wrong too, because it might be invoked while in the middle
of a logging call, and the __del__ of these objects closes
connections and logs while doing that.
Since we're (likely) using cpython, we can work around this
by explicitly calling gc.collect() in a context where the
logging and close is fine, not only ensuring that all the
connections are closed properly before the next test, but
also fixing the issue with reentrant logging.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Instead of printing a very long line of the failed tests, print the test
case names on separate lines up to the number of available lines at the
bottom of the screen. This avoids some issues with curses and overlong
lines. Furthermore, display the last failed test cases instead of
somewhat confusing sequence of test case names from the VMs.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
tcp_addr=from-uri can now be used as a special case for initiating
DPP-over-TCP to the destination indicated in the peer bootstrapping URI.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Parse the host information, if present, in bootstrapping URI and allow
such information to be added when generating the URI.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Only use the bandwidth bits that are applicable for the current
operating band. This avoids use of reserved bits when determining the
length of the Support EHT-MCS And NSS Set field length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This test case could fail if there was an old BSS entry from a previous
test case in the scan results.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This test case was checking the exact key info bits in EAPOL-Key frames
during PTK rekeying as such, needs to be updated to match the
implementation change on the Secure bit setting.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 is ambiguous on how the Secure bit is set in
EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in the case where 4-way handshake is use to
rekey the PTK. 12.7.2 describes this with "set to 1 once the initial key
exchange is complete" while 12.7.6 shows EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 using
Secure=0 without any consideration on whether the handshake is for
rekeying.
TGme seems to be moving towards clarifying this to use Secure=1 based on
there being a shared PTKSA between the Authenticator and the Supplicant.
In other words, this would use Secure=1 in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in
the case of rekeying. Change implementation to match that. This bit was
already practically ignored on the reception side, so this should not
have impact on actual functionality beyond this one bit changing its
value in the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
There was a possible race condition here between the hostapd request
transmission and wpa_supplicant response command. Wait for the
wpa_supplicant event that indicates reception of the request before
issuing the DSCP_RESP command to avoid failures.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Check the full MBIE length against the buffer length explicitly before
the debug print. This is for locally generated data, so the bounds
checking is not critical here, but it is better to use proper checking
anyway to avoid static analyzer complaints.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Avoid the somewhat confusing mechanism of determining the bitfield index
from the assigned IP address to make this easier for static analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Limit the GAS comeback delay to 60000 TUs, i.e., about 60 seconds. This
is mostly to silence static analyzers that complain about unbounded
value from external sources even though this is clearly bounded by being
a 16-bit value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the URL, i.e., pos[0], is verified here to be within the
bounds of the recieved message, but that seemed to be done in a manner
that might bee too complex for static analyzers to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use local variables and common checking of the selector (or vendor
specific IE header) to make the bounds checking easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
BIT(r) is not sufficient here since it does not cover 64 bit values.
Write this out with 1ULL to be large enough for the shift operation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EHT changes made this checking inconsistent. If he_cap can be NULL
in case of EHT being enabled, better make sure it does not get
dereferenced without an explicit check.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is testing code, but it's better to check the return value
explicitly even if this were not really able to fail in practice.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like fst_wpa_obj::get_hw_modes would have been left
uninitialized in hostapd. It is not obviously clear why this would not
have caused issues earlier, but in any case, better make this set
properly to allow unexpected behavior should that function pointer ever
be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Nul terminate the struct p2p_go_neg_results::passphrase explicitly to
keep static analyzers happier. This was already nul terminated in
practice due to the full array being cleared to zero on initialization,
but that was apparently not clear enough for some analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add a parameter (non_coloc_6ghz=1) to the manual scan command to disable
6 GHz collocated scanning.
This option can be used to disable 6 GHz collocated scan logic. Note
that due to limitations on Probe Request frame transmissions on the 6
GHz band mandated in IEEE Std 802.11ax-2021 it is very likely that
non-PSC channels would be scanned passively and this can take a
significant amount of time.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Set NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_COLOCATED_6GHZ in the scan parameters to enable
scanning for co-located APs discovered based on neighbor reports from
the 2.4/5 GHz bands when not scanning passively. Do so only when
collocated scanning is not disabled by higher layer logic.
Signed-off-by: Tova Mussai <tova.mussai@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com>
Without this, hostapd generates Probe Response frames with the null
destination address when hostapd enables unsolicited Probe Response
frame transmission. Fix this to use the broadcast address instead.
Fixes: 024b4b2a29 ("AP: Unsolicited broadcast Probe Response configuration")
Signed-off-by: MeiChia Chiu <meichia.chiu@mediatek.com>
This allows the debugging level to be reduced from hostapd command line
similarly to the already existing flag in wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor <o.mazor@genexis.eu>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Start and
EAPOL-Logoff are potential candidate for such attacks since those frames
could be used to terminate an authentication or initiate a new EAP
authentication. Such an attack could result in the station ending up
disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state
with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Start/Logoff/EAP frames on the AP/Authenticator when it is
known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is
enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that
does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force
disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all
drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL
frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate
whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one
potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to
initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not
allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be
injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack
could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum,
getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Key msg 1/4
is one potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be
used to initiate a 4-way handshake that the real AP might never complete
and the station might end up disconnecting because of that or at
minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAPOL-Key Request frame with Error=1 is not really a request for a new
key, so allow that frame to be sent even if PTK0 rekey is not allowed
since the supplicant is required to report Michael MIC errors to the
authenticator.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This information was already available from the nl80211 control port RX
path, but it was not provided to upper layers within wpa_supplicant and
hostapd. It can be helpful, so parse the information from the driver
event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
