This is needed to be able to use the same implementation for updating
the connection parameters in the driver during an association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Update the replay counter after a roam for all cases. This restores the
design back to what it was before commit
01ef320f19 ('FILS: Update ERP next
sequence number with driver offload').
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
After an initial connection certain connection parameters may be
updated. It may be necessary to send these parameters to drivers since
these will be used in driver-initiated roaming cases. This commit
defines the driver_ops call for this and implements the needed
functionality for the nl80211 driver interface.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add additional attributes to specify the PMK, PMKID, and the ERP next
sequence number to the vendor subcommand
QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_KEY_MGMT_ROAM_AUTH. These are needed in case
of an offloaded FILS roaming.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from
scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS
just before running the new scan for the connection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows a more accurate scan result age to be fetched than the one
available through NL80211_BSS_SEEN_MS_AGO.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within
struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional
layer of protection against unexpected states.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter
wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable
retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install
keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is
similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4
retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group
message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use
aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
EAPOL-Key messages.
This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks
on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices
cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the
retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with
a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side
vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced
robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with
heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the
key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround
is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by
adding the following to the build configuration:
CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new wpa_supplicant RESEND_ASSOC command can be used to request the
last (Re)Association Request frame to be sent to the AP to test FT
protocol behavior.
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new wpa_supplicant "KEY_REQUEST <error=0/1> <pairwise=0/1>" command
can be used to request an EAPOL-Key Request frame to be sent to the AP.
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd control interface command SET_KEY can be used to request
an arbitrary key to be configured to the driver.
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd control interface commands "RESEND_M1 <addr>" and
"RESEND_M3 <addr>" can be used to request a retransmission of the 4-Way
Handshake messages 1/4 and 3/4 witht he same or modified ANonce (in M1).
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd control interface command "RESEND_GROUP_M1 <addr>" can
be used to request a retransmission of the Group Key Handshake message
1/2 for the current GTK.
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to test replay protection. The "RESET_PN" command in
wpa_supplicant and "RESET_PN <addr>" command in hostapd resets the local
counters to zero for the last configured key. For hostapd, the address
parameter specifies which STA this operation is for or selects GTK
("ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff") or IGTK ("ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IGTK").
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This changes wlantest behavior to mark CCMP/TKIP replays for more cases
in case a device is resetting its TSC. Previously, the RSC check got
cleared on the first marked replay and the following packets were not
marked as replays if they continued incrementing the PN even if that PN
was below the highest value received with this key at some point in the
past.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it easier to understand the cases where PMK gets configured
based on information from upper layer call (e.g., a PSK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
break this property.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This was originally added to allow the IEEE 802.11 protocol to be
tested, but there are no known fully functional implementations based on
this nor any known deployments of PeerKey functionality. Furthermore,
PeerKey design in the IEEE Std 802.11-2016 standard has already been
marked as obsolete for DLS and it is being considered for complete
removal in REVmd.
This implementation did not really work, so it could not have been used
in practice. For example, key configuration was using incorrect
algorithm values (WPA_CIPHER_* instead of WPA_ALG_*) which resulted in
mapping to an invalid WPA_ALG_* value for the actual driver operation.
As such, the derived key could not have been successfully set for the
link.
Since there are bugs in this implementation and there does not seem to
be any future for the PeerKey design with DLS (TDLS being the future for
DLS), the best approach is to simply delete all this code to simplify
the EAPOL-Key handling design and to get rid of any potential issues if
these code paths were accidentially reachable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
(Re)Association Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous designed worked since wpa_supplicant did not track pending
request state. With such tracking added, this test case needs to make
sure there is a pending operation when injecting the invalid response.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous implementation ended up starting a new EAPOL-Key 4-way
handshake if the STA were to attempt to perform another association.
This resulted in immediate disconnection since the PTK was not ready for
configuring FILS TK at the point when EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 is sent out.
This is better than alloing the association to continue with the same TK
reconfigured, but not really ideal.
Address this potential sequence by not starting a new 4-way handshake on
the additional association attempt. Instead, allow the association to
complete, but do so without reconfiguring the TK to avoid potential
issues with PN reuse with the same TK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows ext_mgmt_frame_handling=1 cases with hostapd to process TX
status events based on external processing. This is useful for increased
test coverage of management frame processing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 03ed0a5239 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.
For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
This fixes the earlier fix in commit
ad00d64e7d ('Fix TK configuration to the
driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
message 3/4.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
frames on RX side.
This issue was introduced by the commit
0e84c25434 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
failed.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
The new sae_password network profile parameter can now be used to set
the SAE password instead of the previously used psk parameter. This
allows shorter than 8 characters and longer than 63 characters long
passwords to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new sae_password hostapd configuration parameter can now be used to
set the SAE password instead of the previously used wpa_passphrase
parameter. This allows shorter than 8 characters and longer than 63
characters long passwords to be used. In addition, this makes it
possible to configure a BSS with both WPA-PSK and SAE enabled to use
different passphrase/password based on which AKM is selected.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While considering the movement of P2P GO from its current operating
channel, do not mark a DFS channel as invalid if DFS is offloaded
to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
