The DPP_CONTROLLER_START control interface command can be used without
any arguments, so do not force at least a single argument to be included
in wpa_cli and hostapd_cli.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
CRYPTO_RSA_OAEP_SHA256 is not sufficient here since ssid->eap does not
exist without IEEE8021X_EAPOL.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The new SAE AKM suites are defined to use H2E, so ignore the sae_pwe
value when these AKM suites are used similarly to the way H2E gets
enabled when SAE Password Identifiers are used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Use the existing helper function instead of maintaining multiple copies
of lists of SAE key management suites.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This was already done in hostapd and same is needed for wpa_supplicant
to avoid testing issues due to session overlap detection from previous
test cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Verify that the peer does not change its bootstrapping key between the
PKEX exchange and the authentication exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
When PKEX was started through the push button mechanism, the own
bootstrapping key was not bound correctly to the Authentication phase
information and that ended up in incorrectly generating a new
bootstrapping key for the Authentication exchange. Fix this by added the
needed own=<id> parameter into the cached parameters when using push
button.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The peer=<id> information about the specific boostrapping key provided
through PKEX was added for Public Action frame cases, but the TCP
variant did not do same. Add the same information there to maintain
knowledge of the specific peer bootstrapping key from PKEX to
Authentication exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Extend DPP push button support in wpa_supplicant to allow the role of
the Configurator to be used. This provides similar functionality to the
way the DPP_PUSH_BUTTON command in hostapd worked when providing the
configuration parameters with that command (instead of building the
config object based on current AP configuration).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
It is possible for a Controller to receive a copy of its own PKEX
Exchange Request in the case where the Controller is initiating a PKEX
exchange through a Relay. The Configurator role in the device would have
a matching PKEX code in that case and the device might reply as a PKEX
responder which would result in going through the exchange with the
Controller device itself. That is clearly not desired, so recognize this
special case by checking whether the Encrypted Key attribute value
matches a pending locally generated one when processing a received PKEX
Exchange Request.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
We are not supposed to reuse these without being explicitly requested to
perform PKEX again. There is not a strong use case for being able to
provision an Enrollee multiple times with PKEX, so this should have no
issues on the Enrollee. For a Configurator, there might be some use
cases that would benefit from being able to use the same code with
multiple Enrollee devices, e.g., for guess access with a laptop and a
smart phone. That case will now require a new DPP_PKEX_ADD command on
the Configurator after each completion of the provisioning exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The new global configuration parameter
dpp_connector_privacy_default=<0/1> can now be used to set the default
value for the dpp_connector_privacy parameter for all new networks
provisioned using DPP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add a privacy protecting variant of the peer introduction protocol to
allow the station device to hide its Connector from 3rd parties. The new
wpa_supplicant network profile parameter dpp_connector_privacy=1 can be
used to select this alternative mechanism to the peer introduction
protocol added in the initial release of DPP.
It should be noted that the new variant does not work with older DPP APs
(i.e., requires support for release 3). As such, this new variant is
disabled by default.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This allows the DPP Configuration Request Object from an Enrollee to be
extended with 3rd party information. The new dpp_extra_conf_req_name and
dpp_extra_conf_req_value configuration parameters specify the name of
the added JSON node and its contents. For example:
dpp_extra_conf_req_name=org.example
dpp_extra_conf_req_value={"a":1,"b":"test"}
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Allow the Responder/Initiator hash values to be corrupted in Push Button
Presence Announcement messages for testing purposes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add support to use a push button -based bootstrap mechanism with DPP.
The new DPP_PUSH_BUTTON control interface command enables this mode on
the AP/hostapd and station/wpa_supplicant. This goes through the
following sequence of events: a suitable peer in active push button mode
is discovered with session overlap detection, PKEX is executed with
bootstrap key hash validation, DPP authentication and configuration
exchanges are performed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Move most of CHANWIDTH_* definitions from ieee80211_defs.h to defs.h as
the definitions are getting used mostly for internal purpose only. Also
change prefix of the definitions to CONF_OPER_CHWIDTH_* and update in
all the files accordingly.
Leave the couple of VHT-specific exceptions to use the old defines (the
reason why they were originally added as VHT values), to avoid use of
clearly marked configuration values in information elements. In
addition, use the defines instead of magic values where appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Aleti Nageshwar Reddy <quic_anageshw@quicinc.com>
For hidden GBK encoding of a Chinese SSID, both the UTF-8 and GBK
encoding profiles are added into wpa_supplicant to make sure the
connection succeeds. In this situation, wpa_supplicant_select_network()
will not be called so current_ssid is NULL when association begins.
Android monitors the WPA_EVENT_STATE_CHANGE event to get the SSID and
BSSID. When connecting to a Chinese SSID, in case of association
rejection happens, Android will report null SSID to OEM APP because
current_ssid is updated after wpa_supplicant_set_state(wpa_s,
WPA_ASSOCIATING), which may cause confusion.
Fix this by setting the current_ssid before changing state to
ASSOCIATING.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Previously, the driver could optionally (using QCA vendor command)
provide a preferred channel list to wpa_supplicant for channel selection
during the GO negotiation. Channel selection process can be more
efficient with the information of weights and flags of the preferred
channel list that can be provided by the driver. Use a weighted
preferred channel list provided by the driver for channel selection
during GO negotiation if such a list is available.
Signed-off-by: Sreeramya Soratkal <quic_ssramya@quicinc.com>
Extend IMSI privacy functionality to allow an attribute (in name=value
format) to be added using the new imsi_privacy_attr parameter.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This can be used to make sure wpa_supplicant does not process DPP
messages sent in Public Action frames when a test setup is targeting
DPP-over-TCP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Use imsi_privacy_cert as the name of the configuration parameter for the
X.509v3 certificate that contains the RSA public key needed for IMSI
privacy. The only allowed format for this information is a PEM-encoded
X.509 certificate, so the previous name was somewhat confusing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Disable a network profile that has set the imsi_privacy_key if a valid
key cannot be read from the specified file. Previously, this check was
done only after having associated, but there is no point in associating
just to see EAP authentication fail in such a case. This is needed for
avoiding connection attempts if the X.509 certificate for IMSI privacy
has expired.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
tcp_addr=from-uri can now be used as a special case for initiating
DPP-over-TCP to the destination indicated in the peer bootstrapping URI.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Limit the GAS comeback delay to 60000 TUs, i.e., about 60 seconds. This
is mostly to silence static analyzers that complain about unbounded
value from external sources even though this is clearly bounded by being
a 16-bit value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the URL, i.e., pos[0], is verified here to be within the
bounds of the recieved message, but that seemed to be done in a manner
that might bee too complex for static analyzers to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like fst_wpa_obj::get_hw_modes would have been left
uninitialized in hostapd. It is not obviously clear why this would not
have caused issues earlier, but in any case, better make this set
properly to allow unexpected behavior should that function pointer ever
be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add a parameter (non_coloc_6ghz=1) to the manual scan command to disable
6 GHz collocated scanning.
This option can be used to disable 6 GHz collocated scan logic. Note
that due to limitations on Probe Request frame transmissions on the 6
GHz band mandated in IEEE Std 802.11ax-2021 it is very likely that
non-PSC channels would be scanned passively and this can take a
significant amount of time.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Set NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_COLOCATED_6GHZ in the scan parameters to enable
scanning for co-located APs discovered based on neighbor reports from
the 2.4/5 GHz bands when not scanning passively. Do so only when
collocated scanning is not disabled by higher layer logic.
Signed-off-by: Tova Mussai <tova.mussai@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one
potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to
initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not
allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be
injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack
could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum,
getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This information was already available from the nl80211 control port RX
path, but it was not provided to upper layers within wpa_supplicant and
hostapd. It can be helpful, so parse the information from the driver
event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds wifi_generation=7 line to the STATUS output if the driver
reports (Re)Association Request frame and (Re)Association Response frame
information elements in the association or connection event with EHT
capability IEs.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Send the status code from the AP authentication response instead of
sending the hardcoded WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE when the external
SAE authentication failure is due to an explicit rejection by the AP.
This will allow the driver to indicate the correct status in connect
response.
For example, an AP can send WLAN_STATUS_AP_UNABLE_TO_HANDLE_NEW_STA in
SAE authentication response. With this change the driver gets the real
status for the SAE authentication failure and it can fill the correct
status in the connect response event.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
The TLS protocol design for renegotiation was identified to have a
significant security flaw in 2009 and an extension to secure this design
was published in 2010 (RFC 5746). However, some old RADIUS
authentication servers without support for this are still used commonly.
This is obviously not good from the security view point, but since there
are cases where the user of a network service has no realistic means for
getting the authentication server upgraded, TLS handshake may still need
to be allowed to be able to use the network.
OpenSSL 3.0 disabled the client side workaround by default and this
resulted in issues connection to some networks with insecure
authentication servers. With OpenSSL 3.0, the client is now enforcing
security by refusing to authenticate with such servers. The pre-3.0
behavior of ignoring this issue and leaving security to the server can
now be enabled with a new phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1.
This should be used only when having to connect to a network that has an
insecure authentication server that cannot be upgraded.
The old (pre-2010) TLS renegotiation mechanism might open security
vulnerabilities if the authentication server were to allow TLS
renegotiation to be initiated. While this is unlikely to cause real
issues with EAP-TLS, there might be cases where use of PEAP or TTLS with
an authentication server that does not support RFC 5746 might result in
a security vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
pbkdf2_sha1() may return errors and this should be checked in calls.
This is especially an issue with FIPS builds because the FIPS
requirement is that the password must be at least 14 characters.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
Add support for IMSI privacy in the EAP-SIM/AKA peer implementation. If
the new wpa_supplicant network configuration parameter imsi_privacy_key
is used to specify an RSA public key in a form of a PEM encoded X.509v3
certificate, that key will be used to encrypt the permanent identity
(IMSI) in the transmitted EAP messages.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add new crypto wrappers for performing RSA-OAEP-SHA-256 encryption and
decryption. These are needed for IMSI privacy.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Modify hostapd_set_freq_params() to include EHT parameters and update
the calling functions to match.
Signed-off-by: Muna Sinada <quic_msinada@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <quic_alokad@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com>
