Commit graph

18015 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jouni Malinen
e90ea900a9 tests: sigma_dut DPP TCP Configurator as initiator with addr from URI
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-19 22:54:44 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
ed325ff0f9 DPP: Allow TCP destination (address/port) to be used from peer URI
tcp_addr=from-uri can now be used as a special case for initiating
DPP-over-TCP to the destination indicated in the peer bootstrapping URI.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-19 22:53:36 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
e58dabbcfb tests: DPP URI with host info
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-19 17:55:25 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
37bb4178b5 DPP: Host information in bootstrapping URI
Parse the host information, if present, in bootstrapping URI and allow
such information to be added when generating the URI.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-19 17:55:25 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
1142b6e415 EHT: Do not check HE PHY capability info reserved fields
Only use the bandwidth bits that are applicable for the current
operating band. This avoids use of reserved bits when determining the
length of the Support EHT-MCS And NSS Set field length.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-16 19:39:57 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
7173992b96 tests: Flush scan table in ap_wps_priority to make it more robust
This test case could fail if there was an old BSS entry from a previous
test case in the scan results.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-16 19:09:23 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
b9313e17e8 tests: Update ap_wpa2_psk_ext_delayed_ptk_rekey to match implementation
This test case was checking the exact key info bits in EAPOL-Key frames
during PTK rekeying as such, needs to be updated to match the
implementation change on the Secure bit setting.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-16 19:06:47 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
bc36991791 Use Secure=1 in PTK rekeying EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 is ambiguous on how the Secure bit is set in
EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in the case where 4-way handshake is use to
rekey the PTK. 12.7.2 describes this with "set to 1 once the initial key
exchange is complete" while 12.7.6 shows EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 using
Secure=0 without any consideration on whether the handshake is for
rekeying.

TGme seems to be moving towards clarifying this to use Secure=1 based on
there being a shared PTKSA between the Authenticator and the Supplicant.
In other words, this would use Secure=1 in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in
the case of rekeying. Change implementation to match that. This bit was
already practically ignored on the reception side, so this should not
have impact on actual functionality beyond this one bit changing its
value in the frame.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-16 17:47:17 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
d2ce1b4d6c tests: Wait for request before responding in dscp_response
There was a possible race condition here between the hostapd request
transmission and wpa_supplicant response command. Wait for the
wpa_supplicant event that indicates reception of the request before
issuing the DSCP_RESP command to avoid failures.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-09 11:45:33 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
b859b9bcea Simplify wpa_bss_get_vendor_ie_multi_beacon() bounds checking
This makes it easier for static analyzers to understand.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 17:28:58 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
fc9648a6a1 DPP: Debug print if not relay is available for PKEX exchange
This makes it easier to see what happened with the received PKEX frame.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 17:25:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
1739d50c20 FST: More robust bounds checking of local data in fst_dump_mb_ies()
Check the full MBIE length against the buffer length explicitly before
the debug print. This is for locally generated data, so the bounds
checking is not critical here, but it is better to use proper checking
anyway to avoid static analyzer complaints.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 17:18:58 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
63eb98a8ee SAE: Make Anti-Clogging token element parsing simpler
This will hopefully be easier for static analyzers to understand.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 17:14:34 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
a6e04a0676 Simplify DSCP policy parsing
Make the bounds checking easier for static analyzers to understand.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 17:09:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
77bb12a604 P2P: Maintain ip_pool bitfield index separately
Avoid the somewhat confusing mechanism of determining the bitfield index
from the assigned IP address to make this easier for static analyzers.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:59:31 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
3f3ce0571c Check sscanf() return value in TWT_SETUP parsing
Reject invalid values instead of proceeding.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:55:45 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
2982e50c15 EAP-SAKA: Simplify attribute parser for static analyzers
Make bounds checking in eap_sake_parse_attributes() easier to analyze.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:53:38 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
6e8518749f GAS: Limit maximum comeback delay value
Limit the GAS comeback delay to 60000 TUs, i.e., about 60 seconds. This
is mostly to silence static analyzers that complain about unbounded
value from external sources even though this is clearly bounded by being
a 16-bit value.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:41:37 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
fe1dc9ba77 WNM: Try to make bounds checking easier for static analyzers
The length of the URL, i.e., pos[0], is verified here to be within the
bounds of the recieved message, but that seemed to be done in a manner
that might bee too complex for static analyzers to understand.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:41:31 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
f8615990e2 Simplify wpa_parse_kde_ies()
Use a local variable to store the full IE length instead of calculating
it multiple times.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:36:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
61d37f44b7 Simplify wpa_parse_generic()
Use local variables and common checking of the selector (or vendor
specific IE header) to make the bounds checking easier to understand.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:36:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
469528a6e5 BSS coloring: Fix bitmap check
BIT(r) is not sufficient here since it does not cover 64 bit values.
Write this out with 1ULL to be large enough for the shift operation.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 16:36:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
8392c86df0 Check he_cap pointer in hostapd_set_freq_params() consistently
The EHT changes made this checking inconsistent. If he_cap can be NULL
in case of EHT being enabled, better make sure it does not get
dereferenced without an explicit check.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 00:39:20 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
2227c85a94 DPP: Verify that crypto_ec_point_to_bin() succeeds
This is testing code, but it's better to check the return value
explicitly even if this were not really able to fail in practice.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 00:31:25 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
a8c3199527 nl80211: Verify that nla_put_flag() succeeds for background radar
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 00:29:48 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
993eb12407 FST: Make sure get_hw_modes() callback is set for hostapd
It looks like fst_wpa_obj::get_hw_modes would have been left
uninitialized in hostapd. It is not obviously clear why this would not
have caused issues earlier, but in any case, better make this set
properly to allow unexpected behavior should that function pointer ever
be used.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-08 00:27:51 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
4537fe124a P2P: Explicit nul termination of the generated passphrase
Nul terminate the struct p2p_go_neg_results::passphrase explicitly to
keep static analyzers happier. This was already nul terminated in
practice due to the full array being cleared to zero on initialization,
but that was apparently not clear enough for some analyzers.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 23:59:23 +03:00
Ilan Peer
95f4935739 tests: Add coverage for testing disabling collocated 6 GHz scan
Extend 'scan' test to cover 'non_coloc_6ghz' parsing.

Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Ilan Peer
79dc7f6190 scan: Add option to disable 6 GHz collocated scanning
Add a parameter (non_coloc_6ghz=1) to the manual scan command to disable
6 GHz collocated scanning.

This option can be used to disable 6 GHz collocated scan logic. Note
that due to limitations on Probe Request frame transmissions on the 6
GHz band mandated in IEEE Std 802.11ax-2021 it is very likely that
non-PSC channels would be scanned passively and this can take a
significant amount of time.

Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Tova Mussai
3b8d9da9b5 nl80211: Set NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_COLOCATED_6GHZ in scan
Set NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_COLOCATED_6GHZ in the scan parameters to enable
scanning for co-located APs discovered based on neighbor reports from
the 2.4/5 GHz bands when not scanning passively. Do so only when
collocated scanning is not disabled by higher layer logic.

Signed-off-by: Tova Mussai <tova.mussai@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
MeiChia Chiu
96a7f38329 hostapd: Add the destination address of unsolicited Probe Response frame
Without this, hostapd generates Probe Response frames with the null
destination address when hostapd enables unsolicited Probe Response
frame transmission. Fix this to use the broadcast address instead.

Fixes: 024b4b2a29 ("AP: Unsolicited broadcast Probe Response configuration")
Signed-off-by: MeiChia Chiu <meichia.chiu@mediatek.com>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Orr Mazor
16e755754f Add -q flag to hostapd in order to control log level
This allows the debugging level to be reduced from hostapd command line
similarly to the already existing flag in wpa_supplicant.

Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor <o.mazor@genexis.eu>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
29dcebea70 tests: WPA2-EAP AP with PMF and EAP frame injection
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
8690374439 Discard unencrypted EAPOL/EAP when TK is set and PMF is enabled (AP)
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.

However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Start and
EAPOL-Logoff are potential candidate for such attacks since those frames
could be used to terminate an authentication or initiate a new EAP
authentication. Such an attack could result in the station ending up
disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state
with the AP.

Drop EAPOL-Start/Logoff/EAP frames on the AP/Authenticator when it is
known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is
enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that
does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force
disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all
drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL
frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate
whether the frame was encrypted.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
3c2fbe9f56 Discard unencrypted EAPOL-EAP when TK is set and PMF is enabled
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.

However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one
potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to
initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not
allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be
injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack
could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum,
getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.

Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
872a57500c Discard unencrypted EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 when TK is set and PMF is enabled
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.

However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Key msg 1/4
is one potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be
used to initiate a 4-way handshake that the real AP might never complete
and the station might end up disconnecting because of that or at
minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.

Drop EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
e6c0e12158 Do not prevent Michael MIC error report based on disallowed PTK0 rekey
EAPOL-Key Request frame with Error=1 is not really a request for a new
key, so allow that frame to be sent even if PTK0 rekey is not allowed
since the supplicant is required to report Michael MIC errors to the
authenticator.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 21:37:08 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
18c0ac8901 Provide information about the encryption status of received EAPOL frames
This information was already available from the nl80211 control port RX
path, but it was not provided to upper layers within wpa_supplicant and
hostapd. It can be helpful, so parse the information from the driver
event.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 21:37:03 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
7ee814201b FILS: Set pairwise_set when configuring TK after association
sm->pairwise_set needs to be set whenever the TK has been configured to
the driver to request following EAPOL frames to be encrypted (or more
specifically, not to request them to not be encrypted). The FILS case
missed this setting and that could result in rekeying or
reauthentication in an associated started with FILS not working
correctly.

Fixes: da24c5aa1c ("FILS: Set TK after association (AP)")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 20:36:49 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
98278c0de0 Fix no_encrypt flag in control port TX for rekeying
The wpa_supplicant check for whether a TK is configured into the driver
was broken during the time this information is needed for rekeying or
reauthenticating with another 4-way handshake. sm->ptk.installed is not
set at the point the EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 is sent and while that means the
initial 4-way handshake needs to prevent encryption, the consecutive
4-way handshake must not be doing that since the old key (TK) is still
in the driver. Fix this so that the EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 during rekeying
does not get transmitted without encryption.

Fixes: a79ed06871 ("Add no_encrypt flag for control port TX")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 18:54:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
8bbd62afe4 tests: PMF and EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 injection
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 18:54:09 +03:00
Domien Schepers
b1172c19e1 WPA: Discard EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 with corrupted information elements
Currently a corrupted handshake message 1/4 causes the client to
disconnect from the network. This can lead to a denial-of-service
vulnerability allowing an adversary to forcibly disconnect a client from
protected networks even when Wi-Fi Management Frame Protection (MFP) is
enforced if the driver allows unencrypted EAPOL-Key frames to be
received after key configuration..

Fix this by discarding the corrupted handshake message 1/4.

This issue was discovered by Domien Schepers (Northeastern University)
and Mathy Vanhoef (imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven).

Signed-off-by: Domien Schepers <schepers.d@northeastern.edu>
2022-05-07 18:54:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
f8967ece23 tests: Do not require disconnection in ap_wpa2_psk_supp_proto_msg_1_invalid_kde
The wpa_supplicant implementation for this functionality is going to be
changed to not require disconnection, so prepare the test case to not
fail.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 18:54:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
4f0cff704b tests: WPA2-PSK with PMF and Association Request frame injection
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 18:54:09 +03:00
Jouni Malinen
7a7a4ea578 Check need for SA Query/assoc comeback before updating RSNE parameters
wpa_validate_wpa_ie() might update sm->* values, so it should not be
allowed for an existing STA entry if that STA has negotiated MFP to be
used for the association. Fix this by first checking whether an SA Query
procedure needs to be initiated. In particular, this prevents a
potential bypass of the disconnection protection.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
2022-05-07 18:52:13 +03:00
Veerendranath Jakkam
9d07b9447e tests: EHT open connection
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
2022-05-05 13:26:05 +03:00
Veerendranath Jakkam
27e828d728 ACS: Send EHT enabled info to driver
The driver can consider EHT specific parameters such as the puncture
pattern for ACS when this flag attribute is indicated by userspace.

Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
2022-05-05 13:25:44 +03:00
Veerendranath Jakkam
82066bd367 nl80211: Don't force VHT channel definition with EHT
Add a check to avoid sending VHT channel definition when EHT is enabled
in the 2.4 GHz band since the 2.4 GHz band isn't supposed to use VHT
operations. Also add EHT enabled info into debug prints.

Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
2022-05-05 13:23:51 +03:00
Veerendranath Jakkam
43fe1ce35d EHT: Add [EHT] flag into AP mode STA command
This indicates whether an associated stations supports EHT.

Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
2022-05-05 13:21:35 +03:00
Veerendranath Jakkam
696ad5c2d7 EHT: Indicate wifi_generation=7 in wpa_supplicant STATUS output
This adds wifi_generation=7 line to the STATUS output if the driver
reports (Re)Association Request frame and (Re)Association Response frame
information elements in the association or connection event with EHT
capability IEs.

Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
2022-05-05 13:21:04 +03:00