The test assumes that STA will try to reconnect with the same SAE group
after the first authentication attempt is rejected due to unsupported
group. Since this behaviour is fixed in the previous patch, configure
two different groups to trigger the second authentication attempt.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
It seems that sha256_prf may not always be in the stack trace for
failure checking, possibly due to tail call optimization as it simply
calls sha256_prf_bits with updated parameters. Simply match against
sha256_prf_bits directly to avoid issues due to optimizations.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
These test cases check the BSS entry information and if the kernel scan
cache maintains an old BSS entry for a previous test case for the same
BSSID this can result in a false failure.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This event may be sent before CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED, so modify the test
cases to wait directly for TRANSITION-DISABLE by skipping the separate
wait for CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The first MGMT-TX-STATUS event might be for the initial broadcast
Deauthentication frame instead of the SAE Authentication frame. Skip the
first event and try to process TX status for the first Authentication
frame instead.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
In theory, each device that supports WMM (or the IEEE 802.11 QoS for
that matter) is expected to advertise how many replay counters it
supports and the peer device is supposed to use that information to
restrict the total number of different MSDU priorities (AC/UP) that
might be used. In practice, this is not really done in deployed devices
and instead, it is just assumed that everyone supports the eight
different replay counters so that there is no need to restrict which
MSDU priorities can be used.
hostapd implementation of WMM has advertised support for 16 PTKSA replay
counters from the beginning while wpa_supplicant has not had any code
for setting the supported replay counter fields in RSNE, i.e., has left
the value to 0 which implies that only a single replay counter is
supported. While this does not really result in any real issues with
deployed devices, this is not really correct behavior based on the
current IEEE 802.11 standard and the WMM specification.
Update wpa_supplicant to use similar design to the hostapd RSNE
generation by setting the number of supported PTKSA replay counters to
16 whenever WMM is enabled. For now, this is done based on the
association being for HT/VHT/HE/EHT and also based on the AP supporting
WMM since it is much more likely for the local device to support WMM and
eight replay counters (which can be indicated only with the value that
implies support for 16 counters since there is no separate value for 8).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Extend the SAE-EXT-KEY testing to also cover GCMP-256.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Add the `sae_check_mfp` global option to limit SAE when PMF will
not be selected for the connection.
With this option SAE is avoided when the hardware is not capable
of PMF due to missing ciphers.
With this option SAE is avoided on capable hardware when the AP
does not enable PMF.
Allows falling back to PSK on drivers with the
WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_SAE capability but do not support the BIP cipher
necessary for PMF. This enables configurations that can fall back
to WPA-PSK and avoid problems associating with APs configured
with `sae_require_mfp=1`.
Useful when `pmf=1` and `sae_check_mfp=1` are enabled and networks
are configured with ieee80211w=3 (default) and key_mgmt="WPA-PSK SAE".
In this configuration if the device is unable to use PMF due to
lacking BIP group ciphers it will avoid SAE and fallback to
WPA-PSK for that connection.
Signed-off-by: Jeffery Miller <jefferymiller@google.com>
Flush the scan table explicitly to avoid issues with the ROAM command if
the new AP is not found and an entry from a previous test case is used
instead. This was happening in a number of cases where a SAE test case
was run after sigma_dut_ap_cipher_gcmp_256 which used the second AP
instance and allowed that to show up in the scan results in the next
text case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This group should not be used with SAE and as such, it could cause
confusing test errors here. Use an acceptable group instead.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The parsed 'length' field might pointsbeyond the end of the frame, for
some malformed frames. I haven't figured the source of said packets (I'm
using kernel 4.14.177, FWIW), but we can at least be safer about our
handling of them here.
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Use a helper function for this and add checks for number of test cases
that were missing this. This gets rid of undesired FAIL results
(converts them to SKIP) for test runs where the station do not support
SAE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 407879b690ba ("mac80211: Adjust SAE authentication timeout") in
the kernel tree increased the SAE authentication timeout. This caused
some error case tests to fail. To fix this, extend the timeout for some
error case tests.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
The second round may use PMKSA caching, but AP will need to reject msg
2/4 in that case as well due to RSNXE mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
