Commit 94f1fe6f63 ('Remove master key
extraction from tls_connection_get_keys()') left only fetching of
server/client random, but did not rename the function and structure to
minimize code changes. The only name is quite confusing, so rename this
through the repository to match the new purpose.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, this resulted in unnecessary wait and retransmission of the
previous EAP-Request. Change that to trigger immediate transmission of
EAP-Failure and disconnection since the EAP method cannot really recover
from this state.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use explicit typecasting to avoid implicit conversion warnings in cases
where enum eap_erp_type is used in functions taking an EapType argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The flags argument is used to indicate a failure case (0x80) which
allows erp == NULL. This may be a bit too difficult combination for
static analyzers to understand, so add an explicit check for !erp as
another condition for returning from the function before the erp pointer
gets dereferenced without checking it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While RFC 6124 does not define how Session-Id is constructed for
EAP-EKE, there seems to be consensus among the authors on the
construction. Use this Type | Nonce_P | Nonce_S construction based on
the following email:
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf at gmail.com>
To: ietf at ietf.org
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2010 13:13:42 +0200
Expanding on my previous response, I suggest to resolve Bernard's
concern by adding the following text:
5.6 EAP Key Generation
EAP-EKE can be used for EAP key generation, as defined by [RFC 5247].
When used in this manner, the values required to establish the key
hierarchy are defined as follows:
- Peer-Id is the EAP-EKE ID_P value.
- Server-Id is the EAP-EKE ID_S value.
- Session-Id is the concatenated Type | Nonce_P | Nonce_S, where Type is
the method type defined for EAP-EKE in [Sec. 4.1], a single octet.
Thanks,
Yaron
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The cleanup code will handle this, but it is more robust to make sure
this is cleared to zero when allocating a new buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
By analysing objdump output some read only structures were found in
.data section. To help compiler further optimize code declare these
as const.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Kanstrup <mikael.kanstrup@sonymobile.com>
This function exposes internal state of the TLS negotiated parameters
for the sole purpose of being able to implement PRF for EAP-FAST. Since
tls_connection_prf() is now taking care of all TLS-based key derivation
cases, it is cleaner to keep this detail internal to each tls_*.c
wrapper implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
tls_openssl.c is the only remaining TLS/crypto wrapper that needs the
internal PRF implementation for EAP-FAST (since
SSL_export_keying_material() is not available in older versions and does
not support server-random-before-client case). As such, it is cleaner to
assume that TLS libraries support tls_connection_prf() and move the
additional support code for the otherwise unsupported cases into
tls_openssl.c.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds hexdumps of MSCHAP/MSCHAPv2 Challenge and Response in format
used by asleap. This is only enabled for CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y
builds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends EAP-pwd server support to allow NtHash version of password
storage in addition to full plaintext password.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The payload length in a Phase 2 TLV message reporting error was not set
correctly. Fix this to not include the TLVs that are included only in
success case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If TLS encryption fails, encr may be NULL and that would have resulted
in NULL pointer dereference..
Signed-off-by: Haim Dreyfuss <haim.dreyfuss@intel.com>
In ieee802_1x_decapsulate_radius(), eap_server_get_name() may return
NULL, and it could be dereferenced depending on printf implementation.
Change it to return "unknown" instead for the case of no matching EAP
method found. This makes it easier for the callers to simply print this
in logs (which is the only use for this function).
Signed-off-by: Eytan Lifshitz <eytan.lifshitz@intel.com>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() in cases where success condition was used to execute
a step. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
expression E1,E2,E3;
statement S1;
@@
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
- if (\( E1 >= 0 \| E1 > 0 \) && \( (size_t) E1 < E3 \| E1 < (int) E3 \| E1 < E3 \))
+ if (!os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
S1
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
For some reason, the previous version was not understood to be null
terminating the buffer from recv(). It was doing this fine, though. Try
to use a bit more simpler design in hopes of getting static analyzers to
understand this. (CID 72702)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was not really a real issue since bin_clear_free() would not use
the emsk_len argument when emsk is NULL as it would be on the path where
emsk_len has not been initilized. Anyway, it is better to get rid of the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Derive rRK and rIK on EAP server if ERP is enabled and use these keys to
allow EAP re-authentication to be used and to derive rMSK.
The new hostapd configuration parameter eap_server_erp=1 can now be used
to configure the integrated EAP server to derive EMSK, rRK, and rIK at
the successful completion of an EAP authentication method. This
functionality is not included in the default build and can be enabled
with CONFIG_ERP=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
hostapd can now be configured to transmit EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start
before EAP-Request/Identity to try to initiate ERP. This is disabled by
default and can be enabled with erp_send_reauth_start=1 and optional
erp_reauth_start_domain=<domain>.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds EAP-PAX server and peer method functions for deriving
Session-Id from Method-Id per RFC 4746 and RFC 5247.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Now that EMSK derivation is taken into use with ERP, it is better to
make sure the temporary MSK + EMSK buffer does not get left in heap
after use.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, this was implicitly limited by the 16-bit length field to
65535. This resulted in unhelpful static analyzer warnings (CID 62868).
Add an explicit (but pretty arbitrary) limit of 50000 bytes to avoid
this. The actual WSC messages are significantly shorter in practice, but
there is no specific protocol limit, so 50000 is as good as any limit to
use here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This gets registered in tls_openssl.c from tls_init(), so there is no
need for EAP-pwd implementation to register explicitly. This avoids some
corner cases where OpenSSL resources do not get fully freed on exit.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the code more consistent by checking the somewhat theoretical
error cases more consistently (CID 72685).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit e8c08c9a36 ('EAP-FAST server: Fix
potential read-after-buffer (by one byte)') changed the while loop
design in a way that does not require the pos variable to be updated
anymore. Remove that unneeded code to clean up static analyzer warnings
about unused assignments.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds kek_len argument to aes_wrap() and aes_unwrap() functions and
allows AES to be initialized with 192 and 256 bit KEK in addition to
the previously supported 128 bit KEK.
The test vectors in test-aes.c are extended to cover all the test
vectors from RFC 3394.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using implicit limit based on 16-bit unsigned integer having
a maximum value of 65535, limit the maximum length of a CID explicitly
to 1500 bytes. This will hopefully help in reducing false warnings from
static analyzers (CID 72712).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The special PAC_OPAQUE_TYPE_PAD case did not skip incrementing of the
pos pointer and could result in one octet read-after-buffer when parsing
the PAC-Opaque data.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any configuration parameter and
dynamic data that contains private information like keys or identity.
This brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length
of time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the EAP-pwd server and peer implementations more robust
should OpenSSL fail to derive random number for some reason. While this
is unlikely to happen in practice, the implementation better be prepared
for this should something unexpected ever happen. See
http://jbp.io/2014/01/16/openssl-rand-api/#review-of-randbytes-callers
for more details.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the EC_POINT memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the bignum memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
