DGNum/hostapd
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests 1 Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

EAP-TTLS: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons

Browse source 
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2014-06-29 20:25:05 +03:00
parent a564d9ca36
commit 30411b351c
1 changed files with 12 additions and 8 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

20
src/eap_server/eap_server_ttls.c
View file

@ -509,8 +509,8 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_pap(struct eap_sm *sm,
}
if (sm->user->password_len != user_password_len ||
os_memcmp(sm->user->password, user_password, user_password_len) !=
0) {
os_memcmp_const(sm->user->password, user_password,
user_password_len) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/PAP: Invalid user password");
eap_ttls_state(data, FAILURE);
return;
@ -558,7 +558,8 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_chap(struct eap_sm *sm,
return;
}
if (os_memcmp(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN) != 0 ||
if (os_memcmp_const(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN)
!= 0 ||
password[0] != chal[EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN]) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/CHAP: Challenge mismatch");
os_free(chal);
@ -571,7 +572,8 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_chap(struct eap_sm *sm,
chap_md5(password[0], sm->user->password, sm->user->password_len,
challenge, challenge_len, hash);
if (os_memcmp(hash, password + 1, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
if (os_memcmp_const(hash, password + 1, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_PASSWORD_LEN) ==
0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/CHAP: Correct user password");
eap_ttls_state(data, SUCCESS);
} else {
@ -616,7 +618,8 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_mschap(struct eap_sm *sm,
return;
}
if (os_memcmp(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN) != 0 ||
if (os_memcmp_const(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN)
!= 0 ||
response[0] != chal[EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN]) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP: Challenge mismatch");
os_free(chal);
@ -631,7 +634,7 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_mschap(struct eap_sm *sm,
nt_challenge_response(challenge, sm->user->password,
sm->user->password_len, nt_response);
if (os_memcmp(nt_response, response + 2 + 24, 24) == 0) {
if (os_memcmp_const(nt_response, response + 2 + 24, 24) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP: Correct response");
eap_ttls_state(data, SUCCESS);
} else {
@ -703,7 +706,8 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_mschapv2(struct eap_sm *sm,
return;
}
if (os_memcmp(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN) != 0 ||
if (os_memcmp_const(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN)
!= 0 ||
response[0] != chal[EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN]) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Challenge mismatch");
os_free(chal);
@ -736,7 +740,7 @@ static void eap_ttls_process_phase2_mschapv2(struct eap_sm *sm,
}
rx_resp = response + 2 + EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN + 8;
if (os_memcmp(nt_response, rx_resp, 24) == 0) {
if (os_memcmp_const(nt_response, rx_resp, 24) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Correct "
"NT-Response");
data->mschapv2_resp_ok = 1;