The use of a MAC KDE in the Key Data field of an EAPOL-Key Request frame
was only for the STAKey handshake. That handshake was implemented in
2005 as an experimental functionality and it was then removed in 2006.
However, this part of the functionality was forgotten. This does not do
anything in practice, so simplify the implementation and remove it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAPOL-Key request is accepted only if the MIC has been verified, so PTK
must have already been derived and Secure=1 needs to be used. Check the
Secure bit explicitly for completeness even though the MIC verification
is already taking care of validating that the sender is in the
possession of valid keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the Authenticator state machine conditions are already checking
for sm->EAPOLKeyRequest, it seems clearer to explicitly discard any
EAPOL-Key Request frame that is received unexpectedly during a 4-way
handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to try to process the EAPOL-Key frame if it has an
unexpected Key Descriptor Version value. Move these checks to happen
earlier in the sequence. In adition, use a separate helper function for
this to simplify wpa_receive() a bit.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check that the EAPOL-Key frame Key Descriptor Version value is one of
the defined values explicitly instead of failing to process the Key Data
field later (or end up ignoring the unexpected value if no processing of
Key Data is needed).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 describes the rule based on not-TKIP for value 2
and no pairwise cipher condition on value 3, so use that set of more
generic rules here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
key_data_buf is already freed on the common exit path, so do not try to
free it here on error.
Fixes: 4abc37e67b ("Support Key Data field decryption for EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 and 4/4")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
If the driver fetch for the current sequency number fails, do not try to
print the value in a debug print without having cleared it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Now that we have a more advanced check for the differences within the
Key Data field, nonzero Key Data Length case can be determined to be
EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 if there is no RSNE in the Key Data field.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Extend RSN authenticator to be able to process EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 and 4/4
messages in cases where the Key Data field is encrypted using AES key
wrapping (i.e., non-AEAD cipher). While there is not yet any defined
case where such encryption would be used in IEEE Std 802.11-2020,
extensions are considered to be added to use such constructions (e.g.,
in IEEE P802.11bh). As such, it is good to extend the parsing and
processing rules in the authenticator to be ready for such
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The initial Authenticator implementation depended on the Key Data field
being empty for EAPOL-Key msg 4/4. This worked fine for years in
practice, but in theory, vendor specific elements or KDEs could have
been added inti EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 and that would have broken this
design. In addition, the MLD case did introduce a KDE into EAPOL-Key msg
4/4 and required changes here.
As an initial step to make this more robust for future extensions,
recognize a received EAPOL-Key message as msg 4/4 if it is for RSN
(i.e., not WPAv1), has Secure=1, contains an unencrypted Key Data field,
and does not include RSNE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Allow additional elements and KDEs to be added to EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and
3/4 and allow EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 Key Data field to be not encrypted.
These are for testing purposes to enable a convenient mechanism for
testing supplicant behavior with either potential future extensions or
incorrect Authenticator behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This was done with spatch using the following semantic patch and minor
manual edits to clean up coding style and avoid compiler warnings in
driver_wext.c:
@@
expression a,b;
@@
- os_memcmp(a, b, ETH_ALEN) == 0
+ ether_addr_equal(a, b)
@@
expression a,b;
@@
- os_memcmp(a, b, ETH_ALEN) != 0
+ !ether_addr_equal(a, b)
@@
expression a,b;
@@
- !os_memcmp(a, b, ETH_ALEN)
+ ether_addr_equal(a, b)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the PMK ended up getting lost when a PMKSA cache entry was
added based on externally managed information. Set the PMK length in SAE
context to get the correct length stored into the actual PMKSA cache
entry that gets created in this path.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do include group MLO KDEs for links for which the information is
missing.
In addition, set the KDE buffer length based on the added data.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
MBSSID shares a single Beacon frame with multiple BSSs. This implies
that the key used for beacon protection (BIGTK) needs to be shared. The
nontransmitted BSSs managed their own BIGTK previously and that resulted
in providing incorrect value to the stations associated with those BSSs.
Use the BIGTK from the transmitted BSS to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Increase the first group rekey timeout from 500 ms to 1000 ms when the
number of associated stations is greater than 100. This is to avoid
client disconnections due to group handshake timeout in multiclient
scenarios where it might take more than 500 ms to be able deliver Group
Key msg 1/2 to all associated STAs.
Signed-off-by: Sai Pratyusha Magam <quic_smagam@quicinc.com>
This provides the link specific group keys and last used PN/IPN/BIPN
values to the Supplicant in the MLO KDEs instead of the KDEs used for
non-MLO cases.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Verify that the MLD address in EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 is set correctly for
MLO cases. Note that the mechanism used here for distinguishing between
EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 and 4/4 is not exactly ideal and should be improved in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
This provides the link specific group keys and last used PN/IPN/BIPN
values to the Supplicant in the MLO KDEs instead of the KDEs used for
non-MLO cases.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Allow RSN authenticator to fetch the current group key information with
the keys and the last used PN/IPN/BIPN for MLO specific KDEs.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Verify that the affiliated link information matches between association
(unprotected) and 4-way handshake (protected).
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Make the MLO related information available for the RSN Authenticator
state machine to be able to perform steps needed on an AP MLD. The
actual use of this information will be in the following commits.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
As a preparation to use AP MLD address and non-AP MLD address
in the RSN Authenticator state machine, add utility functions to
get the current AA and SPA.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
This function is not used outside wpa_auth.c and it is not mentioned in
any header file either, so it should have been marked static.
Fixes: f2f8e4f458 ("Add PTKSA cache to hostapd")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
FT AP was silently ignoring EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 due to Key MIC mismatch
when the STA advertises support for Secure LTF and derives the KDK while
the AP implementation did not derive KDK.
Fix this to include KDK while deriving PTK for FT cases on the AP.
Signed-off-by: Shiva Sankar Gajula <quic_sgajula@quicinc.com>
hostapd was previously storing the derived PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 as soon as
these keys were derived. While that is fine for most purposes, it is
unnecessary to do that so quickly and if anything were to fail before
the supplicant is able to return a valid EAPOL-Key msg 2/4, there would
not really be any real use for the derived keys.
For the special case of FT-PSK and VLAN determination based on the
wpa_psk file, the VLAN information is set in the per-STA data structures
only after the EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 MIC has been verified. This ended up
storing the PMK-R0/PMK-R1 entries without correct VLAN assignment and as
such, any use of the FT protocol would not be able to transfer the VLAN
information through RRB.
Split local storing of the FT key hierarchy for the cases using the FT
4-way handshake so that PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 are first derived and then
stored as a separate step after having verified the MIC in the EAPOL-Key
msg 2/4 (i.e., after having confirmed the per-STA passphrase/PSK was
selected) and VLAN update. This fixes VLAN information for the
wpa_psk_file cases with FT-PSK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add a testing option to delay EAPOL-Key messages 1/4 and 3/4. By setting
delay_eapol_tx=1, the actual EAPOL Tx will occur on the last possible
attempt (wpa_pairwise_update_count) thus all previous attempts will fail
on timeout which is the wanted delay.
In addition, add an hwsim test that uses this testing option to verify
that non protected Robust Action frames are dropped prior to keys
installation in MFP.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gabay <daniel.gabay@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Just like with WPA-PSK and keyids it may be desired to identify
connecting clients to provide additional network filtering.
This does:
- extend DPP_EVENT_AUTH_SUCCESS to expose public
key hash of the peer so the system can pick it
up and use for identification later
- store public key hash in PMKSA from DPP Network
Intro for later use
- extend sta mib to print out the dpp_pkhash
from PMKSA if present
- extend AP_STA_CONNECTED to include the
dpp_pkhash from PMKSA if present
Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal@plume.com>
CONFIG_NO_RC4=y could have been used to remove this functionality, but
it might as well be done automatically based on CONFIG_FIPS=y as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes hostapd use the struct defines from pasn_common.h so that the
same struct is shared with wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
AES-WRAP(KEK) protection of the Key Data field did not include all the
details in the log. Extend that to cover the details that were already
present for the AES-SIV case to make the debug log more useful for
analyzing issues in this area. Furthermore, print the full EAPOL-Key
frame in the log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Provide key length instead of SHA384/SHA256 selection to the helper
function so that the new SHA512 option can be covered for
FT-SAE-EXT-KEY.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Provide enough information to allow the FTE to be built using the
correct MIC field length based on the used AKM and key length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
After the secure association and PTK derivation are completed, if the
device supports LTF keyseed, generate the LTF keyseed using KDK and set
the ranging context to the driver by using the command
QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_SECURE_RANGING_CONTEXT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 is ambiguous on how the Secure bit is set in
EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in the case where 4-way handshake is use to
rekey the PTK. 12.7.2 describes this with "set to 1 once the initial key
exchange is complete" while 12.7.6 shows EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 using
Secure=0 without any consideration on whether the handshake is for
rekeying.
TGme seems to be moving towards clarifying this to use Secure=1 based on
there being a shared PTKSA between the Authenticator and the Supplicant.
In other words, this would use Secure=1 in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in
the case of rekeying. Change implementation to match that. This bit was
already practically ignored on the reception side, so this should not
have impact on actual functionality beyond this one bit changing its
value in the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Avoid the somewhat confusing mechanism of determining the bitfield index
from the assigned IP address to make this easier for static analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
sm->pairwise_set needs to be set whenever the TK has been configured to
the driver to request following EAPOL frames to be encrypted (or more
specifically, not to request them to not be encrypted). The FILS case
missed this setting and that could result in rekeying or
reauthentication in an associated started with FILS not working
correctly.
Fixes: da24c5aa1c ("FILS: Set TK after association (AP)")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It could have been possible to get into an endless loop of retried EAP
authentication followed by failing or not completed 4-way handshake if
there was a different interpretation of EAP authentication result
(success on AP, failure on STA). Avoid this by limiting the number of
consecutive EAPOL reauth attempts without completing the following 4-way
handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add an alternative sequence for performing the RADIUS ACL check and PSK
fetch. The previously used (macaddr_acl=2, wpa_psk_radius=2) combination
does this during IEEE 802.11 Authentication frame exchange while the new
option (wpa_psk_radius=3) does this during the 4-way handshake. This
allows some more information to be provided to the RADIUS authentication
server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
