In hostapd_clear_old() multiple steps are needed to clear a BSS.
There are some places where it would be desirable to clear only some
BSSes and not all.
To make it easier to clear only some BSSes, split hostapd_clear_old()
with hostapd_clear_old_bss(), which does the same actions but on a
single BSS.
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
When using MAC randomization wpa_supplicant can change the local MAC
address during roaming scenario:
1. We attach to AP1 (with MAC1/SSID1).
2. Roaming to AP2 (with MAC2/SSID2) is started:
a) we send DEAUTH(for AP1, with MAC1)
b) we change MAC to MAC2 due to randomization
c) we start authentication for AP2
d) we get notification about DEAUTH for AP1 (which we ignore)
e) we complete association with AP2
In point 2d we completely ignore the notification which later causes
problems. This happens if the deauthentication event is generated by the
local driver (e.g., due to beacon loss) instead of AP2 sending an
explicit Deauthentication frame.
The intended behavior is as follows: during roaming we generate DEAUTH
(2a) and signal this event right away. To protect from handling of our
own DEAUTH for the 2nd time supplicant marks 'ignore_next_local_deauth'
variable. In point 2d we should receive this notification and clear the
flag but this does not happen because MAC1 in the notification is not
the current MAC address (it has been changed in 2b) so this notification
is ignored as a one with a "foreign" address.
So we end up successfully at AP2 but with 'ignore_next_local_deauth'
still set which causes problems. For example if AP2 shuts down it has
been observed on some drivers that the DEAUTH notification is generated
as a local one and since we have flag to ignore it nothing is reported
over D-Bus.
To address the problem let's store the previously used MAC address and
use it for checking for foreign address (in combination with the current
one).
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Ostruszka <amo@semihalf.com>
This is a step in separating RSN and WPA(v1) processing of EAPOL-Key
frames into separate functions. This allows the implementation to be
simplified and potentially allows the validation rules to be made
stricter more easily. This is also a step towards allowing WPA(v1)
functionality to be removed from the build in the future.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The default provider is being loaded here explicitly only because
OSSL_PROVIDER_load() disables the fallback provider loading (on either
success or failure). If the legacy provider fails to load, which it may
in some configurations, it will never load the default provider.
Just use the formulation which attempts to load without changing the
fallback behavior.
"default" will still be/only be loaded if no other provider (notably
FIPS) is loaded to provide algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Norman Hamer <nhamer@absolute.com>
DES and RC4 are not allowed in such builds, so comment out des_encrypt()
and rc4_skip() from the build to force compile time failures for cases
that cannot be supported instead of failing the operations at runtime.
This makes it easier to detect and fix accidental cases where DES/RC4
could still be used in some older protocols.
Signed-off-by: Norman Hamer <nhamer@absolute.com>
CONFIG_NO_RC4=y could have been used to remove this functionality, but
it might as well be done automatically based on CONFIG_FIPS=y as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
PMKSA caching for the FT initial mobility domain association was fully
defined in IEEE Std 802.11-2020. The state before that was unclear and
there has been interoperability issues in this area, so use of PMKSA
caching with FT-EAP has been disabled in wpa_supplicant by default.
The wpa_supplicant and hostapd implementation of PMKSA caching for FT
ended up using an earlier default mechanism (SHA-1) for deriving the
PMKID when using the FT-EAP. This does not match what got defined in
IEEE Std 802.11-2020, 12.11.2.5.2 (SHA256). It is not really desirable
to use SHA-1 for anything with FT since the initial design of FT was
based on SHA256. Furthermore, it is obviously not good to differ in
behavior against the updated standard. As such, there is sufficient
justification to change the implementation to use SHA256 here even
though this ends up breaking backwards compatibility for PMKSA caching
with FT-EAP.
As noted above, this is still disabled in wpa_supplicant by default and
this change results in PMKSA caching not working only in cases where it
has been enabled explicitly with ft_eap_pmksa_caching=1. Those cases
recover by falling back to full EAP authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add QCA_WLAN_VENDOR_ATTR_CONFIG_WFC_STATE vendor attribute. Userspace
uses this attribute to configure wfc state to the driver/firmware. The
driver/firmware uses this information to optimize power savings, rate
adaption, roaming, etc.
Signed-off-by: Mukul Sharma <quic_mukul@quicinc.com>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020, 12.4.7.6 says that status code CHALLENGE_FAILURE,
needs to be sent in case the verification action fails for SAE Confirm
message frame from a STA: "An SAE Confirm message, with a status code
not equal to SUCCESS, shall indicate that a peer rejects a previously
sent SAE Confirm message. An SAE Confirm message that was not
successfully verified is indicated with a status code of
CHALLENGE_FAILURE."
hostapd, however, did not use this status code for this case. In
ieee802_11.c the function sae_check_confirm() is called and in case of
verification failure (-1 is returned), the response is set to
WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE (status code = 1). Fix this to use
CHALLENGE_FAILURE.
Signed-off-by: Koen Van Oost <koen.vanoost@airties.com>
Signed-off-by: Mert Ekren <mert.ekren@airties.com>
Explicitly check for invalid cases where the configured channel and
bandwidth might result in the full channel number range going beyond the
list of supported channels to avoid reading beyond the end of the
channel buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The SA/DA checks needs to be reversed for the TX case.
Fixes: 8481c750 ("PASN: Fix Authentication frame checks")
Signed-off-by: Vinay Gannevaram <quic_vganneva@quicinc.com>
If an AP is started on a DFS channel (or any channels within its
bandwidth require DFS) and DFS is offloaded to the driver, hostapd needs
to wait for CAC to complete. But the driver may not do CAC and just
switches to a non-DFS channel instead. This would result in a failure to
start the AP because hostapd fails to receive a CAC complete event and
cannot finish interface setup.
Skip CAC and complete AP setup in the channel switch event handler for
this case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add CLOSE_LOG command to stop hostapd logging to file. This can be
followed with RELOG to restart logging to the same file path.
Signed-off-by: Sai Pratyusha Magam <quic_smagam@quicinc.com>
Add a new subcommand QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_DOZED_AP to configure
doze mode state on an AP interface. This is also used as an event to
indicate the updated configuration. In doze mode, AP transmits
beacons at higher beacon intervals and RX is disabled.
Uses attributes defined in enum qca_wlan_vendor_attr_dozed_ap.
Signed-off-by: Purushottam Kushwaha <quic_pkushwah@quicinc.com>
During the roam scan, if there are no desired APs found in the partial
frequency list, an immediate full scan on all the supported frequencies
is initiated as a fallback. This would include the 6 GHz PSC
frequencies. Define an attribute to allow that behavior to be modified
to include PSCs only if 6 GHz use has been detected.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
When the RADIUS server requests a STA to be deauthenticated imminently
without providing a reason URL, there is no need to allow the STA spend
any additional time associated. Deauthenticate the STA immediately after
it has ACK'ed the WNM-Notification frame indicating imminent
deauthentication or at latest two seconds after having processes the
Access-Accept message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Currently sta_mlo_info.req_links is not getting cleared before
populating the requested links information for a new connection/roam
event. This is causing wrong requested links bitmap in
sta_mlo_info.req_links if there is a change in requested link IDs
between the previous and the new connection. To avoid such issues fully
clear MLO connection information after disconnection and before
populating MLO connection information during (re)association event.
Fixes: cc2236299f ("nl80211: Get all requested MLO links information from (re)association events")
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
IGTK and BIGTK MLO KDEs should be validated only when the AP sends them
in EAPOL-Key msg 3/4. Though IEEE P802.11be/D2.2 mandates MLO AP to
enable PMF and Beacon Protection features there is no text to mandate a
STA to discard connection when the MLO AP doesn't send IGTK and BIGTK
MLO KDEs in EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 for a link. Also, fix
wpa_sm->mgmt_group_cipher checks before processing MLO IGTK and BIGTK
MLO KDEs.
Fixes: f15cc834cb ("MLD STA: Processing of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 frame when using MLO")
Fixes: 8f2e493bec ("MLD STA: Validation of MLO KDEs for 4-way handshake EAPOL-Key frames")
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
During the roam scan, if there are no desired APs found in the partial
frequency list, an immediate full scan on all the supported frequencies
is initiated as a fallback. This flag controls the frequency list
creation for full scan on the following lines.
1 - Full scan to exclude the frequencies that were already scanned by
the previous partial scan.
0 - Full scan to include all the supported frequencies irrespective of
the ones already scanned by partial scan.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Taking sizeof(ptr) is incorrect to determine size of passed in hash and
results in hlen getting set to a very large value since MD5_MAC_LEN >
sizeof(ptr). Provide the actual size of the hash buffer from the caller
to fix this.
tls_key_x_server_params_hash() callers src/tls/tlsv1_client_read.c and
src/tls/tlsv1_server_write.c both pass in a large enough hash (hash[64]
or hash[100]) that this does not appear to have an impact, though it is
still wrong.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Strauss <gstrauss@gluelogic.com>
This new value was added to verify peer certificate if it is provided,
but not reject the TLS handshake if no peer certificate is provided.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Strauss <gstrauss@gluelogic.com>
The dev pointer could potentially be NULL here in some P2PS cases, so
check it explicitly before dereferencing it when checking for 6 GHz
capability.
Fixes: b9e2826b9d ("P2P: Filter 6 GHz channels if peer doesn't support them")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Try to make the bounds checking easier for static analyzers by checking
each length field separately in addition to checking them all in the end
against the total buffer length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Try to avoid static analyzer warnings due to use of the FTE length
field instead of the separately stored and validated length field value
when deriving FTE MIC.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Try to avoid static analyzer warnings due to use of the RSNE length
field instead of the separately stored and validated length field value
when deriving FTE MIC.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 25b52e5f83 ("FT: Extend FTE parsing for FT-SAE-EXT-KEY") used
possible MIC length iteration to try to figure out the length of the MIC
field in FTE. That was the only option available at the time, but FTE is
now being extended in IEEE 802.11-REVme to explicitly indicate the
length of the MIC field for the new FT-SAE-EXT-KEY AKM to make this
easier.
Use the new design from the approved comment resolution (*) in
REVme/D2.0 ballot CID 3135 to simplify implementation. This gets rid of
the need to pass in key length and the somewhat strange need_{r0kh,r1kh}
parameters to wpa_ft_parse_ies().
(*)
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/22/11-22-1991-02-000m-proposed-resolutions-to-some-lb270-comments.docx
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is needed to avoid trying the subsequent connections with the old
PMKID that the AP claims not to hold and continues connection failures.
This was already handled for the SME-in-the-driver case in commit commit
50b77f50e8 ("DPP: Flush PMKSA if an assoc reject without timeout is
received"), but the wpa_supplicant SME case did not have matching
processing.
Add the needed check to avoid recover from cases where the AP has
dropped its PMKSA cache entry. Do this only based on the specific status
code value (53 = invalid PMKID) and only for the PMKSA entry that
triggered this failure to minimize actions taken based on an unprotected
(Re)Association Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The addition of the "spa" argument was missed in the empty inline
function.
Fixes: 9ff778fa4b ("Check for own address (SPA) match when finding PMKSA entries")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Depending on the crypto library, crypto_ec_point_from_bin() can fail if
the element is not on curve, i.e., that error may show up before getting
to the explicit crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve() check. Add a debug print
for that earlier call so that the debug log is clearly identifying
reason for rejecting the SAE commit message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This prevents attempts of trying to use PMKSA caching when the existing
entry was created using a different MAC address than the one that is
currently being used. This avoids exposing the longer term PMKID value
when using random MAC addresses for connections.
In practice, similar restriction was already done by flushing the PMKSA
cache entries whenever wpas_update_random_addr() changed the local
address or when the interface was marked down (e.g., for an external
operation to change the MAC address).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This is needed to be able to determine whether a PMKSA cache entry is
valid when using changing MAC addresses. This could also be used to
implement a mechanism to restore a previously used MAC address instead
of a new random MAC address.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Using separate variables for BSSID and peer address is needed to support
Wi-Fi Aware (NAN) use cases where the group address is used as the BSSID
and that could be different from any other peer address. The
infrastructure BSS cases will continue to use the AP's BSSID as both the
peer address and BSSID for the PASN exchanges.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Rename struct pasn_data::bssid to peer_addr to be better aligned with
different use cases of PASN and its extensions. This is a step towards
having option to use different peer address and BSSID values for NAN use
cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Kernel commit 22e76844c566 - ("ieee80211: Increase PMK maximum length to
64 bytes") increased the maximum allowed length for NL80211_ATTR_PMK to
64 bytes. Thus, allow sending 64 bytes PMK in NL80211_CMD_SET_PMKSA and
if NL80211_CMD_SET_PMKSA fails with ERANGE try NL80211_CMD_SET_PMKSA
again without PMK. Also, skip sending PMK when PMK length is greater
than 64 bytes.
This is needed for some newer cases like DPP with NIST P-521 and
SAE-EXT-KEY with group 21. The kernel change from 48 to 64 octets is
from February 2018, so the new limit should be available in most cases
that might want to use these new mechanisms. Maintain a backwards
compatible fallback option for now to cover some earlier needs for DPP.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
wpa_supplicant has support for only a single FT key hierarchy and as
such, cannot use more than a single mobility domain at a time. Do not
allow FT protocol to be started if there is a request to reassociate to
a different BSS within the same ESS if that BSS is in a different
mobility domain. This results in the initial mobility domain association
being used whenever moving to another mobility domain.
While it would be possible to add support for multiple FT key hierachies
and multiple mobility domains in theory, there does not yet seem to be
sufficient justification to add the complexity needed for that due to
limited, if any, deployment of such networks. As such, it is simplest to
just prevent these attempts for now and start with a clean initial
mobility domain association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
There is no help from seeing 32 lines of debug prints about clearing
AP's RSNE/RSNXE information for each potential link when such
information has not been set in the first place. These were printed even
when there is no use of MLO whatsoever, so get rid of the prints for any
case where the value has not yet been set.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Wi-Fi Alliance specification for Automated Frequency Coordination (AFC)
system ensures that the Standard Power Wi-Fi devices can operate in 6
GHz spectrum under favorable conditions, without any interference with
the incumbent devices.
Add support for vendor command/events and corresponding
attributes to define the interface for exchanging AFC requests and
responses between the driver and a userspace application.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Commit 820211245b ("OpenSSL: Fix HPKE in some corner cases") increased
the buffer size for EVP_PKEY_derive() by 16 octets, but it turns out
that OpenSSL might need significantly more room in some cases. Replace a
fixed length buffer with dynamic query for the maximum size and
allocated buffer to cover that need.
This showed up using the following test case sequence:
dbus_pkcs11 module_wpa_supplicant
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The length of labeled_info is determined separately, so there is no need
to increment the pos pointer after the final entry has been added.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Not only the hash[] array, but also the r0_key_data[] array needs to be
extended in size to fit the longer key and salt.
Fixes: a76a314c15 ("FT: Extend PMK-R0 derivation for FT-SAE-EXT-KEY")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add support for group rekeying in MLO connection. Parse per link MLO
GTK/IGTK/BIGTK KDEs from Group Key msg 1/2 and configure to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Rohan Dutta <quic_drohan@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Use AP MLD address as the destination address for EAPOL-Key 4-way
handshake frames since authenticator/supplicant operates above MLD. The
driver/firmware will use RA/TA based on the link used for transmitting
the EAPOL frames.
Signed-off-by: Rohan Dutta <quic_drohan@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Validate new KDEs defined for MLO connection in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and
3/4 and reject the 4-way handshake frames if any of the new KDE data is
not matching expected key data.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Process EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 and configure PTK and per-link GTK/IGTK/BIGTK
keys to the driver when MLO is used.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
