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OpenSSL: Fix additional HPKE corner cases

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Commit 820211245b ("OpenSSL: Fix HPKE in some corner cases") increased
the buffer size for EVP_PKEY_derive() by 16 octets, but it turns out
that OpenSSL might need significantly more room in some cases. Replace a
fixed length buffer with dynamic query for the maximum size and
allocated buffer to cover that need.

This showed up using the following test case sequence:
dbus_pkcs11 module_wpa_supplicant

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2022-11-07 18:01:33 +02:00 committed by Jouni Malinen
parent 0ccb3b6cf2
commit 46f5cf9280
1 changed files with 16 additions and 11 deletions
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27
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
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@ -5020,8 +5020,8 @@ static int hpke_encap(struct hpke_context *ctx, struct crypto_ec_key *pk_r,
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
struct crypto_ec_key *sk_e;
int res = -1;
u8 dhss[HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN + 16];
size_t dhss_len;
u8 *dhss = NULL;
size_t dhss_len = 0;
struct wpabuf *enc_buf = NULL, *pk_rm = NULL;
/* skE, pkE = GenerateKeyPair() */
@ -5038,10 +5038,13 @@ static int hpke_encap(struct hpke_context *ctx, struct crypto_ec_key *pk_r,
if (!pctx ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, (EVP_PKEY *) pk_r) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
!(dhss = os_malloc(dhss_len)) ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, dhss, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
dhss_len > HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: EVP_PKEY_derive failed: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: hpke_encap: EVP_PKEY_derive failed (dhss_len=%zu): %s",
dhss_len, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto fail;
}
@ -5063,7 +5066,7 @@ static int hpke_encap(struct hpke_context *ctx, struct crypto_ec_key *pk_r,
wpabuf_head(pk_rm),
wpabuf_len(pk_rm), shared_secret);
fail:
forced_memzero(dhss, sizeof(dhss));
bin_clear_free(dhss, dhss_len);
crypto_ec_key_deinit(sk_e);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
wpabuf_free(enc_buf);
@ -5184,8 +5187,8 @@ static int hpke_decap(struct hpke_context *ctx, const u8 *enc,
size_t len;
int res = -1;
struct crypto_ec_key *pk_e = NULL;
u8 dhss[HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN + 16];
size_t dhss_len;
u8 *dhss = NULL;
size_t dhss_len = 0;
/* pkE = DeserializePublicKey(enc) */
if (enc_ct_len < ctx->n_pk)
@ -5198,15 +5201,17 @@ static int hpke_decap(struct hpke_context *ctx, const u8 *enc,
if (!pk_e)
return -1; /* invalid public key point */
/* dh = DH(skR, pkE) */
dhss_len = sizeof(dhss);
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new((EVP_PKEY *) sk_r, NULL);
if (!pctx ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, (EVP_PKEY *) pk_e) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
!(dhss = os_malloc(dhss_len)) ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, dhss, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
dhss_len > HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: EVP_PKEY_derive failed: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: hpke_decap: EVP_PKEY_derive failed (dhss_len=%zu): %s",
dhss_len, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto fail;
}
@ -5221,7 +5226,7 @@ static int hpke_decap(struct hpke_context *ctx, const u8 *enc,
wpabuf_head(pk_rm),
wpabuf_len(pk_rm), shared_secret);
fail:
forced_memzero(dhss, sizeof(dhss));
bin_clear_free(dhss, dhss_len);
crypto_ec_key_deinit(pk_e);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
wpabuf_free(pk_rm);