This allows the debugging level to be reduced from hostapd command line
similarly to the already existing flag in wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor <o.mazor@genexis.eu>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Start and
EAPOL-Logoff are potential candidate for such attacks since those frames
could be used to terminate an authentication or initiate a new EAP
authentication. Such an attack could result in the station ending up
disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state
with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Start/Logoff/EAP frames on the AP/Authenticator when it is
known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is
enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that
does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force
disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all
drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL
frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate
whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one
potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to
initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not
allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be
injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack
could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum,
getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Key msg 1/4
is one potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be
used to initiate a 4-way handshake that the real AP might never complete
and the station might end up disconnecting because of that or at
minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAPOL-Key Request frame with Error=1 is not really a request for a new
key, so allow that frame to be sent even if PTK0 rekey is not allowed
since the supplicant is required to report Michael MIC errors to the
authenticator.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This information was already available from the nl80211 control port RX
path, but it was not provided to upper layers within wpa_supplicant and
hostapd. It can be helpful, so parse the information from the driver
event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
sm->pairwise_set needs to be set whenever the TK has been configured to
the driver to request following EAPOL frames to be encrypted (or more
specifically, not to request them to not be encrypted). The FILS case
missed this setting and that could result in rekeying or
reauthentication in an associated started with FILS not working
correctly.
Fixes: da24c5aa1c ("FILS: Set TK after association (AP)")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The wpa_supplicant check for whether a TK is configured into the driver
was broken during the time this information is needed for rekeying or
reauthenticating with another 4-way handshake. sm->ptk.installed is not
set at the point the EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 is sent and while that means the
initial 4-way handshake needs to prevent encryption, the consecutive
4-way handshake must not be doing that since the old key (TK) is still
in the driver. Fix this so that the EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 during rekeying
does not get transmitted without encryption.
Fixes: a79ed06871 ("Add no_encrypt flag for control port TX")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Currently a corrupted handshake message 1/4 causes the client to
disconnect from the network. This can lead to a denial-of-service
vulnerability allowing an adversary to forcibly disconnect a client from
protected networks even when Wi-Fi Management Frame Protection (MFP) is
enforced if the driver allows unencrypted EAPOL-Key frames to be
received after key configuration..
Fix this by discarding the corrupted handshake message 1/4.
This issue was discovered by Domien Schepers (Northeastern University)
and Mathy Vanhoef (imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven).
Signed-off-by: Domien Schepers <schepers.d@northeastern.edu>
The wpa_supplicant implementation for this functionality is going to be
changed to not require disconnection, so prepare the test case to not
fail.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_validate_wpa_ie() might update sm->* values, so it should not be
allowed for an existing STA entry if that STA has negotiated MFP to be
used for the association. Fix this by first checking whether an SA Query
procedure needs to be initiated. In particular, this prevents a
potential bypass of the disconnection protection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The driver can consider EHT specific parameters such as the puncture
pattern for ACS when this flag attribute is indicated by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Add a check to avoid sending VHT channel definition when EHT is enabled
in the 2.4 GHz band since the 2.4 GHz band isn't supposed to use VHT
operations. Also add EHT enabled info into debug prints.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
This adds wifi_generation=7 line to the STATUS output if the driver
reports (Re)Association Request frame and (Re)Association Response frame
information elements in the association or connection event with EHT
capability IEs.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Do not consider optional octets maximum lengths when validating EHT
fixed fields length. Furthermore, do not use the first two octets of the
PPE Thresholds field without explicitly confirming that these octets
were included in the element and fix PPE Thresholds field length
calculation.
Fixes: a6d1b4c46c ("EHT: Process (Re)Association Request frame capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Send the status code from the AP authentication response instead of
sending the hardcoded WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE when the external
SAE authentication failure is due to an explicit rejection by the AP.
This will allow the driver to indicate the correct status in connect
response.
For example, an AP can send WLAN_STATUS_AP_UNABLE_TO_HANDLE_NEW_STA in
SAE authentication response. With this change the driver gets the real
status for the SAE authentication failure and it can fill the correct
status in the connect response event.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
enum macaddr_acl is forward declared in wpa_supplicant/ap.h.
c++ compiler doesn't allow forward declaration. So to fix the
compilation error, moved the enum macaddr_acl declaration out
of struct hostapd_bss_config.
Signed-off-by: Sunil Ravi <sunilravi@google.com>
The OCSP check here is specific to TLS 1.3 and the TLS1_3_VERSION value
is not available in older library versions. Comment this check out from
such cases since it is not applicable with such an old library.
Fixes: 10746875e2 ("OpenSSL: Allow no OCSP response when resuming a session with TLS 1.3")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
LibreSSL does not seem have SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(), so comment out
these not really critical calls when building with that library.
Fixes: 81e2498889 ("OpenSSL: Limit the number of TLS 1.3 session tickets to one")
Fixes: decac7cd1e ("OpenSSL: Do not send out a TLS 1.3 session ticket if caching disabled")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md() does not seem to be available in
LibreSSL, so for now, comment out this functionality whenever building
with that library.
Fixes: 36b11bbcff ("OpenSSL: RSA-OAEP-SHA-256 encryption/decryption")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() is not available in boringSSL.
So protect the call to SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() under
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) to fix the compilation error.
Fixes: decac7cd1e ("OpenSSL: Do not send out a TLS 1.3 session ticket if caching disabled")
Fixes: 81e2498889 ("OpenSSL: Limit the number of TLS 1.3 session tickets to one")
Signed-off-by: Sunil Ravi <sunilravi@google.com>
Add a notification message to indicate reason for TLS handshake failure
due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The TLS protocol design for renegotiation was identified to have a
significant security flaw in 2009 and an extension to secure this design
was published in 2010 (RFC 5746). However, some old RADIUS
authentication servers without support for this are still used commonly.
This is obviously not good from the security view point, but since there
are cases where the user of a network service has no realistic means for
getting the authentication server upgraded, TLS handshake may still need
to be allowed to be able to use the network.
OpenSSL 3.0 disabled the client side workaround by default and this
resulted in issues connection to some networks with insecure
authentication servers. With OpenSSL 3.0, the client is now enforcing
security by refusing to authenticate with such servers. The pre-3.0
behavior of ignoring this issue and leaving security to the server can
now be enabled with a new phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1.
This should be used only when having to connect to a network that has an
insecure authentication server that cannot be upgraded.
The old (pre-2010) TLS renegotiation mechanism might open security
vulnerabilities if the authentication server were to allow TLS
renegotiation to be initiated. While this is unlikely to cause real
issues with EAP-TLS, there might be cases where use of PEAP or TTLS with
an authentication server that does not support RFC 5746 might result in
a security vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Some of the TLS library wrappers defined only an empty function for
tls_connection_set_success_data(). That could result in memory leaks in
TLS server cases, so update these to do the minimal thing and free the
provided buffer as unused.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
When a new session ticket is not issued to the peer, Phase 2 identity
request need to be sent out as a response to the Finished message from
the peer. Fix this to allow the TLS server to be configured to not send
out a new session ticket when using TLS 1.3.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
TLS 1.3 sends the OCSP response with the server Certificate message.
Since that Certificate message is not sent when resuming a session,
there can be no new OCSP response. Allow this since the OCSP response
was validated when checking the initial certificate exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The internal flag prot_success_received was not cleared between the
sessions and that resulted in the resumed session not mandating the
protected success indication to be received. Fix this by clearing the
internal flag so that the EAP-TLS handshake using session resumption
with TLS 1.3 takes care of the required check before marking the
authentication successfully completed. This will make the EAP-TLS peer
reject an EAP-Success message should it be received without the
protected success indication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The final message with NewSessionTicket and ApplicationData(0x00) was
already generated, but that was not sent out due the session considered
to be already completed. Fix this by actually sending out that message
to allow the peer to receive the new session ticket and protected
success indication when using resuming a session with TLS 1.3.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
One session ticket is sufficient for EAP-TLS, so do not bother
generating more than a single session ticket.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
A port of the trivial patch I wrote for FreeRADIUS to allow TLS decoding
in Wireshark for hostapd/wpa_supplicant:
df0eb0a884
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@coremem.com>
This may fail with FIPS builds because the FIPS requirement is that the
password must be at least 14 characters.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
pbkdf2_sha1() may return errors and this should be checked in calls.
This is especially an issue with FIPS builds because the FIPS
requirement is that the password must be at least 14 characters.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
Some API is not available when using FIPS. We need to allocate memory
and initialize the structs directly.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
Register a callback with wolfCrypt_SetCb_fips to inform the user of
errors in the wolfCrypt FIPS module.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
In some configurations the wc_Init*() functions may either allocate
memory or other system resources. These resources need to be freed.
Co-authored-by: JacobBarthelmeh <jacob@wolfssl.com>
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
Add support for loading private keys and certificates in both PEM and
DER formats with wolfSSL.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
