hostapd/src/common/sae.c

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/*
* Simultaneous authentication of equals
* Copyright (c) 2012-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "crypto/sha256.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "ieee802_11_defs.h"
#include "sae.h"
int sae_set_group(struct sae_data *sae, int group)
{
crypto_ec_deinit(sae->ec);
sae->ec = crypto_ec_init(group);
if (!sae->ec)
return -1;
sae->group = group;
sae->prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(sae->ec);
return 0;
}
void sae_clear_data(struct sae_data *sae)
{
if (sae == NULL)
return;
crypto_ec_deinit(sae->ec);
os_memset(sae, 0, sizeof(*sae));
}
static int val_zero_or_one(const u8 *val, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len - 1; i++) {
if (val[i])
return 0;
}
return val[len - 1] <= 1;
}
static int val_zero(const u8 *val, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (val[i])
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void buf_shift_right(u8 *buf, size_t len, size_t bits)
{
size_t i;
for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
buf[i] = (buf[i - 1] << (8 - bits)) | (buf[i] >> bits);
buf[0] >>= bits;
}
static int sae_get_rand(const u8 *order, size_t prime_len_bits, u8 *val)
{
int iter = 0;
size_t prime_len = (prime_len_bits + 7) / 8;
do {
if (iter++ > 100)
return -1;
if (random_get_bytes(val, prime_len) < 0)
return -1;
if (prime_len_bits % 8)
buf_shift_right(val, prime_len, 8 - prime_len_bits % 8);
} while (os_memcmp(val, order, prime_len) >= 0 ||
val_zero_or_one(val, prime_len));
return 0;
}
static struct crypto_bignum * sae_get_rand_and_mask(struct sae_data *sae)
{
u8 mask[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN], order[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *bn;
size_t prime_len_bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->ec);
if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(crypto_ec_get_order(sae->ec),
order, sizeof(order), sae->prime_len) < 0)
return NULL;
if (sae_get_rand(order, prime_len_bits, sae->sae_rand) < 0 ||
sae_get_rand(order, prime_len_bits, mask) < 0)
return NULL;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: rand",
sae->sae_rand, sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: mask", mask, sae->prime_len);
bn = crypto_bignum_init_set(mask, sae->prime_len);
os_memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
return bn;
}
static void sae_pwd_seed_key(const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, u8 *key)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE derivation - addr1=" MACSTR
" addr2=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2));
if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) > 0) {
os_memcpy(key, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
os_memcpy(key + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
} else {
os_memcpy(key, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
os_memcpy(key + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
}
}
static int sae_test_pwd_seed(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
struct crypto_ec_point *pwe, u8 *pwe_bin)
{
u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN], prime[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *x;
int y_bit;
size_t bits;
if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(crypto_ec_get_prime(sae->ec),
prime, sizeof(prime), sae->prime_len) < 0)
return -1;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
/* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */
bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->ec);
sha256_prf_bits(pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN, "SAE Hunting and Pecking",
prime, sae->prime_len, pwd_value, bits);
if (bits % 8)
buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), 8 - bits % 8);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
pwd_value, sae->prime_len);
if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->prime_len) >= 0)
return 0;
y_bit = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01;
x = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->prime_len);
if (x == NULL)
return -1;
if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->ec, pwe, x, y_bit) < 0) {
crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 0);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: No solution found");
return 0;
}
crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 0);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found");
if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->ec, pwe, pwe_bin,
pwe_bin + sae->prime_len) < 0)
return -1;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE x", pwe_bin, sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE y",
pwe_bin + sae->prime_len, sae->prime_len);
return 1;
}
static int sae_derive_pwe(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
size_t password_len, struct crypto_ec_point *pwe,
u8 *pwe_bin)
{
u8 counter, k = 4;
u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
int found = 0;
struct crypto_ec_point *pwe_tmp;
u8 pwe_bin_tmp[2 * SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
pwe_tmp = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
if (pwe_tmp == NULL)
return -1;
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
password, password_len);
/*
* H(salt, ikm) = HMAC-SHA256(salt, ikm)
* pwd-seed = H(MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC),
* password || counter)
*/
sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs);
addr[0] = password;
len[0] = password_len;
addr[1] = &counter;
len[1] = sizeof(counter);
/*
* Continue for at least k iterations to protect against side-channel
* attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required
* in the loop.
*/
for (counter = 1; counter < k || !found; counter++) {
u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
int res;
if (counter > 200) {
/* This should not happen in practice */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to derive PWE");
break;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter);
if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, addr, len,
pwd_seed) < 0)
break;
res = sae_test_pwd_seed(sae, pwd_seed,
found ? pwe_tmp : pwe,
found ? pwe_bin_tmp : pwe_bin);
if (res < 0)
break;
if (res == 0)
continue;
if (found) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Ignore this PWE (one was "
"already selected)");
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
found = 1;
}
}
crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe_tmp, 1);
return found ? 0 : -1;
}
static int sae_derive_commit(struct sae_data *sae, struct crypto_ec_point *pwe)
{
struct crypto_bignum *x, *bn_rand, *mask;
struct crypto_ec_point *elem;
int ret = -1;
mask = sae_get_rand_and_mask(sae);
if (mask == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not get rand/mask");
return -1;
}
x = crypto_bignum_init();
bn_rand = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->sae_rand, sae->prime_len);
elem = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
if (x == NULL || bn_rand == NULL || elem == NULL)
goto fail;
/* commit-scalar = (rand + mask) modulo r */
crypto_bignum_add(bn_rand, mask, x);
crypto_bignum_mod(x, crypto_ec_get_order(sae->ec), x);
crypto_bignum_to_bin(x, sae->own_commit_scalar,
sizeof(sae->own_commit_scalar), sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: commit-scalar",
sae->own_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len);
/* COMMIT-ELEMENT = inverse(scalar-op(mask, PWE)) */
if (crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->ec, pwe, mask, elem) < 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_invert(sae->ec, elem) < 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->ec, elem, sae->own_commit_element,
sae->own_commit_element + sae->prime_len) <
0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not compute commit-element");
goto fail;
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: commit-element x",
sae->own_commit_element, sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: commit-element y",
sae->own_commit_element + sae->prime_len, sae->prime_len);
ret = 0;
fail:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(elem, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(mask, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(bn_rand, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
return ret;
}
int sae_prepare_commit(const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2,
const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
struct sae_data *sae)
{
struct crypto_ec_point *pwe;
int ret = 0;
pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
if (pwe == NULL ||
sae_derive_pwe(sae, addr1, addr2, password, password_len, pwe,
sae->pwe) < 0 ||
sae_derive_commit(sae, pwe) < 0)
ret = -1;
crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe, 1);
return ret;
}
static int sae_check_peer_commit(struct sae_data *sae)
{
u8 order[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN], prime[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(crypto_ec_get_order(sae->ec),
order, sizeof(order), sae->prime_len) < 0 ||
crypto_bignum_to_bin(crypto_ec_get_prime(sae->ec),
prime, sizeof(prime), sae->prime_len) < 0)
return -1;
/* 0 < scalar < r */
if (val_zero(sae->peer_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len) ||
os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_scalar, order, sae->prime_len) >= 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid peer scalar");
return -1;
}
/* element x and y coordinates < p */
if (os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_element, prime, sae->prime_len) >= 0 ||
os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_element + sae->prime_len, prime,
sae->prime_len) >= 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid coordinates in peer "
"element");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int sae_derive_k(struct sae_data *sae, u8 *k)
{
struct crypto_ec_point *pwe, *peer_elem, *K;
struct crypto_bignum *rand_bn, *peer_scalar;
int ret = -1;
pwe = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->ec, sae->pwe);
peer_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->peer_commit_scalar,
sae->prime_len);
peer_elem = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->ec, sae->peer_commit_element);
K = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
rand_bn = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->sae_rand, sae->prime_len);
if (pwe == NULL || peer_elem == NULL || peer_scalar == NULL ||
K == NULL || rand_bn == NULL)
goto fail;
if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(sae->ec, peer_elem)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer element is not on curve");
goto fail;
}
/*
* K = scalar-op(rand, (elem-op(scalar-op(peer-commit-scalar, PWE),
* PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT)))
* If K is identity element (point-at-infinity), reject
* k = F(K) (= x coordinate)
*/
if (crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->ec, pwe, peer_scalar, K) < 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_add(sae->ec, K, peer_elem, K) < 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->ec, K, rand_bn, K) < 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(sae->ec, K) ||
crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->ec, K, k, NULL) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate K and k");
goto fail;
}
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: k", k, sae->prime_len);
ret = 0;
fail:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(peer_elem, 0);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(rand_bn, 1);
return ret;
}
static int sae_derive_keys(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *k)
{
u8 null_key[SAE_KEYSEED_KEY_LEN], val[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
u8 keyseed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
u8 keys[SAE_KCK_LEN + SAE_PMK_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *own_scalar, *peer_scalar, *tmp;
int ret = -1;
own_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->own_commit_scalar,
sae->prime_len);
peer_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->peer_commit_scalar,
sae->prime_len);
tmp = crypto_bignum_init();
if (own_scalar == NULL || peer_scalar == NULL || tmp == NULL)
goto fail;
/* keyseed = H(<0>32, k)
* KCK || PMK = KDF-512(keyseed, "SAE KCK and PMK",
* (commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) modulo r)
* PMKID = L((commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) modulo r, 0, 128)
*/
os_memset(null_key, 0, sizeof(null_key));
hmac_sha256(null_key, sizeof(null_key), k, sae->prime_len, keyseed);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: keyseed", keyseed, sizeof(keyseed));
crypto_bignum_add(own_scalar, peer_scalar, tmp);
crypto_bignum_mod(tmp, crypto_ec_get_order(sae->ec), tmp);
crypto_bignum_to_bin(tmp, val, sizeof(val), sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMKID", val, SAE_PMKID_LEN);
sha256_prf(keyseed, sizeof(keyseed), "SAE KCK and PMK",
val, sae->prime_len, keys, sizeof(keys));
os_memcpy(sae->kck, keys, SAE_KCK_LEN);
os_memcpy(sae->pmk, keys + SAE_KCK_LEN, SAE_PMK_LEN);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: KCK", sae->kck, SAE_KCK_LEN);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMK", sae->pmk, SAE_PMK_LEN);
ret = 0;
fail:
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(peer_scalar, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(own_scalar, 0);
return ret;
}
int sae_process_commit(struct sae_data *sae)
{
u8 k[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
if (sae_check_peer_commit(sae) < 0 ||
sae_derive_k(sae, k) < 0 ||
sae_derive_keys(sae, k) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
void sae_write_commit(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf,
const struct wpabuf *token)
{
wpabuf_put_le16(buf, sae->group); /* Finite Cyclic Group */
if (token)
wpabuf_put_buf(buf, token);
wpabuf_put_data(buf, sae->own_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len);
wpabuf_put_data(buf, sae->own_commit_element, 2 * sae->prime_len);
}
u16 sae_parse_commit(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len,
const u8 **token, size_t *token_len, int *allowed_groups)
{
const u8 *pos = data, *end = data + len;
u16 group;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Commit fields", data, len);
if (token)
*token = NULL;
if (token_len)
*token_len = 0;
/* Check Finite Cyclic Group */
if (pos + 2 > end)
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
group = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
if (allowed_groups) {
int i;
for (i = 0; allowed_groups[i] >= 0; i++) {
if (allowed_groups[i] == group)
break;
}
if (allowed_groups[i] != group) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Proposed group %u not "
"enabled in the current configuration",
group);
return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
}
if (sae->state == SAE_COMMITTED && group != sae->group) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not allow group to be changed");
return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (group != sae->group && sae_set_group(sae, group) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Unsupported Finite Cyclic Group %u",
group);
return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
pos += 2;
if (pos + 3 * sae->prime_len < end) {
size_t tlen = end - (pos + 3 * sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Anti-Clogging Token", pos, tlen);
if (token)
*token = pos;
if (token_len)
*token_len = tlen;
pos += tlen;
}
if (pos + sae->prime_len > end) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for scalar");
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
}
/*
* IEEE Std 802.11-2012, 11.3.8.6.1: If there is a protocol instance for
* the peer and it is in Authenticated state, the new Commit Message
* shall be dropped if the peer-scalar is identical to the one used in
* the existing protocol instance.
*/
if (sae->state == SAE_ACCEPTED &&
os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_scalar, pos, sae->prime_len) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not accept re-use of previous "
"peer-commit-scalar");
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
}
os_memcpy(sae->peer_commit_scalar, pos, sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-scalar",
sae->peer_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len);
pos += sae->prime_len;
if (pos + 2 * sae->prime_len > end) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for "
"commit-element");
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
}
os_memcpy(sae->peer_commit_element, pos, 2 * sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element(x)",
sae->peer_commit_element, sae->prime_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element(y)",
sae->peer_commit_element + sae->prime_len, sae->prime_len);
return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
void sae_write_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf)
{
const u8 *sc;
const u8 *addr[5];
size_t len[5];
/* Send-Confirm */
sc = wpabuf_put(buf, 0);
wpabuf_put_le16(buf, sae->send_confirm);
sae->send_confirm++;
/* Confirm
* CN(key, X, Y, Z, ...) =
* HMAC-SHA256(key, D2OS(X) || D2OS(Y) || D2OS(Z) | ...)
* confirm = CN(KCK, send-confirm, commit-scalar, COMMIT-ELEMENT,
* peer-commit-scalar, PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT)
*/
addr[0] = sc;
len[0] = 2;
addr[1] = sae->own_commit_scalar;
len[1] = sae->prime_len;
addr[2] = sae->own_commit_element;
len[2] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
addr[3] = sae->peer_commit_scalar;
len[3] = sae->prime_len;
addr[4] = sae->peer_commit_element;
len[4] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
hmac_sha256_vector(sae->kck, sizeof(sae->kck), 5, addr, len,
wpabuf_put(buf, SHA256_MAC_LEN));
}
int sae_check_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len)
{
u16 rc;
const u8 *addr[5];
size_t elen[5];
u8 verifier[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm fields", data, len);
if (len < 2 + SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Too short confirm message");
return -1;
}
rc = WPA_GET_LE16(data);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: peer-send-confirm %u", rc);
/* Confirm
* CN(key, X, Y, Z, ...) =
* HMAC-SHA256(key, D2OS(X) || D2OS(Y) || D2OS(Z) | ...)
* verifier = CN(KCK, peer-send-confirm, peer-commit-scalar,
* PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT, commit-scalar, COMMIT-ELEMENT)
*/
addr[0] = data;
elen[0] = 2;
addr[1] = sae->peer_commit_scalar;
elen[1] = sae->prime_len;
addr[2] = sae->peer_commit_element;
elen[2] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
addr[3] = sae->own_commit_scalar;
elen[3] = sae->prime_len;
addr[4] = sae->own_commit_element;
elen[4] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
hmac_sha256_vector(sae->kck, sizeof(sae->kck), 5, addr, elen, verifier);
if (os_memcmp(verifier, data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm mismatch");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received confirm",
data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Calculated verifier",
verifier, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}