71 lines
3.6 KiB
Text
71 lines
3.6 KiB
Text
transfer.fsckObjects::
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When `fetch.fsckObjects` or `receive.fsckObjects` are
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not set, the value of this variable is used instead.
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Defaults to false.
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+
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When set, the fetch or receive will abort in the case of a malformed
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object or a link to a nonexistent object. In addition, various other
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issues are checked for, including legacy issues (see `fsck.<msg-id>`),
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and potential security issues like the existence of a `.GIT` directory
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or a malicious `.gitmodules` file (see the release notes for v2.2.1
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and v2.17.1 for details). Other sanity and security checks may be
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added in future releases.
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On the receiving side, failing fsckObjects will make those objects
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unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in
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linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will
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instead be left unreferenced in the repository.
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Due to the non-quarantine nature of the `fetch.fsckObjects`
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implementation it cannot be relied upon to leave the object store
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clean like `receive.fsckObjects` can.
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As objects are unpacked they're written to the object store, so there
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can be cases where malicious objects get introduced even though the
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"fetch" failed, only to have a subsequent "fetch" succeed because only
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new incoming objects are checked, not those that have already been
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written to the object store. That difference in behavior should not be
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relied upon. In the future, such objects may be quarantined for
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"fetch" as well.
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For now, the paranoid need to find some way to emulate the quarantine
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environment if they'd like the same protection as "push". E.g. in the
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case of an internal mirror do the mirroring in two steps, one to fetch
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the untrusted objects, and then do a second "push" (which will use the
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quarantine) to another internal repo, and have internal clients
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consume this pushed-to repository, or embargo internal fetches and
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only allow them once a full "fsck" has run (and no new fetches have
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happened in the meantime).
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transfer.hideRefs::
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String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which
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refs to omit from their initial advertisements. Use more than
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one definition to specify multiple prefix strings. A ref that is
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under the hierarchies listed in the value of this variable is
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excluded, and is hidden when responding to `git push` or `git
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fetch`. See `receive.hideRefs` and `uploadpack.hideRefs` for
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program-specific versions of this config.
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You may also include a `!` in front of the ref name to negate the entry,
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explicitly exposing it, even if an earlier entry marked it as hidden.
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If you have multiple hideRefs values, later entries override earlier ones
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(and entries in more-specific config files override less-specific ones).
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If a namespace is in use, the namespace prefix is stripped from each
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reference before it is matched against `transfer.hiderefs` patterns.
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For example, if `refs/heads/master` is specified in `transfer.hideRefs` and
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the current namespace is `foo`, then `refs/namespaces/foo/refs/heads/master`
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is omitted from the advertisements but `refs/heads/master` and
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`refs/namespaces/bar/refs/heads/master` are still advertised as so-called
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"have" lines. In order to match refs before stripping, add a `^` in front of
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the ref name. If you combine `!` and `^`, `!` must be specified first.
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Even if you hide refs, a client may still be able to steal the target
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objects via the techniques described in the "SECURITY" section of the
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linkgit:gitnamespaces[7] man page; it's best to keep private data in a
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separate repository.
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transfer.unpackLimit::
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When `fetch.unpackLimit` or `receive.unpackLimit` are
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not set, the value of this variable is used instead.
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The default value is 100.
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