2018-09-04 12:45:07 +02:00
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// Copyright (C) 2018 Aprila Bank ASA
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//
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// alcoholic_jwt is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
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// modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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// published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
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// License, or (at your option) any later version.
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//
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// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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// GNU General Public License for more details.
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//
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// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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2018-09-04 12:36:59 +02:00
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//! Implements a library for for **validation** of **RS256** JWTs
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//! using keys from a JWKS. Nothing more, nothing less.
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//!
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//! The name of the library stems from the potential side-effects of
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//! trying to use the other Rust libraries that are made for similar
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//! purposes.
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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//!
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//! This library is specifically aimed at developers that consume
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//! tokens from services which provide their RSA public keys in
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//! [JWKS][] format.
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//!
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//! ## Usage example (token with `kid`-claim)
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//!
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//! ```rust
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! # extern crate serde_json;
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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//! extern crate alcoholic_jwt;
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//!
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//! use alcoholic_jwt::{JWKS, Validation, validate, token_kid};
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//!
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! # fn some_token_fetching_function() -> String {
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//! # "eyJraWQiOiI4ckRxOFB3MEZaY2FvWFdURVZRbzcrVGYyWXpTTDFmQnhOS1BDZWJhYWk0PSIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLnRlc3QuYXByaWxhLm5vIiwiaWF0IjoxNTM2MDUwNjkzLCJleHAiOjE1MzYwNTQyOTMsInN1YiI6IjQyIiwiZXh0Ijoic21va2V0ZXN0IiwicHJ2IjoiYXJpc3RpIiwic2NwIjoicHJvY2VzcyJ9.gOLsv98109qLkmRK6Dn7WWRHLW7o8W78WZcWvFZoxPLzVO0qvRXXRLYc9h5chpfvcWreLZ4f1cOdvxv31_qnCRSQQPOeQ7r7hj_sPEDzhKjk-q2aoNHaGGJg1vabI--9EFkFsGQfoS7UbMMssS44dgR68XEnKtjn0Vys-Vzbvz_CBSCH6yQhRLik2SU2jR2L7BoFvh4LGZ6EKoQWzm8Z-CHXLGLUs4Hp5aPhF46dGzgAzwlPFW4t9G4DciX1uB4vv1XnfTc5wqJch6ltjKMde1GZwLR757a8dJSBcmGWze3UNE2YH_VLD7NCwH2kkqr3gh8rn7lWKG4AUIYPxsw9CB".into()
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//! # }
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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//!
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! # fn jwks_fetching_function() -> JWKS {
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//! # let jwks_json = "{\"keys\":[{\"kty\":\"RSA\",\"alg\":\"RS256\",\"use\":\"sig\",\"kid\":\"8rDq8Pw0FZcaoXWTEVQo7+Tf2YzSL1fBxNKPCebaai4=\",\"n\":\"l4UTgk1zr-8C8utt0E57DtBV6qqAPWzVRrIuQS2j0_hp2CviaNl5XzGRDnB8gwk0Hx95YOhJupAe6RNq5ok3fDdxL7DLvppJNRLz3Ag9CsmDLcbXgNEQys33fBJaPw1v3GcaFC4tisU5p-o1f5RfWwvwdBtdBfGiwT1GRvbc5sFx6M4iYjg9uv1lNKW60PqSJW4iDYrfqzZmB0zF1SJ0BL_rnQZ1Wi_UkFmNe9arM8W9tI9T3Ie59HITFuyVSTCt6qQEtSfa1e5PiBaVuV3qoFI2jPBiVZQ6LPGBWEDyz4QtrHLdECPPoTF30NN6TSVwwlRbCuUUrdNdXdjYe2dMFQ\",\"e\":\"DhaD5zC7mzaDvHO192wKT_9sfsVmdy8w8T8C9VG17_b1jG2srd3cmc6Ycw-0blDf53Wrpi9-KGZXKHX6_uIuJK249WhkP7N1SHrTJxO0sUJ8AhK482PLF09Qtu6cUfJqY1X1y1S2vACJZItU4Vjr3YAfiVGQXeA8frAf7Sm4O1CBStCyg6yCcIbGojII0jfh2vSB-GD9ok1F69Nmk-R-bClyqMCV_Oq-5a0gqClVS8pDyGYMgKTww2RHgZaFSUcG13KeLMQsG2UOB2OjSC8FkOXK00NBlAjU3d0Vv-IamaLIszO7FQBY3Oh0uxNOvIE9ofQyCOpB-xIK6V9CTTphxw\"}]}";
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//! # serde_json::from_str(jwks_json).unwrap()
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//! # }
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2018-09-04 12:36:59 +02:00
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//! #
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! // The function implied here would usually perform an HTTP-GET
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//! // on the JWKS-URL for an authentication provider and deserialize
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//! // the result into the `alcoholic_jwt::JWKS`-struct.
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//! let jwks: JWKS = jwks_fetching_function();
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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//!
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! let token: String = some_token_fetching_function();
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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//!
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! // Several types of built-in validations are provided:
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//! let validations = vec![
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2018-09-04 12:33:30 +02:00
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//! Validation::Issuer("auth.test.aprila.no".into()),
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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//! Validation::SubjectPresent,
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//! ];
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//!
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//! // If a JWKS contains multiple keys, the correct KID first
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//! // needs to be fetched from the token headers.
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//! let kid = token_kid(&token)
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//! .expect("Failed to decode token headers")
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//! .expect("No 'kid' claim present in token");
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//!
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//! let jwk = jwks.find(&kid).expect("Specified key not found in set");
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//!
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//! validate(token, jwk, validations).expect("Token validation has failed!");
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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//! ```
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//!
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//! [JWKS]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
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#[macro_use] extern crate serde_derive;
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extern crate base64;
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extern crate openssl;
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extern crate serde;
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extern crate serde_json;
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use base64::{decode_config, URL_SAFE};
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use openssl::bn::BigNum;
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
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use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
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2018-09-04 11:01:22 +02:00
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use openssl::pkey::{Public, PKey};
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use openssl::rsa::Rsa;
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use openssl::sign::Verifier;
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
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use serde_json::Value;
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2018-09-04 12:33:30 +02:00
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use std::time::{UNIX_EPOCH, Duration, SystemTime};
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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2018-09-04 11:00:46 +02:00
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests;
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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/// JWT algorithm used. The only supported algorithm is currently
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/// RS256.
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#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
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enum KeyAlgorithm { RS256 }
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/// Type of key contained in a JWT. The only supported key type is
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/// currently RSA.
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#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
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enum KeyType { RSA }
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/// Representation of a single JSON Web Key. See [RFC
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/// 7517](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517#section-4).
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2018-09-04 12:21:11 +02:00
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#[allow(dead_code)] // kty & alg only constrain deserialisation, but aren't used
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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pub struct JWK {
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kty: KeyType,
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alg: Option<KeyAlgorithm>,
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kid: Option<String>,
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// Shared modulus
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n: String,
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// Public key exponent
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e: String,
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}
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2018-09-04 11:01:22 +02:00
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/// Representation of a set of JSON Web Keys. See [RFC
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/// 7517](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517#section-5).
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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pub struct JWKS {
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// This is a vector instead of some kind of map-like structure
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// because key IDs are in fact optional.
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//
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// Technically having multiple keys with the same KID would not
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// violate the JWKS-definition either, but behaviour in that case
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// is unspecified.
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keys: Vec<JWK>,
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}
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impl JWKS {
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/// Attempt to find a JWK by its key ID.
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pub fn find(&self, kid: &str) -> Option<&JWK> {
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self.keys.iter().find(|jwk| jwk.kid == Some(kid.into()))
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}
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}
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2018-09-04 11:01:22 +02:00
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/// Representation of an undecoded JSON Web Token. See [RFC
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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/// 7519](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519).
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2018-09-04 11:53:23 +02:00
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struct JWT (String);
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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2018-09-04 11:36:36 +02:00
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/// Representation of a decoded and validated JSON Web Token.
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///
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/// Specific claim fields are only decoded internally in the library
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/// for validation purposes, while it is generally up to the consumer
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/// of the validated JWT what structure they would like to impose.
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pub struct ValidJWT {
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/// JOSE header of the JSON Web Token. Certain fields are
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/// guaranteed to be present in this header, consult section 5 of
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/// RFC7519 for more information.
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pub headers: Value,
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/// Claims (i.e. primary data) contained in the JSON Web Token.
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/// While there are several registered and recommended headers
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/// (consult section 4.1 of RFC7519), the presence of no field is
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/// guaranteed in these.
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pub claims: Value,
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}
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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/// Possible token claim validations. This enumeration only covers
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/// common use-cases, for other types of validations the user is
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/// encouraged to inspect the claim set manually.
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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pub enum Validation {
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/// Validate that the issuer ("iss") claim matches a specified
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/// value.
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Issuer(String),
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/// Validate that the audience ("aud") claim matches a specified
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/// value.
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Audience(String),
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/// Validate that a subject value is present.
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SubjectPresent,
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2018-09-04 12:33:30 +02:00
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/// Validate that the expiry time of the token ("exp"-claim) has
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/// not yet been reached.
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NotExpired,
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2018-09-04 11:53:51 +02:00
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}
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/// Possible results of a token validation.
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2018-09-04 10:58:59 +02:00
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub enum ValidationError {
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/// Token was malformed (various possible reasons!)
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MalformedJWT,
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/// Decoding of the provided JWK failed.
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InvalidJWK,
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/// Signature validation failed, i.e. because of a non-matching
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/// public key.
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InvalidSignature,
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2018-09-04 10:58:59 +02:00
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/// An OpenSSL operation failed along the way at a point at which
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/// a more specific error variant could not be constructed.
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OpenSSL(ErrorStack),
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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/// JSON decoding into a provided type failed.
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JSON(serde_json::Error),
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2018-09-04 12:33:30 +02:00
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/// One or more claim validations failed. This variant contains
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/// human-readable validation errors.
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InvalidClaims(Vec<&'static str>),
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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}
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2018-09-04 10:58:59 +02:00
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type JWTResult<T> = Result<T, ValidationError>;
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impl From<ErrorStack> for ValidationError {
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fn from(err: ErrorStack) -> Self { ValidationError::OpenSSL(err) }
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}
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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impl From<serde_json::Error> for ValidationError {
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fn from(err: serde_json::Error) -> Self { ValidationError::JSON(err) }
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}
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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/// Attempt to extract the `kid`-claim out of a JWT's header claims.
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///
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/// This function is normally used when a token provider has multiple
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/// public keys in rotation at the same time that could all still have
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/// valid tokens issued under them.
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///
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/// This is only safe if the key set containing the currently allowed
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/// key IDs is fetched from a trusted source.
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2018-09-04 11:53:23 +02:00
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pub fn token_kid(token: &str) -> JWTResult<Option<String>> {
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2018-09-04 11:13:44 +02:00
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// Fetch the header component of the JWT by splitting it out and
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// dismissing the rest.
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2018-09-04 11:53:23 +02:00
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let parts: Vec<&str> = token.splitn(2, '.').collect();
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2018-09-04 11:13:44 +02:00
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if parts.len() != 2 {
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return Err(ValidationError::MalformedJWT);
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}
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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// Decode only the first part of the token into a specialised
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// representation:
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2018-09-04 11:13:44 +02:00
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct KidOnly {
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kid: Option<String>,
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}
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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let kid_only: KidOnly = deserialize_part(parts[0])?;
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2018-09-04 11:13:44 +02:00
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Ok(kid_only.kid)
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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}
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/// Validate the signature of a JSON Web Token and optionally apply
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/// claim validations. Signatures are always verified before claims,
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/// and if a signature verification passes *all* claim validations are
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/// run and returned.
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///
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2018-09-04 11:36:42 +02:00
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/// If validation succeeds a representation of the token is returned
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/// that contains the header and claims as simple JSON values.
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///
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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/// It is the user's task to ensure that the correct JWK is passed in
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/// for validation.
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2018-09-04 11:36:42 +02:00
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pub fn validate(token: String,
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jwk: &JWK,
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validations: Vec<Validation>) -> JWTResult<ValidJWT> {
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let jwt = JWT(token);
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let public_key = public_key_from_jwk(&jwk)?;
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validate_jwt_signature(&jwt, public_key)?;
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// Split out all three parts of the JWT this time, deserialising
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// the first and second as appropriate.
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let parts: Vec<&str> = jwt.0.splitn(3, '.').collect();
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if parts.len() != 3 {
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// This is unlikely considering that validation has already
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// been performed at this point, but better safe than sorry.
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return Err(ValidationError::MalformedJWT)
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}
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2018-09-04 12:33:30 +02:00
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// Perform claim validations before constructing the valid token:
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let partial_claims = deserialize_part(parts[1])?;
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validate_claims(partial_claims, validations)?;
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2018-09-04 11:36:42 +02:00
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let headers = deserialize_part(parts[0])?;
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let claims = deserialize_part(parts[1])?;
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let valid_jwt = ValidJWT { headers, claims };
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Ok(valid_jwt)
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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}
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// Internal implementation
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//
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// The functions in the following section are not part of the public
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// API of this library.
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2018-09-04 10:58:59 +02:00
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/// Decode a single key fragment (base64-url encoded integer) to an
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/// OpenSSL BigNum.
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fn decode_fragment(fragment: &str) -> JWTResult<BigNum> {
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let bytes = decode_config(fragment, URL_SAFE)
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.map_err(|_| ValidationError::InvalidJWK)?;
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BigNum::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(Into::into)
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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}
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/// Decode an RSA public key from a JWK by constructing it directly
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/// from the public RSA key fragments.
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2018-09-04 10:58:59 +02:00
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fn public_key_from_jwk(jwk: &JWK) -> JWTResult<Rsa<Public>> {
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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let jwk_n = decode_fragment(&jwk.n)?;
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let jwk_e = decode_fragment(&jwk.e)?;
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2018-09-04 10:58:59 +02:00
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Rsa::from_public_components(jwk_n, jwk_e).map_err(Into::into)
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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}
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2018-09-04 11:34:22 +02:00
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/// Decode a base64-URL encoded string and deserialise the resulting
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/// JSON.
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fn deserialize_part<T: DeserializeOwned>(part: &str) -> JWTResult<T> {
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let json = base64::decode_config(part, URL_SAFE)
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.map_err(|_| ValidationError::MalformedJWT)?;
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serde_json::from_slice(&json).map_err(Into::into)
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}
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2018-09-04 11:01:22 +02:00
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/// Validate the signature on a JWT using a provided public key.
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///
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/// A JWT is made up of three components (headers, claims, signature)
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/// - only the first two are part of the signed data.
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fn validate_jwt_signature(jwt: &JWT, key: Rsa<Public>) -> JWTResult<()> {
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let key = PKey::from_rsa(key)?;
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let mut verifier = Verifier::new(MessageDigest::sha256(), &key)?;
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// Split the token from the back to a maximum of two elements.
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// There are technically three components using the same separator
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// ('.'), but we are interested in the first two together and
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// splitting them is unnecessary.
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let token_parts: Vec<&str> = jwt.0.rsplitn(2, '.').collect();
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if token_parts.len() != 2 {
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return Err(ValidationError::MalformedJWT);
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}
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// Second element of the vector will be the signed payload.
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let data = token_parts[1];
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// First element of the vector will be the (encoded) signature.
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let sig_b64 = token_parts[0];
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let sig = base64::decode_config(sig_b64, URL_SAFE)
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.map_err(|_| ValidationError::MalformedJWT)?;
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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2018-09-04 11:01:22 +02:00
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// Verify signature by inserting the payload data and checking it
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// against the decoded signature.
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verifier.update(data.as_bytes())?;
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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2018-09-04 11:01:22 +02:00
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match verifier.verify(&sig)? {
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true => Ok(()),
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false => Err(ValidationError::InvalidSignature),
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2018-09-04 09:58:29 +02:00
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}
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}
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2018-09-04 12:33:30 +02:00
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/// Internal helper struct for claims that are relevant for claim
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/// validations.
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct PartialClaims {
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aud: Option<String>,
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iss: Option<String>,
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sub: Option<String>,
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exp: Option<u64>,
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}
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/// Apply a single validation to the claim set of a token.
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fn apply_validation(claims: &PartialClaims,
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validation: Validation) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
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match validation {
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// Validate that an 'iss' claim is present and matches the
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// supplied value.
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Validation::Issuer(iss) => {
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match claims.iss {
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None => Err("'iss' claim is missing"),
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Some(ref claim) => if *claim == iss {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err("'iss' claim does not match")
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}
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}
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},
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// Validate that an 'aud' claim is present and matches the
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// supplied value.
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Validation::Audience(aud) => {
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match claims.aud {
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None => Err("'aud' claim is missing"),
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Some(ref claim) => if *claim == aud {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err("'aud' claim does not match")
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}
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}
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},
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Validation::SubjectPresent => match claims.sub {
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Some(_) => Ok(()),
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None => Err("'sub' claim is missing"),
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},
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Validation::NotExpired => match claims.exp {
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None => Err("'exp' claim is missing"),
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Some(exp) => {
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// Determine the current timestamp in seconds since
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// the UNIX epoch.
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let now = SystemTime::now()
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.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
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// this is an unrecoverable, critical error. There
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// aren't many ways this can occur, other than
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// system time being set into the far future or
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// this library being used in some sort of future
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// museum.
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.expect("system time is likely incorrect");
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// Convert the expiry time (which is also in epoch
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// seconds) to a duration.
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let exp_duration = Duration::from_secs(exp);
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// The token has not expired if the expiry duration is
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// larger than (i.e. in the future from) the current
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// time.
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if exp_duration > now {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err("token has expired")
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}
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}
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},
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}
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}
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/// Apply all requested validations to a partial claim set.
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fn validate_claims(claims: PartialClaims,
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validations: Vec<Validation>) -> JWTResult<()> {
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let validation_errors: Vec<_> = validations.into_iter()
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.map(|v| apply_validation(&claims, v))
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.filter_map(|result| match result {
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Ok(_) => None,
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Err(err) => Some(err),
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})
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.collect();
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if validation_errors.is_empty() {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err(ValidationError::InvalidClaims(validation_errors))
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}
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}
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