a7f6b85180
Return value of crypto_bignum_to_bin() wasn't always checked, resulting in potential access to uninitialized values. Fix it, as some analyzers complain about it. Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Micha Hashkes <micha.hashkes@intel.com>
490 lines
13 KiB
C
490 lines
13 KiB
C
/*
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* EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines
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* Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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*
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "common.h"
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#include "utils/const_time.h"
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#include "common/dragonfly.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "eap_defs.h"
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#include "eap_pwd_common.h"
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#define MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN 66
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/* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
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struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
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{
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u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
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os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero,
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SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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}
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void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len)
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{
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crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len);
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}
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void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest)
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{
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size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
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crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len);
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}
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/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
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static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
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size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen)
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{
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struct crypto_hash *hash;
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u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
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u16 i, ctr, L;
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size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen;
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resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8;
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ctr = 0;
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L = htons(resultbitlen);
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while (len < resultbytelen) {
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ctr++;
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i = htons(ctr);
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hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
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key, keylen);
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if (hash == NULL)
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return -1;
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if (ctr > 1)
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crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
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crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen);
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crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
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mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
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if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0)
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return -1;
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if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen)
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os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
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else
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os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
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len += mdlen;
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}
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/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
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if (resultbitlen % 8) {
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u8 mask = 0xff;
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mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
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result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
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{
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EAP_PWD_group *grp;
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if (!dragonfly_suitable_group(num, 1)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsuitable group %u", num);
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return NULL;
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}
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grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
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if (!grp)
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return NULL;
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grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
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if (!grp->group) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC group");
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os_free(grp);
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return NULL;
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}
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grp->group_num = num;
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: provisioned group %d", num);
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return grp;
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}
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/*
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* compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
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* on the password and identities.
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*/
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int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
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const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
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const u8 *id_server, size_t id_server_len,
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const u8 *id_peer, size_t id_peer_len,
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const u8 *token)
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{
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struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
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u8 qr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 x_y[2 * MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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struct crypto_bignum *tmp2 = NULL, *y = NULL;
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struct crypto_hash *hash;
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unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
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int ret = 0, res;
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u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
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* mask */
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size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
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struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
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const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
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u8 found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
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int cmp_prime;
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unsigned int in_range;
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unsigned int is_eq;
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if (grp->pwe)
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return -1;
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os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
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prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
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primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
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primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
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if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
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primebytelen) < 0)
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return -1;
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if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
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"buffer");
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goto fail;
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}
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/* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */
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if (dragonfly_get_random_qr_qnr(prime, &qr, &qnr) < 0 ||
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin),
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primebytelen) < 0 ||
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin),
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primebytelen) < 0)
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goto fail;
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os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
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ctr = 0;
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/*
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* Run through the hunting-and-pecking loop 40 times to mask the time
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* necessary to find PWE. The odds of PWE not being found in 40 loops is
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* roughly 1 in 1 trillion.
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*/
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while (ctr < 40) {
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ctr++;
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/*
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* compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
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* pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
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* counter)
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*/
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hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
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if (hash == NULL)
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goto fail;
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32));
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len);
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
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eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
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is_odd = const_time_select_u8(
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found, is_odd, pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
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if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
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(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
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os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
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prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
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goto fail;
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if (primebitlen % 8)
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buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
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8 - primebitlen % 8);
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cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen);
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/* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
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* being smaller than prime. */
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in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
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/* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
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* cmp_prime >= 0, but go through them regardless to minimize
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* externally observable differences in behavior. */
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crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
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x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
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if (!x_candidate) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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"EAP-pwd: unable to create x_candidate");
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goto fail;
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}
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
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prfbuf, primebytelen);
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const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
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x_bin);
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/*
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* compute y^2 using the equation of the curve
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*
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* y^2 = x^3 + ax + b
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*/
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crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
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tmp2 = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate);
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if (!tmp2)
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goto fail;
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res = dragonfly_is_quadratic_residue_blind(grp->group, qr_bin,
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qnr_bin, tmp2);
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if (res < 0)
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goto fail;
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found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
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/* found is 0 or 0xff here and res is 0 or 1. Bitwise OR of them
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* (with res converted to 0/0xff and masked with prf being below
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* prime) handles this in constant time.
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*/
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found |= (res & in_range) * 0xff;
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}
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if (found == 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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"EAP-pwd: unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy",
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num);
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goto fail;
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}
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/*
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* We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set it here.
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*/
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crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
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x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);
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if (!x_candidate)
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goto fail;
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/* y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b) mod p
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* if LSB(y) == LSB(pwd-seed): PWE = (x, y)
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* else: PWE = (x, p - y)
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*
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* Calculate y and the two possible values for PWE and after that,
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* use constant time selection to copy the correct alternative.
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*/
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y = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate);
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if (!y ||
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dragonfly_sqrt(grp->group, y, y) < 0 ||
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y, MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, primebytelen) < 0 ||
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crypto_bignum_sub(prime, y, y) < 0 ||
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y + MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
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MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, primebytelen) < 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve y");
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goto fail;
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}
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/* Constant time selection of the y coordinate from the two
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* options */
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is_eq = const_time_eq(is_odd, x_y[primebytelen - 1] & 0x01);
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const_time_select_bin(is_eq, x_y, x_y + MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
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primebytelen, x_y + primebytelen);
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os_memcpy(x_y, x_bin, primebytelen);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: PWE", x_y, 2 * primebytelen);
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grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(grp->group, x_y);
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if (!grp->pwe) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Could not generate PWE");
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goto fail;
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}
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/*
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* If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be on the
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* curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code says this is
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* required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
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*/
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if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
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goto fail;
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}
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
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if (0) {
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fail:
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
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grp->pwe = NULL;
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ret = 1;
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}
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/* cleanliness and order.... */
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crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
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bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen);
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os_memset(qr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_bin));
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os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));
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os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));
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os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));
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forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y));
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return ret;
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}
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int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, const struct crypto_bignum *k,
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const struct crypto_bignum *peer_scalar,
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const struct crypto_bignum *server_scalar,
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const u8 *confirm_peer, const u8 *confirm_server,
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const u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk, u8 *session_id)
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{
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struct crypto_hash *hash;
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u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft;
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u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
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size_t prime_len, order_len;
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prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
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order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(grp->group);
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cruft = os_malloc(prime_len);
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if (!cruft)
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return -1;
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/*
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* first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
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* scal_s)
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*/
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session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
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hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
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if (hash == NULL) {
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os_free(cruft);
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return -1;
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}
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (const u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
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if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(peer_scalar, cruft, order_len,
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order_len) < 0) {
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os_free(cruft);
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return -1;
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}
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, order_len);
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if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(server_scalar, cruft, order_len,
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order_len) < 0) {
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os_free(cruft);
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return -1;
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}
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, order_len);
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eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]);
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/* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */
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hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
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if (hash == NULL) {
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os_free(cruft);
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return -1;
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}
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if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(k, cruft, prime_len, prime_len) < 0) {
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os_free(cruft);
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return -1;
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}
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, prime_len);
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os_free(cruft);
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk);
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/* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
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if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
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session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1,
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msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
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os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
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return 1;
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}
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static int eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum *prime,
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const u8 *buf, size_t len)
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{
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struct crypto_bignum *val;
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int ok = 1;
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val = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, len);
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if (!val || crypto_bignum_is_zero(val) ||
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crypto_bignum_cmp(val, prime) >= 0)
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ok = 0;
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crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 0);
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return ok;
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}
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struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
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const u8 *buf)
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{
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struct crypto_ec_point *element;
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const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
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size_t prime_len;
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prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(group->group);
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prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(group->group);
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/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: 0 < x,y < p */
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if (!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf, prime_len) ||
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!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf + prime_len, prime_len)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid coordinate in element");
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return NULL;
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}
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element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(group->group, buf);
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if (!element) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: EC point from element failed");
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return NULL;
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}
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/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: on curve and not the point at infinity */
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if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(group->group, element) ||
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crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, element)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid element");
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goto fail;
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}
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out:
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|
return element;
|
|
fail:
|
|
crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
|
|
element = NULL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_bignum *scalar;
|
|
const struct crypto_bignum *order;
|
|
size_t order_len;
|
|
|
|
order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
|
|
order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(group->group);
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2: 1 < scalar < r */
|
|
scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, order_len);
|
|
if (!scalar || crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) ||
|
|
crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar) ||
|
|
crypto_bignum_cmp(scalar, order) >= 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: received scalar is invalid");
|
|
crypto_bignum_deinit(scalar, 0);
|
|
scalar = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return scalar;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int eap_pwd_get_rand_mask(EAP_PWD_group *group, struct crypto_bignum *_rand,
|
|
struct crypto_bignum *_mask,
|
|
struct crypto_bignum *scalar)
|
|
{
|
|
return dragonfly_generate_scalar(crypto_ec_get_order(group->group),
|
|
_rand, _mask, scalar);
|
|
}
|