7babd2539c
This can be used to increase buffer sizes when adding support for new groups. Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
599 lines
16 KiB
C
599 lines
16 KiB
C
/*
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* Simultaneous authentication of equals
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* Copyright (c) 2012, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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*
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "common.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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#include "crypto/random.h"
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#include "ieee802_11_defs.h"
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#include "sae.h"
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static const u8 group19_prime[] = {
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
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};
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static const u8 group19_order[] = {
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
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0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
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};
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int sae_set_group(struct sae_data *sae, int group)
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{
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crypto_ec_deinit(sae->ec);
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sae->ec = crypto_ec_init(group);
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if (!sae->ec)
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return -1;
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sae->group = group;
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sae->prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(sae->ec);
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return 0;
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}
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void sae_clear_data(struct sae_data *sae)
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{
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if (sae == NULL)
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return;
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crypto_ec_deinit(sae->ec);
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os_memset(sae, 0, sizeof(*sae));
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}
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static int val_zero_or_one(const u8 *val, size_t len)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < len - 1; i++) {
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if (val[i])
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return 0;
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}
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return val[len - 1] <= 1;
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}
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static int val_zero(const u8 *val, size_t len)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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if (val[i])
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int sae_get_rand(u8 *val)
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{
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int iter = 0;
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do {
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if (random_get_bytes(val, sizeof(group19_prime)) < 0)
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return -1;
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if (iter++ > 100)
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return -1;
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} while (os_memcmp(val, group19_order, sizeof(group19_prime)) >= 0 ||
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val_zero_or_one(val, sizeof(group19_prime)));
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return 0;
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}
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static void sae_pwd_seed_key(const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, u8 *key)
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{
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE derivation - addr1=" MACSTR
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" addr2=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2));
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if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) > 0) {
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os_memcpy(key, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
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os_memcpy(key + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
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} else {
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os_memcpy(key, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
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os_memcpy(key + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
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}
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}
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static int sae_test_pwd_seed(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
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struct crypto_ec_point *pwe, u8 *pwe_bin)
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{
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u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
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struct crypto_bignum *x;
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int y_bit;
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, 32);
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/* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */
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sha256_prf(pwd_seed, 32, "SAE Hunting and Pecking",
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group19_prime, sizeof(group19_prime),
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pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value));
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
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pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value));
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if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, group19_prime, sizeof(group19_prime)) >= 0)
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return 0;
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y_bit = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01;
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x = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value));
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if (x == NULL)
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return -1;
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if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->ec, pwe, x, y_bit) < 0) {
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crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 0);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: No solution found");
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return 0;
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}
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crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 0);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found");
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if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->ec, pwe, pwe_bin,
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pwe_bin + sae->prime_len) < 0)
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return -1;
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE x", pwe_bin, sae->prime_len);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE y",
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pwe_bin + sae->prime_len, sae->prime_len);
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return 1;
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}
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static int sae_derive_pwe(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
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const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
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size_t password_len, struct crypto_ec_point *pwe,
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u8 *pwe_bin)
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{
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u8 counter, k = 4;
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u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
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const u8 *addr[2];
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size_t len[2];
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int found = 0;
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struct crypto_ec_point *pwe_tmp;
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u8 pwe_bin_tmp[2 * SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
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pwe_tmp = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
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if (pwe_tmp == NULL)
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return -1;
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wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
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password, password_len);
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/*
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* H(salt, ikm) = HMAC-SHA256(salt, ikm)
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* pwd-seed = H(MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC),
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* password || counter)
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*/
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sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs);
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addr[0] = password;
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len[0] = password_len;
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addr[1] = &counter;
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len[1] = sizeof(counter);
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/*
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* Continue for at least k iterations to protect against side-channel
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* attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required
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* in the loop.
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*/
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for (counter = 1; counter < k || !found; counter++) {
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u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
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int res;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter);
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if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, addr, len,
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pwd_seed) < 0)
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break;
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res = sae_test_pwd_seed(sae, pwd_seed,
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found ? pwe_tmp : pwe,
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found ? pwe_bin_tmp : pwe_bin);
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if (res < 0)
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break;
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if (res == 0)
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continue;
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if (found) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Ignore this PWE (one was "
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"already selected)");
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} else {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
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found = 1;
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}
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if (counter > 200) {
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/* This should not happen in practice */
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to derive PWE");
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break;
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}
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}
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe_tmp, 1);
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return found ? 0 : -1;
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}
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static int sae_derive_commit(struct sae_data *sae, struct crypto_ec_point *pwe)
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{
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struct crypto_bignum *x, *bn_rand, *bn_mask, *order;
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struct crypto_ec_point *elem;
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u8 mask[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
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int ret = -1;
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if (sae_get_rand(sae->sae_rand) < 0 || sae_get_rand(mask) < 0)
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return -1;
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: rand",
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sae->sae_rand, sizeof(sae->sae_rand));
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: mask", mask, sizeof(mask));
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x = crypto_bignum_init();
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bn_rand = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->sae_rand, sae->prime_len);
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bn_mask = crypto_bignum_init_set(mask, sizeof(mask));
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order = crypto_bignum_init_set(group19_order, sizeof(group19_order));
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elem = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
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if (x == NULL || bn_rand == NULL || bn_mask == NULL || order == NULL ||
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elem == NULL)
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goto fail;
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/* commit-scalar = (rand + mask) modulo r */
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crypto_bignum_add(bn_rand, bn_mask, x);
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crypto_bignum_mod(x, order, x);
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(x, sae->own_commit_scalar,
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sizeof(sae->own_commit_scalar), sae->prime_len);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: commit-scalar",
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sae->own_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len);
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/* COMMIT-ELEMENT = inverse(scalar-op(mask, PWE)) */
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if (crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->ec, pwe, bn_mask, elem) < 0 ||
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crypto_ec_point_invert(sae->ec, elem) < 0 ||
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crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->ec, elem, sae->own_commit_element,
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sae->own_commit_element + sae->prime_len) <
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0)
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goto fail;
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: commit-element x",
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sae->own_commit_element, sae->prime_len);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: commit-element y",
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sae->own_commit_element + sae->prime_len, sae->prime_len);
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ret = 0;
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fail:
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(elem, 0);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(order, 0);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(bn_mask, 1);
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os_memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
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crypto_bignum_deinit(bn_rand, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
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return ret;
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}
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int sae_prepare_commit(const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2,
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const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
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struct sae_data *sae)
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{
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struct crypto_ec_point *pwe;
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int ret = 0;
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pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
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if (pwe == NULL ||
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sae_derive_pwe(sae, addr1, addr2, password, password_len, pwe,
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sae->pwe) < 0 ||
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sae_derive_commit(sae, pwe) < 0)
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ret = -1;
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe, 1);
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return ret;
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}
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static int sae_check_peer_commit(struct sae_data *sae)
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{
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/* 0 < scalar < r */
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if (val_zero(sae->peer_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len) ||
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os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_scalar, group19_order,
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sizeof(group19_prime)) >= 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid peer scalar");
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return -1;
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}
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/* element x and y coordinates < p */
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if (os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_element, group19_prime,
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sizeof(group19_prime)) >= 0 ||
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os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_element + sae->prime_len, group19_prime,
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sizeof(group19_prime)) >= 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid coordinates in peer "
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"element");
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int sae_derive_k(struct sae_data *sae, u8 *k)
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{
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struct crypto_ec_point *pwe, *peer_elem, *K;
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struct crypto_bignum *rand_bn, *peer_scalar;
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int ret = -1;
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pwe = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->ec, sae->pwe);
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peer_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->peer_commit_scalar,
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sae->prime_len);
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peer_elem = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->ec, sae->peer_commit_element);
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K = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->ec);
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rand_bn = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->sae_rand, sae->prime_len);
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if (pwe == NULL || peer_elem == NULL || peer_scalar == NULL ||
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K == NULL || rand_bn == NULL)
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goto fail;
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if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(sae->ec, peer_elem)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer element is not on curve");
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goto fail;
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}
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/*
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* K = scalar-op(rand, (elem-op(scalar-op(peer-commit-scalar, PWE),
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* PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT)))
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* If K is identity element (point-at-infinity), reject
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* k = F(K) (= x coordinate)
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*/
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if (crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->ec, pwe, peer_scalar, K) < 0 ||
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crypto_ec_point_add(sae->ec, K, peer_elem, K) < 0 ||
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crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->ec, K, rand_bn, K) < 0 ||
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crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(sae->ec, K) ||
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crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->ec, K, k, NULL) < 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate K and k");
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goto fail;
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}
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: k", k, sae->prime_len);
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ret = 0;
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fail:
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe, 1);
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(peer_elem, 0);
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crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(rand_bn, 1);
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return ret;
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}
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static int sae_derive_keys(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *k)
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{
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u8 null_key[32], val[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 keyseed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
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u8 keys[32 + 32];
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struct crypto_bignum *order, *own_scalar, *peer_scalar, *tmp;
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int ret = -1;
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order = crypto_bignum_init_set(group19_order, sizeof(group19_order));
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own_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->own_commit_scalar,
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sae->prime_len);
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peer_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(sae->peer_commit_scalar,
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sae->prime_len);
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tmp = crypto_bignum_init();
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if (order == NULL || own_scalar == NULL || peer_scalar == NULL ||
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tmp == NULL)
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goto fail;
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/* keyseed = H(<0>32, k)
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* KCK || PMK = KDF-512(keyseed, "SAE KCK and PMK",
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* (commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) modulo r)
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* PMKID = L((commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) modulo r, 0, 128)
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*/
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os_memset(null_key, 0, sizeof(null_key));
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hmac_sha256(null_key, sizeof(null_key), k, sae->prime_len, keyseed);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: keyseed", keyseed, sizeof(keyseed));
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crypto_bignum_add(own_scalar, peer_scalar, tmp);
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crypto_bignum_mod(tmp, order, tmp);
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(tmp, val, sizeof(val), sae->prime_len);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMKID", val, 16);
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sha256_prf(keyseed, sizeof(keyseed), "SAE KCK and PMK",
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val, sae->prime_len, keys, sizeof(keys));
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os_memcpy(sae->kck, keys, 32);
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os_memcpy(sae->pmk, keys + 32, 32);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: KCK", sae->kck, 32);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMK", sae->pmk, 32);
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ret = 0;
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fail:
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crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 0);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(peer_scalar, 0);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(own_scalar, 0);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(order, 0);
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return ret;
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}
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int sae_process_commit(struct sae_data *sae)
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{
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u8 k[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
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if (sae_check_peer_commit(sae) < 0 ||
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sae_derive_k(sae, k) < 0 ||
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sae_derive_keys(sae, k) < 0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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void sae_write_commit(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf,
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const struct wpabuf *token)
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{
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wpabuf_put_le16(buf, sae->group); /* Finite Cyclic Group */
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if (token)
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wpabuf_put_buf(buf, token);
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wpabuf_put_data(buf, sae->own_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len);
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wpabuf_put_data(buf, sae->own_commit_element, 2 * sae->prime_len);
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}
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u16 sae_parse_commit(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len,
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const u8 **token, size_t *token_len)
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{
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const u8 *pos = data, *end = data + len;
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u16 group;
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Commit fields", data, len);
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if (token)
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*token = NULL;
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if (token_len)
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*token_len = 0;
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/* Check Finite Cyclic Group */
|
|
if (pos + 2 > end)
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
|
|
group = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
if (sae->state == SAE_COMMITTED && group != sae->group) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not allow group to be changed");
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (group != sae->group && sae_set_group(sae, group) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Unsupported Finite Cyclic Group %u",
|
|
group);
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (pos + 3 * sae->prime_len < end) {
|
|
size_t tlen = end - (pos + 3 * sae->prime_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Anti-Clogging Token", pos, tlen);
|
|
if (token)
|
|
*token = pos;
|
|
if (token_len)
|
|
*token_len = tlen;
|
|
pos += tlen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pos + sae->prime_len > end) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for scalar");
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11-2012, 11.3.8.6.1: If there is a protocol instance for
|
|
* the peer and it is in Authenticated state, the new Commit Message
|
|
* shall be dropped if the peer-scalar is identical to the one used in
|
|
* the existing protocol instance.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sae->state == SAE_ACCEPTED &&
|
|
os_memcmp(sae->peer_commit_scalar, pos, sae->prime_len) == 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not accept re-use of previous "
|
|
"peer-commit-scalar");
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(sae->peer_commit_scalar, pos, sae->prime_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-scalar",
|
|
sae->peer_commit_scalar, sae->prime_len);
|
|
pos += sae->prime_len;
|
|
|
|
if (pos + 2 * sae->prime_len > end) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for "
|
|
"commit-element");
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(sae->peer_commit_element, pos, 2 * sae->prime_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element(x)",
|
|
sae->peer_commit_element, sae->prime_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element(y)",
|
|
sae->peer_commit_element + sae->prime_len, sae->prime_len);
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void sae_write_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *sc;
|
|
const u8 *addr[5];
|
|
size_t len[5];
|
|
|
|
/* Send-Confirm */
|
|
sc = wpabuf_put(buf, 0);
|
|
wpabuf_put_le16(buf, sae->send_confirm);
|
|
sae->send_confirm++;
|
|
|
|
/* Confirm
|
|
* CN(key, X, Y, Z, ...) =
|
|
* HMAC-SHA256(key, D2OS(X) || D2OS(Y) || D2OS(Z) | ...)
|
|
* confirm = CN(KCK, send-confirm, commit-scalar, COMMIT-ELEMENT,
|
|
* peer-commit-scalar, PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT)
|
|
*/
|
|
addr[0] = sc;
|
|
len[0] = 2;
|
|
addr[1] = sae->own_commit_scalar;
|
|
len[1] = sae->prime_len;
|
|
addr[2] = sae->own_commit_element;
|
|
len[2] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
|
|
addr[3] = sae->peer_commit_scalar;
|
|
len[3] = sae->prime_len;
|
|
addr[4] = sae->peer_commit_element;
|
|
len[4] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
|
|
hmac_sha256_vector(sae->kck, sizeof(sae->kck), 5, addr, len,
|
|
wpabuf_put(buf, SHA256_MAC_LEN));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int sae_check_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
u16 rc;
|
|
const u8 *addr[5];
|
|
size_t elen[5];
|
|
u8 verifier[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm fields", data, len);
|
|
|
|
if (len < 2 + SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Too short confirm message");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = WPA_GET_LE16(data);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: peer-send-confirm %u", rc);
|
|
|
|
/* Confirm
|
|
* CN(key, X, Y, Z, ...) =
|
|
* HMAC-SHA256(key, D2OS(X) || D2OS(Y) || D2OS(Z) | ...)
|
|
* verifier = CN(KCK, peer-send-confirm, peer-commit-scalar,
|
|
* PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT, commit-scalar, COMMIT-ELEMENT)
|
|
*/
|
|
addr[0] = data;
|
|
elen[0] = 2;
|
|
addr[1] = sae->peer_commit_scalar;
|
|
elen[1] = sae->prime_len;
|
|
addr[2] = sae->peer_commit_element;
|
|
elen[2] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
|
|
addr[3] = sae->own_commit_scalar;
|
|
elen[3] = sae->prime_len;
|
|
addr[4] = sae->own_commit_element;
|
|
elen[4] = 2 * sae->prime_len;
|
|
hmac_sha256_vector(sae->kck, sizeof(sae->kck), 5, addr, elen, verifier);
|
|
|
|
if (os_memcmp(verifier, data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm mismatch");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received confirm",
|
|
data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Calculated verifier",
|
|
verifier, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|