IEEE P802.11az/D2.0 renamed the FILS Wrapped Data element,
removing the FILS prefix. Change the code accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Since SAE PMK can be updated only by going through a new SAE
authentication instead of being able to update it during an association
like EAP authentication, do not allow PMKSA entries to be used for
caching after the reauthentication threshold has been reached. This
allows the PMK to be updated without having to force a disassociation
when the PMK expires if the station roams between the reauthentication
threshold and expiration timeout.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Since SAE PMK can be updated only by going through a new SAE
authentication instead of being able to update it during an association
like EAP authentication, do not allow PMKSA entries to be used for OKC
after the reauthentication threshold has been reached. This allows the
PMK to be updated without having to force a disassociation when the PMK
expires if the station roams between the reauthentication threshold and
expiration timeout.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
SAE authentication derives PMKID differently from the EAP cases. The
value comes from information exchanged during SAE authentication and
does not bind in the MAC addresses of the STAs. As such, the same PMKID
is used with different BSSIDs. Fix both the hostapd and wpa_supplicant
to use the previous PMKID as is for OKC instead of deriving a new PMKID
using an incorrect derivation method when using an SAE AKM.
This fixes use of opportunistic key caching with SAE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Rekeying a pairwise key using only keyid 0 (PTK0 rekey) has many broken
implementations and should be avoided when using or interacting with
one. The effects can be triggered by either end of the connection and
range from hardly noticeable disconnects over long connection freezes up
to leaking clear text MPDUs.
To allow affected users to mitigate the issues, add a new configuration
option "wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey" to replace all PTK0 rekeys with fast
reconnects.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Add a new wpa_supplicant network profile configuration parameter
beacon_prot=<0/1> to allow Beacon protection to be enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Initial OWE implementation used SHA256 when deriving the PTK for all OWE
groups. This was supposed to change to SHA384 for group 20 and SHA512
for group 21. The new owe_ptk_workaround=1 network parameter can be used
to enable older behavior mainly for testing purposes. There is no impact
to group 19 behavior, but if enabled, this will make group 20 and 21
cases use SHA256-based PTK derivation which will not work with the
updated OWE implementation on the AP side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific
description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to
be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed
Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to
replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have
moved to using the new key_flag.
The following flag are defined:
KEY_FLAG_MODIFY
Set when an already installed key must be updated.
So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed
keys. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT
Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when
deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.)
KEY_FLAG_RX
The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_TX
The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP
The key is a broadcast or group key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
The key is a pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PMK
The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK).
Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are:
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX
WEP key not used as default key (yet).
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT
Default WEP or WPA-NONE key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX
GTK key valid for RX only.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT
GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX
Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX
Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID
support.)
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY
Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX.
KEY_FLAG_RX_TX
Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination
with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX.
This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new
key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using
it, yet.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
In order to correctly encrypt rekeying frames, wpa_supplicant now checks
if a PTK is currently installed and sets the corresponding encrypt
option for tx_control_port().
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
Add PMKSA candidates from scan results only if they advertise an AKMP
that is used with RSN pre-authentication. Previously, candidates were
added but then ignored later if the AKMP was not suitable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This buffer was getting corrupted, so add more details to make it
clearer what causes the corruption should this type of regression show
up again.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Protect RSNXE, if present, in FT Reassociation Request/Response frames.
This is needed for SAE H2E with FT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Use a single struct definition and a single shared implementation for
parsing EAPOL-Key KDEs and IEs instead of maintaining more or less
identical functionality separately for wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add the new RSNXE into (Re)Association Request frames and EAPOL-Key msg
2/4 when using SAE with hash-to-element mechanism enabled. This allows
the AP to verify that there was no downgrade attack when both PWE
derivation mechanisms are enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
If the AP advertises RSN Extension element, it has to be advertised
consistently in the unprotected (Beacon and Probe Response) and
protected (EAPOL-Key msg 3/4) frames. Verify that this is the case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Commit e820cf952f ("MFP: Add MFPR flag into station RSN IE if 802.11w
is mandatory") added indication of MFPR flag in non-FT cases and was
further extended to cover FT protocol in commit ded56f2faf ("FT: Fix
MFPR flag in RSNE during FT protocol"). Similar fix is needed for
FILS+FT as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Hardcode this to be defined and remove the separate build options for
PMF since this functionality is needed with large number of newer
protocol extensions and is also something that should be enabled in all
WPA2/WPA3 networks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If FT over-the-DS case is enforced through the "FT_DS <BSSID>" control
interface command, the PMF capability check during BSS selection is not
used and that could have allowed PMF to be disabled in the over-the-DS
case even if the local network profile mandated use of PMF. Check
against this explicitly to avoid unexpected cases if the APs within the
same mobility domain are not configured consistently.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Commit e820cf952f ("MFP: Add MFPR flag into station RSN IE if 802.11w
is mandatory") added indication of MFPR flag in non-FT cases, but forgot
to do so for the FT protocol cases where a different function is used to
build the RSNE. Do the same change now for that FT specific case to get
consistent behavior on indicating PMF configuration state with MFPR.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
gcc 8.3.0 was apparently clever enough to optimize away the previously
used os_memset() to explicitly clear a stack buffer that contains keys
when that clearing happened just before returning from the function.
Since memset_s() is not exactly portable (or commonly available yet..),
use a less robust mechanism that is still pretty likely to prevent
current compilers from optimizing the explicit clearing of the memory
away.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016 requires the FILS STA to do this check, but this
was missing from the initial implementation. The AP side behavior was
not described properly in 802.11ai due to a missing change in the
(Re)Association Response frame format tables which has resulted in some
deployed devices not including the RSNE.
For now, use an interoperability workaround to ignore the missing RSNE
and only check the payload of the element if it is present in the
protected frame. In other words, enforce this validation step only with
an AP that implements FILS authentication as described in REVmd while
allowing older implementations to skip this check (and the protection
against downgrade attacks). This workaround may be removed in the future
if it is determined that most deployed APs can be upgraded to add RSNE
into the (Re)Association Response frames.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This allows supplicant side to complete FT initial mobility domain
association using FT-EAP with PMKSA caching.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
When completing FT initial mobility domain association with EAP, store
XXKey/MPMK in the PMKSA cache instead of MSK. The previously stored MSK
was of no use since it could not be used as the XXKey for another FT
initial mobility domain association using PMKSA caching.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
These cases are for the IEEE 802.11 Status Code and Reason Code and
those fields are unsigned 16 bit values, so use the more appropriate
type consistently. This is mainly to document the uses and to make the
source code easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no PMK/PMKID when going through 4-way handshake during an
association started with FT protocol, so need to allow the operation to
proceed even if there is no selected PMKSA cache entry in place.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
There are number of deployed APs with broken PMF implementation where
the IGTK KDE uses swapped bytes in the KeyID field (0x0400 and 0x0500
instead of 4 and 5). Such APs cannot be trusted to implement BIP
correctly or provide a valid IGTK, so do not try to configure this key
with swapped KeyID bytes. Instead, continue without configuring the IGTK
so that the driver can drop any received group-addressed robust
management frames due to missing keys.
Normally, this error behavior would result in us disconnecting, but
there are number of deployed APs with this broken behavior, so as an
interoperability workaround, allow the connection to proceed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Previously wpa_supplicant_key_neg_complete() was called before the
attempt to configure the IGTK received from the authenticator. This
could resulted in somewhat surprising sequence of events if IGTK
configuration failed since completion event would be followed by
immediate disconnection event. Reorder these operations so that
completion is reported only if GTK and IGTK are configurated
successfully.
Furthermore, check for missing GTK KDE in case of RSN and handle that
with an explicit disconnection instead of waiting for the AP to deliver
the GTK later.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Use Diffie-Hellman key exchange to derivate additional material for
PMK-to-PTK derivation to get PFS. The Diffie-Hellman Parameter element
(defined in OWE RFC 8110) is used in association frames to exchange the
DH public keys. For backwards compatibility, ignore missing
request/response DH parameter and fall back to no PFS in such cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
DPP allows Diffie-Hellman exchange to be used for PFS in PTK derivation.
This requires an additional Z.x (x coordinate of the DH shared secret)
to be passed to wpa_pmk_to_ptk(). This commit adds that to the function
and updates all the callers to pass NULL,0 for that part in preparation
of the DPP specific changes to start using this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Verify that the AP uses matching PMKR1Name in (Re)Association Response
frame when going through FT initial mobility domain association using
FILS. Thise step was missing from the initial implementation, but is
needed to match the IEEE 802.11ai requirements for explicit confirmation
of the FT key hierarchy (similarly to what is done in FT 4-way handshake
when FILS is not used).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
ext_supp_rates_len would be 0 here, so decrementing it by 2 will result
in unsigned integer overflow even if that result is not actually used
anywhere. Avoid that to get rid of the UBSan warning.
tdls.c:1597:27: runtime error: unsigned integer overflow: 0 - 2 cannot be represented in type 'unsigned long'
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add test-eapol program that can be used for fuzzing the EAPOL-Key
Supplicant and Authenticator implementations. This tool can write
Supplicant or Authenticator messages into a file as an initialization
step and for the fuzzing step, that file (with potential modifications)
can be used to replace the internally generated message contents.
The TEST_FUZZ=y build parameter is used to make a special build where a
hardcoded random number generator and hardcoded timestamp are used to
force deterministic behavior for the EAPOL-Key operations. This will
also make the implementation ignore Key MIC and AES keywrap errors to
allow processing of modified messages to continue further.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to schedule the postponed RSN preauthentication start
if there are no candidates. Avoid wasting eloop resources for this.
This is most useful for fuzz testing of the 4-way handshake
implementation to avoid getting stuck waiting for this unnecessary one
second time when using eloop to coordinate the Authenticator and
Supplicant state machines.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Include and verify the the OCI element in (Re)Association Request and
Response frames of the FT handshake. In case verification fails, the
handshake message is silently ignored.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Verify the received OCI element in the 4-way and group key handshakes.
If verification fails, the handshake message is silently dropped.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
If Operating Channel Verification is negotiated, include the OCI KDE
element in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 and 3/4 of the 4-way handshake and both
messages of the group key handshake.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This adds the necessary functions and callbacks to make the channel_info
driver API available to the supplicant state machine that implements the
4-way and group key handshake. This is needed for OCV.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
PMKID derivation with the Suite B AKMs is a special case compared to
other AKMs since that derivation uses KCK instead of PMK as an input.
This means that the PMKSA cache entry can be added only after KCK has
been derived during 4-way handshake. This also means that PMKID would
change every time 4-way handshake is repeated even when maintaining the
same PMK (i.e., during PTK rekeying and new associations even if they
use PMKSA caching).
wpa_supplicant was previously replacing the PMKSA cache entry whenever a
new PMKID was derived. This did not match hostapd expectations on the AP
side since hostapd did not update the PMKSA cache entry after it was
created. Consequently, PMKSA caching could be used only once (assuming
no PTK rekeying happened before that). Fix this by making wpa_supplicant
behave consistently with hostapd, i.e., by adding the Suite B PMKSA
cache entries with the PMKID from the very first 4-way handshake
following PMK derivation and then not updating the PMKID.
IEEE Std 802.11-2016 is somewhat vague in this area and it seems to
allow both cases to be used (initial PMKID or any consecutive PMKID
derived from the same PMK). While both cases could be supported that
would result in significantly more complex implementation and need to
store multiple PMKID values. It looks better to clarify the standard to
explicitly note that only the first PMKID derived after PMK derivation
is used (i.e., match the existing hostapd implementation).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
flag set, but not the MIC flag.
When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
(CVE-2018-14526)
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
The AKM 00-0F-AC:13 is supposed to use cryptographic algorithms
consistently, but the current IEEE 802.11 standard is not doing so for
the key names: PMKID (uses SHA-1), PMKR0Name/PMKR1Name (uses SHA-256).
The PMKID case was already implemented with SHA-384 and this commit
replaces use of SHA-256 with SHA-384 for PMKR0Name/PMKR1Name derivation
to be consistent in SHA-384. While this is not compliant with the
current IEEE 802.11 standard, this is clearly needed to meet CNSA Suite
requirements. Matching change is being proposed in REVmd to get the IEEE
802.11 standard to meet the use case requirements.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
wpa_supplicant was hardcoded to use BIP-CMAC-128 in FT protocol if PMF
was enabled. Extend that to allow the other BIP algorithms to be used as
well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When support for KCK2 and KEK2 was added, both keys were derived for
FT-FILS cases, but only KCK2 was actually used. Add similar changes to
use KEK2 to protect GTK/IGTK in FTE with using FT-FILS AKMs.
This fixes AES key wrapping to use the correct key. The change is not
backwards compatible.
Fixes: 2f37387812 ("FILS: Add more complete support for FT-FILS use cases")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The MIC field is now a variable length field, so make FTE generation in
wpa_supplicant aware of the two different field lengths.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This defines key lengths for SHA384-based FT AKM and handles writing and
parsing for RSNE AKMs with the new value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows a single BSS/SSID to be used for both data connection and
OSU. In wpa_supplicant configuration, the current proto=OSEN
key_mgmt=OSEN combination is now allowing both the old separate OSEN
BSS/IE and the new RSN-OSEN to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add MDE (mobility domain element) to Association Request frame IEs in
the driver assoc params. wpa_supplicant will add MDE only if the network
profile allows FT, the selected AP supports FT, and the mobility domain
ID matches.
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Masri <amasri@codeaurora.org>
pmksa_cache stubs have not been updated when function prototypes have
been modified in commit 852b2f2738 (SAE: Only allow SAE AKMP for PMKSA
caching attempts). Add new function parameter int akmp to stubs of
pmksa_cache_get() and pmksa_cache_set_current() as well to fix build.
Fixes: 852b2f2738 ("SAE: Only allow SAE AKMP for PMKSA caching attempts")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Explicitly check the PMKSA cache entry to have matching SAE AKMP for the
case where determining whether to use PMKSA caching instead of new SAE
authentication. Previously, only the network context was checked, but a
single network configuration profile could be used with both WPA2-PSK
and SAE, so should check the AKMP as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This gives more protection against unexpected behavior if RSN supplicant
code ends up trying to use sm->pmk[] with a stale value. Couple of the
code paths did not clear sm->pmk_len explicitly in cases where the old
PMK is being removed, so cover those cases as well to make sure these
will result in PMK-to-PTK derivation failures rather than use of
incorrect PMK value if such a code path could be reached somehow.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the original IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016 functionality with the
changes added in REVmd to describe how additional keys are derived to
protect the FT protocol using keys derived through FILS authentication.
This allows key_mgmt=FT-FILS-SHA256 to be used with FT protocol since
the FTE MIC can now be calculated following the changes in REVmd. The
FT-FILS-SHA384 case is still unsupported (it needs support for variable
length MIC field in FTE).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Previously, matching PMKSA cache entry ended up clearing XXKey. However,
that XXKey is needed in the specific case where FT-SAE goes through the
initial mobility domain association with SAE authentication. FT-SAE
worked previously since the hostapd side generation of the particular
PMKID value in msg 1/4 was broken, but once that PMKID is fixed,
wpa_supplicant will need this fix to allow FT-SAE to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The SAE AKM 00-0F-AC:8 is supposed to use EAPOL-Key Key Descriptor
Version 0 (AKM-defined) with AES-128-CMAC and NIST AES Key Wrap.
However, the previous implementation ended up using Key Descriptor
Version 2 (HMAC-SHA-1-128 and NIST AES Key Wrap). Fix this by using the
appropriate Key Descriptor Version and integrity algorithm. Use helper
functions to keep the selection clearer and more consistent between
wpa_supplicant and hostapd uses.
Note: This change is not backwards compatible. Both the AP and station
side implementations will need to be updated at the same time to
maintain functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from
scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS
just before running the new scan for the connection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within
struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional
layer of protection against unexpected states.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it easier to understand the cases where PMK gets configured
based on information from upper layer call (e.g., a PSK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
break this property.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This was originally added to allow the IEEE 802.11 protocol to be
tested, but there are no known fully functional implementations based on
this nor any known deployments of PeerKey functionality. Furthermore,
PeerKey design in the IEEE Std 802.11-2016 standard has already been
marked as obsolete for DLS and it is being considered for complete
removal in REVmd.
This implementation did not really work, so it could not have been used
in practice. For example, key configuration was using incorrect
algorithm values (WPA_CIPHER_* instead of WPA_ALG_*) which resulted in
mapping to an invalid WPA_ALG_* value for the actual driver operation.
As such, the derived key could not have been successfully set for the
link.
Since there are bugs in this implementation and there does not seem to
be any future for the PeerKey design with DLS (TDLS being the future for
DLS), the best approach is to simply delete all this code to simplify
the EAPOL-Key handling design and to get rid of any potential issues if
these code paths were accidentially reachable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
(Re)Association Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.
For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
This fixes the earlier fix in commit
ad00d64e7d ('Fix TK configuration to the
driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
message 3/4.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This extends OWE support in wpa_supplicant to allow DH groups 20 and 21
to be used in addition to the mandatory group 19 (NIST P-256). The group
is configured using the new network profile parameter owe_group.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
sm->pmk_len was not set when deriving the PMK as part of OWE key
generation. This depending on wpa_sm_set_pmk_from_pmksa() call resetting
the value to the default. While this worked for many cases, this is not
correct and can have issues with network profile selection based on
association information. For example, the OWE transition mode cases
would hit an issue here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Update these comments based on IEEE Std 802.11-2016 to get rid of the
already resolved TODO comment regarding duplicated N_KEY use. The
implementation does not need any changes since it was already following
the fixed version in the current standard.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This part is missing from IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016, but the lack of DHss
here means there would not be proper PFS for the case where PMKSA
caching is used with FILS SK+PFS authentication. This was not really the
intent of the FILS design and that issue was fixed during REVmd work
with the changes proposed in
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/17/11-17-0906-04-000m-fils-fixes.docx
that add DHss into FILS-Key-Data (and PTK, in practice) derivation for
the PMKSA caching case so that a unique ICK, KEK, and TK are derived
even when using the same PMK.
Note: This is not backwards compatible, i.e., this breaks PMKSA caching
with FILS SK+PFS if only STA or AP side implementation is updated.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016 had missed a change in the Pairwise key hierarchy
clause (12.7.1.3 in IEEE Std 802.11-2016) and due to that, the previous
implementation ended up using HMAC-SHA-1 -based PMKID derivation. This
was not really the intent of the FILS design and that issue was fixed
during REVmd work with the changes proposed in
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/17/11-17-0906-04-000m-fils-fixes.docx
that change FILS cases to use HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 based on the
negotiated AKM.
Update the implementation to match the new design. This changes the
rsn_pmkid() function to take in the more generic AKMP identifier instead
of a boolean identifying whether SHA256 is used.
Note: This is not backwards compatible, i.e., this breaks PMKSA caching
based on the initial ERP key hierarchy setup if only STA or AP side
implementation is updated. PMKSA caching based on FILS authentication
exchange is not impacted by this, though.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
pmksa_cache_add_entry() may actually free old_entry if the PMKSA cache
is full. This can result in the PMKSA cache containing entries with
corrupt expiration times.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
This new AKM is used with DPP when using the signed Connector to derive
a PMK. Since the KCK, KEK, and MIC lengths are variable within a single
AKM, this needs number of additional changes to get the PMK length
delivered to places that need to figure out the lengths of the PTK
components.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Derive PMK-R0 and the relevant key names when using FILS authentication
for initial FT mobility domain association. Fill in the FT IEs in
(Re)Association Request frame for this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends fils_pmk_to_ptk() to allow FILS-FT to be derived. The
callers do not yet use that capability; i.e., actual use will be added
in separate commits.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The conditional gSTA and gAP (DH public keys) were not previously
included in Key-Auth derivation, but they are needed for the PFS case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While responding to EAPOL-Key message 1/2 with EAPOL-Key message 2/2
when using FILS AKM suites the ENCRYPTED bit is not set in key info of
2/2 which causes AP to drop 2/2. Fix this by setting the ENCRYPTED bit
since FILS AKM based connection uses AEAD encryption/decryption.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
GTK rekeying was rejected if a prior 4-way handshake is not done.
Fix this by allowing GTK rekey to happen in case of a FILS connection
since it does not involve a 4-way handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add a new PMKSA cache entry within wpa_supplicant if a driver event from
offloaded FILS shared key authentication indicates a new PMKSA entry was
created.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Update the internal fils_completed state when offloading FILS shared key
authentication to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add support for setting and deleting PMKSA cache entries based on FILS Cache
Identifer. Also additionally add support for sending PMK as part of
SET_PMKSA to enable driver to derive keys in case of FILS shared key
offload using PMKSA caching.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
When using FILS for FT initial mobility domain association, add MDE to
the Authentication frame from the STA to indicate this special case for
FILS authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This change fixes the following compilation error:
wpa.c:2465: error: undefined reference to 'crypto_ecdh_deinit'
in builds where CONFIG_ECC does not get defined.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds an option to configure wpa_supplicant to use the perfect
forward secrecy option in FILS shared key authentication. A new build
option CONFIG_FILS_SK_PFS=y can be used to include this functionality. A
new runtime network profile parameter fils_dh_group is used to enable
this by specifying which DH group to use. For example, fils_dh_group=19
would use FILS SK PFS with a 256-bit random ECP group.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
draft-harkins-owe-07.txt does not specify these parameters, so need to
pick something sensible to use for the experimental implementation. The
Suite B 128-bit level AKM 00-0F-AC:11 has reasonable parameters for the
DH group 19 case (i.e., SHA256 hash), so use it for now. This can be
updated if the OWE RFC becomes clearer on the appropriate parameters
(KEK/KCK/MIC length, PRF/KDF algorithm, and key-wrap algorithm).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds STA side addition of OWE Diffie-Hellman Parameter element into
(Re)Association Request frame and processing it in (Re)Association
Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This leads to cleaner code overall, and also reduces the size
of the hostapd and wpa_supplicant binaries (in hwsim test build
on x86_64) by about 2.5 and 3.5KiB respectively.
The mechanical conversions all over the code were done with
the following spatch:
@@
expression SIZE, SRC;
expression a;
@@
-a = os_malloc(SIZE);
+a = os_memdup(SRC, SIZE);
<...
if (!a) {...}
...>
-os_memcpy(a, SRC, SIZE);
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This allows PMKSA cache entries for FILS-enabled BSSs to be shared
within an ESS when the BSSs advertise the same FILS Cache Identifier
value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The RSN supplicant implementation needs to be updated to use the new
BSSID whenever doing FILS authentication. Previously, this was only done
when notifying association and that was too late for the case of
reassociation. Fix this by providing the new BSSID when calling
fils_process_auth(). This makes PTK derivation use the correct BSSID.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This debug print can include GTK and IGTK, so use wpa_hexdump_key()
instead of wpa_hexdump() for it to avoid undesired exposure of keys in
debug log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While the FILS authentication cases were already using the proper PMK
length (48 octets instead of the old hardcoded 32 octet), the initial
association case had not yet been updated to cover the new FILS SHA384
AKM and ended up using only a 32-octet PMK. Fix that to use 48-octet PMK
when using FILS SHA384 AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While the key derivation steps are not expected to fail, this was
already done on the AP side, so do the same in the STA side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new FILS-HLP-RX control interface event is now used to report
received FILS HLP responses from (Re)Association Response frame as a
response to the HLP requests configured with FILS_HLP_REQ_ADD.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new wpa_supplicant control interface commands FILS_HLP_REQ_FLUSH and
FILS_HLP_REQ_ADD can now be used to request FILS HLP requests to be
added to the (Re)Association Request frame whenever FILS authentication
is used.
FILS_HLP_REQ_ADD parameters use the following format:
<destination MAC address> <hexdump of payload starting from ethertype>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds helper functions for deriving PMK and PMKID from ERP exchange
in FILS shared key authentication as defined in IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016,
12.12.2.5.2 (PMKSA key derivation with FILS authentication). These
functions is used to fix PMK and PMKID derivation which were previously
using the rMSK directly as PMK instead of following the FILS protocol to
derive PMK with HMAC from nonces and rMSK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit c93b7e1888 ('RSN: Check result of
EAPOL-Key frame send request') forgot to update two PeerKey users of
EAPOL-Key TX functions. That resulted in STK handshake failing since
message 2/4 and 4/4 TX calls were assumed to have failed when the return
value was changed from 0 to a positive value for success case. This
resulted in not updating nonce information properly and hitting
following error when processing STK 4-way handshake message 3/4:
RSN: INonce from message 1 of STK 4-Way Handshake differs from 3 of STK
4-Way Handshake - drop packet (src=<addr>)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 6d014ffc6e ('Make struct
wpa_eapol_key easier to use with variable length MIC') forgot to update
number of EAPOL-Key processing steps for SMK and STK exchanges and broke
PeerKey. Fix this by updating the Key Data field pointers to match the
new style with variable length Key MIC field.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds new wpa_supplicant control interface commands PMKSA_GET and
PMKSA_ADD that can be used to store PMKSA cache entries in an external
persistent storage when terminating a wpa_supplicant process and then
restore those entries when starting a new process. The previously added
PMKSA-CACHE-ADDED/REMOVED events can be used to help in synchronizing
the external storage with the memory-only volatile storage within
wpa_supplicant.
"PMKSA_GET <network_id>" fetches all stored PMKSA cache entries bound to
a specific network profile. The network_id of the current profile is
available with the STATUS command (id=<network_id). In addition, the
network_id is included in the PMKSA-CACHE-ADDED/REMOVED events. The
output of the PMKSA_GET command uses the following format:
<BSSID> <PMKID> <PMK> <reauth_time in seconds> <expiration in seconds>
<akmp> <opportunistic>
For example:
02:00:00:00:03:00 113b8b5dc8eda16594e8274df4caa3d4 355e98681d09e0b69d3a342f96998aa765d10c4459ac592459b5efc6b563eff6 30240 43200 1 0
02:00:00:00:04:00 bbdac8607aaaac28e16aacc9152ffe23 e3dd6adc390e685985e5f40e6fe72df846a0acadc59ba15c208d9cb41732a663 30240 43200 1 0
The PMKSA_GET command uses the following format:
<network_id> <BSSID> <PMKID> <PMK> <reauth_time in seconds> <expiration
in seconds> <akmp> <opportunistic>
(i.e., "PMKSA_ADD <network_id> " prefix followed by a line of PMKSA_GET
output data; however, the reauth_time and expiration values need to be
updated by decrementing them by number of seconds between the PMKSA_GET
and PMKSA_ADD commands)
For example:
PMKSA_ADD 0 02:00:00:00:03:00 113b8b5dc8eda16594e8274df4caa3d4 355e98681d09e0b69d3a342f96998aa765d10c4459ac592459b5efc6b563eff6 30140 43100 1 0
PMKSA_ADD 0 02:00:00:00:04:00 bbdac8607aaaac28e16aacc9152ffe23 e3dd6adc390e685985e5f40e6fe72df846a0acadc59ba15c208d9cb41732a663 30140 43100 1 0
This functionality is disabled be default and can be enabled with
CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y build configuration option. It should be
noted that this allows any process that has access to the wpa_supplicant
control interface to use PMKSA_ADD command to fetch keying material
(PMK), so this is for environments in which the control interface access
is restricted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
These allow external program to monitor PMKSA cache updates in
preparation to enable external persistent storage of PMKSA cache.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
ext_capab/ext_capab_len do not include ID and Length so no extra +2
offset should be used. This fixes a regression from commit
faf427645a ('TDLS: Use proper IE parsing
routine for non-EAPOL-Key cases') that replaced the IE parser without
noticing the difference in the pointer offset.
Signed-off-by: Flavia Vanetti <flavia.vanetti@ceva-dsp.com>
Decrypt the AES-SIV protected elements and verify Key-Auth. Parse and
configure keys to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If a PMKSA cache entry for the target AP is available, try to use FILS
with PMKSA caching.
If an ERP key for the target AP is available, try to use FILS with
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth added as Wrapper Data element.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This changes 4-way handshake authenticator processing to decrypt the
EAPOL-Key frames using an AEAD cipher (AES-SIV with FILS AKMs) before
processing the Key Data field. This replaces Key MIC validation for the
cases where AEAD cipher is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This modifies wpa_eapol_key_send() to use AEAD cipher (AES-SIV for FILS
AKMs) to provide both integrity protection for the EAPOL-Key frame and
encryption for the Key Data field. It should be noted that this starts
encrypting the Key Data field in EAPOL-Key message 2/4 while it remains
unencrypted (but integrity protected) in non-FILS cases. Similarly, the
empty Key Data field in EAPOL-Key message 4/4 gets encrypted for AEAD
cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This will be needed to be able to implement AEAD cipher support from
FILS that will need to use KEK to protect the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Suite B 192-bit addition from IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 replaced the
previous fixed length Key MIC field with a variable length field. That
change was addressed with an addition of a new struct defined for the
second MIC length. This is not really scalable and with FILS coming up
with a zero-length MIC case for AEAD, a more thorough change to support
variable length MIC is needed.
Remove the Key MIC and Key Data Length fields from the struct
wpa_eapol_key and find their location based on the MIC length
information (which is determined by the AKMP). This change allows the
separate struct wpa_eapol_key_192 to be removed since struct
wpa_eapol_key will now include only the fixed length fields that are
shared with all EAPOL-Key cases in IEEE Std 802.11.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The Secure bit in the Key Information field of EAPOL-Key frames is
supposed to be set to 1 when there is a security association. This was
done for other frames, but not for the EAPOL-Key Request frame where
supplicant is requesting a new PTK to be derived (either due to Michael
MIC failure report Error=1 or for other reasons with Error=0). In
practice, EAPOL-Key Request frame is only sent when there is a PTK in
place, so all such frames should have Secure=1.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The SAE PMKID is calculated with IEEE Std 802.11-2012 11.3.5.4, but the
PMKID was re-calculated with 11.6.1.3 and saved into PMKSA cache. Fix
this to save the PMKID calculated with 11.3.5.4 into the PMKSA cache.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
Ciuple of the nonce comparisons used a strange '!os_memcmp() == 0' to
check if the values were different. While this resulted in correct
behavior, the construction is not exactly clear and clang has started
warning about this (-Wlogical-not-parentheses). Clean this up by using
'os_mecmp() != 0'.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The PMKSA caching and RSN pre-authentication components were marked as
conditional on IEEE8021X_EAPOL. However, the empty wrappers are needed
also in a case IEEE8021X_EAPOL is defined with CONFIG_NO_WPA.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This message is sent at MSG_INFO level and it is supposed to go out even
even debug messages were to be removed from the build. As such, use
wpa_msg() instead of wpa_dbg() for it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
When AES-WRAP was used to protect the EAPOL-Key Key Data field, this was
decrypted using a temporary heap buffer with aes_unwrap(). That buffer
was not explicitly cleared, so it was possible for the group keys to
remain in memory unnecessarily until the allocated area was reused.
Clean this up by clearing the temporary allocation explicitly before
freeing it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The Setup Response timer is relatively fast (500 ms) and there are
instances where it fires on the responder side after the initiator has
already sent out the TDLS Setup Confirm frame. Prevent the processing of
this stale TDLS Setup Response frame on the initiator side.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
wpa_insert_pmkid() did not support cases where the original RSN IE
included any PMKIDs. That case can happen when PTK rekeying through
4-way handshake is used after FT protocol run. Such a 4-way handshake
used to fail with wpa_supplicant being unable to build the EAPOL-Key msg
2/4.
Fix this by extending wpa_insert_pmkid() to support removal of the old
PMKIDs, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new wpa_supplicant control interface command "TEST_ASSOC_IE
<hexdump>" can now be used to override the WPA/RSN IE for Association
Request frame and following 4-way handshake to allow protocol testing of
AP side processing of WPA/RSN IE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Number of places were calling functions that are not included in
CONFIG_NO_WPA=y build anymore. Comment out such calls. In addition, pull
in SHA1 and MD5 for config_internal.c, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_sm_key_mgmt_set_pmk() was checking for proactive_key_caching to be
enabled before setting the PMK to the driver. This check is not required
and would mandate configuration setting of okc or proactive_key_caching
for cases which were not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Amarnath Hullur Subramanyam <amarnath@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some APs may send RSC octets in EAPOL-Key message 3 of 4-Way Handshake
or in EAPOL-Key message 1 of Group Key Handshake in the opposite byte
order (or by some other corrupted way). Thus, after a successful
EAPOL-Key exchange the TSC values of received multicast packets, such as
DHCP, don't match the RSC one and as a result these packets are dropped
on replay attack TSC verification. An example of such AP is Sapido
RB-1732.
Work around this by setting RSC octets to 0 on GTK installation if the
AP RSC value is identified as a potentially having the byte order issue.
This may open a short window during which older (but valid)
group-addressed frames could be replayed. However, the local receive
counter will be updated on the first received group-addressed frame and
the workaround is enabled only if the common invalid cases are detected,
so this workaround is acceptable as not decreasing security
significantly. The wpa_rsc_relaxation global configuration property
allows the GTK RSC workaround to be disabled if it's not needed.
Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com>
Provide information on whether EAPOL-Key frame was sent successfully to
kernel for transmittion. wpa_eapol_key_send() will return
>= 0 on success and < 0 on failure. After receiving EAPOL-Key msg 3/4,
wpa_supplicant sends EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 and shows CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED
only after verifying that the msg 4/4 was sent to kernel for
transmission successfully.
Signed-off-by: Avichal Agarwal <avichal.a@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyeong-Chae Lim <kcya.lim@samsung.com>
There is no point in sending TPK M3 (TDLS Setup Confirm) with a failure
status if the first transmission attempt fails. Instead, just return a
failure by disabling the link rather than retransmitting the TPK M3
frame with an error status.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
On TPK lifetime expiration, tear down the direct link before renewing
the link in the case of TDLS initiator processing. The expired key
cannot be used anymore, so it is better to explicitly tear down the old
link first.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the PTK length increasing, the length of the PMK was
increased (from 256 to 384 bits) for the 00-0f-ac:12 AKM. This part was
missing from the initial implementation and a fixed length (256-bit) PMK
was used for all AKMs.
Fix this by adding more complete support for variable length PMK and use
384 bits from MSK instead of 256 bits when using this AKM. This is not
backwards compatible with the earlier implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit 7d711541dc ('Clear TK part of PTK
after driver key configuration') started clearing TK from memory
immediately after having configured it to the driver when processing
EAPOL-Key message 3/4. While this covered the most common case, it did
not take into account the possibility of the authenticator having to
retry EAPOL-Key message 3/4 in case the first EAPOL-Key message 4/4
response is lost. That case ended up trying to reinstall the same TK to
the driver, but the key was not available anymore.
Fix the EAPOL-Key message 3/4 retry case by configuring TK to the driver
only once. There was no need to try to set the same key after each
EAPOL-Key message 3/4 since TK could not change. If actual PTK rekeying
is used, the new TK will be configured once when processing the new
EAPOL-Key message 3/4 for the first time.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The GTK value received in RSN (WPA2) group rekeying did not use the
wpa_hexdump_key() version of debug printing that is conditional on -K
being included on the command line.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
wpa_supplicant_parse_ies() was never supposed to be used as a generic IE
parser, i.e., it is for the specific purpose of parsing EAPOL-Key Key
Data IEs and KDEs. TDLS used this function for parsing generic AP IEs
and while that works, it resulted in confusing "WPA: Unrecognized
EAPOL-Key Key Data IE" debug messages. Clean this up by using
ieee802_11_parse_elems() for the cases where generic IEs are being
parsed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new CONFIG_NO_RC4=y build option can be used to remove all internal
hostapd and wpa_supplicant uses of RC4. It should be noted that external
uses (e.g., within a TLS library) do not get disabled when doing this.
This removes capability of supporting WPA/TKIP, dynamic WEP keys with
IEEE 802.1X, WEP shared key authentication, and MSCHAPv2 password
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If WPA2-Enterprise connection with full EAP authentication (i.e., no
PMKSA caching used) results in a PMKID that does not match the one the
AP/Authenticator indicates in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4, there is not much point
in trying to trigger full EAP authentication by sending EAPOL-Start
since this sequence was immediately after such full authentication
attempt.
There are known examples of authentication servers with incorrect MSK
derivation when TLS v1.2 is used (e.g., FreeRADIUS 2.2.6 or 3.0.7 when
built with OpenSSL 1.0.2). Write a clear debug log entry and also send
it to control interface monitors when it looks likely that this case has
been hit. After doing that, stop the connection attempt by
disassociating instead of trying to send out EAPOL-Start to trigger new
EAP authentication round (such another try can be tried with a new
association).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The FT-specific check for valid group cipher in wpa_ft_gen_req_ies() was
not up-to-date with the current list of supported ciphers. Fix this by
using a generic function to determine validity of the cipher. In
practice, this adds support for using CCMP-256 and GCMP-256 as the group
cipher with FT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check the element length in the parser and remove the length field from
struct ieee802_11_elems since the element is of fixed length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check the element length in the parser and remove the length field from
struct ieee802_11_elems since the element is of fixed length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the existing users of these elements were already validating the
element length. However, it is clearer to validate this already at the
parser for extra layer of protection for any future changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This program can be used to run fuzzing tests for areas related to EAPOL
frame parsing and processing on the supplicant side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Old code defaulted to WEP for an AP advertising OSEN. Show as OSEN
instead. Re-use most of the RSN parsing logic since all but the header
is the same.
Example output:
[root@ath9k-f lanforge]# ./local/bin/wpa_cli -i sta0 scan_results
bssid / frequency / signal level / flags / ssid
00:0e:8e:6f:40:49 2462 -23 [OSEN-OSEN-CCMP][ESS] ben-138
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Previously, it would have been possible to complete RSN connection by
skipping the msg 3/4 and 4/4 completely. This would have resulted in
pairwise key not being configured. This is obviously not supposed to
happen in practice and could result in unexpected behavior, so reject
group key message before the initial 4-way handshake has been completed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, it was possible for the wpa_sm_start_preauth() and
wpa_sm_rekey_ptk() eloop callbacks to remain active after disconnection
and potentially continue to be used for the next association. This is
not correct behavior, so explicitly cancel these timeouts to avoid
unexpected attempts to complete RSN preauthentication or to request PTK
to be rekeyed.
It was possible to trigger this issue, e.g., by running the following
hwsim test case sequence: ap_wpa2_ptk_rekey ap_ft_sae_over_ds
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some APs (e.g., Cisco 1260) sometimes add padding to the end of short
TDLS management packets and that can look like invalid IEs. This was
allowed on M3 and discovery packets, but not in others. Allow it for the
other packets as well, since required IEs are verified in the code
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is possible for wpa_tdls_teardown_peers() to be called with sm ==
NULL in case interface addition fails before the WPA state machine is
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The supplicant code does not try to control the actual channel of the
radio at any point. It simply passes the target peer and channel
parameters to the driver. It's the driver's responsibility to
periodically initiate TDLS channel-switch operations when TDLS
channel-switching is enabled.
Allow enable/disable operations to be invoked via the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Mark an appropriate sm flag when TDLS switch is prohibited by the AP.
Populate the flag upon association with the AP.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
It was possible for the decrypted EAPOL-Key Key Data field to remain in
heap after the temporary buffer was freed. Explicitly clear that buffer
before freeing it to minimize the time GTK remains in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need for wpa_supplicant to maintain a copy of the TK part of
PTK after this has been configured to the driver, so clear that from
heap memory and only maintain KEK and KCK during association to allow
additional EAPOL-Key handshakes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
PMK and PTK are not needed in the supplicant state machine after
disassociation since core wpa_supplicant will reconfigure them for the
next association. As such, clear these from heap in
wpa_sm_notify_disassoc() to reduce time and number of places storing key
material in memory. In addition, clear FT keys in case of
CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y build (sm->xxkey stored a copy of PSK in case of
FT-PSK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Bounds checking for gd->gtk_len in wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher()
was apparently too complex for some static analyzers. Use a local
variable and a more explicit validation step to avoid false report.
(CID 62864)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new AKM uses a different mechanism of deriving the PMKID based on
KCK instead of PMK. hostapd was already doing this after the KCK had
been derived, but wpa_supplicant functionality needs to be moved from
processing of EAPOL-Key frame 1/4 to 3/4 to have the KCK available.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds definitions for the 128-bit level Suite B AKM 00-0F-AC:11. The
functionality itself is not yet complete, i.e., this commit only
includes parts to negotiate the new AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like some APs are incorrectly selecting descriptor version 3
(AES-128-CMAC) for EAPOL-Key frames when version 2 (HMAC-SHA1) was
expected to be used. This is likely triggered by an attempt to negotiate
PMF with SHA1-based AKM.
Since AES-128-CMAC is considered stronger than HMAC-SHA1, allow the
incorrect, but stronger, option to be used in these cases to avoid
interoperability issues with deployed APs.
This issue shows up with "WPA: CCMP is used, but EAPOL-Key descriptor
version (3) is not 2" in debug log. With the new workaround, this issue
is ignored and "WPA: Interoperability workaround: allow incorrect
(should have been HMAC-SHA1), but stronger (is AES-128-CMAC), descriptor
version to be used" is written to the log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This commit introduces a QCA vendor command and event to provide an
option to use extended versions of the nl80211 connect/roam operations
in a way that allows drivers to offload key management operations to the
driver/firmware.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes wpa_supplicant SME create PMKSA cache entries from SAE
authentication and try to use PMKSA caching if an entry is found for the
AP. If the AP rejects the attempt, fall back to SAE authentication is
used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
dl_list_del() followed by dl_list_add() seemed to confuse clang static
analyzer somehow, so explicitly check for the prev pointer to be
non-NULL to avoid an incorrect warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds kek_len argument to aes_wrap() and aes_unwrap() functions and
allows AES to be initialized with 192 and 256 bit KEK in addition to
the previously supported 128 bit KEK.
The test vectors in test-aes.c are extended to cover all the test
vectors from RFC 3394.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Relying on qos qosinfo is not enough, as it can be 0 for WMM enabled
peers that don't support U-APSD. Further, some peers don't even contain
this IE (Google Nexus 5), but do contain the WMM IE during setup.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
A recent mac80211 patch ("8f02e6b mac80211: make sure TDLS peer STA
exists during setup") forces the TDLS STA to exist before sending any
mgmt packets. Add the STA before sending a concurrent-setup test packet.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Some drivers need to know the initiator of a TDLS connection in order
to generate a correct TDLS mgmt packet. It is used to determine
the link identifier IE. Pass this information to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
IEEE 802.11 standard sends AID in a field that is defined in a bit
strange way to set two MSBs to ones. That is not the real AID and those
extra bits need to be filtered from the value before passing this to the
driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
TDLS Setup Request frame has to be rejected with status code 37 ("The
request has been declined"), if the BSSID in the received Link
Identifier does not match the current BSSID per IEEE Std 802.11-2012,
10.22.4 ('TDLS direct-link establishment') step (b). The previously used
status code 7 ('Not in same BSS') is described to used only when
processing TPK Handshake Message 2 in TDLS Setup Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>