This may be needed to avoid interoperability issues with the new
protocol version and significant changes for EAP use cases in both key
derivation and handshake termination.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EAP session cannot be marked fully completed on sending Client
Finished with TLS v1.3 since the server may still send NewSessionTicket
before EAP-Success.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
With TLS v1.3, the Finished message from the client can require
fragmentation. Postpone key derivation and marking of the EAP session
fully completed until all the fragments of that last message are sent to
avoid losing all the subsequent fragments.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In the current implementation, upon an EAP method failure, followed by
an EAP failure, the EAP Status is propagated up in wpa_supplicant with a
general failure parameter string "failure". This parameter is used for a
notification on the dbus.
This commit reports the EAP method failure error code in a separate
callback.
The solution in this commit is generic to all EAP methods, and can be
used by any method that need to pass its error code. However, this
commit only implements the reporting for EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA methods
where the Notification Code (in AT_NOTIFICATION) is used as the method
specific error code value.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed ElArabawy <arabawy@google.com>
This allows a separate configuration parameter (imsi_identity) to be
used in EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' profiles to override the identity used in MK
derivation for the case where the identity is expected to be from the
last AT_IDENTITY attribute (or EAP-Response/Identity if AT_IDENTITY was
not used). This may be needed to avoid sending out an unprotected
permanent identity information over-the-air and if the EAP-SIM/AKA
server ends up using a value based on the real IMSI during the internal
key derivation operation (that does not expose the data to others).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The hostapd.conf tls_flags=[SUITEB-NO-ECDH] and wpa_supplicant network
profile phase1="tls_suiteb_no_ecdh=1" can now be used to configure Suite
B RSA constraints with ECDHE disabled. This is mainly to allow
the DHE TLS cipher suite to be tested.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds phase1 parameter tls_suiteb=1 into wpa_supplicant
configuration to allow TLS library (only OpenSSL supported for now) to
use Suite B 192-bit level rules with RSA when using >= 3k (3072) keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
After KDF negotiation, must check only requested change occurred in the
list of AT_KDF attributes. If there are any other changes, the peer must
behave like the case that AT_MAC had been incorrect and authentication
is failed. These are defined in EAP-AKA' specification RFC 5448, Section
3.2.
Add a complete check of AT_KDF attributes and send Client-Error if a
change which is not requested is included in it.
Signed-off-by: Tomoharu Hatano <tomoharu.hatano@sony.com>
AT_KDF attributes need to be included in Synchronization-Failure
according to EAP-AKA' specification RFC 5448.
Signed-off-by: Tomoharu Hatano <tomoharu.hatano@sony.com>
ERP key was previously derived immediately after the availability of
EMSK and Session-Id and the ERP key hierarchy was saved even if the
authentication resulted in failure eventually. Instead, derive the ERP
key only after a successful EAP authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows the eap_proxy mechanism to be used with multiple SIMs by
following the configured sim_num to index which SIM to use for when
fetching the IMSI through eap_proxy.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
For proxy based EAP methods, the EAP identity is constructed in
eap_proxy layer from IMSI when required. Realm information from identity
is used to do ERP eventually, hence construct the realm for proxy based
methods from IMSI in core wpa_supplicant to enable the ERP use case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This commit adds support for deriving ERP key information in EAP Proxy
based EAP method implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This commit adds changes to not generate ERP information if the domain
name is not specified in the EAP identity. keyName-NAI needs the realm
part and as such, it is reasonable to require the main EAP configuration
to provide that realm.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The check for erp->keyname_nai within eap_erp_get_key() is apparently
too difficult for some static analyzers to notice. Add an explicit check
for os_strchr() return value being non-NULL to avoid false reports.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows ERP keys to be managed by external entities, e.g., when
offloading FILS shared key authentication to a driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This leads to cleaner code overall, and also reduces the size
of the hostapd and wpa_supplicant binaries (in hwsim test build
on x86_64) by about 2.5 and 3.5KiB respectively.
The mechanical conversions all over the code were done with
the following spatch:
@@
expression SIZE, SRC;
expression a;
@@
-a = os_malloc(SIZE);
+a = os_memdup(SRC, SIZE);
<...
if (!a) {...}
...>
-os_memcpy(a, SRC, SIZE);
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST were previously doing this for init_for_reauth(), but
not for deinit_for_reauth(). Add the deinit_for_reauth() call as well to
cover cases like EAP-AKA cleaup of AT_CHECKCODE data.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds the same changes to EAP-AKA that were previous done for
EAP-SIM to allow functionality within an EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel
without causing issues to the phase 1 identity string.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The "anonymous_identity" configuration field has more than one
semantic meaning. For tunneled EAP methods, this refers to the
outer EAP identity. For EAP-SIM, this refers to the pseudonym
identity. Also, interestingly, EAP-SIM can overwrite the
"anonymous_identity" field if one is provided to it by the
authenticator.
When EAP-SIM is tunneled within an outer method, it makes sense
to only use this value for the outer method, since it's unlikely
that this will also be valid as an identity for the inner EAP-SIM
method. Also, presumably since the outer method protects the
EAP-SIM transaction, there is no need for a pseudonym in this
usage.
Similarly, if EAP-SIM is being used as an inner method, it must
not push the pseudonym identity using eap_set_anon_id() since it
could overwrite the identity for the outer EAP method.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
Add an internal flag which indicates to tunneled EAP methods (FAST,
PEAP, TTLS) that they should cache decrypted EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' requests.
This allows EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' to be tunneled within these outer methods
while using an external SIM authenticator over the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
While RFC 5295 uses "8" as the value to use in the length field in KDF
context when deriving EMSKname, it is clearer to use the macro defining
EMSKname as the value since the KDF design in RFC 5295 encodes the
length of the derived data in octets in that part of the context data.
This change is just making the implementation easier to understand while
not actually changing the behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Unlike the EMSKname and rRK derivations, rIK derivation is actually
using the "optional data" component in the context data (see RFC 5295).
RFC 6696 defines that optional data to be the cryptosuite field for rIK.
This was missing from the previous implementation and that resulted in
incorrect rIK being derived.
In addition, the rIK Label string does not actually include the "EAP "
prefix in the way as the rRK Label in RFC 6696 does. This would also
have resulted in incorrect rIK value.
Fix rIK derivation by adding the cryptosuite value into the KDF context
data and fixing the label string. This change is not backwards
compatible and breaks all ERP use cases (including FILS shared key
authentication) with older (broken) and new (fixed)
hostapd/wpa_supplicant builds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This registers a new callback to indicate change in SIM state. This
helps to do some clean up (more specifically pmksa_flush) based on the
state change of the SIM. Without this, the reconnection using the cached
PMKSA could happen though the SIM is changed.
Currently eap_proxy_sim_state corresponds to only SIM_STATE_ERROR. This
can be further extended.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The eapol_cb structure was made const and that change resulted in a
compilation warning/error if CONFIG_EAP_PROXY=<name> is enabled in the
wpa_supplicant build configuration. Fix this by updating the function
prototype to match the change.
Note: This results in a change needed to external eap_proxy_*.c
implementations to match the change.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This needs to be callable through the EAPOL supplicant wrappers to allow
FILS implementation to use ERP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
That function does not need the full EAP header -- it only needs to know
which EAP identifier to use in the message. Make this usable for cases
where the previous EAP message may not exist (FILS).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Fix the pre-processing field in the response when EAP_PWD_PREP_MS is
being used. This fixes interoperability with EAP-pwd servers that
validate the Prep field in EAP-pwd-ID/Response when the RFC2759
(PasswordHashHash) pre-processing is used.
Signed-off-by: Brian Candler <B.Candler@pobox.com>
These are called through function pointers, so no need to make the
function symbols directly available outside this file.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Most protocols extracting keys from TLS use RFC 5705 exporters which is
commonly implemented in TLS libraries. This is the mechanism used by
EAP-TLS. (EAP-TLS actually predates RFC 5705, but RFC 5705 was defined
to be compatible with it.)
EAP-FAST, however, uses a legacy mechanism. It reuses the TLS internal
key block derivation and derives key material after the key block. This
is uncommon and a misuse of TLS internals, so not all TLS libraries
support this. Instead, we reimplement the PRF for the OpenSSL backend
and don't support it at all in the GnuTLS one.
Since these two are very different operations, split
tls_connection_prf() in two. tls_connection_export_key() implements the
standard RFC 5705 mechanism that we expect most TLS libraries to
support. tls_connection_get_eap_fast_key() implements the
EAP-FAST-specific legacy mechanism which may not be implemented on all
backends but is only used by EAP-FAST.
Signed-Off-By: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
eap_proto_sake_errors test case where the result was used after the
failed eap_sake_compute_mic() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
eap_proto_pax_errors test case where the result was used after the
failed eap_pax_mac() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
eap_proto_fast_errors test case where the result was used after the
failed sha1_t_prf() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Need to clear the pac pointer for the first error case to avoid freeing
the previous PAC entry if the following entry has an invalid header.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
clang started warning about the use of || with constants that came from
PCSC_FUNCS not being enabled in the build. It seems to be easier to just
ifdef this block out completely since that has the same outcome for
builds that do not include PC/SC support.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If the final Phase 2 message needed fragmentation, EAP method decision
was cleared from UNCOND_SUCC or COND_SUCC to FAIL and that resulted in
the authentication failing when the EAP-Success message from the server
got rejected. Fix this by restoring the EAP method decision after
fragmentation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Free the allocated structure in error cases to remove need for each EAP
method to handle the error cases separately. Each registration function
can simply do "return eap_peer_method_register(eap);" in the end of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This function can fail at least in theory, so check its return value
before proceeding. This is mainly helping automated test case coverage
to reach some more error paths.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was reported to fail with Windows 2012r2 with "Invalid Compound_MAC
in cryptobinding TLV". It turns out that the server decided to go
through inner EAP method (EAP-MSCHAPv2 in the reported case) even when
using PEAP fast-reconnect. This seems to be against the [MS-PEAP]
specification which claims that inner EAP method is not used in such a
case. This resulted in a different CMK being derived by the server (used
the version that used ISK) and wpa_supplicant (used the version where
IPMK|CMK = TK without ISK when using fast-reconnect).
Fix this interop issue by making wpa_supplicant to use the
fast-reconnect version of CMK derivation only when using TLS session
resumption and the server having not initiated inner EAP method before
going through the cryptobinding exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The data->state == WAIT_FRAG_ACK case is already handling all cases
where data->out_buf could be non-NULL, so this additional check after
the WAIT_FRAG_ACK steps cannot be reached. Remove the duplicated dead
code.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, a fixed 1300 fragment_size was hardcoded. Now the EAP
profile parameter fragment_size can be used to override this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
ocsp=3 extends ocsp=2 by require all not-trusted certificates in the
server certificate chain to receive a good OCSP status. This requires
support for ocsp_multi (RFC 6961). This commit is only adding the
configuration value, but all the currently included TLS library wrappers
are rejecting this as unsupported for now.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Instead of using default list of methods, reject a configuration with an
unsupported EAP method at the time the main TLS method is being
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
eap_peap_parse_phase1() returned 0 unconditionally, so there was no need
for that return value or the code path that tried to address the error
case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This patch fixes an issue with an invalid phase2 parameter value
auth=MSCHAPv2 getting interpreted as auth=MSCHAP (v1) which could
degrade security (though, only within a protected TLS tunnel). Now when
invalid or unsupported auth= phase2 parameter combinations are
specified, EAP-TTLS initialization throws an error instead of silently
doing something.
More then one auth= phase2 type cannot be specified and also both auth= and
autheap= options cannot be specified.
Parsing phase2 type is case sensitive (as in other EAP parts), so phase2
parameter auth=MSCHAPv2 is invalid. Only auth=MSCHAPV2 is correct.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
[Use cstr_token() to get rid of unnecessary allocation; cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do not override the parsing error with the "PAC block not terminated
with END" message if the reason for the END line not yet being seen is
in failure to parse an earlier line.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It was possible to hit a NULL pointer dereference if Session-Id
derivation failed due to a memory allocation failure.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If init_for_reauth fails, the EAP-SIM peer state was not freed properly.
Use eap_sim_deinit() to make sure all allocations get freed. This could
be hit only if no random data could be derived for NONCE_MT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
did not take this corner case into account and could end up
dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While this is not part of RFC 4137, the way m.check(eapReqData) is
implemented in wpa_supplicant allows an EAP method to not update the
ignore value even though each such call is really supposed to get a new
response. It seems to be possible to hit a sequence where a previous EAP
authentication attempt terminates with sm->ignore set from the last
m.check() call and the following EAP authentication attempt could fail
to go through the expected code path if it does not clear the ignore
flag. This is likely only hit in some error cases, though. The hwsim
test cases could trigger this with the following sequence:
eap_proto_ikev2 ap_wps_m1_oom
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, the EAP-WSC peer state machine ended up just ignoring an
error and waiting for a new message from the AP. This is not going to
recover the exchange, so simply force the connection to terminate
immediately.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new CONFIG_NO_RC4=y build option can be used to remove all internal
hostapd and wpa_supplicant uses of RC4. It should be noted that external
uses (e.g., within a TLS library) do not get disabled when doing this.
This removes capability of supporting WPA/TKIP, dynamic WEP keys with
IEEE 802.1X, WEP shared key authentication, and MSCHAPv2 password
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 94f1fe6f63 ('Remove master key
extraction from tls_connection_get_keys()') left only fetching of
server/client random, but did not rename the function and structure to
minimize code changes. The only name is quite confusing, so rename this
through the repository to match the new purpose.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
FIPS builds do not include support for MD4/MD5, so disable
EAP-TTLS/CHAP, MSCHAP, and MSCHAPV2 when CONFIG_FIPS=y is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
MD5 is not available in CONFIG_FIPS=y builds, so use SHA1 for the EAP
peer workaround that tries to detect more robustly whether a duplicate
message was sent.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If there is only zero-length buffer of output data in error case, mark
that as an immediate failure instead of trying to report that
non-existing error report to the server. This allows faster connection
termination in cases where a non-recoverable error occurs in local TLS
processing, e.g., if none of the configured ciphers are available.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-TLS was already doing this, but the other TLS-based EAP methods did
not mark methodState DONE and decision FAIL on local TLS processing
errors (instead, they left the connection waiting for a longer timeout).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds a new STATUS command field "eap_tls_version" that shows the
TLS version number that was used during EAP-TLS/TTLS/PEAP/FAST exchange.
For now, this is only supported with OpenSSL.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new phase1 config parameter value tls_disable_tlsv1_0=1 can now be
used to disable use of TLSv1.0 for a network configuration. This can be
used to force a newer TLS version to be used. For example,
phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=1 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=1" would indicate that
only TLS v1.2 is accepted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The only time the PIN should fail is when we initialize the TLS
connection, so it doesn't really make sense to get rid of the PIN just
because some other part of the handshake failed.
This is a followup to commit fd4fb28179
('OpenSSL: Try to ensure we don't throw away the PIN unnecessarily').
Signed-off-by: Mike Gerow <gerow@google.com>
Use explicit typecasting to avoid implicit conversion warnings in cases
where enum eap_erp_type is used in functions taking an EapType argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If key derivation fails, there is no point in trying to continue
authentication. In theory, this could happen if memory allocation during
TLS PRF fails.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While RFC 6124 does not define how Session-Id is constructed for
EAP-EKE, there seems to be consensus among the authors on the
construction. Use this Type | Nonce_P | Nonce_S construction based on
the following email:
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf at gmail.com>
To: ietf at ietf.org
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2010 13:13:42 +0200
Expanding on my previous response, I suggest to resolve Bernard's
concern by adding the following text:
5.6 EAP Key Generation
EAP-EKE can be used for EAP key generation, as defined by [RFC 5247].
When used in this manner, the values required to establish the key
hierarchy are defined as follows:
- Peer-Id is the EAP-EKE ID_P value.
- Server-Id is the EAP-EKE ID_S value.
- Session-Id is the concatenated Type | Nonce_P | Nonce_S, where Type is
the method type defined for EAP-EKE in [Sec. 4.1], a single octet.
Thanks,
Yaron
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The cleanup code will handle this, but it is more robust to make sure
this is cleared to zero when allocating a new buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
due to invalid buffer allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was previously checked as part of the eap_sim_parse_attr()
processing, but it is easier to review the code if there is an
additional explicit check for confirming that the Reserved field is
present since the pos variable is advanced beyond it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The req_plen argument to eap_pax_process_std_1() and
eap_pax_process_std_3() could be smaller than sizeof(struct eap_pax_hdr)
since the main processing function was only verifying that there is
enough room for the ICV and then removed ICV length from the remaining
payload length.
In theory, this could have resulted in the size_t left parameter being
set to a negative value that would be interpreted as a huge positive
integer. That could then result in a small buffer read overflow and
process termination if MSGDUMP debug verbosity was in use.
In practice, it does not seem to be feasible to construct a short
message that would be able to pass the ICV validation (calculated using
HMAC-SHA1-128) even for the case where an empty password is used.
Anyway, the implementation should really check the length explicitly
instead of depending on implicit check through ICV validation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EAP-TLS-based helper functions can easily use struct wpabuf in more
places, so continue cleanup in that direction by replacing separate
pointer and length arguments with a single struct wpabuf argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function is only using the Identifier field from the EAP request
header, so there is no need to pass it a pointer to the full message.
This makes it a bit easier to analyze the area that gets access to
unverified message payload.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
By analysing objdump output some read only structures were found in
.data section. To help compiler further optimize code declare these
as const.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Kanstrup <mikael.kanstrup@sonymobile.com>
Now on an engine error we decode the error value and determine if the
issue is due to a true PIN error or not. If it is due to incorrrect PIN,
delete the PIN as usual, but if it isn't let the PIN be.
Signed-off-by: Mike Gerow <gerow@google.com>
This program can be used to run fuzzing tests for areas related to EAPOL
frame parsing and processing on the supplicant side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function exposes internal state of the TLS negotiated parameters
for the sole purpose of being able to implement PRF for EAP-FAST. Since
tls_connection_prf() is now taking care of all TLS-based key derivation
cases, it is cleaner to keep this detail internal to each tls_*.c
wrapper implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
tls_openssl.c is the only remaining TLS/crypto wrapper that needs the
internal PRF implementation for EAP-FAST (since
SSL_export_keying_material() is not available in older versions and does
not support server-random-before-client case). As such, it is cleaner to
assume that TLS libraries support tls_connection_prf() and move the
additional support code for the otherwise unsupported cases into
tls_openssl.c.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This extends EAP-pwd peer support to allow NtHash version of password
storage in addition to full plaintext password. In addition, this allows
the server to request hashed version even if the plaintext password is
available on the client. Furthermore, unsupported password preparation
requests are now rejected rather than allowing the authentication
attempt to continue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit introduces a callback to notify any configuration updates
from the eap_proxy layer. This is used to trigger re-reading of IMSI and
MNC length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
For wired IEEE 802.1X authentication, phase1="allow_canned_success=1"
can now be used to configure a mode that allows EAP-Success (and
EAP-Failure) without going through authentication step. Some switches
use such sequence when forcing the port to be authorized/unauthorized or
as a fallback option if the authentication server is unreachable. By
default, wpa_supplicant discards such frames to protect against
potential attacks by rogue devices, but this option can be used to
disable that protection for cases where the server/authenticator does
not need to be authenticated.
When enabled, this mode allows EAP-Success/EAP-Failure as an immediate
response to EAPOL-Start (or even without EAPOL-Start) and EAP-Success is
also allowed immediately after EAP-Identity exchange (fallback case for
authenticator not being able to connect to authentication server).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_supplicant used to request user to re-enter username/password if the
server indicated that EAP-MSCHAPv2 (e.g., in PEAP Phase 2)
authentication failed (E=691), but retry is allowed (R=1). This is a
reasonable default behavior, but there may be cases where it is more
convenient to close the authentication session immediately rather than
wait for user to do something.
Add a new "mschapv2_retry=0" option to the phase2 field to allow the
retry behavior to be disabled. This will make wpa_supplicant abort
authentication attempt on E=691 regardless of whether the server allows
retry.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the VENDOR-TEST EAP method peer implementation to allow
pending processing case to be selected at run time. The
ap_wpa2_eap_vendor_test test case is similarly extended to include this
option as the second case for full coverage.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is similar with domain_suffix_match, but required a full match of
the domain name rather than allowing suffix match (subdomains) or
wildcard certificates.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
A new "CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-ALT depth=<i> <alt name>" event is now used
to provide information about server certificate chain alternative
subject names for upper layers, e.g., to make it easier to configure
constraints on the server certificate. For example:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-ALT depth=0 DNS:server.example.com
Currently, this includes DNS, EMAIL, and URI components from the
certificates. Similar information is priovided to D-Bus Certification
signal in the new altsubject argument which is a string array of these
items.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These were already covered in both README-HS20 for credentials and in
header files for developers' documentation, but the copy in
wpa_supplicant.conf did not include all the details. In addition, add a
clearer note pointing at subject_match not being suitable for suffix
matching domain names; domain_suffix_match must be used for that.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows recovery through fallback to full EAP authentication if the
server rejects us, e.g., due to having dropped ERP state.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to determine whether the last TLS-based EAP
authentication instance re-used a previous session (e.g., TLS session
resumption or EAP-FAST session ticket).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 35efa2479f ('OpenSSL: Allow TLS
v1.1 and v1.2 to be negotiated by default') changed from using
TLSv1_method() to SSLv23_method() to allow negotiation of TLS v1.0,
v1.1, and v1.2.
Unfortunately, it looks like EAP-FAST does not work with this due to
OpenSSL not allowing ClientHello extensions to be configured with
SSL_set_session_ticket_ext() when SSLv23_method() is used. Work around
this regression by initiating a separate SSL_CTX instance for EAP-FAST
phase 1 needs with TLSv1_method() while leaving all other EAP cases
using TLS to work with the new default that allows v1.1 and v1.2 to be
negotiated. This is not ideal and will hopefully get fixed in the future
with a new OpenSSL method, but until that time, this can be used allow
other methods use newer TLS versions while still allowing EAP-FAST to be
used even if it remains to be constraint to TLS v1.0 only.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was not really a real issue since bin_clear_free() would not use
the emsk_len argument when emsk is NULL as it would be on the path where
emsk_len has not been initilized. Anyway, it is better to get rid of the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Derive rRK and rIK on EAP peer if ERP is enabled. The new wpa_supplicant
network configuration parameter erp=1 can now be used to configure the
EAP peer to derive EMSK, rRK, and rIK at the successful completion of an
EAP authentication method. This functionality is not included in the
default build and can be enabled with CONFIG_ERP=y.
If EAP authenticator indicates support for re-authentication protocol,
initiate this with EAP-Initiate/Re-auth and complete protocol when
receiving EAP-Finish/Re-auth.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds EAP-PAX server and peer method functions for deriving
Session-Id from Method-Id per RFC 4746 and RFC 5247.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The comment about library not supporting Session-Id derivation was not
accurate and there is no need to check for master key that is not used
as part of derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, this was implicitly limited by the 16-bit length field to
65535. This resulted in unhelpful static analyzer warnings (CID 62868).
Add an explicit (but pretty arbitrary) limit of 50000 bytes to avoid
this. The actual WSC messages are significantly shorter in practice, but
there is no specific protocol limit, so 50000 is as good as any limit to
use here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers seem to have issues understanding "pos +
proposal_len > end" style validation, so convert this to "proposal_len >
end - pos" to make this more obvious to be bounds checking for
proposal_len. (CID 62874)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers seem to have issues with "pos + len > end"
validation (CID 62875), so convert this to "len > end - pos" to make it
more obvious that len is validated against its bounds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was too difficult for some static analyzers (CID 62876). In
addition, the pac_info_len assignment should really have explicitly
validated that there is room for the two octet length field instead of
trusting the following validation step to handle both this and the
actual pac_info_len bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This gets registered in tls_openssl.c from tls_init(), so there is no
need for EAP-pwd implementation to register explicitly. This avoids some
corner cases where OpenSSL resources do not get fully freed on exit.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new openssl_cipher configuration parameter can be used to select
which TLS cipher suites are enabled for TLS-based EAP methods when
OpenSSL is used as the TLS library. This parameter can be used both as a
global parameter to set the default for all network blocks and as a
network block parameter to override the default for each network
profile.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This forces EAP peer implementation to drop any possible fast resumption
data if the network block for the current connection is not the same as
the one used for the previous one. This allows different network blocks
to be used with non-matching parameters to enforce different rules even
if the same authentication server is used. For example, this allows
different CA trust rules to be enforced with different ca_cert
parameters which can prevent EAP-TTLS Phase 2 from being used based on
TLS session resumption.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any configuration parameter and
dynamic data that contains private information like keys or identity.
This brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length
of time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the EAP-pwd server and peer implementations more robust
should OpenSSL fail to derive random number for some reason. While this
is unlikely to happen in practice, the implementation better be prepared
for this should something unexpected ever happen. See
http://jbp.io/2014/01/16/openssl-rand-api/#review-of-randbytes-callers
for more details.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the EC_POINT memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the bignum memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
FreeRADIUS releases before 1.1.4 did not send MS-CHAP2-Success in
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2. A wpa_supplicant workaround for that was added in
2005 and it has been enabled by default to avoid interoperability
issues. This could be disabled with all other EAP workarounds
(eap_workaround=0). However, that will disable some workarounds that are
still needed with number of authentication servers.
Old FreeRADIUS versions should not be in use anymore, so it makes sense
to remove this EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 workaround completely to get more
complete validation of server behavior. This allows MSCHAPv2 to verify
that the server knows the password instead of relying only on the TLS
certificate validation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any wpa_supplicant configuration
parameter that contains private information like keys or identity. This
brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length of
time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
