hostapd (and wpa_supplicant in AP mode) was internally updating the STA
flags on disconnection cases to remove authorization and association.
However, some cases did not result in immediate update of the driver STA
entry. Update all such cases to send out the update to the driver as
well to reduce risk of race conditions where new frames might be
accepted for TX or RX after the port authorization or association has
been lost and configured keys are removed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The previous design for adding RSNXE into FT was not backwards
compatible. Move to a new design based on 20/332r3 to avoid that issue
by not include RSNXE in the FT protocol Reassociation Response frame so
that a STA not supporting RSNXE can still validate the FTE MIC
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Check whether an error is reported from any of the functions that could
in theory fail and if so, do not proceed with the partially filled SAE
commit buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In theory, hmac_sha256() might fail, so check for that possibility
instead of continuing with undetermined index value that could point to
an arbitrary token entry.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
send_auth_reply() could be called with sta == NULL in certain error
conditions. While that is not applicable for this special test
functionality for SAE, the inconsistent checks for the sta pointer could
result in warnings from static analyzers. Address this by explicitly
checking the sta pointer here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
IEEE P802.11az/D2.0 renamed the FILS Wrapped Data element,
removing the FILS prefix. Change the code accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
WEP should not be used for anything anymore. As a step towards removing
it completely, move all WEP related functionality to be within
CONFIG_WEP blocks. This will be included in builds only if CONFIG_WEP=y
is explicitly set in build configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Hardcoded CONFIG_IEEE80211N to be included to clean up implementation.
More or less all new devices support IEEE 802.11n (HT) and there is not
much need for being able to remove that functionality from the build.
Included this unconditionally to get rid of one more build options and
to keep things simpler.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In the function owe_assoc_req_process(), values assigned to the reason
argument imply that it should be renamed to status. Rename 'reason' to
'status' and modify the uses of owe_assoc_req_process() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich.os@quantenna.com>
(Re)Association Response frames should include radio measurement
capabilities in order to let stations know if they can, e.g., use
neighbor requests.
I tested this commit with a Samsung S8, which does not send neighbor
requests without this commit and sends them afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
The new sae_pwe=3 mode can be used to test non-compliant behavior with
SAE Password Identifiers. This can be used to force use of
hunting-and-pecking loop for PWE derivation when Password Identifier is
used. This is not allowed by the standard and as such, this
functionality is aimed at compliance testing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Only one peer-commit-scalar value was stored for a specific STA (i.e.,
one per MAC address) and that value got replaced when the next SAE
Authentication exchange was started. This ended up breaking the check
against re-use of peer-commit-scalar from an Accepted instance when
anti-clogging token was requested. The first SAE commit message (the one
without anti-clogging token) ended up overwriting the cached
peer-commit-scalar value while leaving that instance in Accepted state.
The second SAE commit message (with anti-clogging token) added ended up
getting rejected if it used the same value again (and re-use is expected
in this particular case where the value was not used in Accepted
instance).
Fix this by using a separate pointer for storing the peer-commit-scalar
value that was used in an Accepted instance. There is no need to
allocate memory for two values, i.e., it is sufficient to maintain
separate pointers to the value and move the stored value to the special
Accepted state pointer when moving to the Accepted state.
This fixes issues where a peer STA ends up running back-to-back SAE
authentication within couple of seconds, i.e., without hostapd timing
out the STA entry for a case where anti-clogging token is required.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
IEEE P802.11-REVmd was modified to use a container IE for anti-clogging
token whenver H2E is used so that parsing of the SAE Authentication
frames can be simplified.
See this document for more details of the approved changes:
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/19/11-19-2154-02-000m-sae-anti-clogging-token.docx
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific
description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to
be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed
Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to
replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have
moved to using the new key_flag.
The following flag are defined:
KEY_FLAG_MODIFY
Set when an already installed key must be updated.
So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed
keys. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT
Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when
deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.)
KEY_FLAG_RX
The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_TX
The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP
The key is a broadcast or group key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
The key is a pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PMK
The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK).
Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are:
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX
WEP key not used as default key (yet).
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT
Default WEP or WPA-NONE key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX
GTK key valid for RX only.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT
GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX
Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX
Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID
support.)
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY
Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX.
KEY_FLAG_RX_TX
Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination
with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX.
This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new
key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using
it, yet.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
This is in preparation for adding support to use a single WLAN netdev
with VLAN operations offloaded to the driver. No functional changes are
included in this commit.
Signed-off-by: Gurumoorthi Gnanasambandhan <gguru@codeaurora.org>
sae_confirm_immediate=2 can now be used in CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y
builds to minimize the latency between SAE Commit and SAE Confirm by
postponing transmission of SAE Commit until the SAE Confirm frame is
generated. This does not have significant impact, but can get the frames
tiny bit closer to each other over the air to increase testing coverage.
The only difference between sae_confirm_immediate 1 and 2 is in the
former deriving KCK, PMK, PMKID, and CN between transmission of the
frames (i.e., a small number of hash operations).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Merge hostapd_drv_send_mlme_csa() functionality into
hostapd_drv_send_mlme() to get a single driver ops handler function for
hostapd. In addition, add a new no_encrypt parameter in preparation for
functionality that is needed to get rid of the separate send_frame()
driver op.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
ieee802_11_allowed_address() did not really do anything useful for the
call from handle_probe_req(), so replace that with a direct call to
hostapd_allowed_address() and make ieee802_11_allowed_address() a static
function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When returning from handle_auth() after ieee802_11_allowed_address()
returned HOSTAPD_ACL_ACCEPT, but before ieee802_11_set_radius_info() has
been called, identity, radius_cui, and psk might not have been consumed.
Fix this by avoiding the need to free these variables at all.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Previously, this case was ignored silently in AP mode. While that could
be a reasonable approach for an unexpected condition, it would be fine
to reject this case explicitly as well. This makes it somewhat easier to
test unexpected SAE H2E vs. looping behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
check_sae_rejected_groups() returns 1, not -1, in case an enabled group
is rejected. The previous check for < 0 could not have ever triggered.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Previously, this case was ignored silently in AP mode. While that could
be a reasonable approach for an unexpected condition, it would be fine
to reject this case explicitly as well. This makes it somewhat easier to
test unexpected SAE H2E vs. looping behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Previously, nonzero sae_h2e parameter values were used to perform SAE
H2E specific operations (deriving PT, adding RSNXE, adding H2E-only BSS
membership selector) in AP mode even if SAE was not enabled for the
network. This could result in unexpected behavior if sae_pwe=1 or
sae_pwe=2 were set in the configuration. Fix this by making the SAE
operations conditional on SAE being actually enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
If hostapd had existing STA SAE state, e.g., from a previously completed
SAE authentication, a new start of a separate SAE authentication (i.e.,
receiving of a new SAE commit) ended up using some of the previous
state. This is problematic for determining whether to H2E vs. looping
since the STA is allowed (even if not really expected to) to change
between these two alternatives. This could result in trying to use H2E
when STA was using looping to derive PWE and that would result in SAE
confirm failing.
Fix this by determining whether to use H2E or looping for the restarted
authentication based on the Status Code in the new SAE commit message
instead of previously cached state information.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
If a STA indicates support for SAE H2E in RSNXE and H2E is enabled in
the AP configuration, require H2E to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This is needed to be able to compare the received RSNXE to a protected
version in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
When operating on the 6 GHz band, add 6 GHz Operation Information inside
the HE Operation element and don't publish HT/VHT IEs.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
- Replace HOSTAPD_MODE_IEEE80211AX mode checks with is_6ghz_op_class()
Signed-off-by: Vamsi Krishna <vamsin@codeaurora.org>
If hostapd is configured to enable only the hash-to-element version of
SAE PWE derivation (sae_pwe=1), advertise BSS membership selector to
indicate this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
hostapd is by default waiting STA to send SAE Confirm before sending the
SAE Confirm. This can now be configured with sae_confirm_immediate=1
resulting in hostapd sending out SAE Confirm immediately after sending
SAE Commit.
These are the two different message sequences:
sae_confirm_immediate=0
STA->AP: SAE Commit
AP->STA: SAE Commit
STA->AP: SAE Confirm
AP->STA: SAE Confirm
STA->AP: Association Request
AP->STA: Association Response
sae_confirm_immediate=1
STA->AP: SAE Commit
AP->STA: SAE Commit
AP->STA: SAE Confirm
STA->AP: SAE Confirm
STA->AP: Association Request
AP->STA: Association Response
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Use the same rules for dropping driver notifications for Data frames
from unassociated stations as were added for Management frame reception.
This results in more consistent behavior in sending out Deauthentication
frames with Reason Code 6/7.
This case was already checking for unexpected multicast addresses, so
there was no issue for the PMF protections for unexpected disconnection.
Anyway, better avoid unnecessary Deauthentication frames consistently.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
out a response to another device and that other device processing the
unexpected response.
In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
connected station dropping its association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Hardcode this to be defined and remove the separate build options for
PMF since this functionality is needed with large number of newer
protocol extensions and is also something that should be enabled in all
WPA2/WPA3 networks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Even though the station is not supposed to include Hotspot 2.0
Indication element in the Association Request frame when connecting to
the open OSU BSS, some station devices seem to do so. With the strict
PMF-required-with-Hotspot-2.0-R2 interpretation, such connection
attempts were rejected. Relax this to only perform the PMF check if the
local AP configuration has PMF enabled, i.e., for the production BSS.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The HE capabilities are no longer per PHY but per iftype on this
specific PHY. It is therefore no longer enough to just parse the AP
capabilities.
The he_capabilities are now duplicated to store all information for
IEEE80211_MODE_* which hostap cares about. The nl80211 driver fills in
this information when the iftype supports HE. The rest of the code still
only uses the IEEE80211_HE_AP portion but can be extended later to also
use other HE capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <seckelmann@datto.com>
This implements the required functionality in hostapd to facilitate OWE
connection with the AP SME-in-driver cases. Stations can either send DH
IE or PMKID (in RSNE) (or both) in Association Request frame during the
OWE handshake. The drivers that use this offload mechanism do not
interpret this information and instead, pass the same to hostapd for
further processing. hostapd will either validate the PMKID obtained from
the STA or generate DH IE and further indicate the same to the driver.
The driver further sends this information in the Association Response
frame.
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Liangwei Dong <liangwei@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
External auth status to the driver includes the PMKID derived as part of
SAE authentication, but this is not valid if PMKSA caching is disabled.
Drivers might not be expecting PMKID when it is not valid. Do not send
the PMKID to the driver in such cases.
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@codeaurora.org>
When a new station is added, let it have some supported rates
(they're empty without this change), using the basic rates
that it must support to connect.
This, together with the kernel-side changes for client-side,
lets us finish the complete auth/assoc handshake with higher
rates than the mandatory ones, without any further config.
However, the downside to this is that a broken station that
doesn't check the basic rates are supported before it tries
to connect will possibly not get any response to its auth
frame.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Process HE information in (Re)Association Request frames and add HE
elements into (Re)Association Response frames when HE is enabled in the
BSS.
Signed-off-by: Shashidhar Lakkavalli <slakkavalli@datto.com>
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
This copying attempt was added incorrectly since that element is never
actually present in (Re)Association Request frames. It is only valid to
copy that element from the mesh peering frames.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This AP behavior was missing from IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016, but it is
needed for the RSNE validation to work correctly and for a FILS STA to
be able to perform the mandatory check for RSNE matching when processing
the (Re)Association Response frame (as described in 802.11ai). REVmd
will be updating the standard to cover this AP case, so prepare the
implementation to match that. Without this, a FILS STA might reject
association whenever using FILS authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Logs involving IEEE 802.11 Status Codes output the Status Code value,
but do not provide any explanation of what the value means. This change
provides a terse explanation of each status code using the latter part
of the Status Code #define names.
Signed-off-by: Alex Khouderchah <akhouderchah@chromium.org>
The PMK and PMKID information from FILS ERP and FILS PMKSA caching needs
to be stored within struct wpa_state_machine for PTK to work. Without
this, PTK derivation would fail and attempt to go through rekeying would
result in disconnection. Furthermore, wpa_rekey_ptk() timer needs to be
started at the completion of FILS association since the place where it
was done for non-FILS cases at the end of 4-way handshake is not reached
when FILS authentication is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
