Enable MLO for SAE authentication when the driver indicates the AP MLD
address in an external authentication request. The MAC address of the
interface on which the external authentication request received will be
used as the own MLD address.
This commit does below for enabling MLO during external SAE
authentication:
- Use MLD addresses for SAE authentication.
- Add Basic Multi-Link element with the own MLD address in SAE
Authentication frames.
- Send SAE Authentication frames with the source address as the own MLD
address, destination address and BSSID as the AP MLD address to the
driver.
- Validate the MLD address indicated by the AP in SAE Authentication
frames against the AP MLD address indicated in external authentication
request.
- Store the PMKSA with the AP MLD address after completing SAE
authentication.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
It was possible to hit a case where the SAE PT had not yet been derived,
e.g., when using P2P group re-invocation. Update PT use at the time
authentication is started, if needed, to avoid this. While this is not
really ideal from the externally observable timing view point, this is
done only for the case where there is no other option available with a
dynamically changing network configuration for P2P. Similar design was
already in place for the SAE offload-from-driver (external auth) case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Commit 3a0edb2cd8 ("SAE: Enable H2E for 6 GHz BSS") started enabling
H2E automatically for SAE use on the 6 GHz band, but it did not update
these steps in verifying whether the STA has matching configuration for
a BSS that mandates use of H2E and whether to use PT for SAE in SME.
Update these to be aware of automatic H2E enabling.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The driver is expected to translate the link addresses to MLD addresses
when processing an Authentication frame from a MLD AP. Thus, accept
Authentication frame when the peer matches the expected MLD address.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
In case both the local driver and the AP support MLD, request an MLD
association from the driver.
When processing the association event from the driver verify that the
multi link information in the (Re)Association Response frame ML element
matches the links on which the association was expected.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
In case both the local driver and the AP support MLD, request an MLD
authentication from the driver. When processing the authentication event
from the driver verify that the MLD address in the authentication data
matches that of the requested AP.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Authentication frames include several fixed body parts (see Table 9-68
(Authentication frame body) and Table 9-69 (Presence of fields and
elements in Authentication frames) in IEEE P802.11-REVme/D2.0).
To be able to parse the IE part, these fields need to be skipped. Since
SAE logic already implements this parsing, change SAE authentication
handling functions to return the offset to the IE part. This preparation
is needed for future MLD patches that need to parse out the ML related
elements in the Authentication frames.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Add support to handle external authentication request with a different
SAE AKM suite compared to the current connection AKM suite. This is
needed to support cross AKM roaming between SAE and SAE-EXT-KEY AKM
suites.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
There are several cases where memory allocations are not
checked for success. Add conditions and error messages, as some
analyzers complain about that.
Signed-off-by: Micha Hashkes <micha.hashkes@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
For WPA2/WPA3 authentication mode, wpa_supplicant needs to notify
CurrentAuthMode property change when wpa_s->key_mgmt changes, so
NetworkManager can judge whether it needs to request a password based on
this.
Call wpas_notify_auth_changed() when starting a new connection item,
i.e., after having updated wpa_s->key_mgmt.
Signed-off-by: xinpeng wang <wangxinpeng@uniontech.com>
This is needed to avoid trying the subsequent connections with the old
PMKID that the AP claims not to hold and continues connection failures.
This was already handled for the SME-in-the-driver case in commit commit
50b77f50e8 ("DPP: Flush PMKSA if an assoc reject without timeout is
received"), but the wpa_supplicant SME case did not have matching
processing.
Add the needed check to avoid recover from cases where the AP has
dropped its PMKSA cache entry. Do this only based on the specific status
code value (53 = invalid PMKID) and only for the PMKSA entry that
triggered this failure to minimize actions taken based on an unprotected
(Re)Association Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_supplicant has support for only a single FT key hierarchy and as
such, cannot use more than a single mobility domain at a time. Do not
allow FT protocol to be started if there is a request to reassociate to
a different BSS within the same ESS if that BSS is in a different
mobility domain. This results in the initial mobility domain association
being used whenever moving to another mobility domain.
While it would be possible to add support for multiple FT key hierachies
and multiple mobility domains in theory, there does not yet seem to be
sufficient justification to add the complexity needed for that due to
limited, if any, deployment of such networks. As such, it is simplest to
just prevent these attempts for now and start with a clean initial
mobility domain association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
During cross SSID roaming wpa_supplicant ended up using the default
RSNE/RSNXE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 though the driver indicated
(Re)Association Request frame elements without RSNE/RSNXE. This causes
RSNE/RSNXE mismatch between (Re)Association Request frame and EAPOL-Key
msg 2/4.
To avoid this skip copying the default RSNE/RSNXE if the driver
indicates the actually used (Re)Association Request frame elements in
the association event.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Soni <quic_usoni@quicinc.com>
Add the `sae_check_mfp` global option to limit SAE when PMF will
not be selected for the connection.
With this option SAE is avoided when the hardware is not capable
of PMF due to missing ciphers.
With this option SAE is avoided on capable hardware when the AP
does not enable PMF.
Allows falling back to PSK on drivers with the
WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_SAE capability but do not support the BIP cipher
necessary for PMF. This enables configurations that can fall back
to WPA-PSK and avoid problems associating with APs configured
with `sae_require_mfp=1`.
Useful when `pmf=1` and `sae_check_mfp=1` are enabled and networks
are configured with ieee80211w=3 (default) and key_mgmt="WPA-PSK SAE".
In this configuration if the device is unable to use PMF due to
lacking BIP group ciphers it will avoid SAE and fallback to
WPA-PSK for that connection.
Signed-off-by: Jeffery Miller <jefferymiller@google.com>
When scanning for a new connection, we currently optimize by scanning
all frequencies only when our MCC capabilities will allow an additional
operating frequency, and scan only the existing operating frequencies
otherwise. This is problematic when there the current operating
frequency singularly accounts for one of the shared radio frequencies
because we should be able to switch operating frequencies without adding
to the channel count. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wang <matthewmwang@chromium.org>
Use a full list of AKM suite selectors that can use SAE authentication
when checking for authentication trigger from the driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
AKM suite selector check was initially implemented with incorrect byte
swapping of the value from the driver (nl80211). Fix this and leave a
workaround option for any potentially deployed device where the driver
might be using the swapped byte order.
Fixes: 5ff39c1380 ("SAE: Support external authentication offload for driver-SME cases")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Previously, wpa_supplicant was using the current SSID for building the
SAE authentication commit frame for retries during external
authentication. But the external authentication SSID can be different
from the current SSID. Fix this by using the correct SSID profile.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
The driver's SME may choose a BSS of a different ESS (SSID) compared to
the current SSID and trigger external authentication. If the chosen SSID
is not associated/selected before by wpa_supplicant it won't have the
H2E PT derived. Make sure to derive PT for SSID indicated in the
external authentication request.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
The new SAE AKM suites are defined to use H2E, so ignore the sae_pwe
value when these AKM suites are used similarly to the way H2E gets
enabled when SAE Password Identifiers are used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Send the status code from the AP authentication response instead of
sending the hardcoded WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE when the external
SAE authentication failure is due to an explicit rejection by the AP.
This will allow the driver to indicate the correct status in connect
response.
For example, an AP can send WLAN_STATUS_AP_UNABLE_TO_HANDLE_NEW_STA in
SAE authentication response. With this change the driver gets the real
status for the SAE authentication failure and it can fill the correct
status in the connect response event.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
After receiving a BSS Transition Management request,
wpa_supplicant_connect() will abort ongoing scans, which will cause scan
results to be reported. Since the reassociate bit is set, this will
trigger a connection attempt based on the aborted scan's scan results
and cancel the initial connection request. This often causes
wpa_supplicant to reassociate to the same AP it is currently associated
to instead of the AP it was asked to transition to.
Add a bss_trans_mgmt_in_progress flag to indicate that we're currently
transitioning to a different AP so that we don't initiate another
connection attempt based on the possibly received scan results from a
scan that was in progress at the time the BSS Transition Management
request was received.
This is the equivalent of commit 5ac977758d ("Reject authentication
start during explicit roam requests") for the roaming scenario.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Norvez <norvez@chromium.org>
wpa_supplicant may use wrong SAE authentication method if it doesn't
have the scan result for the target BSS since RSNXE information is not
available.
For example, STA might use the hunting-and-pecking loop method for SAE
authentication even though AP supports SAE H2E and STA is configured
with sae_pwe=2.
This is possible in cases like EXTERNAL_AUTH triggered by the driver
during roaming. To avoid this update scan results to fetch the target
BSS scan result from the driver.
Signed-off-by: Shivani Baranwal <quic_shivbara@quicinc.com>
This reverts commit 3204795d7a.
The commit adds an additional check that checks for overlapping BSSs in
addition to the existing 40 MHz intolerance subfield checks. The commit
cites IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 11.16.12, which defines the proper behavior
for a 20/40 MHz HT STA and AP, but the standard actually doesn't say
anything about overlapping BSSs. Specifically, the standard states that
the only BSSs that belong in the Intolerant channel report are those
that satisfy trigger event A, defined as channels with BSSs that don't
contain the HT capabilities element (which wpa_supplicant already did
before). Note that we also include channels with BSSs that have the 40
MHz intolerance bit set in the Intolerant channel report.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wang <matthewmwang@chromium.org>
CTRL-EVENT-AUTH-REJECT reporting was previously skipped when going
through SAE-specific Authentication frame handling. Add this event here
as well to be more consistent with control interface events.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 mandates H2E to be used whenever an SAE password
identifier is used. While this was already covered in the
implementation, the sae_prepare_commit() function still included an
argument for specifying the password identifier since that was used in
an old test vector. Now that that test vector has been updated, there is
no more need for this argument anymore. Simplify the older non-H2E case
to not pass through a pointer to the (not really used) password
identifier.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The roam D-Bus and ROAM control itnerface commands flip the reassociate
bit before calling wpa_supplicant_connect(). wpa_supplicant connect
eventually aborts ongoing scans (if any), which causes scan results to
be reported. Since the reassociate bit is set, this will trigger a
connection attempt based on the aborted scan's scan results and cancel
the initial connetion request. This often causes wpa_supplicant to
reassociate to the same AP it is currently associated to instead of the
explicitly requested roaming target.
Add a roam_in_progress flag to indicate that we're currently attempting
to roam via an explicitly request to a specific BSS so that we don't
initiate another connection attempt based on the possibly received scan
results from a scan that was in progress at the time the roam command
was received.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wang <matthewmwang@chromium.org>
These frames are used for verifying that a specific SA and protected
link is in functional state between two devices. The IEEE 802.11
standard defines only a case that uses individual MAC address as the
destination. While there is no explicit rule on the receiver to ignore
other cases, it seems safer to make sure group-addressed frames do not
end up resulting in undesired behavior. As such, drop such frames
instead of interpreting them as valid SA Query Request/Response.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Replace the implicit boolean checks that used int variables with use of
a more explicit bool variable type.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Enhance the return values of ocv_verify_tx_params with enum to indicate
different OCI verification failures to caller.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <vjakkam@codeaurora.org>
Previously wpabuf_head() of the buffer is passed to wpa_hexdump_buf()
instead of the wpabuf struct itself and it was causing wpa_supplicant to
crash. Fix this by using the correct pointer in the debug prints.
Fixes: a118047245 ("MSCS: Add support to send MSCS Request frames")
Fixes: c504ff5398 ("MSCS: Add support to populate MSCS Descriptor IE in (Re)AssocReq")
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <vjakkam@codeaurora.org>
Allow MSCS change/remove request to be sent only after an initial setup,
i.e., after an add request has been accepted.
Signed-off-by: Vinita S. Maloo <vmaloo@codeaurora.org>
Include the MSCS Descriptor IE in the (Re)Association Request frames to
setup MSCS between the AP and the STA during association.
Signed-off-by: Vinita S. Maloo <vmaloo@codeaurora.org>
Only the sae_password parameter was previously accepted for SAE-PK use.
That is not sufficient for covering mixed SAE+PSK cases. Extend this by
allowing the psk parameter to be used as well just like it can be used
for SAE without SAE-PK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This replaces the previously used sae_pk_only configuration parameter
with a more generic sae_pk that can be used to specify how SAE-PK is
negotiated. The default behavior (sae_pk=0) is to automatically
negotiate SAE-PK whenever the AP supports it and the password is in
appropriate format. sae_pk=1 allows only SAE-PK to be used and sae_pk=2
disables SAE-PK completely.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This maintains knowledge of whether H2E or PK was used as part of the
SAE authentication beyond the removal of temporary state needed during
that authentication. This makes it easier to use information about which
kind of SAE authentication was used at higher layer functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The new wpa_supplicant network profile parameter sae_pk_only=1 can now
be used to disable use of SAE authentication without SAE-PK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This adds STA side functionality for SAE-PK. This version enables SAE-PK
automatically based on the configured SAE password value if the selected
AP advertises support for SAE-PK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This adds core SAE functionality for a new mode of using SAE with a
specially constructed password that contains a fingerprint for an AP
public key and that public key being used to validate an additional
signature in SAE confirm from the AP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
