Allow hostapd to be requested to override the RSNXE Used subfield in FT
reassociation case for testing purposes with "ft_rsnxe_used=<0/1/2>"
where 0 = no override, 1 = override to 1, and 2 = override to 0.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Discard the FT Reassociation Request frame instead of rejecting it
(i.e., do not send Reassociation Response frame) if RSNXE Used is
indicated in FTE, but no RSNXE is included even though the AP is
advertising RSNXE.
While there is not really much of a difference between discarding and
rejecting the frame, this discarding behavior is what the standard says
for this type of an error case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Allow STA entry to be removed and re-added to the driver with PMF is
used with FT. Previously, this case resulted in cfg80211 rejecting STA
entry update after successful FT protocol use if the association had not
been dropped and it could not be dropped for the PMF case in
handle_auth().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd configuration parameter dpp_pfs can be used to specify
how PFS is applied to associations. The default behavior (dpp_pfs=0)
remains same as it was previously, i.e., allow the station to decide
whether to use PFS. PFS use can now be required (dpp_pfs=1) or rejected
(dpp_pfs=2).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The new hostapd configuration parameter transition_disable can now be
used to configure the AP to advertise that use of a transition mode is
disabled. This allows stations to automatically disable transition mode
by disabling less secure network profile parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Support Extended Key ID in hostapd according to IEEE Std 802.11-2016.
Extended Key ID allows to rekey pairwise keys without the otherwise
unavoidable MPDU losses on a busy link. The standard is fully backward
compatible, allowing an AP to serve STAs with and without Extended Key
ID support in the same BSS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
The previous design for adding RSNXE into FT was not backwards
compatible. Move to a new design based on 20/332r3 to avoid that issue
by not include RSNXE in the FT protocol Reassociation Response frame so
that a STA not supporting RSNXE can still validate the FTE MIC
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The new hostapd configuration parameter rsne_override_eapol can now be
used similarly to the previously added rsnxe_override_eapol to override
(replace contents or remove) RSNE in EAPOL-Key msg 3/4. This can be used
for station protocol testing to verify sufficient checks for RSNE
modification between the Beacon/Probe Response frames and EAPOL-Key msg
3/4.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previous implementation was determining whether the override value was
set based on its length being larger than zero. Replace this with an
explicit indication of whether the parameter is set to allow zero length
replacement, i.e., remove of RSNXE from EAPOL-Key msg 3/4.
In addition, move IE replacement into a more generic helper function to
allow this to be used with other IEs as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Rekeying a pairwise key using only keyid 0 (PTK0 rekey) has many broken
implementations and should be avoided when using or interacting with
one. The effects can be triggered by either end of the connection and
range from hardly noticeable disconnects over long connection freezes up
to leaking clear text MPDUs.
To allow affected users to mitigate the issues, add a new hostapd
configuration option "wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey" to replace all PTK0 rekeys
with disconnection. This requires the station to reassociate to get
connected again and as such, can result in connectivity issues as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Add a new hostapd configuration parameter beacon_prot=<0/1> to allow
Beacon protection to be enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Initial OWE implementation used SHA256 when deriving the PTK for all OWE
groups. This was supposed to change to SHA384 for group 20 and SHA512
for group 21. The new owe_ptk_workaround parameter can be used to enable
workaround for interoperability with stations that use SHA256 with
groups 20 and 21. By default, only the appropriate hash function is
accepted. When workaround is enabled (owe_ptk_workaround=1), the
appropriate hash function is tried first and if that fails, SHA256-based
PTK derivation is attempted. This workaround can result in reduced
security for groups 20 and 21, but is required for interoperability with
older implementations. There is no impact to group 19 behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific
description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to
be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed
Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to
replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have
moved to using the new key_flag.
The following flag are defined:
KEY_FLAG_MODIFY
Set when an already installed key must be updated.
So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed
keys. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT
Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when
deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.)
KEY_FLAG_RX
The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_TX
The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP
The key is a broadcast or group key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
The key is a pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PMK
The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK).
Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are:
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX
WEP key not used as default key (yet).
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT
Default WEP or WPA-NONE key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX
GTK key valid for RX only.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT
GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX
Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX
Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID
support.)
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY
Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX.
KEY_FLAG_RX_TX
Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination
with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX.
This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new
key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using
it, yet.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
The new hostapd gtk_rsc_override and igtk_rsc_override configuration
parameters can be used to set an override value for the RSC that the AP
advertises for STAs for GTK/IGTK. The contents of those parameters is a
hexdump of the RSC in little endian byte order.
This functionality is available only in CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y builds.
This can be used to verify that stations implement initial RSC
configuration correctly for GTK/ and IGTK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This new hostapd configuration parameter rsnxe_override_eapol=<hexdump>
can be used to override RSNXE value in EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 for testing
purposes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This is needed to be able to compare the received RSNXE to a protected
version in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This parameter can be used to specify which PWE derivation mechanism(s)
is enabled. This commit is only introducing the new parameter; actual
use of it will be address in separate commits.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Hardcode this to be defined and remove the separate build options for
PMF since this functionality is needed with large number of newer
protocol extensions and is also something that should be enabled in all
WPA2/WPA3 networks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This AP behavior was missing from IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016, but it is
needed for the RSNE validation to work correctly and for a FILS STA to
be able to perform the mandatory check for RSNE matching when processing
the (Re)Association Response frame (as described in 802.11ai). REVmd
will be updating the standard to cover this AP case, so prepare the
implementation to match that. Without this, a FILS STA might reject
association whenever using FILS authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The PMK and PMKID information from FILS ERP and FILS PMKSA caching needs
to be stored within struct wpa_state_machine for PTK to work. Without
this, PTK derivation would fail and attempt to go through rekeying would
result in disconnection. Furthermore, wpa_rekey_ptk() timer needs to be
started at the completion of FILS association since the place where it
was done for non-FILS cases at the end of 4-way handshake is not reached
when FILS authentication is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Use Diffie-Hellman key exchange to derivate additional material for
PMK-to-PTK derivation to get PFS. The Diffie-Hellman Parameter element
(defined in OWE RFC 8110) is used in association frames to exchange the
DH public keys. For backwards compatibility, ignore missing
request/response DH parameter and fall back to no PFS in such cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Derive PMKR1Name during the FILS authentication step, verify that the
station uses matching PMKR1Name in (Re)Association Request frame, and
add RSNE[PMKR1Name] into (Re)Association Response frame when going
through FT initial mobility domain association using FILS. These steps
were missed from the initial implementation, but are needed to match the
IEEE 802.11ai requirements for explicit confirmation of the FT key
hierarchy (similarly to what is done in FT 4-way handshake when FILS is
not used).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
According to IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 9.4.2.25 when fields of an RSNE are
not included, the default values are used. The cipher suite defaults
were hardcoded to CCMP in the previous implementation, but the default
is actually different for DMG: GCMP (per 9.4.2.25.2).
It is not possible to find out from the RSNE if the network is non-DMG
or DMG, so callers of wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn() need to handle this case
based on context, which can be different for each caller.
In order to fix this issue, add flags to the wpa_ie_data indicating
whether pairwise/group ciphers were included in the RSNE. Callers can
check these flags and fill in the appropriate ciphers. The
wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn() function still initializes the ciphers to CCMP by
default so existing callers will not break. This change also fixes some
callers which need to handle the DMG network case.
Signed-off-by: Lior David <liord@codeaurora.org>
Extend wpa_psk_file to allow an optional VLAN ID to be specified with
"vlanid=<VLAN ID>" prefix on the line. If VLAN ID is specified and the
particular wpa_psk_file entry is used for a station, that station is
bound to the specified VLAN. This can be used to operate a single
WPA2-Personal BSS with multiple VLANs based on the used passphrase/PSK.
This is similar to the WPA2-Enterprise case where the RADIUS server can
assign stations to different VLANs.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This doesn't change any behavior on its own. It's going to be used to
expose per-station keyids and allow reloading passphrases in runtime.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal@plume.com>
Use the information elements that were present in the (Re)Association
Request frame to derive the maximum bandwidth the AP will use to
transmit frames to a specific STA. By using this approach, we don't need
to query the kernel for this information, and avoid having to add a
driver API for that.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Set the OCV bit in RSN capabilities (RSNE) based on AP mode
configuration. Do the same for OSEN since it follows the RSNE field
definitions.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
This adds the necessary functions and callbacks to make the channel_info
driver API available to the authenticator state machine that implements
the 4-way and group key handshake. This is needed for OCV.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
The MIC field is now a variable length field, so make FTE generation in
hostapd aware of the two different field lengths.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This ensures a session timeout configured on R0KH either using
RADIUS-based ACL or 802.1X authentication is copied over to the new
R1KH.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
This uses set_vlan()/get_vlan() callbacks to fetch and configure the
VLAN of STA. Transmission of VLAN information between APs uses new TLVs.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 12.7.1.7.1 indicates that the lifetime of the
PMK-R0 (and PMK-R1) is bound to the lifetime of PSK or MSK from which
the key was derived. This is currently stored in r0_key_lifetime, but
cache entries are not actually removed.
This commit uses the r0_key_lifetime configuration parameter when
wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft() is called. This may need to be extended to use
the MSK lifetime, if provided by an external authentication server, with
some future changes. For PSK, there is no such lifetime, but it also
matters less as FT-PSK can be achieved without inter-AP communication.
The expiration timeout is then passed from R0KH to R1KH. The R1KH verifies
that the given timeout for sanity, it may not exceed the locally configured
r1_max_key_lifetime.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Add a new configuration option ft_r0_key_lifetime that deprecates
r0_key_lifetime. Though, the old configuration is still accepted for
backwards compatibility.
This simplifies testing. All other items are in seconds as well. In
addition, this makes dot11FTR0KeyLifetime comment match with what got
standardized in the end in IEEE Std 802.11r-2008.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Previously, the association that used SAE authentication ended up
recalculating the PMKID for EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 using incorrect
PMK-to-PMKID derivation instead of using the previously derived PMKID
from SAE. The correct PMKID was used only when going through PMKSA
caching exchange with a previously derived PMKSA from SAE.
Fix this by storing the SAE PMKID into the state machine entry for the
initial SAE authentication case when there is no explicit PMKSA entry
attached to the station.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The new hostapd.conf parameter sae_require_pmf=<0/1> can now be used to
enforce negotiation of MFP for all associations that negotiate use of
SAE. This is used in cases where SAE-capable devices are known to be
MFP-capable and the BSS is configured with optional MFP (ieee80211w=1)
for legacy support. The non-SAE stations can connect without MFP while
SAE stations are required to negotiate MFP if sae_require_mfp=1.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In order to test the WoWLAN GTK rekeying KRACK mitigation, add a
REKEY_GTK hostapd control interface command that can be used at certain
points of the test.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This allows hostapd testing functionality to be forced to send out a
plaintext EAPOL-Key frame with the RESEND_* command. That can be useful
in seeing how the station behaves if an unencrypted EAPOL frame is
received when TK is already configured.
This is not really perfect since there is no convenient way of sending
out a single unencrypted frame in the current nl80211 design. The
monitor interface could likely still do this, but that's not really
supposed to be used anymore. For now, clear and restore TK during this
operation. The restore part is not really working correctly, though,
since it ends up clearing the TSC value on the AP side and that shows up
as replay protection issues on the station. Anyway, this is sufficient
to generate sniffer captures to analyze station behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter
wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable
retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install
keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is
similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4
retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group
message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use
aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
EAPOL-Key messages.
This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks
on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices
cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the
retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with
a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side
vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced
robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with
heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the
key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround
is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by
adding the following to the build configuration:
CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd control interface commands "RESEND_M1 <addr>" and
"RESEND_M3 <addr>" can be used to request a retransmission of the 4-Way
Handshake messages 1/4 and 3/4 witht he same or modified ANonce (in M1).
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd control interface command "RESEND_GROUP_M1 <addr>" can
be used to request a retransmission of the Group Key Handshake message
1/2 for the current GTK.
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was originally added to allow the IEEE 802.11 protocol to be
tested, but there are no known fully functional implementations based on
this nor any known deployments of PeerKey functionality. Furthermore,
PeerKey design in the IEEE Std 802.11-2016 standard has already been
marked as obsolete for DLS and it is being considered for complete
removal in REVmd.
This implementation did not really work, so it could not have been used
in practice. For example, key configuration was using incorrect
algorithm values (WPA_CIPHER_* instead of WPA_ALG_*) which resulted in
mapping to an invalid WPA_ALG_* value for the actual driver operation.
As such, the derived key could not have been successfully set for the
link.
Since there are bugs in this implementation and there does not seem to
be any future for the PeerKey design with DLS (TDLS being the future for
DLS), the best approach is to simply delete all this code to simplify
the EAPOL-Key handling design and to get rid of any potential issues if
these code paths were accidentially reachable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous implementation ended up starting a new EAPOL-Key 4-way
handshake if the STA were to attempt to perform another association.
This resulted in immediate disconnection since the PTK was not ready for
configuring FILS TK at the point when EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 is sent out.
This is better than alloing the association to continue with the same TK
reconfigured, but not really ideal.
Address this potential sequence by not starting a new 4-way handshake on
the additional association attempt. Instead, allow the association to
complete, but do so without reconfiguring the TK to avoid potential
issues with PN reuse with the same TK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
