This part is missing from IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016, but the lack of DHss
here means there would not be proper PFS for the case where PMKSA
caching is used with FILS SK+PFS authentication. This was not really the
intent of the FILS design and that issue was fixed during REVmd work
with the changes proposed in
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/17/11-17-0906-04-000m-fils-fixes.docx
that add DHss into FILS-Key-Data (and PTK, in practice) derivation for
the PMKSA caching case so that a unique ICK, KEK, and TK are derived
even when using the same PMK.
Note: This is not backwards compatible, i.e., this breaks PMKSA caching
with FILS SK+PFS if only STA or AP side implementation is updated.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016 had missed a change in the Pairwise key hierarchy
clause (12.7.1.3 in IEEE Std 802.11-2016) and due to that, the previous
implementation ended up using HMAC-SHA-1 -based PMKID derivation. This
was not really the intent of the FILS design and that issue was fixed
during REVmd work with the changes proposed in
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/17/11-17-0906-04-000m-fils-fixes.docx
that change FILS cases to use HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 based on the
negotiated AKM.
Update the implementation to match the new design. This changes the
rsn_pmkid() function to take in the more generic AKMP identifier instead
of a boolean identifying whether SHA256 is used.
Note: This is not backwards compatible, i.e., this breaks PMKSA caching
based on the initial ERP key hierarchy setup if only STA or AP side
implementation is updated. PMKSA caching based on FILS authentication
exchange is not impacted by this, though.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This new AKM is used with DPP when using the signed Connector to derive
a PMK. Since the KCK, KEK, and MIC lengths are variable within a single
AKM, this needs number of additional changes to get the PMK length
delivered to places that need to figure out the lengths of the PTK
components.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This extends fils_pmk_to_ptk() to allow FILS-FT to be derived. The
callers do not yet use that capability; i.e., actual use will be added
in separate commits.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
draft-harkins-owe-07.txt does not specify these parameters, so need to
pick something sensible to use for the experimental implementation. The
Suite B 128-bit level AKM 00-0F-AC:11 has reasonable parameters for the
DH group 19 case (i.e., SHA256 hash), so use it for now. This can be
updated if the OWE RFC becomes clearer on the appropriate parameters
(KEK/KCK/MIC length, PRF/KDF algorithm, and key-wrap algorithm).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
sha384_prf() is used both with Suite B and FILS, so add CONFIG_FILS as
another alternative to building in this functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, any potential (even if very unlikely) local operation error
was ignored. Now these will result in aborting the negotiation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds helper functions for deriving PMK and PMKID from ERP exchange
in FILS shared key authentication as defined in IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016,
12.12.2.5.2 (PMKSA key derivation with FILS authentication). These
functions is used to fix PMK and PMKID derivation which were previously
using the rMSK directly as PMK instead of following the FILS protocol to
derive PMK with HMAC from nonces and rMSK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
wpa_cipher_to_alg() returns enumerated values from enum wpa_alg and all
uses of the return value treat it as enum wpa_alg (by either assigning
it to a variable of type enum wpa_alg or passing to a function that
expects enum wpa_alg).
This commit updates the return value to match the expected usage
(enum wpa_alg) rather than int. This ensures the return value is
of the proper type and eliminates the following compiler warnings:
ARM RVCT (2.2):
'Warning: #188-D: enumerated type mixed with another type'
Signed-off-by: Joel Cunningham <joel.cunningham@me.com>
P802.11ai/D7.0 changed from CRC32 to SHA256 as the hash algorithm for
the FILS realm name. Update the implementation to match that change.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This implements Key-Auth derivation for (Re)Association Request frames
(see P802.11ai/D11.0 12.12.2.6.2) and (Re)Association Response frames
(see P802.11ai/D11.0 12.12.2.6.3).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This is the PTKSA key derivation used as part of the FILS authentication
exchange. See P802.11ai/D11.0 12.12.2.5.3.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Calculate the hashed realm from hostapd erp_domain configuration
parameter and add this to the FILS Indication element when ERP is
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Station should be able to connect initially without ft_pmk_cache filled,
so the target AP has the PSK available and thus the same information as
the origin AP. Therefore neither caching nor communication between the
APs with respect to PMK-R0 or PMK-R1 or VLANs is required if the target
AP derives the required PMKs locally.
This patch introduces the generation of the required PMKs locally for
FT-PSK. Additionally, PMK-R0 is not stored (and thus pushed) for FT-PSK.
So for FT-PSK networks, no configuration of inter-AP communication is
needed anymore when using ft_psk_generate_local=1 configuration. The
default behavior (ft_psk_generate_local=0) remains to use the pull/push
protocol.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
This makes it easier to debug AP selection issues in case of a invalid
RSN element or use of customer cipher suites that are not supported by
wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
wpa_insert_pmkid() did not support cases where the original RSN IE
included any PMKIDs. That case can happen when PTK rekeying through
4-way handshake is used after FT protocol run. Such a 4-way handshake
used to fail with wpa_supplicant being unable to build the EAPOL-Key msg
2/4.
Fix this by extending wpa_insert_pmkid() to support removal of the old
PMKIDs, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes it easier to interpret AP side debug log for a case where a
station specifies in unsupported management group cipher.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the EAPOL-Key MIC derivation was already changed from SHA256 to
SHA384 for the Suite B 192-bit AKM, KDF had not been updated similarly.
Fix this by using HMAC-SHA384 instead of HMAC-SHA256 when deriving PTK
from PMK when using the Suite B 192-bit AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This code path could not be hit with the RSNE generated by hostapd or
wpa_supplicant, but it is now possible to reach when using
own_ie_override test functionality. The RSNE and IE buffer length were
not updated correct in case wpa_insert_pmkid() had to add the RSN
Capabilities field.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The FT-specific check for valid group cipher in wpa_ft_gen_req_ies() was
not up-to-date with the current list of supported ciphers. Fix this by
using a generic function to determine validity of the cipher. In
practice, this adds support for using CCMP-256 and GCMP-256 as the group
cipher with FT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to have a separate "fail silently" case for wpa_ie_len
== 0. That condition does not seem to be reachable and even if it were,
the following "ie len too short" case will result in the exact same
return value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
As far as IEEE 802.11 standard is concerned, WEP is deprecated, but at
least in theory, allowed as a group cipher. This option is unlikely to
be deployed anywhere and to clean up the implementation, we might as
well remove all support for this combination.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the existing users of these elements were already validating the
element length. However, it is clearer to validate this already at the
parser for extra layer of protection for any future changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Old code defaulted to WEP for an AP advertising OSEN. Show as OSEN
instead. Re-use most of the RSN parsing logic since all but the header
is the same.
Example output:
[root@ath9k-f lanforge]# ./local/bin/wpa_cli -i sta0 scan_results
bssid / frequency / signal level / flags / ssid
00:0e:8e:6f:40:49 2462 -23 [OSEN-OSEN-CCMP][ESS] ben-138
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers had problems understanding "left < count * len"
(CID 62855, CID 62856), so convert this to equivalent "count > left /
len" (len here is fixed to 4, so this can be done efficiently).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Static analyzers may not have understood the bounds checking on
data->num_pmkid. Use a local, temporary variable and validate that that
value is within length limits before assining this to data->num_pmkid to
make this clearer. (CID 62857, CID 68126)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new AKM uses a different mechanism of deriving the PMKID based on
KCK instead of PMK. hostapd was already doing this after the KCK had
been derived, but wpa_supplicant functionality needs to be moved from
processing of EAPOL-Key frame 1/4 to 3/4 to have the KCK available.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds definitions for the 128-bit level Suite B AKM 00-0F-AC:11. The
functionality itself is not yet complete, i.e., this commit only
includes parts to negotiate the new AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds hostapd support for the new WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher,
WLAN-Group-Cipher, WLAN-AKM-Suite, and WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Pairwise-Cipher
attributes defined in RFC 7268. These attributes are added to RADIUS
messages when the station negotiates use of WPA/RSN.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows hostapd to set a different management group cipher than the
previously hardcoded default BIP (AES-128-CMAC). The new configuration
file parameter group_mgmt_cipher can be set to BIP-GMAC-128,
BIP-GMAC-256, or BIP-CMAC-256 to select one of the ciphers defined in
IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
There is no need to maintain a separate counter for this in addition to
the pointer to the current location. In addition, this gets rid of
warnings about unused variable write.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
WPA_CIPHER_* and CIPHER_* are used for the exact same set of cipher
suites with the main difference being that the WPA_CIPHER_* version is
suitable to be used as a bitfield. Similarly, WPA_KEY_MGMT_* and
KEY_MGMT_* have similar design for AKMs. There is no need to maintain
two separate copies of the definitions since the bitfield compatible
version can be used for both needs. Get rid of the CIPHER_* and
KEY_MGMT_* versions to clean up the implementation by getting rid of
unnecessary mapping functions.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This prepares wpa_supplicant for accepting cases where the AP does not
use group addressed frames.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds initial parts for supporting the new GCMP-256, CCMP-256,
BIP-GMAC-128, BIP-GMAC-256, and BIP-CMAC-256 cipher suites.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is not much use for enabling WPA without WPA2 nowadays since most
networks have been upgraded to WPA2. Furthermore, the code size savings
from disabling just WPA2 are pretty small, so there is not much
justification for maintaining this build option. Remove it to get rid of
undesired complexity.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This introduces new AKM for SAE and FT-SAE and adds the initial parts
for going through the SAE Authentication frame exchange. The actual SAE
algorithm and new fields in Authentication frames are not yet included
in this commit and will be added separately. This version is able to
complete a dummy authentication with the correct authentication
algorithm and transaction values to allow cfg80211/mac80211 drivers to
be tested (all the missing parts can be handled with
hostapd/wpa_supplicant changes).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Try to share most of the cipher information like key and RSC lengths and
suite selector conversions, etc. in wpa_common.c to avoid having similar
code throughout the WPA implementation for handling cipher specific
behavior.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows both hostapd and wpa_supplicant to be used to derive and
configure keys for GCMP. This is quite similar to CCMP key
configuration, but a different cipher suite and somewhat different rules
are used in cipher selection. It should be noted that GCMP is not
included in default parameters at least for now, so explicit
pairwise/group configuration is needed to enable it. This may change in
the future to allow GCMP to be selected automatically in cases where
CCMP could have been used.
This commit does not included changes to WPS or P2P to allow GCMP to be
used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
When CONFIG_FIPS=y is used, do not include MD5 in the build and disable
EAPOL-Key frames that use MD5 (WPA/TKIP and dynamic WEP with IEEE
802.1X).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no point in maintaining two almost identical versions
of this parser. Move WPA IE parser into wpa_common.c similarly
to what was already the case with RSN IE parse.
IEEE Std 802.11r-2008, 11A.4.2 describes FT initial mobility domain
association in an RSN to include PMKR1Name in the PMKID-List field
in RSN IE in messages 2/4 and 3/4. This makes the RSN IE not be
bitwise identical with the values used in Beacon, Probe Response,
(Re)association Request frames.
The previous versions of wpa_supplicant and hostapd did not add the
PMKR1Name value in EAPOL-Key frame and did not accept it if added
(due to bitwise comparison of RSN IEs). This commit fixes the
implementation to be compliant with the standard by adding the
PMKR1Name value into EAPOL-Key messages during FT 4-Way Handshake and
by verifying that the received value matches with the value derived
locally.
This breaks interoperability with previous wpa_supplicant/hostapd
versions.
In addition, start ordering header file includes to be in more
consistent order: system header files, src/utils, src/*, same
directory as the *.c file.
Previously, both CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y and CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y were needed
to enable SHA256-based key handshake (WPA-PSK-SHA256 and
WPA-EAP-SHA256). This can now be done with just CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y.
IEEE 802.11w/D6.0 defines new AKMPs to indicate SHA256-based algorithms for
key derivation (and AES-CMAC for EAPOL-Key MIC). Add support for using new
AKMPs and clean up AKMP processing with helper functions in defs.h.
