The standard fragment_size network parameter can now be used to
configure EAP-IKEv2 fragmentation limit instead of always using the
hardcoded value of 1400.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Setting methodState = DONE for the case where GPSK-1 is found to be
invalid or incompatible allows EAP state machine to proceed to FAILURE
state instead of remaining stuck until AP times out the connection.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
phase1 parameter 'cipher' can now be used to specify which algorithm
proposal is selected, e.g., with phase1="cipher=1" selecting AES-based
design and cipher=2 SHA256-based. This is mainly for testing purposes,
but can also be used to enforce stronger algorithms to be used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
One of the RFC 4137 state transitions (METHOD -> FAILURE) had been
forgotten and this could result in EAP peer method processing not
reporting failure immediately and instead, remain stuck waiting for the
connection to time out. Fix this by adding the methodState == DONE &&
decision == FAIL case to allow immediate reporting of failures.
The condition from RFC 4137 as-is would cause problems for number of the
existing EAP method implementations since they use that in places where
the final message before EAP-Failure should really be sent to the EAP
server (e.g., WSC_Done in EAP-WSC). Address this by includng eapRespData
== NULL as an additional constraint for entering FAILURE state directly
from METHOD.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
phase1 parameters dhgroup, encr, prf, and mac can now be used to specify
which algorithm proposal is selected, e.g., with phase1="dhgroup=3
encr=1 prf=1 mac=1" selecting the mandatory-to-implement case. This is
mainly for testing purposes, but can also be used to enforce stronger
algorithms to be used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was already included in all the other calls to eap_proxy, but
somehow the get_imsi call had been forgotten.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows the new external_sim=1 case to be used to perform UMTS
authentication step in EAP-AKA/AKA' peer process. Following control
interface event is used to request the operation:
CTRL-REQ-SIM-<network id>:UMTS-AUTH:<RAND>:<AUTN> needed for SSID <SSID>
Response from external processing is returned with
CTRL-RSP-SIM-<network id> UMTS-AUTH:<IK>:<CK>:<RES>
or
CTRL-RSP-SIM-<network id> UMTS-AUTS:<AUTS>
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the new external_sim=1 case to be used to perform GSM
authentication step in EAP-SIM peer process. Following control interface
event is used to request the operation:
CTRL-REQ-SIM-<network id>:GSM-AUTH:<RAND1>:<RAND2>[:<RAND3>] needed
for SSID <SSID>
For example:
<3>CTRL-REQ-SIM-0:GSM-AUTH:5e3496ce7d5863b3b09f97f565513bc3:
73f0f0bc5c47bcbed6f572d07ab74056:447b784f08de80bdc2b1e100fccbb534
needed for SSID test
Response from external processing is returned with
CTRL-RSP-SIM-<network id> GSM-AUTH:<Kc1>:<SRES1>:<Kc2>:<SRES2>
[:<Kc3>:<SRES3>]
For example:
wpa_cli sim 0 GSM-AUTH:d41c76e0079247aa:2709ebfb:43baa77cfc8bcd6c:
0fa98dc1:a8ad1f6e30e
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new configuration parameter external_sim=<0/1> can now be used to
configure wpa_supplicant to use external SIM/USIM processing (e.g., GSM
authentication for EAP-SIM or UMTS authentication for EAP-AKA). The
requests and responses for such operations are sent over the ctrl_iface
CTRL-REQ-SIM and CTRL-RSP-SIM commands similarly to the existing
password query mechanism.
Changes to the EAP methods to use this new mechanism will be added in
separate commits.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new domain_suffix_match (and domain_suffix_match2 for Phase 2
EAP-TLS) can now be used to specify an additional constraint for the
server certificate domain name. If set, one of the dNSName values (or if
no dNSName is present, one of the commonName values) in the certificate
must have a suffix match with the specified value. Suffix match is done
based on full domain name labels, i.e., "example.com" matches
"test.example.com" but not "test-example.com".
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Swisscom SIM cards do not include MNC length within EF_AD, and end up
using incorrect MNC length based on the 3-digit default. Hardcode MNC
length of 2 for Switzerland, in the same manner as it was done for
Finland.
Signed-hostap: Andrejs Cainikovs <andrejs.cainikovs@sonymobile.com>
When using OpenSSL with TLS-based EAP methods, wpa_supplicant can now be
configured to use OCSP stapling (TLS certificate status request) with
ocsp=1 network block parameter. ocsp=2 can be used to require valid OCSP
response before connection is allowed to continue.
hostapd as EAP server can be configured to return cached OCSP response
using the new ocsp_stapling_response parameter and an external mechanism
for updating the response data (e.g., "openssl ocsp ..." command).
This allows wpa_supplicant to verify that the server certificate has not
been revoked as part of the EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST handshake before
actual data connection has been established (i.e., when a CRL could not
be fetched even if a distribution point were specified).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There are quite a few places in the current implementation where a nul
terminated string is generated from binary data. Add a helper function
to simplify the code a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
We should not call getSessionID method if it's not provided. This fixes
a regression from commit 950c563076 where
EAP methods that did not implement getSessionId resulted in NULL pointer
dereference when deriving the key.
Signed-off-by: Shijie Zhang <shijiez@qca.qualcomm.com>
WSC specification 2.0 section 7.4 describes OOB password to be expressed
in ASCII format (upper case hexdump) instead of raw binary.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit ffdaa05a6b added support for using
NFC password token from an AP. However, it had a bug that prevented the
wpa_supplicant wps_reg command from being used with "nfc-pw" as the PIN
value. Fix string comparison to handle this correctly.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds a new getSessionId() callback for EAP peer methods to allow
EAP Session-Id to be derived. This commits implements this for EAP-FAST,
EAP-GPSK, EAP-IKEv2, EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, and EAP-TTLS.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the offload mechanism, the Android configuration and
makefiles are extended to allow this to be configured for the build by
dropping in platform specific configuration files and makefile without
having to modify any existing files.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signal the start of EAP authentication as well as when additional
credentials are required to complete.
Signed-hostap: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
Even if the PAC file does not start with the proper header line, allow
the file to be used if it is empty. [Bug 423]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 458cb30191 broke LEAP since it
rejects EAP-Success packet that is used within LEAP and this frame does
not have a payload. Fix LEAP by relaxing the generic EAP packet
validation if LEAP has been negotiated.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While the existing code already addresses TLS Message Length validation
for both EAP-TLS peer and server side, this adds explicit checks and
rejection of invalid messages in the functions handling reassembly. This
does not change externally observable behavior in case of EAP server.
For EAP peer, this starts rejecting invalid messages instead of
addressing them by reallocating the buffer (i.e., ignoring TLS Message
Length in practice).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use the anonymous_identity field to store EAP-SIM/AKA pseudonym identity
so that this can be maintained between EAP sessions (e.g., after
wpa_supplicant restart) even if fast re-authentication data was cleared.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The AT_NONCE_S value needs to be used in AT_MAC calculation for
SIM/Re-authentication response even if re-authentication is rejected
with AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
This EAP type uses a vendor specific expanded EAP header to encapsulate
EAP-TLS with a configuration where the EAP server does not authenticate
the EAP peer. In other words, this method includes only server
authentication. The peer is configured with only the ca_cert parameter
(similarly to other TLS-based EAP methods). This method can be used for
cases where the network provides free access to anyone, but use of RSN
with a securely derived unique PMK for each station is desired.
The expanded EAP header uses the hostapd/wpa_supplicant vendor
code 39068 and vendor type 1 to identify the UNAUTH-TLS method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some deployed authentication servers seem to be unable to handle the TLS
Session Ticket extension (they are supposed to ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions, but end up rejecting the ClientHello instead). As a
workaround, disable use of TLS Sesson Ticket extension for EAP-TLS,
EAP-PEAP, and EAP-TTLS (EAP-FAST uses session ticket, so any server that
supports EAP-FAST does not need this workaround).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
tls_disable_session_ticket=1 in phase1/phase2 can now be used to disable
use of TLS Session Ticket extension (which is enabled by default in
recent OpenSSL versions). This can be used to work around issues with
broken authentication servers that do not ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions properly.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Only allow the TLS library keying material exporter functionality to be
used for MSK derivation with TLS-based EAP methods to avoid exporting
internal TLS keys from the library.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y was assumed to be set for
CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y. Avoid this dependency by making including the
MSCHAPv2 parts in EAP-TTLS conditionally.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These validation steps are already done in the EAP parsing code and in
the EAP methods, but the additional check is defensive programming and
can make the validation of received EAP messages more easier to
understand.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the password parameter for EAP methods to be fetched
from an external storage.
Following example can be used for developer testing:
ext_password_backend=test:pw1=password|pw2=testing
network={
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
identity="user"
password=ext:pw1
ca_cert="ca.pem"
phase2="auth=PAP"
}
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
At least some error paths (e.g., hitting the limit on hunt-and-peck
iterations) could have resulted in double-freeing of some memory
allocations. Avoid this by setting the pointers to NULL after they have
been freed instead of trying to free the data structure in a location
where some external references cannot be cleared. [Bug 453]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The AP PIN on wps_reg command can now be replaced with special value
"nfc-pw" to use device password from a NFC password token from the AP.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The OOB Device Password is passed in as a hexdump of the real Device
Password (16..32 octets of arbitrary binary data). The hexdump needs to
be converted to binary form before passing it for WPS processing.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Send an "EAP" signal via the new DBus interface under various
conditions during EAP authentication:
- During method selection (ACK and NAK)
- During certificate verification
- While sending and receiving TLS alert messages
- EAP success and failure messages
This provides DBus callers a number of new tools:
- The ability to probe an AP for available EAP methods
(given an identity).
- The ability to identify why the remote certificate was
not verified.
- The ability to identify why the remote peer refused
a TLS connection.
Signed-hostap: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
There was a technical change between the last IETF draft version
(draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10) and RFC 5448 in the leading characters
used in the username (i.e., use unique characters for EAP-AKA' instead
of reusing the EAP-AKA ones). This commit updates EAP-AKA' server and
peer implementations to use the leading characters based on the final
RFC.
Note: This will make EAP-AKA' not interoperate between the earlier
draft version and the new version.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
OpenSSL wrapper was using the same certificate store for both Phase 1
and Phase 2 TLS exchange in case of EAP-PEAP/TLS, EAP-TTLS/TLS, and
EAP-FAST/TLS. This would be fine if the same CA certificates were used
in both phases, but does not work properly if different CA certificates
are used. Enforce full separation of TLS state between the phases by
using a separate TLS library context in EAP peer implementation.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 30680e9332 changed the length
of the implicit challenge result to match with the exact length used
in TTLS. However, it failed to update the peer_challenge generation
to use a separate random value. Previously, this was generated as
part of the implicit challenge, but more correct way would have been
to generate a random value for it separately. Do this now to fix the
read after the allocated buffer (16 bytes after the implicit
challenge).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
intended-for: hostap-1
Remove the GPL notification text from EAP-pwd implementation per
approval from Dan Harkins who contributed these files.
(email from Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> dated
Wed, 4 Jan 2012 16:25:48 -0800)
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pseudonym identity should use a realm in environments where a realm is
used. Thus, the realm of the permanent identity is added to the pseudonym
username sent by the server.
Signed-hostap: Simon Baatz <gmbnomis@gmail.com>
The pseudonym identity should use a realm in environments where a realm is
used. Thus, the realm of the permanent identity is added to the pseudonym
username sent by the server.
Signed-hostap: Simon Baatz <gmbnomis@gmail.com>
Some SIM cards do not include MNC length with in EF_AD. Try to figure
out the MNC length based on the MCC/MNC values in the beginning of the
IMSI. This covers a prepaid Elisa/Kolumbus card that would have ended
up using incorrect MNC length based on the 3-digit default.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The temporary IMSI buffer can be used for this without needing the
extra memory allocation. In addition, the implementation is easier
to understand when the extra identity prefix value for EAP-SIM/AKA
is not included while fetching MCC/MNC from the IMSI.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pseudonym is a temporary identity, but is no one-time identifier (like
the fast re-authentication identity). Thus, do not forget it if the server
does not include it in every challenge. There are servers that include the
pseudonym identity only at full-auth. [Bug 424]
Prepare for multiple TLS PRF functions by renaming the SHA1+MD5 based
TLS PRF function to more specific name and add tls_prf() within the
internal TLS implementation as a wrapper for this for now.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This structure was not really used for anything apart from figuring out
length of the EAP-pwd header (and even that in a way that would not work
with fragmentation). Since the bitfields in the structure could have
been problematic depending on target endianness, remove this unnecessary
structure.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Another niceness of OpenSSL is that if the high-order bit of a 521-bit
big num is not set then BN_bn2bin() will just return 65 bytes instead of
66 bytes with the 1st (big endian, after all) being all zero. When this
happens the wrong number of octets are mixed into function H(). So
there's a whole bunch of "offset" computations and BN_bn2bin() dumps the
big number into a buffer + offset. That should be obvious in the patch
too.
data->phase2_method cannot really be NULL if
eap_fast_init_phase2_method() returns success, but this construction
seems to be too difficult for some static analyzers. While this change
is not really needed in practice, it makes it easier to go through
warnings from such analyzers.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function can fail in theory since the SHA-1 functions are
allowed to return an error. While this does not really happen in
practice (we would not get this far if SHA-1 does not work), it is
cleaner to include the error handling here to keep static analyzers
happier. [Bug 421]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Control requests will be extended for non-EAP uses later, so it makes
sense to have them be generic. Furthermore, having them defined as an
enum is easier for processing internally, and more generic for control
interfaces that may not use field names. The public ctrl_req_type /
field_name conversion function will be used later by the D-Bus control
interface too.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Special processing is needed to handle EAP user request for
identity or password at the beginning of Phase 2 when the implicit
identity request is used. data->pending_phase2_req needs to be set
to an empty buffer in that case to avoid re-processing the previous
part of TLS negotiation when the user enters the needed information.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This fixes an issue where WPS run leaves a small ClientTimeout
value (2) configured and the next EAPOL authentication is started
with that small value even for Identity exchange. This can cause
problems when an EAPOL packet gets dropped immediately after
association and a retry of that packet is needed (which may take
more than two seconds).
While EAP-FAST uses protected success notification, RFC 5422, Section
3.5 points out a possibility of EAP-Failure being sent out even after
protected success notification in case of provisioning. Change the
EAP-FAST peer implementation to accept that exception to the protected
success notification. This allows the station to re-connect more quickly
to complete EAP-FAST connection in the case the server rejects the
initial attempt by only allowing it to use to provision a new PAC.
These protocols seem to be abandoned: latest IETF drafts have expired
years ago and it does not seem likely that EAP-TTLSv1 would be
deployed. The implementation in hostapd/wpa_supplicant was not complete
and not fully tested. In addition, the TLS/IA functionality was only
available when GnuTLS was used. Since GnuTLS removed this functionality
in 3.0.0, there is no available TLS/IA implementation in the latest
version of any supported TLS library.
Remove the EAP-TTLSv1 and TLS/IA implementation to clean up unwanted
complexity from hostapd and wpa_supplicant. In addition, this removes
any potential use of the GnuTLS extra library.
eapol_test command line argument -o<file> can now be used to request
the received server certificate chain to be written to the specified
file. The certificates will be written in PEM format. [Bug 391]
In general, this patch attemps to extend commit
00468b4650 with dbus support.
This can be used by dbus client to implement subject match text
entry with preset value probed from server. This preset value, if
user accepts it, is remembered and passed to subject_match config
for any future authentication.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@novell.com>
This function does not get called with in_data == NULL in practice, but
it seems to be at least partly prepared for that case, so better make it
consistent by handling the NULL value throughout the function.
The size_t value here can be 64-bit and result in implicit sign
extension. In this particular case, that gets masked out by
host_to_be32(), so there is no practical difference, but it is better
to get rid of the 64-bit variable explicitly.
The supportedTypes parameter is a list of TNC_MessageType values
and the buffer to be copied should use size of TNC_MessageType, not
TNC_MessageTypeList. In practice, these are of same length on most
platforms, so this is not a critical issue, but anyway, the correct
type should be used.
The changes are:
1. the word "and" in the hunting-and-pecking string passed to the KDF
should be capitalized.
2. the primebitlen used in the KDF should be a short not an int.
3. the computation of MK in hostap is based on an older version of the
draft and is not the way it's specified in the RFC.
4. the group being passed into computation of the Commit was not in
network order.
ClientTimeout changes from EAP peer methods were not supposed to
change behavior for other EAP peer methods or even other sessions
of the same method. Re-initialize ClientTimeout whenever an EAP
peer method is initialized to avoid this. This addresses problems
where WPS (EAP-WSC) reduces the timeout and consecutive EAP runs
may fail due to too small timeout.
One of the pointers to the PAC buffer was not updated after realloc
and if the realloc ended up returning new pointer, the *pos pointer
was still pointing at the old location (i.e., freed memory at
this point).
This commit adds a new wrapper, random_get_bytes(), that is currently
defined to use os_get_random() as is. The places using
random_get_bytes() depend on the returned value being strong random
number, i.e., something that is infeasible for external device to
figure out. These values are used either directly as a key or as
nonces/challenges that are used as input for key derivation or
authentication.
The remaining direct uses of os_get_random() do not need as strong
random numbers to function correctly.
Advertize list of authorized enrollee MAC addresses in Beacon and
Probe Response frames and use these when selecting the AP. In order
to provide the list, the enrollee MAC address should be specified
whenever adding a new PIN. In addition, add UUID-R into
SetSelectedRegistrar action to make it potentially easier for an AP
to figure out which ER sent the action should there be multiple ERs
using the same IP address.
This works around issues with EAP-Failure getting lost for some reason.
Instead of waiting up to 60 seconds on a timeout, 30 second timeout is
now used and whenever the provisioning step has been completed (either
successfully or unsuccessfully), this timeout is reduced to 2 seconds.
There are no subdirectories in any of these directories or plans
for adding ones. As such, there is no point in running the loop
that does not do anything and can cause problems with some shells.
The server may still reject authentication at this point, so better
use conditional success decision. This allows the potentially
following EAP-Failure message to be processed properly. [Bug 354]
TNC IF-T is somewhat unclear on this are, but
draft-hanna-nea-pt-eap-00.txt, which is supposed to define the same
protocol, is clearer on the Flags field being included.
This change breaks interoperability with the old implementation if
EAP-TNC fragmentation is used. The old version would not accept
the acknowledgement message with the added Flags octet while the
new version accepts messagss with with both options.
TNC IF-T specification is unclear on the exact contents of the fragment
acknowledgement frame. An interoperability issue with the tncs@fhh
implementation was reported by Arne Welzel
<arne.welzel@stud.fh-hannover.de> due to the different interpretations
of the specification. Relax EAP-TNC server/peer validation rules to
accept fragmentation acknowledgement frames to include the Flags field
to avoid this issue.
This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information
about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can
be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to
figure out most likely network configuration and to get information
about reasons for failed authentications.
The follow new control interface events are used for this:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR
In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate
instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is
not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing
the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new
events and then adding a network configuration with the server
certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will
then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used.
Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following
configuration options:
eap=TTLS PEAP TLS
identity=""
ca_cert="probe://"
Example set of control events for this:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe'
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed
Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.:
ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a"
This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other
TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in
the future.
Undocumented (at least for the time being) TLS parameters can now
be provided in wpa_supplicant configuration to enable some workarounds
for being able to connect insecurely to some networks. phase1 and
phase2 network parameters can use following options:
tls_allow_md5=1
- allow MD5 signature to be used (disabled by default with GnuTLS)
tls_disable_time_checks=1
- ignore certificate expiration time
For now, only the GnuTLS TLS wrapper implements support for these.
This converts tls_connection_handshake(),
tls_connection_server_handshake(), tls_connection_encrypt(), and
tls_connection_decrypt() to use struct wpa_buf to allow higher layer
code to be cleaned up with consistent struct wpabuf use.
The password in User-Password AVP is padded to a multiple of 16 bytes
on EAP-TTLS/PAP. But when the password length is zero, no padding is
added. It doesn't cause connectivity issue. In fact, I could connect
with hostapd RADIUS server with zero length password.
I think it's better for obfuscation to pad the 16 bytes data when the
password length is zero with this patch.
In addition, start ordering header file includes to be in more
consistent order: system header files, src/utils, src/*, same
directory as the *.c file.
This makes it clearer which files are including header from src/common.
Some of these cases should probably be cleaned up in the future not to
do that.
In addition, src/common/nl80211_copy.h and wireless_copy.h were moved
into src/drivers since they are only used by driver wrappers and do not
need to live in src/common.
wpa_supplicant can now reconfigure the AP by acting as an External
Registrar with the wps_reg command. Previously, this was only used
to fetch the current AP settings, but now the wps_reg command has
optional arguments which can be used to provide the new AP
configuration. When the new parameters are set, the WPS protocol run
is allowed to continue through M8 to reconfigure the AP instead of
stopping at M7.
wpa_supplicant can now be built with FIPS capable OpenSSL for FIPS mode
operation. Currently, this is only enabling the FIPS mode in OpenSSL
without providing any higher level enforcement in wpa_supplicant.
Consequently, invalid configuration will fail during the authentication
run. Proper configuration (e.g., WPA2-Enterprise with EAP-TLS) allows
the connection to be completed.
This removes need for local configuration to ignore *.o and *~
and allows the src/*/.gitignore files to be removed (subdirectories
will inherit the rules from the root .gitignore).
This attribute is not supposed to be used in the response frame (i.e.,
it is only in the EAP-Request/SIM-Notification frame) per RFC 4186
chapters 10.1 and 9.9. This is a minor bug since the server is required
to ignore the contents of the EAP-Response/SIM-Notification during
protected result indication per chapter 6.2.
EAP-AKA peer was already following the similar specification in RFC 4187,
but this was somehow missed in the EAP-SIM peer implementation.
hostapd_cli wps_pin command can now have an optional timeout
parameter that sets the PIN lifetime in seconds. This can be used
to reduce the likelihood of someone else using the PIN should an
active PIN be left in the Registrar.
On "eap_tnc_process" function error case, data->in_buf keeps reference
to a local scope variable. For example this will cause segmentation
fault in "eap_tnc_deinit" function "wpabuf_free(data->in_buf)"
statement.
If session resumption fails for any reason, do not try it again because
that is just likely to fail. Instead, drop back to using full
authentication which may work. This is a workaround for servers that do
not like session resumption, but do not know how to fall back to full
authentication properly.
This fixes an issue where two AKA'/Challenge messages are received when
resynchronizing SEQ#. Previously, this used to trigger an authentication
failure since the second Challenge message did not duplicate AT_KDF.
It looks like GnuTLS (at least newer versions) is using random padding
on the application data and the previously used 100 byte extra buffer
for tls_connection_encrypt() calls was not enough to handle all cases.
This resulted in semi-random authentication failures with EAP-PEAP and
EAP-TTLS during Phase 2.
Increase the extra space for encryption from 100 to 300 bytes and add an
error message into tls_gnutls.c to make it easier to notice this issue
should it ever show up again even with the larger buffer.
This adds mostly feature complete external Registrar support with the
main missing part being proper support for multiple external Registrars
working at the same time and processing of concurrent registrations when
using an external Registrar.
This code is based on Sony/Saice implementation
(https://www.saice-wpsnfc.bz/) and the changes made by Ted Merrill
(Atheros) to make it more suitable for hostapd design and embedded
systems. Some of the UPnP code is based on Intel's libupnp. Copyrights
and licensing are explained in src/wps/wps_upnp.c in more detail.
Previous version assumed that the Flags field is always present and
ended up reading one octet past the end of the buffer should the Flags
field be missing. The message length would also be set incorrectly
(size_t)-1 or (size_t)-5, but it looks like reassembly code ended up
failing in malloc before actually using this huge length to read data.
RFC 2716 uses a somewhat unclear description on what exactly is included
in the TLS Ack message ("no data" can refer to either Data field in 4.1
or TLS Data field in 4.2), so in theory, it would be possible for some
implementations to not include Flags field. However,
EAP-{PEAP,TTLS,FAST} need the Flags field in Ack messages, too, for
indicating the used version.
The EAP peer code will now accept the no-Flags case as an Ack message if
EAP workarounds are enabled (which is the default behavior). If
workarounds are disabled, the message without Flags field will be
rejected.
[Bug 292]
We need to be a bit more careful when removing the WPS configuration
block since wpa_s->current_ssid may still be pointing at it. In
addition, registrar pointer in wps_context will need to be cleared
since the context data is now maintained over multiple EAP-WSC runs.
Without this, certain WPS operations could have used freed memory.
Windows Server 2008 NPS gets very confused if the TLS Message Length is
not included in the Phase 1 messages even if fragmentation is not used.
If the TLS Message Length field is not included in ClientHello message,
NPS seems to decide to use the ClientHello data (excluding first six
octets, i.e., EAP header, type, Flags) as the OuterTLVs data in
Cryptobinding Compound_MAC calculation (per PEAPv2; not MS-PEAP)..
Lets add the TLS Message Length to PEAPv0 Phase 1 messages to get rid of
this issue. This seems to fix Cryptobinding issues with NPS and PEAPv0
is now using optional Cryptobinding by default (again) since there are
no known interop issues with it anymore.
Changed peer to derive the full key (both MS-MPPE-Recv-Key and
MS-MPPE-Send-Key for total of 32 octets) to match with server
implementation.
Swapped the order of MPPE keys in MSK derivation since server
MS-MPPE-Recv-Key | MS-MPPE-Send-Key matches with the order specified for
EAP-TLS MSK derivation. This means that PEAPv0 cryptobinding is now
using EAP-MSCHAPv2 MSK as-is for ISK while EAP-FAST will need to swap
the order of the MPPE keys to get ISK in a way that interoperates with
Cisco EAP-FAST implementation.
This allows the same source code file to be shared for both methods. For
now, this is only in eap_aka_prime.c, but eventually, changes in
eap_aka_prime.c are likely to be merged into eap_aka.c at which point
the separate eap_aka_prime.c can be removed.
This is just making an as-is copy of EAP-AKA server and peer
implementation into a new file and by using the different EAP method
type that is allocated for EAP-AKA' (50). None of the other differences
between EAP-AKA and EAP-AKA' are not yet included.
It is likely that once EAP-AKA' implementation is done and is found to
work correctly, large part of the EAP-AKA and EAP-AKA' code will be
shared. However, it is not reasonable to destabilize EAP-AKA
implementation at this point before it is clearer what the final
differences will be.
The wps_context data is now managed at wpa_supplicant, not EAP-WSC. This
makes wpa_supplicant design for WPS match with hostapd one and also
makes it easier configure whatever parameters and callbacks are needed
for WPS.
Previously, wpa_supplicant as Enrollee case was handled using a
different callback function pointer. However, now that the wps_context
structure is allocated for all cases, the same variable can be used in
all cases.
Previously, hardcoded values were used in wps_enrollee.c. These are now
moved into shared data in struct wps_context. In case of
AP/Authenticator, these are initialized in wps_hostapd.c. In case of
client/supplicant, these are now initialized in EAP-WSC peer method,
but will probably end up being moved into higher layer for better
configuration.
EAP-WSC peer method for
The old (i.e., currently used) AP Settings are processed. For now, they
are copied as-is into M8 as new AP Settings to avoid changing
configuration. This should be changed to allow external programs (e.g.,
GUI) to fetch the old AP settings over ctrl_iface and then allow
settings to be changed before sending M8 with the new settings.
This adds WPS support for both hostapd and wpa_supplicant. Both programs
can be configured to act as WPS Enrollee and Registrar. Both PBC and PIN
methods are supported.
Currently, hostapd has more complete configuration option for WPS
parameters and wpa_supplicant configuration style will likely change in
the future. External Registrars are not yet supported in hostapd or
wpa_supplicant. While wpa_supplicant has initial support for acting as
an Registrar to configure an AP, this is still using number of hardcoded
parameters which will need to be made configurable for proper operation.
It looks like [MS-PEAP] 3.2.5.6 points towards this being the expected
behavior (however, that chapter is very confusing).
In addition, remove Cryptobinding TLV from response if the received
Cryptobinding TLV is not valid. Add some more debug messages to the case
where the received Cryptobinding TLV is found invalid.
I fixed the engine issue in phase2 of EAP-TTLS. The problem was that you
only defined one engine variable, which was read already in phase1. I
defined some new variables:
engine2
engine2_id
pin2
and added support to read those in phase2 wheres all the engine
variables without number are only read in phase1. That solved it and I
am now able to use an engine also in EAP-TTLS phase2.
It looks like ACS did not like PAC Acknowledgment TLV before Result TLV, so
reorder the TLVs to match the order shown in a
draft-cam-winget-eap-fast-provisioning-09.txt example. This allows
authenticated provisioning to be terminated with Access-Accept (if ACS has
that option enabled). Previously, provisioning was otherwise successful,
but the server rejected connection due to not understanding the PAC Ack
("Invalid TEAP Data recieved").
Previously, hardcoded identity in the network configuration skipped both
IMSI reading and PIN verification. This broke cases where PIN is needed for
GSM/UMTS authentication. Now, only IMSI reading is skipped if identity is
hardcoded.
This adds all the attributes that are marked as mandatory for SoH in
IF-TNCCS-SOH v1.0. MS-Machine-Inventory does not contain correct data
(i.e., all version fields are just marked as inapplicable) and
MS-MachineName is hardcoded to wpa_supplicant@w1.fi for now.
The change to support fragmentation added extra function to generate the
EAP header, but forgot to remove the original code and ended up getting two
EAP headers and TNC flags field in the generated message. These header
fields need to be added only in the function that builds the final message
(and if necessary, fragments the data).
Even though we try to disable TLS compression, it is possible that this
cannot be done with all TLS libraries. For example, OpenSSL 0.9.8 does not
seem to have a configuration item for disabling all compression (0.9.9 has
such an option). If compression is used, Phase 2 decryption may end up
producing more data than the input buffer due to compressed data. This
shows up especially with EAP-TNC that uses very compressible data format.
As a workaround, increase the decryption buffer length to (orig_len+500)*3.
This is a hack, but at least it handles most cases. TLS compression should
really be disabled for EAP use of TLS, but since this can show up with
common setups, it is better to handle this case.
Process SoH Request in SoH EAP Extension method and reply with SoH TLV. The
contents of SSoH is not yet complete (i.e., some of the required attributes
are still missing). Use of SoH is disabled by default; it can be enabled
with tnc=soh in phase1 parameter for PEAP.
crypto_binding=# in phase1 network parameter can now be used to change the
PEAPv0 cryptobinding behavior (0 = do not use, 1 = optional (default),
2 = required).
The previous version was deriving unnecessarily large amount of output data
for the implicit challenge. With the TLS PRF, this was not causing any
problems because the output length is not explicitly bound into the
derivation. Anyway, it is better to use the correct output length should
the PRF be ever changed to a one that uses the output length to change the
beginning of the output data.
It looks like Microsoft implementation does not match with their
specification as far as PRF+ label usage is concerned.. IPMK|CMK is derived
without null termination on the label, but the label for CSK derivation
must be null terminated.
This allows cryptobinding to be used with PEAPv0 in a way that
interoperates with Windows XP SP3 (RC2) and as such, this functionality is
now enabled as an optional addition to PEAPv0.
