Store PMKSA cache entry in wpas_pasn and remove wpa_sm dependency to add
an entry to PMKSA cache. This is a step towards allowing the PASN
implementation to be used outside the context of wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Use struct wpas_pasn (i.e., &wpa_s->pasn) as the function argument for
the SAE functionality that does not need the full struct wpa_supplicant
context. This is a step towards allowing PASN to be used outside the
context of wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Split wpas_pasn_reset() so that the main reset steps can be used without
an instance of struct wpa_supplicant. This is needed to allow PASN
implementation to be used for additional purposes outside the context of
wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Do not try to use variables that are not defined without
CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y and add the forgotten "inline" for the function
wrapper.
Fixes: 5c65ad6c0b ("PASN: Support PASN with FT key derivation")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Set secure ranging context to the driver for a valid PTKSA entry in the
PTKSA cache, if available. When the driver requests for PASN keys,
wpa_supplicant configures the keys from its cache if the keys for the
peer derived with the same own MAC address are available in the cache
instead of doing the full PASN handshake again.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add an option for an alternative processing of PTKSA life time expiry.
Register a callback in wpa_supplicant to handle the life time expiry of
the keys in PTKSA cache. Send PASN deauthentication when a PTKSA cache
entry expires.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This brings in the functionality to hold multiple peers and perform PASN
authentication with each peer at a time and send the PASN response to
the driver. PASN parameters such as AKMP and cipher suite are obtained
from the BSS information of the cached scan results. Also add
functionality to trigger deauthentication to the peer for which PASN
request with action PASN_ACTION_DELETE_SECURE_RANGING_CONTEXT is
received.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The driver requests PASN authentication for a peer with a specified
source (own) MAC address. Use the specified own MAC address for PASN
operations. This is needed to allow random MAC addresses to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
On successful PASN handshake or 4-way handshake with a peer, PTK is
derived using the local and peer MAC addresses as input. Store the own
MAC address that is used for key derivation in PTKSA cache to maintain
that state over potential MAC addresses changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Use separate capabilities for AP and STA modes for P802.11az security
parameters secure LTF support, secure RTT measurement exchange support,
and protection of range negotiation and measurement management frames
support.
P802.11az security parameters are considered to be supported for both
station and AP modes if the driver sets NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_SECURE_LTF,
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_SECURE_RTT, and
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_PROT_RANGE_NEGO_AND_MEASURE flags. The driver can
advertize capabilities specific to each mode using
QCA_WLAN_VENDOR_FEATURE_SECURE_LTF*,
QCA_WLAN_VENDOR_FEATURE_SECURE_RTT*, and
QCA_WLAN_VENDOR_FEATURE_PROT_RANGE_NEGO_AND_MEASURE* flags.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
force_kdk_derivation is defined within CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS, so need
to use matching condition when accessing it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Simplify the implementation by using shared functions for parsing the
capabilities instead of using various similar but not exactly identical
checks throughout the implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do so for both wpa_supplicant and hostapd. While this was not explicitly
required in IEEE P802.11az/D3.0, likely direction for the draft is to
start requiring use of H2E for all cases where SAE is used with PASN.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When a PTK derivation is done as part of PASN authentication flow, a KDK
derivation should be done if and only if the higher layer protocol is
supported by both parties.
Fix the code accordingly, so KDK would be derived if and only if both
sides support Secure LTF.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Process the received comeback cookie and retry automatically if the AP
allows this. Otherwise, provide the cookie to upper layers to allow a
later attempt with the cookie.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
The new wpa_supplicant control interface command "PASN_DEAUTH
bssid=<BSSID>" can now be used to flush the local PTKSA cache for the
specified BSS and to notify the AP to request it to drop its PTKSA as
well.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
For testing purposes, add support for corrupting the MIC in PASN
Authentication frames for both wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When a public key is included in the PASN Parameters element, it should
be encoded using the RFC 5480 conventions, and thus the first octet of
the Ephemeral Public Key field should indicate whether the public key is
compressed and the actual key part starts from the second octet.
Fix the implementation to properly adhere to the convention
requirements for both wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
These defines are for the capability bit number, not the binary value
from the bit index. As such, need to use BIT() here to set the bitmap
appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
IEEE P802.11az/D2.6 added definitions to include RSNXE in the PASN
negotiation. Implement the new functionality in both wpa_supplicant and
hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Add support for PASN authentication with FT key derivation:
- As IEEE P802.11az/D2.6 states that wrapped data is optional and
is only needed for further validation of the FT security parameters,
do not include them in the first PASN frame.
- PASN with FT key derivation requires knowledge of the PMK-R1 and
PMK-R1-Name for the target AP. As the WPA state machine stores PMK-R1,
etc. only for the currently associated AP, store the mapping of
BSSID to R1KH-ID for each previous association, so the R1KH-ID
could be used to derive PMK-R1 and PMK-R1-Name. Do so instead
of storing the PMK-R1 to avoid maintaining keys that might not
be used.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
As the PASN FILS authentication is only defined for FILS SK without PFS,
and to support PASN authentication with FILS, implement the PASN with
FILS processing as part of the PASN handling and not as part of the WPA
state machine.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Add PASN implementation to wpa_supplicant
1. Add functions to initialize and clear PASN data.
2. Add functions to construct PASN Authentication frames.
3. Add function to process PASN Authentication frame.
4. Add function to handle PASN frame TX status.
5. Implement the station side flow processing for PASN.
The implementation is missing support for wrapped data and PMKSA
establishment for base AKMs, and only supports PASN authentication or
base AKM with PMKSA caching.
The missing parts will be added in later patches.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
