This can be helpful for upper layers to be able to determine whether the
configuration was rejected.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The new SAE AKM suites are defined to use H2E, so ignore the sae_pwe
value when these AKM suites are used similarly to the way H2E gets
enabled when SAE Password Identifiers are used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The new DPP-RELAY-NEEDS-CONTROLLER control interface event can be used
to trigger mDNS discovery of a Controller to see if such a connection
can be established automatically at the time an Enrollee is trying to
initiate an operation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The new control interface commands "DPP_RELAY_ADD_CONTROLLER <IP addr>
<PK hash>" and "DPP_RELAY_REMOVE_CONTROLLER <IP addr>" can now be used
to dynamically add and remove connections to Controllers for the cases
where the connection is initialized through a DPP Public Action frame
(i.e., Controller as the Responder).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Instead of requiring explicit configuration through
dpp_configurator_connectivity=1, advertise Configurator connectivity
automatically if a Relay is configured with a Controller that can
operate as a Responder.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Accept an incoming TCP connection from a Controller in a Relay that is
configured with dpp_relay_port even if that Controller is not configured
with a dpp_controller parameter. This allows more dynamic Controller
initiated operations, e.g., when using mDNS to discover a Relay.
This type of a dynamic Controller entry will not be used for exchanges
that are initiated by an Enrollee (i.e., based on a DPP Public Action
frame received by the Relay).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Verify that the peer does not change its bootstrapping key between the
PKEX exchange and the authentication exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
When PKEX was started through the push button mechanism, the own
bootstrapping key was not bound correctly to the Authentication phase
information and that ended up in incorrectly generating a new
bootstrapping key for the Authentication exchange. Fix this by added the
needed own=<id> parameter into the cached parameters when using push
button.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The peer=<id> information about the specific boostrapping key provided
through PKEX was added for Public Action frame cases, but the TCP
variant did not do same. Add the same information there to maintain
knowledge of the specific peer bootstrapping key from PKEX to
Authentication exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Extend DPP push button support in wpa_supplicant to allow the role of
the Configurator to be used. This provides similar functionality to the
way the DPP_PUSH_BUTTON command in hostapd worked when providing the
configuration parameters with that command (instead of building the
config object based on current AP configuration).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
It is possible for a Controller to receive a copy of its own PKEX
Exchange Request in the case where the Controller is initiating a PKEX
exchange through a Relay. The Configurator role in the device would have
a matching PKEX code in that case and the device might reply as a PKEX
responder which would result in going through the exchange with the
Controller device itself. That is clearly not desired, so recognize this
special case by checking whether the Encrypted Key attribute value
matches a pending locally generated one when processing a received PKEX
Exchange Request.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
We are not supposed to reuse these without being explicitly requested to
perform PKEX again. There is not a strong use case for being able to
provision an Enrollee multiple times with PKEX, so this should have no
issues on the Enrollee. For a Configurator, there might be some use
cases that would benefit from being able to use the same code with
multiple Enrollee devices, e.g., for guess access with a laptop and a
smart phone. That case will now require a new DPP_PKEX_ADD command on
the Configurator after each completion of the provisioning exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add a privacy protecting variant of the peer introduction protocol to
allow the station device to hide its Connector from 3rd parties. The new
wpa_supplicant network profile parameter dpp_connector_privacy=1 can be
used to select this alternative mechanism to the peer introduction
protocol added in the initial release of DPP.
It should be noted that the new variant does not work with older DPP APs
(i.e., requires support for release 3). As such, this new variant is
disabled by default.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This allows the DPP Configuration Request Object from an Enrollee to be
extended with 3rd party information. The new dpp_extra_conf_req_name and
dpp_extra_conf_req_value configuration parameters specify the name of
the added JSON node and its contents. For example:
dpp_extra_conf_req_name=org.example
dpp_extra_conf_req_value={"a":1,"b":"test"}
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This extends Relay functionality to allow a Controller to intitiate a
new DPP exchange in addition to the previously supported case where the
exchange was initiated through a DPP Public Action frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
While the most likely production use case for DPP push button is to
provision the AP's current configuration, there might be some use cases
for providing different configuration. Add possibility for doing this by
extending the DPP_PUSH_BUTTON command to accept an optional set of
parameters similarly to the other DPP commands for the Configurator.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add support to use a push button -based bootstrap mechanism with DPP.
The new DPP_PUSH_BUTTON control interface command enables this mode on
the AP/hostapd and station/wpa_supplicant. This goes through the
following sequence of events: a suitable peer in active push button mode
is discovered with session overlap detection, PKEX is executed with
bootstrap key hash validation, DPP authentication and configuration
exchanges are performed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Move most of CHANWIDTH_* definitions from ieee80211_defs.h to defs.h as
the definitions are getting used mostly for internal purpose only. Also
change prefix of the definitions to CONF_OPER_CHWIDTH_* and update in
all the files accordingly.
Leave the couple of VHT-specific exceptions to use the old defines (the
reason why they were originally added as VHT values), to avoid use of
clearly marked configuration values in information elements. In
addition, use the defines instead of magic values where appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Aleti Nageshwar Reddy <quic_anageshw@quicinc.com>
Skip the x_snoop_deinit() operations if hostapd did not actually
configure the parameters in the first place. While clearing these
specific parameters is unlikely to change how they were set outside the
scope of hostapd, it is better to leave them as-is to avoid surprises if
hostapd was not configured to use ProxyARP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
tcp_addr=from-uri can now be used as a special case for initiating
DPP-over-TCP to the destination indicated in the peer bootstrapping URI.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Only use the bandwidth bits that are applicable for the current
operating band. This avoids use of reserved bits when determining the
length of the Support EHT-MCS And NSS Set field length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 is ambiguous on how the Secure bit is set in
EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in the case where 4-way handshake is use to
rekey the PTK. 12.7.2 describes this with "set to 1 once the initial key
exchange is complete" while 12.7.6 shows EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 using
Secure=0 without any consideration on whether the handshake is for
rekeying.
TGme seems to be moving towards clarifying this to use Secure=1 based on
there being a shared PTKSA between the Authenticator and the Supplicant.
In other words, this would use Secure=1 in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in
the case of rekeying. Change implementation to match that. This bit was
already practically ignored on the reception side, so this should not
have impact on actual functionality beyond this one bit changing its
value in the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Avoid the somewhat confusing mechanism of determining the bitfield index
from the assigned IP address to make this easier for static analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Limit the GAS comeback delay to 60000 TUs, i.e., about 60 seconds. This
is mostly to silence static analyzers that complain about unbounded
value from external sources even though this is clearly bounded by being
a 16-bit value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
BIT(r) is not sufficient here since it does not cover 64 bit values.
Write this out with 1ULL to be large enough for the shift operation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like fst_wpa_obj::get_hw_modes would have been left
uninitialized in hostapd. It is not obviously clear why this would not
have caused issues earlier, but in any case, better make this set
properly to allow unexpected behavior should that function pointer ever
be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Without this, hostapd generates Probe Response frames with the null
destination address when hostapd enables unsolicited Probe Response
frame transmission. Fix this to use the broadcast address instead.
Fixes: 024b4b2a29 ("AP: Unsolicited broadcast Probe Response configuration")
Signed-off-by: MeiChia Chiu <meichia.chiu@mediatek.com>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAPOL-Start and
EAPOL-Logoff are potential candidate for such attacks since those frames
could be used to terminate an authentication or initiate a new EAP
authentication. Such an attack could result in the station ending up
disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state
with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-Start/Logoff/EAP frames on the AP/Authenticator when it is
known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is
enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that
does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force
disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all
drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL
frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate
whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This information was already available from the nl80211 control port RX
path, but it was not provided to upper layers within wpa_supplicant and
hostapd. It can be helpful, so parse the information from the driver
event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
sm->pairwise_set needs to be set whenever the TK has been configured to
the driver to request following EAPOL frames to be encrypted (or more
specifically, not to request them to not be encrypted). The FILS case
missed this setting and that could result in rekeying or
reauthentication in an associated started with FILS not working
correctly.
Fixes: da24c5aa1c ("FILS: Set TK after association (AP)")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_validate_wpa_ie() might update sm->* values, so it should not be
allowed for an existing STA entry if that STA has negotiated MFP to be
used for the association. Fix this by first checking whether an SA Query
procedure needs to be initiated. In particular, this prevents a
potential bypass of the disconnection protection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The driver can consider EHT specific parameters such as the puncture
pattern for ACS when this flag attribute is indicated by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Do not consider optional octets maximum lengths when validating EHT
fixed fields length. Furthermore, do not use the first two octets of the
PPE Thresholds field without explicitly confirming that these octets
were included in the element and fix PPE Thresholds field length
calculation.
Fixes: a6d1b4c46c ("EHT: Process (Re)Association Request frame capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
enum macaddr_acl is forward declared in wpa_supplicant/ap.h.
c++ compiler doesn't allow forward declaration. So to fix the
compilation error, moved the enum macaddr_acl declaration out
of struct hostapd_bss_config.
Signed-off-by: Sunil Ravi <sunilravi@google.com>
Add a notification message to indicate reason for TLS handshake failure
due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
pbkdf2_sha1() may return errors and this should be checked in calls.
This is especially an issue with FIPS builds because the FIPS
requirement is that the password must be at least 14 characters.
Signed-off-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz <juliusz@wolfssl.com>
Add support for IMSI privacy in the EAP-SIM/AKA server implementation.
If the new hostapd configuration parameter imsi_privacy_key is used to
specify an RSA private key, that key will be used to decrypt encrypted
permanent identity.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Modify hostapd_set_freq_params() to include EHT parameters and update
the calling functions to match.
Signed-off-by: Muna Sinada <quic_msinada@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <quic_alokad@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com>
Set bit 21 in the neighbor report for an EHT AP as described in IEEE
P802.11be/D1.5, 9.4.2.36. Also move the check for HE outside the check
for HT as neither HT nor VHT are enabled in the 6 GHz band.
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <quic_alokad@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com>
Add support for EHT capabilities in the addition of a new station entry
to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <quic_alokad@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com>
Parse EHT capabilities sent by a non-AP STA in (Re)Association Request
frames. Validate the length of the element, matching MCS rates between
AP TX and STA RX. Store the capabilities in the station info structure.
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <quic_alokad@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com>
Add EHT Operation element in Beacon, Probe Response, and (Re)Association
Response frames using the format described in IEEE P802.11be/D1.5,
9.4.2.311.
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <quic_alokad@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Muna Sinada <quic_msinada@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com>
