Enable use of FT RRB without configuring each other AP locally. Instead,
broadcast messages are exchanged to discover APs within the local
network.
When an R0KH or R1KH is discovered, it is cached for one day.
When a station uses an invalid or offline r0kh_id, requests are always
broadcast. In order to avoid this, if r0kh does not reply, a temporary
blacklist entry is added to r0kh_list.
To avoid blocking a valid r0kh when a non-existing pmk_r0_name is
requested, r0kh is required to always reply using a NAK. Resend requests
a few times to ensure blacklisting does not happen due to small packet
loss.
To free newly created stations later, the r*kh_list start pointer in
conf needs to be updateable from wpa_auth_ft.c, where only wconf is
accessed.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
This adds a counter and adds sequence numbering to FT RRB packets. The
sequence number is checked against r0kh/r1kh sequence number cache.
Special attention is needed in case the remote AP reboots and thus loses
its state. I prefer it to recover automatically even without synchronized
clocks. Therefore an identifier called dom is generated randomly along the
initial sequence number. If the dom transmitted does not match or the
sequence number is not in the range currently expected, the sender is asked
for a fresh confirmation of its currently used sequence numbers. The packet
that triggered this is cached and processed again later.
Additionally, in order to ensure freshness, the remote AP includes an
timestamp with its messages. It is then verified that the received
messages are indeed fresh by comparing it to the older timestamps
received and the time elapsed since then. Therefore FT_RRB_TIMESTAMP is
no longer needed.
This assigns new OUI 00:13:74 vendor-specific subtype 0x0001 subtypes:
4 (SEQ_REQ) and 5 (SEQ_RESP).
This breaks backward compatibility, i.e., hostapd needs to be updated
on all APs at the same time to allow FT to remain functional.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Convert FT RRB into a new TLV based format. Use AES-SIV as AEAD cipher
to protect the messages.
This needs at least 32 byte long keys. These can be provided either
by a config file change or letting a KDF derive the 32 byte key used
from the 16 byte key given.
This breaks backward compatibility, i.e., hostapd needs to be updated on
all APs at the same time to allow FT to remain functional.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
The struct wpa_stsl_negotiation seemed to have been for some kind of
tracking of state of PeerKey negotiations within hostapd. However,
nothing is actually adding any entries to wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations or
using this state. Since PeerKey does not look like something that would
be deployed in practice, there is no justification to spend time on
making this any more complete. Remove the dead code now instead of
trying to figure out what it might be used for.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_group_update_count and wpa_pairwise_update_count can now be used to
set the GTK and PTK rekey retry limits (dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
and dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount). Defaults set to current
hardcoded value (4).
Some stations may suffer from frequent deauthentications due to GTK
rekey failures: EAPOL 1/2 frame is not answered during the total timeout
period of currently ~3.5 seconds. For example, a Galaxy S6 with Android
6.0.1 appears to go into power save mode for up to 5 seconds. Increasing
wpa_group_update_count to 6 fixed this issue.
Signed-off-by: Günther Kelleter <guenther.kelleter@devolo.de>
Instead of copying the struct wpa_auth_callbacks, just keep a pointer to
it, keep the context pointer separate, and let the user just provide a
static const structure. This reduces the attack surface of heap
overwrites, since the function pointers move elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Previously, CONFIG_IEEE80211R enabled build that supports FT for both
station mode and AP mode. However, in most wpa_supplicant cases only
station mode FT is required and there is no need for AP mode FT.
Add support to differentiate between station mode FT and AP mode FT in
wpa_supplicant builds by adding CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP that should be used
when AP mode FT support is required in addition to station mode FT. This
allows binary size to be reduced for builds that require only the
station side FT functionality.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
This implements processing of FILS Authentication frame for FILS shared
key authentication with ERP and PMKSA caching.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the PTK length increasing, the length of the PMK was
increased (from 256 to 384 bits) for the 00-0f-ac:12 AKM. This part was
missing from the initial implementation and a fixed length (256-bit) PMK
was used for all AKMs.
Fix this by adding more complete support for variable length PMK and use
384 bits from MSK instead of 256 bits when using this AKM. This is not
backwards compatible with the earlier implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This ensures that group key is set as long as the interface exists.
Additionally, ifconfig_up is needed as wpa_group will enter
FATAL_FAILURE if the interface is still down. Also vlan_remove_dynamic()
is moved after wpa_auth_sta_deinit() so vlan_remove_dynamic() can check
it was the last user of the wpa_group.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Previously, struct wpa_group was created when the first station enters
the group and the struct wpa_group was not freed when all station left
the group. This causes a problem because wpa_group will enter
FATAL_FAILURE when a wpa_group is running while the AP_VLAN interface
has already been removed.
Fix this by adding a reference counter to struct wpa_group and free a
group if it is unused.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the earlier PeerKey station side design to be used on the
AP side as well by passing pointer and already validated length from the
caller rather than parsing the length again from the frame buffer. This
avoids false warnings from static analyzer (CID 62870, CID 62871,
CID 62872).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the 4-way handshake ends up having to retransmit the EAPOL-Key
message 1/4 due to a timeout on waiting for the response, it is possible
for the Supplicant to change SNonce between the first and second
EAPOL-Key message 2/4. This is not really desirable due to extra
complexities it causes on the Authenticator side, but some deployed
stations are doing this.
This message sequence looks like this:
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 1/4 (replay counter 1, ANonce)
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 1/4 (replay counter 2, ANonce)
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 2/4 (replay counter 1, SNonce 1)
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 3/4 (replay counter 3, ANonce)
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 2/4 (replay counter 2, SNonce 2)
followed by either:
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 4/4 (replay counter 3 using PTK from SNonce 1)
or:
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 3/4 (replay counter 4, ANonce)
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 4/4 (replay counter 4, using PTK from SNonce 2)
Previously, Authenticator implementation was able to handle the cases
where SNonce 1 and SNonce 2 were identifical (i.e., Supplicant did not
update SNonce which is the wpa_supplicant behavior) and where PTK
derived using SNonce 2 was used in EAPOL-Key 4/4. However, the case of
using PTK from SNonce 1 was rejected ("WPA: received EAPOL-Key 4/4
Pairwise with unexpected replay counter" since EAPOL-Key 3/4 TX and
following second EAPOL-Key 2/4 invalidated the Replay Counter that was
used previously with the first SNonce).
This commit extends the AP/Authenticator workaround to keep both SNonce
values in memory if two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages are received with
different SNonce values. The following EAPOL-Key 4/4 message is then
accepted whether the MIC has been calculated with the latest SNonce (the
previously existing behavior) or with the earlier SNonce (the new
extension). This makes 4-way handshake more robust with stations that
update SNonce for each transmitted EAPOL-Key 2/4 message in cases where
EAPOL-Key message 1/4 needs to be retransmitted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If the PMK-R1 needs to be pulled for the R0KH, the previous
implementation ended up rejecting the over-the-air authentication and
over-the-DS action frame unnecessarily while waiting for the RRB
response. Improve this by postponing the Authentication/Action frame
response until the pull response is received.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows hostapd to set a different management group cipher than the
previously hardcoded default BIP (AES-128-CMAC). The new configuration
file parameter group_mgmt_cipher can be set to BIP-GMAC-128,
BIP-GMAC-256, or BIP-CMAC-256 to select one of the ciphers defined in
IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This new mechanism allows P2P Client to request an IPv4 address from the
GO as part of the 4-way handshake to avoid use of DHCP exchange after
4-way handshake. If the new mechanism is used, the assigned IP address
is shown in the P2P-GROUP-STARTED event on the client side with
following new parameters: ip_addr, ip_mask, go_ip_addr. The assigned IP
address is included in the AP-STA-CONNECTED event on the GO side as a
new ip_addr parameter. The IP address is valid for the duration of the
association.
The IP address pool for this new mechanism is configured as global
wpa_supplicant configuration file parameters ip_addr_go, ip_addr_mask,
ip_addr_star, ip_addr_end. For example:
ip_addr_go=192.168.42.1
ip_addr_mask=255.255.255.0
ip_addr_start=192.168.42.2
ip_addr_end=192.168.42.100
DHCP mechanism is expected to be enabled at the same time to support P2P
Devices that do not use the new mechanism. The easiest way of managing
the IP addresses is by splitting the IP address range into two parts and
assign a separate range for wpa_supplicant and DHCP server.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If configuration of the group key to the driver fails, move the WPA
group into failed state and indication group setup error to avoid cases
where AP could look like it is working even through the keys are not set
correctly.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to implement per-device PSK selection based on the
peer's P2P Device Address instead of P2P Interface Address.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Replace CONFIG_IEEE80211V with CONFIG_WNM to get more consistent build
options for WNM-Sleep Mode operations. Previously it was possible to
define CONFIG_IEEE80211V without CONFIG_WNM which would break the build.
In addition, IEEE 802.11v has been merged into IEEE Std 802.11-2012 and
WNM is a better term to use for this new functionality anyway.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP WZC) update SNonce for
each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated even if we have
already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
While the issue was made less likely to occur when the retransmit
timeout for the initial EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 was increased to 1000 ms,
this fixes the problem even if that timeout is not long enough.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This is a workaround for Windows 7 supplicant rejecting WPA msg 3/4
in case it used Secure=1 in msg 2/4. This can happen, e.g., when
rekeying PTK after EAPOL-Key Error Request (Michael MIC failure)
from the supplicant.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some deployed supplicants update their SNonce for every receive
EAPOL-Key message 1/4 even when these messages happen during the
same 4-way handshake. Furthermore, some of these supplicants fail
to use the first SNonce that they sent and derive an incorrect PTK
using another SNonce that does not match with what the authenticator
is using from the first received message 2/4. This results in
failed 4-way handshake whenever the EAPOL-Key 1/4 retransmission
timeout is reached. The timeout for the first retry is fixed to
100 ms in the IEEE 802.11 standard and that seems to be short
enough to make it difficult for some stations to get the response
out before retransmission.
Work around this issue by increasing the initial EAPOL-Key 1/4
timeout by 1000 ms (i.e., total timeout of 1100 ms) if the station
acknowledges reception of the EAPOL-Key frame. If the driver does
not indicate TX status for EAPOL frames, use longer initial
timeout (1000 ms) unconditionally.
On Linux, verify that the kernel entropy pool is capable of providing
strong random data before allowing WPA/WPA2 connection to be
established. If 20 bytes of data cannot be read from /dev/random,
force first two 4-way handshakes to fail while collecting entropy
into the internal pool in hostapd. After that, give up on /dev/random
and allow the AP to function based on the combination of /dev/urandom
and whatever data has been collected into the internal entropy pool.
This adds more time for the system entropy pool to be filled before
requesting random data for generating the WPA/WPA2 encryption keys.
This can be helpful especially on embedded devices that do not have
hardware random number generator and may lack good sources of
randomness especially early in the bootup sequence when hostapd is
likely to be started.
GMK and Key Counter are still initialized once in the beginning to
match the RSN Authenticator state machine behavior and to make sure
that the driver does not transmit broadcast frames unencrypted.
However, both GMK (and GTK derived from it) and Key Counter will be
re-initialized when the first station connects and is about to
enter 4-way handshake.
IEEE Std 802.11r-2008, 11A.4.2 describes FT initial mobility domain
association in an RSN to include PMKR1Name in the PMKID-List field
in RSN IE in messages 2/4 and 3/4. This makes the RSN IE not be
bitwise identical with the values used in Beacon, Probe Response,
(Re)association Request frames.
The previous versions of wpa_supplicant and hostapd did not add the
PMKR1Name value in EAPOL-Key frame and did not accept it if added
(due to bitwise comparison of RSN IEs). This commit fixes the
implementation to be compliant with the standard by adding the
PMKR1Name value into EAPOL-Key messages during FT 4-Way Handshake and
by verifying that the received value matches with the value derived
locally.
This breaks interoperability with previous wpa_supplicant/hostapd
versions.
It turns out that this is needed for both FT-over-DS and FT-over-air
when using mac80211, so it looks easiest to just unconditionally
re-configure the keys after reassociation when FT is used.
This seems to be needed at least with mac80211 when a STA is using
FT-over-DS to reassociate back to the AP when the AP still has the
previous association state.
Must update sm->pairwise when fetching PMK-R1 SA.
Add a workaround for drivers that cannot set keys before association
(e.g., cfg80211/mac80211): retry PTK configuration after association.
This code can be shared by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant and this
is an initial step in getting the generic code moved to be under the
src directories. Couple of generic files still remain under the
hostapd directory due to direct dependencies to files there. Once the
dependencies have been removed, they will also be moved to the src/ap
directory to allow wpa_supplicant to be built without requiring anything
from the hostapd directory.
