The internal flag prot_success_received was not cleared between the
sessions and that resulted in the resumed session not mandating the
protected success indication to be received. Fix this by clearing the
internal flag so that the EAP-TLS handshake using session resumption
with TLS 1.3 takes care of the required check before marking the
authentication successfully completed. This will make the EAP-TLS peer
reject an EAP-Success message should it be received without the
protected success indication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
RFC 9190 requires protected result indication to be used with TLSv1.3,
so do not allow EAP-TLS to complete successfully if the server does not
send that indication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
While the drafts for RFC 9190 used a separate Commitment Message term,
that term was removed from the published RFC. Update the debug prints to
match that final language.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The previously used references were pointing to an obsoleted RFC and
draft versions. Replace these with current versions.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Recognize the explicitly defined Commitment Message per
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13 at the conclusion of the EAP-TLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
This allows EAP-TLS to be used within an EAP-TEAP tunnel when there is
an explicit request for machine credentials. The network profile
parameters are otherwise same as the Phase 1 parameters, but each one
uses a "machine_" prefix for the parameter name.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These parameters for certificate authentication are identical for the
Phase 1 (EAP-TLS alone) and Phase 2 (EAP-TLS inside a TLS tunnel).
Furthermore, yet another copy would be needed to support separate
machine credential in Phase 2. Clean this up by moving the shared
parameters into a separate data struct that can then be used for each
need without having to define separate struct members for each use.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 uses an empty application data record from the
server to indicate end of the exchange, so EAP-TLS peer will need to
check for this special case and finish the exchange with an empty
EAP-TLS (ACK) so that the server can send out EAP-Success.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow an additional context value to be passed to TLS exporter as
specified in RFC 5705 section 4.
This does not yet implement it for the internal TLS implementation.
However, as currently nothing uses context yet, this will not break
anything right now. WolfSSL maintainers also stated that they are not
going to add context support yet, but would look into it if/when this is
required by a published draft or a standard.
Signed-off-by: Ervin Oro <ervin.oro@aalto.fi>
The label strings used for deriving Key_Material with TLS v1.3 were
changed, so update the implementation to match the new values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EAP session cannot be marked fully completed on sending Client
Finished with TLS v1.3 since the server may still send NewSessionTicket
before EAP-Success.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
With TLS v1.3, the Finished message from the client can require
fragmentation. Postpone key derivation and marking of the EAP session
fully completed until all the fragments of that last message are sent to
avoid losing all the subsequent fragments.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This leads to cleaner code overall, and also reduces the size
of the hostapd and wpa_supplicant binaries (in hwsim test build
on x86_64) by about 2.5 and 3.5KiB respectively.
The mechanical conversions all over the code were done with
the following spatch:
@@
expression SIZE, SRC;
expression a;
@@
-a = os_malloc(SIZE);
+a = os_memdup(SRC, SIZE);
<...
if (!a) {...}
...>
-os_memcpy(a, SRC, SIZE);
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Free the allocated structure in error cases to remove need for each EAP
method to handle the error cases separately. Each registration function
can simply do "return eap_peer_method_register(eap);" in the end of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The only time the PIN should fail is when we initialize the TLS
connection, so it doesn't really make sense to get rid of the PIN just
because some other part of the handshake failed.
This is a followup to commit fd4fb28179
('OpenSSL: Try to ensure we don't throw away the PIN unnecessarily').
Signed-off-by: Mike Gerow <gerow@google.com>
The EAP-TLS-based helper functions can easily use struct wpabuf in more
places, so continue cleanup in that direction by replacing separate
pointer and length arguments with a single struct wpabuf argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds a new getSessionId() callback for EAP peer methods to allow
EAP Session-Id to be derived. This commits implements this for EAP-FAST,
EAP-GPSK, EAP-IKEv2, EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, and EAP-TTLS.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This EAP type uses a vendor specific expanded EAP header to encapsulate
EAP-TLS with a configuration where the EAP server does not authenticate
the EAP peer. In other words, this method includes only server
authentication. The peer is configured with only the ca_cert parameter
(similarly to other TLS-based EAP methods). This method can be used for
cases where the network provides free access to anyone, but use of RSN
with a securely derived unique PMK for each station is desired.
The expanded EAP header uses the hostapd/wpa_supplicant vendor
code 39068 and vendor type 1 to identify the UNAUTH-TLS method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some deployed authentication servers seem to be unable to handle the TLS
Session Ticket extension (they are supposed to ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions, but end up rejecting the ClientHello instead). As a
workaround, disable use of TLS Sesson Ticket extension for EAP-TLS,
EAP-PEAP, and EAP-TTLS (EAP-FAST uses session ticket, so any server that
supports EAP-FAST does not need this workaround).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
OpenSSL wrapper was using the same certificate store for both Phase 1
and Phase 2 TLS exchange in case of EAP-PEAP/TLS, EAP-TTLS/TLS, and
EAP-FAST/TLS. This would be fine if the same CA certificates were used
in both phases, but does not work properly if different CA certificates
are used. Enforce full separation of TLS state between the phases by
using a separate TLS library context in EAP peer implementation.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In addition, start ordering header file includes to be in more
consistent order: system header files, src/utils, src/*, same
directory as the *.c file.
I fixed the engine issue in phase2 of EAP-TTLS. The problem was that you
only defined one engine variable, which was read already in phase1. I
defined some new variables:
engine2
engine2_id
pin2
and added support to read those in phase2 wheres all the engine
variables without number are only read in phase1. That solved it and I
am now able to use an engine also in EAP-TTLS phase2.
