As a preparation to use AP MLD address and non-AP MLD address
in the RSN Authenticator state machine, add utility functions to
get the current AA and SPA.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
This function is not used outside wpa_auth.c and it is not mentioned in
any header file either, so it should have been marked static.
Fixes: f2f8e4f458 ("Add PTKSA cache to hostapd")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
FT AP was silently ignoring EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 due to Key MIC mismatch
when the STA advertises support for Secure LTF and derives the KDK while
the AP implementation did not derive KDK.
Fix this to include KDK while deriving PTK for FT cases on the AP.
Signed-off-by: Shiva Sankar Gajula <quic_sgajula@quicinc.com>
hostapd was previously storing the derived PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 as soon as
these keys were derived. While that is fine for most purposes, it is
unnecessary to do that so quickly and if anything were to fail before
the supplicant is able to return a valid EAPOL-Key msg 2/4, there would
not really be any real use for the derived keys.
For the special case of FT-PSK and VLAN determination based on the
wpa_psk file, the VLAN information is set in the per-STA data structures
only after the EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 MIC has been verified. This ended up
storing the PMK-R0/PMK-R1 entries without correct VLAN assignment and as
such, any use of the FT protocol would not be able to transfer the VLAN
information through RRB.
Split local storing of the FT key hierarchy for the cases using the FT
4-way handshake so that PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 are first derived and then
stored as a separate step after having verified the MIC in the EAPOL-Key
msg 2/4 (i.e., after having confirmed the per-STA passphrase/PSK was
selected) and VLAN update. This fixes VLAN information for the
wpa_psk_file cases with FT-PSK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add a testing option to delay EAPOL-Key messages 1/4 and 3/4. By setting
delay_eapol_tx=1, the actual EAPOL Tx will occur on the last possible
attempt (wpa_pairwise_update_count) thus all previous attempts will fail
on timeout which is the wanted delay.
In addition, add an hwsim test that uses this testing option to verify
that non protected Robust Action frames are dropped prior to keys
installation in MFP.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gabay <daniel.gabay@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Just like with WPA-PSK and keyids it may be desired to identify
connecting clients to provide additional network filtering.
This does:
- extend DPP_EVENT_AUTH_SUCCESS to expose public
key hash of the peer so the system can pick it
up and use for identification later
- store public key hash in PMKSA from DPP Network
Intro for later use
- extend sta mib to print out the dpp_pkhash
from PMKSA if present
- extend AP_STA_CONNECTED to include the
dpp_pkhash from PMKSA if present
Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal@plume.com>
CONFIG_NO_RC4=y could have been used to remove this functionality, but
it might as well be done automatically based on CONFIG_FIPS=y as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes hostapd use the struct defines from pasn_common.h so that the
same struct is shared with wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
AES-WRAP(KEK) protection of the Key Data field did not include all the
details in the log. Extend that to cover the details that were already
present for the AES-SIV case to make the debug log more useful for
analyzing issues in this area. Furthermore, print the full EAPOL-Key
frame in the log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Provide key length instead of SHA384/SHA256 selection to the helper
function so that the new SHA512 option can be covered for
FT-SAE-EXT-KEY.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Provide enough information to allow the FTE to be built using the
correct MIC field length based on the used AKM and key length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
After the secure association and PTK derivation are completed, if the
device supports LTF keyseed, generate the LTF keyseed using KDK and set
the ranging context to the driver by using the command
QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_SECURE_RANGING_CONTEXT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
IEEE Std 802.11-2020 is ambiguous on how the Secure bit is set in
EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in the case where 4-way handshake is use to
rekey the PTK. 12.7.2 describes this with "set to 1 once the initial key
exchange is complete" while 12.7.6 shows EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 using
Secure=0 without any consideration on whether the handshake is for
rekeying.
TGme seems to be moving towards clarifying this to use Secure=1 based on
there being a shared PTKSA between the Authenticator and the Supplicant.
In other words, this would use Secure=1 in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4 in
the case of rekeying. Change implementation to match that. This bit was
already practically ignored on the reception side, so this should not
have impact on actual functionality beyond this one bit changing its
value in the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Avoid the somewhat confusing mechanism of determining the bitfield index
from the assigned IP address to make this easier for static analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
sm->pairwise_set needs to be set whenever the TK has been configured to
the driver to request following EAPOL frames to be encrypted (or more
specifically, not to request them to not be encrypted). The FILS case
missed this setting and that could result in rekeying or
reauthentication in an associated started with FILS not working
correctly.
Fixes: da24c5aa1c ("FILS: Set TK after association (AP)")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It could have been possible to get into an endless loop of retried EAP
authentication followed by failing or not completed 4-way handshake if
there was a different interpretation of EAP authentication result
(success on AP, failure on STA). Avoid this by limiting the number of
consecutive EAPOL reauth attempts without completing the following 4-way
handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add an alternative sequence for performing the RADIUS ACL check and PSK
fetch. The previously used (macaddr_acl=2, wpa_psk_radius=2) combination
does this during IEEE 802.11 Authentication frame exchange while the new
option (wpa_psk_radius=3) does this during the 4-way handshake. This
allows some more information to be provided to the RADIUS authentication
server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Unlike the other keys that were cleared here, the PMK is available
without FT support built into hostapd and as such, should be cleared in
all cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
This makes it easier for test scripts to track completion of 4-way
handshake from hostapd, e.g., when going through PTK rekeying.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
"REKEY_PTK <STA MAC address>" can now be used to force rekeying of the
PTK for the specified associated STA.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Do not start yet another rekeying of GTK when receiving an EAPOL-Key
request frame at the point when the GTK is already being rekeyed. This
fixes issues where the AP might end up configuring a different GTK than
the one it sends to the associated stations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Simplify the implementation by using shared functions for parsing the
capabilities instead of using various similar but not exactly identical
checks throughout the implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previous debug print used IGTK instead of BIGTK, so fix that to use the
correct key. Actual generation of the BIGTK subelement itself was using
the correct key, though, so this is only needed to fix the debug print.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function can get called with hapd->wpa_auth == NULL from the
control interface handler, so explicitly check for that.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When the AP advertised RSNE, RSNXE, and WPA IE, hostapd incorrectly
removed the RSNE in the EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 if the STA associates with
WPA, leaving only RSNXE instead of WPA IE. WPA STA fails to connect to
such AP as the WPA IE is missing.
Since RSNXE is not really used in non-RSN connection, just remove it
here with RSNE.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Derive the KDK as part of PMK to PTK derivation if forced by
configuration or in case both the local AP and the peer station declare
support for secure LTF.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Extend the fils_pmk_to_ptk() to also derive Key Derivation
Key (KDK) which can later be used for secure LTF measurements.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Extend the wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk() to also derive Key Derivation
Key (KDK), which can later be used for secure LTF measurements.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Extend the wpa_pmk_to_ptk() to also derive Key Derivation
Key (KDK), which can later be used for secure LTF measurements.
Update the wpa_supplicant and hostapd configuration and the
corresponding WPA and WPA Auth state machine, to allow enabling of KDK
derivation. For now, use a testing parameter to control whether KDK is
derived.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When SAE is used, the local pointer pmk may point to sm->PMK. Skip the
memcpy operation in such a case since it is not really needed and use of
overlapping memory buffers is undefined behavior for memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Some legacy stations copy previously reserved RSN capability bits,
including OCVC, in (Re)Association Request frames from the AP's RSNE but
do not indicate MFP capability and/or do not send OCI in RSN handshakes.
This is causing connection failures with such erroneous STAs.
To improve interoperability with such legacy STAs allow a workaround OCV
mode to be enabled to ignore OCVC=1 from the STA if it does not follow
OCV requirements in the first protected exchange. This covers cases
where a STA claims to have OCV capability, but it does not negotiate use
of management frame protection or does not include OCI in EAPOL Key msg
2/4, FT Reassociation Request frame, or FILS (Re)Association Reqest.
The previous behavior with ocv=1 is maintained, i.e., misbehaving STAs
are not allowed to connect. When the new workaround mode is enabled with
ocv=2, the AP considers STA as OCV capable on below criteria
- STA indicates both OCV and MFP capability
- STA sends OCI during connection attempt in a protected frame
Enabling this workaround mode reduced OCV protection to some extend
since it allows misbehavior to go through. As such, this should be
enabled only if interoperability with misbehaving STAs is needed.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <vjakkam@codeaurora.org>
Enhance the return values of ocv_verify_tx_params with enum to indicate
different OCI verification failures to caller.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <vjakkam@codeaurora.org>
This is mainly for testing purposes to allow more convenient checking of
station behavior when a transition mode is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add hostapd configuration parameters oci_freq_override_* to allow the
OCI channel information to be overridden for various frames for testing
purposes. This can be set in the configuration and also updated during
the runtime of a BSS.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
OSEN STAs are not authenticated, so do not send the actual BIGTK for
them so that they cannot generate forged protected Beacon frames. This
means that OSEN STAs cannot enable beacon protection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Do not include the actual GTK/IGTK value in WNM Sleep Mode Response
frame if WNM Sleep Mode is used in OSEN or in a network where use of GTK
is disabled. This was already the case for the EAPOL-Key cases of
providing GTK/IGTK, but the WNM Sleep Mode exit case was missed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add the OCV-FAILURE control interface event to notify upper layers of
OCV validation issues in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 and group 2/2.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Make reporting of OCV validation failure reasons more flexible by
removing the fixed prefix from ocv_verify_tx_params() output in
ocv_errorstr so that the caller can use whatever prefix or encapsulation
that is most appropriate for each case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
"SET dpp_version_override <ver>" can now be used to request
wpa_supplicant and hostapd to support a subset of DPP versions. In
practice, the only valid case for now is to fall back from DPP version 2
support to version 1 in builds that include CONFIG_DPP2=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Do not allow association to continue if the local configuration enables
PFS and the station indicates it supports PFS, but PFS was not
negotiated for the association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
