Add the ability to ignore time-based CRL errors from OpenSSL by
specifying a new configuration parameter, check_crl_strict=0.
This causes the following:
- This setting does nothing when CRL checking is not enabled.
- When CRL is enabled, "strict mode" will cause CRL time errors to not
be ignored and will continue behaving as it currently does.
- When CRL is enabled, disabling strict mode will cause CRL time
errors to be ignored and will allow connections.
By default, check_crl_strict is set to 1, or strict mode, to keep
current functionality.
Signed-off-by: Sam Voss <sam.voss@rockwellcollins.com>
Old code would just re-connect to a particular interface, even if user
had started wpa_cli with the '-g' option. Refactor global control
interface connection routine to allow it to be used in
wpa_cli_reconnect().
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Build configurations with CONFIG_TLS=internal and NEED_SHA512 failed due
to missing sha512.c file. Add that file even though this is not really
used in the currently available configuration combinations since DPP and
OWE are the only users of it and the internal crypto implementation
supports neither.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW is enabled but CONFIG_AP is
disabled the build fails. This is because dbus getters try to
access ap_iface member of wpa_supplicant struct which is defined
if and only if CONFIG_AP is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
One of the reset_participant_mi() callers did not log the error. Make
this more consistent with the other callers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
One of the linux_br_del_if() calls did not log nl80211-specific entry.
Make this more consistent with the other cases even though
linux_br_add_if() function itself is logging an error in the ioctl()
failure case (but not in the interface not found case).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it possible to use ECDSA certificates with EAP-TLS/TTLS/etc.
It should be noted that when using Suite B, different mechanism is used
to specify the allowed ECDH curves and this new parameter must not be
used in such cases.
Signed-off-by: Hristo Venev <hristo@venev.name>
Some versions of OpenSSL need server support for ECDH to be explicitly
enabled, so provide a new parameter for doing so and all
SSL_{,CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() for versions that need it to enable automatic
selection.
Signed-off-by: Hristo Venev <hristo@venev.name>
handle_dhcp() was first trying to learn the IP address of an associated
STA before doing broadcast-to-unicast conversion. This could result in
not converting some DHCPACK messages since the address learning part
aborts processing by returning from the function in various cases.
Reorder these operations to allow broadcast-to-unicast conversion to
happen even if an associated STA entry is not updated based on a
DHCPACK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, the special value 0 was used to indicate no UDP checksum.
Replace that with the calculated checksum for more like use case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 11.11 describes that the ICV is separate from the
parameter sets before it. Due to its convenient layout the ICV Indicator
'body part' is used to encode the ICV as well.
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 11.11.3 describes the encoding of MKPDUs. In
bullet e) is desribed that the ICV Indicator itself is encoded when the
ICV is not 16 octets in length. IEEE Std 802.1Xbx-2014, Table 11-7 note
e) states that it will not be encoded unless the Algorithm Agility
parameter specifies the use of an ICV that is not 16 octets in length.
Therefore the length calculation for the ICV indicator body part must
take into account if the ICV Indicator is to be encoded or not. The
actual encoder of the ICV body already takes care of the rest.
In practice, this change will remove the ICV Indicator parameter set (4
octets before the ICV value itself) since the only defined algorithm
agility value uses an ICV of 16 octets. IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 MKPDU
validation and decoding rules in 11.11.2 and 11.11.4 require the
receipient to handle both cases of ICV Indicator being included or not.
Signed-off-by: Jaap Keuter <jaap.keuter@xs4all.nl>
The ap_open_tdls_vht* test cases could leave some pending regulatory
Beacon hints waiting to be cleared during the following test case. This
would result in a failure if the following test case expected specific
regdom event behavior. For example, this caused "ap_open_tdls_vht160
dbus_country" sequence to result in failure in dbus_country. Fix this by
using more robust sequence in clearing regdom state at the end of the
TDLS test cases that have the AP advertising a country code.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It was possible for a participant to first be elected as a key server
and schedule a new SAK to be generated and distributed just to be
followed by another participant being elected as the key server. That
did not stop the participant that disabled key server functionality to
stop generating the new SAK and then trying to distribute it. That is
not correct behavior, so make these steps conditional on the participant
still being a key server when going through the timer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This pointer needs to be cleared when the matching SAK is being removed
from the SAK list. The previous implementation was doing something
pretty strange in the loop by clearing the pointer for any non-matching
key that happened to be iterated through before finding the matching
key. This could probably result in incorrect behavior, but not clearing
the pointer for the matching key could do more harm by causing freed
memory to be referenced.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using a specifically set index value from table definition,
use the actual real index of the table entry. This removes need for
maintaining these index values separately. Furthermore, the
mka_alg_tbl[] index was already off-by-one (but not used anywhere).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When running wpa_supplicant (with logging for testing) the log output is
somewhat disorganized for KaY related items. E.g., items are not
aligned, inconsistent type handling, wrong wording, missing labels, etc.
This change tries to clean up the log output, so it is somewhat more
accessible.
Signed-off-by: Jaap Keuter <jaap.keuter@xs4all.nl>
Go through the SM_STEP_RUN() global transition to get into the INIT
state to follow the state machine design more closely.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 talks about arbitrary authorization data that
could be passed to the CP from sources like RADIUS server, there is not
much point in trying to implement this as an arbitrary memory buffer in
wpa_supplicant. Should such data be supported in the future, it would
much more likely use more detailed data structures that encode the
received data in easier to use form.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to allow 256-bit key hierarchy to be derived from
EAP-based authentication. For now, the MSK length is hardcoded to 128
bits, so the previous behavior is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The CAK length is not hardcoded in the algorithm agility parameter, so
remove that from the table. Instead, allow both 16 (128-bit) and 32
(256-bit) CAK to be used so that the following key derivations use
appropriate key lengths based on the configured/derived CAK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The ICK and KEK are derived from a CAK and the length of the CAK
determines the length of the KCK/ICK. Remove the separate ICK/KEK length
parameters from the algorithm agility table.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Extend the previously implemented KDF (IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 6.2.1) to
support 256-bit input key and AES-CMAC-256. This does not change any
actual key derivation functionality yet, but is needed as a step towards
supporting 256-bit CAK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is possible to get a situation where a peer removes the Key Server
from its live peers list but the server still thinks that the peer is
alive (e.g., high packet loss in one direction). In such a case, the Key
Server will continue to advertise Last Key but this peer will not be
able to set up SA as it has already deleted its key.
Change the peer MI which will force the Key Server to distribute a new
SAK.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
Decrease timeout for a peer with duplicated SCI to speed up process in
case it is a valid peer after MI change.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
There is already partial support of GCM-AES-256. It is possible to
enable this mode by setting 'kay->macsec_csindex = 1;' in
ieee802_1x_kay_init() function, but the generated key contained only 128
bits of data while other 128 bits are in 0.
Enables KaY to generate full 256-bit SAK from the same 128-bit CAK. Note
that this does not support 256-bit CAK or AES-CMAC-256 -based KDF.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
According IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 9.8 each participant shall record the
values of NextPN for last SAK accepted from each Key Server to use it in
case of a switch from one Key Server to another and back. Add LPN
recording and set saved value as the initial PN for the created channel.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
It is possible that the driver fails to create Secure Channel (due to
hardware limitations for example). Add checks of create_*_sc() result
codes and abort procedure in case of failure.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
Fix a minor memory leak in ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka() in
case of KEK/ICK derivation failure.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
Add new configuration parameters macsec_replay_protect and
macsec_replay_window to allow user to set up MACsec replay protection
feature. Note that according to IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 replay protection
and delay protection are different features: replay protection is
related only to SecY and does not appear on MKA level while delay
protection is something that KaY can use to manage SecY state.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
