This works around issues with EAP-Failure getting lost for some reason.
Instead of waiting up to 60 seconds on a timeout, 30 second timeout is
now used and whenever the provisioning step has been completed (either
successfully or unsuccessfully), this timeout is reduced to 2 seconds.
There are no subdirectories in any of these directories or plans
for adding ones. As such, there is no point in running the loop
that does not do anything and can cause problems with some shells.
The server may still reject authentication at this point, so better
use conditional success decision. This allows the potentially
following EAP-Failure message to be processed properly. [Bug 354]
TNC IF-T is somewhat unclear on this are, but
draft-hanna-nea-pt-eap-00.txt, which is supposed to define the same
protocol, is clearer on the Flags field being included.
This change breaks interoperability with the old implementation if
EAP-TNC fragmentation is used. The old version would not accept
the acknowledgement message with the added Flags octet while the
new version accepts messagss with with both options.
TNC IF-T specification is unclear on the exact contents of the fragment
acknowledgement frame. An interoperability issue with the tncs@fhh
implementation was reported by Arne Welzel
<arne.welzel@stud.fh-hannover.de> due to the different interpretations
of the specification. Relax EAP-TNC server/peer validation rules to
accept fragmentation acknowledgement frames to include the Flags field
to avoid this issue.
This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information
about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can
be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to
figure out most likely network configuration and to get information
about reasons for failed authentications.
The follow new control interface events are used for this:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR
In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate
instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is
not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing
the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new
events and then adding a network configuration with the server
certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will
then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used.
Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following
configuration options:
eap=TTLS PEAP TLS
identity=""
ca_cert="probe://"
Example set of control events for this:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe'
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed
Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.:
ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a"
This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other
TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in
the future.
Undocumented (at least for the time being) TLS parameters can now
be provided in wpa_supplicant configuration to enable some workarounds
for being able to connect insecurely to some networks. phase1 and
phase2 network parameters can use following options:
tls_allow_md5=1
- allow MD5 signature to be used (disabled by default with GnuTLS)
tls_disable_time_checks=1
- ignore certificate expiration time
For now, only the GnuTLS TLS wrapper implements support for these.
This converts tls_connection_handshake(),
tls_connection_server_handshake(), tls_connection_encrypt(), and
tls_connection_decrypt() to use struct wpa_buf to allow higher layer
code to be cleaned up with consistent struct wpabuf use.
The password in User-Password AVP is padded to a multiple of 16 bytes
on EAP-TTLS/PAP. But when the password length is zero, no padding is
added. It doesn't cause connectivity issue. In fact, I could connect
with hostapd RADIUS server with zero length password.
I think it's better for obfuscation to pad the 16 bytes data when the
password length is zero with this patch.
In addition, start ordering header file includes to be in more
consistent order: system header files, src/utils, src/*, same
directory as the *.c file.
This makes it clearer which files are including header from src/common.
Some of these cases should probably be cleaned up in the future not to
do that.
In addition, src/common/nl80211_copy.h and wireless_copy.h were moved
into src/drivers since they are only used by driver wrappers and do not
need to live in src/common.
wpa_supplicant can now reconfigure the AP by acting as an External
Registrar with the wps_reg command. Previously, this was only used
to fetch the current AP settings, but now the wps_reg command has
optional arguments which can be used to provide the new AP
configuration. When the new parameters are set, the WPS protocol run
is allowed to continue through M8 to reconfigure the AP instead of
stopping at M7.
wpa_supplicant can now be built with FIPS capable OpenSSL for FIPS mode
operation. Currently, this is only enabling the FIPS mode in OpenSSL
without providing any higher level enforcement in wpa_supplicant.
Consequently, invalid configuration will fail during the authentication
run. Proper configuration (e.g., WPA2-Enterprise with EAP-TLS) allows
the connection to be completed.
This removes need for local configuration to ignore *.o and *~
and allows the src/*/.gitignore files to be removed (subdirectories
will inherit the rules from the root .gitignore).
This attribute is not supposed to be used in the response frame (i.e.,
it is only in the EAP-Request/SIM-Notification frame) per RFC 4186
chapters 10.1 and 9.9. This is a minor bug since the server is required
to ignore the contents of the EAP-Response/SIM-Notification during
protected result indication per chapter 6.2.
EAP-AKA peer was already following the similar specification in RFC 4187,
but this was somehow missed in the EAP-SIM peer implementation.
hostapd_cli wps_pin command can now have an optional timeout
parameter that sets the PIN lifetime in seconds. This can be used
to reduce the likelihood of someone else using the PIN should an
active PIN be left in the Registrar.
On "eap_tnc_process" function error case, data->in_buf keeps reference
to a local scope variable. For example this will cause segmentation
fault in "eap_tnc_deinit" function "wpabuf_free(data->in_buf)"
statement.
If session resumption fails for any reason, do not try it again because
that is just likely to fail. Instead, drop back to using full
authentication which may work. This is a workaround for servers that do
not like session resumption, but do not know how to fall back to full
authentication properly.
This fixes an issue where two AKA'/Challenge messages are received when
resynchronizing SEQ#. Previously, this used to trigger an authentication
failure since the second Challenge message did not duplicate AT_KDF.
It looks like GnuTLS (at least newer versions) is using random padding
on the application data and the previously used 100 byte extra buffer
for tls_connection_encrypt() calls was not enough to handle all cases.
This resulted in semi-random authentication failures with EAP-PEAP and
EAP-TTLS during Phase 2.
Increase the extra space for encryption from 100 to 300 bytes and add an
error message into tls_gnutls.c to make it easier to notice this issue
should it ever show up again even with the larger buffer.
This adds mostly feature complete external Registrar support with the
main missing part being proper support for multiple external Registrars
working at the same time and processing of concurrent registrations when
using an external Registrar.
This code is based on Sony/Saice implementation
(https://www.saice-wpsnfc.bz/) and the changes made by Ted Merrill
(Atheros) to make it more suitable for hostapd design and embedded
systems. Some of the UPnP code is based on Intel's libupnp. Copyrights
and licensing are explained in src/wps/wps_upnp.c in more detail.
Previous version assumed that the Flags field is always present and
ended up reading one octet past the end of the buffer should the Flags
field be missing. The message length would also be set incorrectly
(size_t)-1 or (size_t)-5, but it looks like reassembly code ended up
failing in malloc before actually using this huge length to read data.
RFC 2716 uses a somewhat unclear description on what exactly is included
in the TLS Ack message ("no data" can refer to either Data field in 4.1
or TLS Data field in 4.2), so in theory, it would be possible for some
implementations to not include Flags field. However,
EAP-{PEAP,TTLS,FAST} need the Flags field in Ack messages, too, for
indicating the used version.
The EAP peer code will now accept the no-Flags case as an Ack message if
EAP workarounds are enabled (which is the default behavior). If
workarounds are disabled, the message without Flags field will be
rejected.
[Bug 292]
We need to be a bit more careful when removing the WPS configuration
block since wpa_s->current_ssid may still be pointing at it. In
addition, registrar pointer in wps_context will need to be cleared
since the context data is now maintained over multiple EAP-WSC runs.
Without this, certain WPS operations could have used freed memory.
Windows Server 2008 NPS gets very confused if the TLS Message Length is
not included in the Phase 1 messages even if fragmentation is not used.
If the TLS Message Length field is not included in ClientHello message,
NPS seems to decide to use the ClientHello data (excluding first six
octets, i.e., EAP header, type, Flags) as the OuterTLVs data in
Cryptobinding Compound_MAC calculation (per PEAPv2; not MS-PEAP)..
Lets add the TLS Message Length to PEAPv0 Phase 1 messages to get rid of
this issue. This seems to fix Cryptobinding issues with NPS and PEAPv0
is now using optional Cryptobinding by default (again) since there are
no known interop issues with it anymore.
Changed peer to derive the full key (both MS-MPPE-Recv-Key and
MS-MPPE-Send-Key for total of 32 octets) to match with server
implementation.
Swapped the order of MPPE keys in MSK derivation since server
MS-MPPE-Recv-Key | MS-MPPE-Send-Key matches with the order specified for
EAP-TLS MSK derivation. This means that PEAPv0 cryptobinding is now
using EAP-MSCHAPv2 MSK as-is for ISK while EAP-FAST will need to swap
the order of the MPPE keys to get ISK in a way that interoperates with
Cisco EAP-FAST implementation.