This allows wpa_supplicant configuration with phase1="tls_suiteb=1" to
use openssl_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" to further limit the
possible TLS cipher suites when using Suite B with RSA >3K keys. This
combination disables use of DHE and as such, mandates ECDHE to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These functions are a bit awkward to use for one-off file loads, as
suggested by the tls_clear_default_passwd_cb() logic. There was also
some historical mess with OpenSSL versions and either not having per-SSL
settings, having per-SSL settings but ignoring them, and requiring the
per-SSL settings.
Instead, loading the key with the lower-level functions seems a bit
tidier and also allows abstracting away trying both formats, one after
another.
Signed-off-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There's no need to make an extra copy of private_key_passwd for
SSL_{CTX_,}set_default_passwd_cb().
Signed-off-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL restored the previously removed AES-192 ECB support in ("Add
AES-192 ECB.") commit. Since this is needed for DPP with the P-384
curve, restore support for this through EVP_aes_192_ecb().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes it clearer why some AES operations fail especially with
BoringSSL where the 192-bit case is not supported.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
BoringSSL does not provide some of the OpenSSL API that was used here,
so update this to use similar design to what was already done with DPP
key derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It looks like BoringSSL claims to have OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER for a
1.1.0 version, but it does not provide SSL_set_default_passwd_cb*(). For
now, comment out this regardless of the version BoringSSL claims to be.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It looks like BoringSSL claims to have OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER for a
1.1.0 version, but it does not provide SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(). For now,
comment out this regardless of the version BoringSSL claims to be.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It looks like BoringSSL claims to have OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER for a
1.1.0 version, but it does not provide RSA_bits(). For now, add this
backwards compatibility wrapper for BoringSSL regardless of the version
it claims to be.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Reject a DHE handshake if the server uses a DH prime that does not have
sufficient length to meet the Suite B 192-bit level requirement (<= 3k
(3072) bits).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The hostapd.conf tls_flags=[SUITEB-NO-ECDH] and wpa_supplicant network
profile phase1="tls_suiteb_no_ecdh=1" can now be used to configure Suite
B RSA constraints with ECDHE disabled. This is mainly to allow
the DHE TLS cipher suite to be tested.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Reject a peer certificate chain if it includes an RSA public key that
does not use sufficient key length to meet the Suite B 192-bit level
requirement (<= 3k (3072) bits).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds phase1 parameter tls_suiteb=1 into wpa_supplicant
configuration to allow TLS library (only OpenSSL supported for now) to
use Suite B 192-bit level rules with RSA when using >= 3k (3072) keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
ubsan reported:
../src/crypto/random.c:69:30: runtime error: shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
Explicitly check for the ROL32(x, 0) case which is supposed to be a
no-op.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Previously, the pointer to strdup passwd was left in OpenSSL library
default_passwd_cb_userdata and even the default_passwd_cb was left set
on an error path. To avoid unexpected behavior if something were to
manage to use there pointers, clear them explicitly once done with
loading of the private key.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since OpenSSL version 1.1.0f, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the
callback from the SSL object instead of the one from the CTX, so let's
set the callback on both SSL and CTX. Note that
SSL_set_default_passwd_cb*() is available only in 1.1.0.
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Add a build option to select different default ciphers for OpenSSL
instead of the hardcoded default "DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW".
This new option is useful on distributions where the security level
should be consistent for all applications, as in Fedora [1]. In such
cases the new configuration option would be set to "" or
"PROFILE=SYSTEM" to select the global crypto policy by default.
[1] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
The additional SHA-384 and SHA-512 functionality is needed to support
DPP with various ECC curves.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, only SHA1 hash -based server certificate matching was used,
but the OCSP response may use SHA256 instead of SHA1, so check the match
with both hash functions, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The KDF define in RFC 5295 is very similar to HKDF-Expand() defined in
RFC 5869. Allow a NULL label to be used to select the RFC 5869 version
with arbitrary seed (info in RFC 5869) material without forcing the
label and NULL termination to be included. HKDF-Expand() will be needed
for OWE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These allow ECDH to be used with compressed public key encoding (only
x-coordinate). This is needed for FILS PFS and OWE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This leads to cleaner code overall, and also reduces the size
of the hostapd and wpa_supplicant binaries (in hwsim test build
on x86_64) by about 2.5 and 3.5KiB respectively.
The mechanical conversions all over the code were done with
the following spatch:
@@
expression SIZE, SRC;
expression a;
@@
-a = os_malloc(SIZE);
+a = os_memdup(SRC, SIZE);
<...
if (!a) {...}
...>
-os_memcpy(a, SRC, SIZE);
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CONFIG_TLS=linux can now be used to select the crypto implementation
that uses the user space socket interface (AF_ALG) for the Linux kernel
crypto implementation. This commit includes some of the cipher, hash,
and HMAC functions. The functions that are not available through AF_ALG
(e.g., the actual TLS implementation) use the internal implementation
(CONFIG_TLS=internal).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These operations may fail with some crypto wrappers, so allow the
functions to report their results to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is a copy of the internal HMAC-SHA256 implementation with the hash
block size and output length updated to match SHA384 parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The output length was incorrect (32 from the copy-pasted SHA256
version). Fix this to return the correct number of octets (48) for
SHA384. This fixes incorrect key derivation in FILS when using the
SHA384-based AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If the keychain holds additional certificates other than the end
certificate, read them into the certificate chain.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
Number of deployed use cases assume the default OpenSSL behavior of auto
chaining the local certificate is in use. BoringSSL removed this
functionality by default, so we need to restore it here to avoid
breaking existing use cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This simplifies the implementation since the SSL_clear_options() and
SSL_CTX_clear_options() are available in all supported versions of
OpenSSL. These were previously needed with older (now obsolete) versions
of OpenSSL, but the ifdefs were missed when removing the more explicit
version macro based backwards compatibility sections.
In practice, this reverts commit
d53d2596e4.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The previous implementation was hardcoded to use 128-bit AES key
(AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256). Extend this by allowing AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_384
and AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_512 with 192-bit and 256-bit AES keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This basically just follows commit
587b0457e0 ('LibreSSL: Fix build with
LibreSSL') with the same pattern, which was missed here.
Signed-off-by: Julian Ospald <hasufell@hasufell.de>
Due to a missing guard for old OpenSSL code, SSL_library_init() was not
called, which is required for LibreSSL. Likewise for cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Christian Neukirchen <chneukirchen@gmail.com>
Add LibreSSL check to old OpenSSL #ifdef guard as DH_{get0,set0}_key()
is not implemented in LibreSSL.
Signed-off-by: Christian Neukirchen <chneukirchen@gmail.com>
To be consistent with OpenSSL 1.1.0, the free functions should
internally check for NULL. EVP_MD_CTX_free also was missing an
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup, so this leaked a little.
OpenSSL 1.1.0 also has given get_rfc3526_prime_1536 a better namespace
with get_rfc3526_prime_1536 as a compatibility-only name. Use that
instead in 1.1.0.
Signed-off-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit 49fe2ada20 ('OpenSSL: Support
OpenSSL 1.1.0 DH opacity') started using the new accessor functions, but
used incorrect success check for the DH_set0_key() call. This resulted
in dh5_init_fixed() failures and double-free on error path if the build
was linked against OpenSSL 1.1.0. Fix this by checking DH_set0_key()
return value to be 1 for the success case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
OpenSSL 1.1.0 (master branch) apparently ended up modifying the API
after the beta 2 release that was supposed to complete the work. Mark
the variables const to fix the compilation with the modified OpenSSL
API.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
