EAP-EKE: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing information to potential attackers from comparisons of information received from a remote device and private material known only by the authorized devices. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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3 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -635,8 +635,8 @@ static void eap_eke_process_confirm(struct eap_sm *sm,
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return;
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}
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth_P", auth_p, data->sess.prf_len);
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if (os_memcmp(auth_p, payload + data->sess.pnonce_len,
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data->sess.prf_len) != 0) {
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if (os_memcmp_const(auth_p, payload + data->sess.pnonce_len,
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data->sess.prf_len) != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Auth_P does not match");
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eap_eke_fail(data, EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL);
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return;
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