EAP-pwd: Replace direct OpenSSL HMAC use with wrapper

This is a step towards allowing EAP-pwd to be supported with other
crypto libraries.

Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2012-07-02 22:10:03 +03:00
parent d9cc4646eb
commit daf10baf9e
4 changed files with 148 additions and 123 deletions

View file

@ -8,70 +8,76 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "crypto/sha256.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "eap_defs.h"
#include "eap_pwd_common.h"
/* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
void H_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
{
u8 allzero[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
HMAC_Init(ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256());
u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero,
SHA256_MAC_LEN);
}
void H_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const u8 *data, int len)
void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len)
{
HMAC_Update(ctx, data, len);
crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len);
}
void H_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, u8 *digest)
void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest)
{
unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
HMAC_Final(ctx, digest, &mdlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len);
}
/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
void eap_pwd_kdf(u8 *key, int keylen, u8 *label, int labellen,
u8 *result, int resultbitlen)
static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen)
{
HMAC_CTX hctx;
unsigned char digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
struct crypto_hash *hash;
u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
u16 i, ctr, L;
int resultbytelen, len = 0;
unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
unsigned char mask = 0xff;
size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen;
resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7)/8;
resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8;
ctr = 0;
L = htons(resultbitlen);
while (len < resultbytelen) {
ctr++; i = htons(ctr);
HMAC_Init(&hctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256());
ctr++;
i = htons(ctr);
hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
key, keylen);
if (hash == NULL)
return -1;
if (ctr > 1)
HMAC_Update(&hctx, digest, mdlen);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
HMAC_Update(&hctx, label, labellen);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest, &mdlen);
if ((len + (int) mdlen) > resultbytelen)
crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen);
crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0)
return -1;
if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen)
os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
else
os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
len += mdlen;
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
}
/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
if (resultbitlen % 8) {
u8 mask = 0xff;
mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
}
return 0;
}
@ -85,9 +91,10 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 *id_peer, int id_peer_len, u8 *token)
{
BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
HMAC_CTX ctx;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
int nid, is_odd, primebitlen, primebytelen, ret = 0;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
int nid, is_odd, ret = 0;
size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
switch (num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
case 19:
@ -167,20 +174,23 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
* pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
* counter)
*/
H_Init(&ctx);
H_Update(&ctx, token, sizeof(u32));
H_Update(&ctx, id_peer, id_peer_len);
H_Update(&ctx, id_server, id_server_len);
H_Update(&ctx, password, password_len);
H_Update(&ctx, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
H_Final(&ctx, pwe_digest);
hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
if (hash == NULL)
goto fail;
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32));
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, rnd);
eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
(unsigned char *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
prfbuf, primebitlen);
if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
goto fail;
BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
@ -276,9 +286,9 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, BIGNUM *k,
u8 *confirm_peer, u8 *confirm_server,
u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
{
HMAC_CTX ctx;
u8 mk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft;
u8 session_id[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1];
struct crypto_hash *hash;
u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft;
u8 session_id[SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1];
u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
int offset;
@ -290,37 +300,46 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, BIGNUM *k,
* scal_s)
*/
session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
H_Init(&ctx);
H_Update(&ctx, (u8 *)ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
if (hash == NULL) {
os_free(cruft);
return -1;
}
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(peer_scalar);
os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
BN_bn2bin(peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(server_scalar);
os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
BN_bn2bin(server_scalar, cruft + offset);
H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
H_Final(&ctx, &session_id[1]);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]);
/* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */
H_Init(&ctx);
hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
if (hash == NULL) {
os_free(cruft);
return -1;
}
offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(k);
os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
BN_bn2bin(k, cruft + offset);
H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
H_Update(&ctx, confirm_peer, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
H_Update(&ctx, confirm_server, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
H_Final(&ctx, mk);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
os_free(cruft);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk);
/* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
session_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH+1,
msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8);
if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1,
msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) {
return -1;
}
os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
os_free(cruft);
return 1;
}

View file

@ -10,10 +10,8 @@
#define EAP_PWD_COMMON_H
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
/*
* definition of a finite cyclic group
@ -62,8 +60,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *, u16, u8 *, int, u8 *, int, u8 *,
int, u8 *);
int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
u8 *, u8 *, u32 *, u8 *, u8 *);
void H_Init(HMAC_CTX *);
void H_Update(HMAC_CTX *, const u8 *, int);
void H_Final(HMAC_CTX *, u8 *);
struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void);
void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len);
void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest);
#endif /* EAP_PWD_COMMON_H */