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OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums

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This helps in reducing measurable timing differences in operations
involving private information. BoringSSL has removed BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
and expects specific constant time functions to be called instead, so a
bit different approach is needed depending on which library is used.

The main operation that needs protection against side channel attacks is
BN_mod_exp() that depends on private keys (the public key validation
step in crypto_dh_derive_secret() is an exception that can use the
faster version since it does not depend on private keys).

crypto_bignum_div() is currently used only in SAE FFC case with not
safe-prime groups and only with values that do not depend on private
keys, so it is not critical to protect it.

crypto_bignum_inverse() is currently used only in SAE FFC PWE
derivation. The additional protection here is targeting only OpenSSL.
BoringSSL may need conversion to using BN_mod_inverse_blinded().

This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2019-02-26 11:43:03 +02:00 committed by Jouni Malinen
parent 3ffeb7d8c8
commit d42c477cc7
1 changed files with 15 additions and 5 deletions
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20
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
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@ -607,7 +607,8 @@ int crypto_mod_exp(const u8 *base, size_t base_len,
bn_result == NULL)
goto error;
if (BN_mod_exp(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus, ctx) != 1)
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus,
ctx, NULL) != 1)
goto error;
*result_len = BN_bn2bin(bn_result, result);
@ -1360,8 +1361,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_exptmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (bnctx == NULL)
return -1;
res = BN_mod_exp((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b,
(const BIGNUM *) c, bnctx);
res = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a,
(const BIGNUM *) b, (const BIGNUM *) c,
bnctx, NULL);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return res ? 0 : -1;
@ -1380,6 +1382,11 @@ int crypto_bignum_inverse(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (bnctx == NULL)
return -1;
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
/* TODO: use BN_mod_inverse_blinded() ? */
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
res = BN_mod_inverse((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a,
(const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
@ -1413,6 +1420,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (bnctx == NULL)
return -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
res = BN_div((BIGNUM *) c, NULL, (const BIGNUM *) a,
(const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
@ -1504,8 +1514,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
/* exp = (p-1) / 2 */
!BN_sub(exp, (const BIGNUM *) p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_rshift1(exp, exp) ||
!BN_mod_exp(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp, (const BIGNUM *) p,
bnctx))
!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp,
(const BIGNUM *) p, bnctx, NULL))
goto fail;
if (BN_is_word(tmp, 1))