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Reject the initial 4-way handshake if initial GTK setup fails

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This makes the AP/Authenticator design more robust against unexpected
failures in random number generation.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2015-06-28 21:40:37 +03:00
parent 2da525651d
commit aac1efec34
1 changed files with 7 additions and 3 deletions
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10
src/ap/wpa_auth.c
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@ -1841,9 +1841,13 @@ static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
}
wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group);
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
group->first_sta_seen = FALSE;
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
}
}