DGNum/hostapd
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests 1 Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

Suite B: Select EAPOL-Key integrity and key-wrap algorithms based on AKM

Browse source 
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2014-11-16 15:40:02 +02:00
parent 087a1f4efd
commit 929a2ea5df
6 changed files with 90 additions and 38 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

38
src/ap/wpa_auth.c
View file

@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len);
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data,
size_t data_len);
static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
struct wpa_group *group);
@ -884,6 +885,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN &&
!wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
LOGGER_WARNING,
@ -902,6 +904,13 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
return;
}
}
if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED) {
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
"did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
return;
}
}
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
@ -1123,7 +1132,8 @@ continue_processing:
sm->MICVerified = FALSE;
if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm->PTK, data, data_len)) {
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, &sm->PTK, data,
data_len)) {
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
"received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
return;
@ -1295,7 +1305,8 @@ void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
if (force_version)
version = force_version;
else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN)
else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED;
else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm))
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
@ -1320,6 +1331,7 @@ void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
if (pad_len)
@ -1389,6 +1401,7 @@ void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
buf, key_data_len);
if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, 16,
(key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf,
@ -1420,8 +1433,8 @@ void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
os_free(hdr);
return;
}
wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, version, (u8 *) hdr, len,
key->key_mic);
wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, sm->wpa_key_mgmt, version,
(u8 *) hdr, len, key->key_mic);
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
if (!pairwise &&
wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability > 0.0 &&
@ -1473,7 +1486,8 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
}
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data,
size_t data_len)
{
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
@ -1489,7 +1503,7 @@ static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
os_memcpy(mic, key->key_mic, 16);
os_memset(key->key_mic, 0, 16);
if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, akmp, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
data, data_len, key->key_mic) ||
os_memcmp_const(mic, key->key_mic, 16) != 0)
ret = -1;
@ -1795,10 +1809,13 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
if (sm->pmksa)
if (sm->pmksa) {
os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
else {
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
/* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
pmkid = NULL;
} else {
/*
* Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
* available with pre-calculated PMKID.
@ -1856,7 +1873,8 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
wpa_derive_ptk(sm, pmk, &PTK);
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, &PTK,
sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
ok = 1;
break;