OpenSSL: Fix HPKE in some corner cases
EVP_PKEY_derive() might report a larger maximum size of the output than HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN under some conditions. That should be allowed as long as the real final length is within the maximum limit. Furthermore, since we are using a fixed length buffer for this, there is no need to call EVP_PKEY_derive() twice to first learn the maximum length. Use a bit longer buffer and allow OpenSSL to take care of the update to the final length internally with than single call. This showed up using the following test case sequence: dbus_pkcs11 dpp_private_peer_introduction Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
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1 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions
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@ -5020,7 +5020,7 @@ static int hpke_encap(struct hpke_context *ctx, struct crypto_ec_key *pk_r,
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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struct crypto_ec_key *sk_e;
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struct crypto_ec_key *sk_e;
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int res = -1;
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int res = -1;
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u8 dhss[HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN];
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u8 dhss[HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN + 16];
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size_t dhss_len;
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size_t dhss_len;
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struct wpabuf *enc_buf = NULL, *pk_rm = NULL;
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struct wpabuf *enc_buf = NULL, *pk_rm = NULL;
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@ -5033,13 +5033,13 @@ static int hpke_encap(struct hpke_context *ctx, struct crypto_ec_key *pk_r,
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}
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}
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/* dh = DH(skE, pkR) */
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/* dh = DH(skE, pkR) */
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dhss_len = sizeof(dhss);
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new((EVP_PKEY *) sk_e, NULL);
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new((EVP_PKEY *) sk_e, NULL);
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if (!pctx ||
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if (!pctx ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, (EVP_PKEY *) pk_r) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, (EVP_PKEY *) pk_r) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, dhss, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
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dhss_len > HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN ||
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dhss_len > HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN) {
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EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, dhss, &dhss_len) != 1) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: EVP_PKEY_derive failed: %s",
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: EVP_PKEY_derive failed: %s",
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ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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goto fail;
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goto fail;
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@ -5184,7 +5184,7 @@ static int hpke_decap(struct hpke_context *ctx, const u8 *enc,
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size_t len;
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size_t len;
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int res = -1;
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int res = -1;
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struct crypto_ec_key *pk_e = NULL;
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struct crypto_ec_key *pk_e = NULL;
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u8 dhss[HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN];
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u8 dhss[HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN + 16];
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size_t dhss_len;
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size_t dhss_len;
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/* pkE = DeserializePublicKey(enc) */
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/* pkE = DeserializePublicKey(enc) */
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@ -5198,13 +5198,13 @@ static int hpke_decap(struct hpke_context *ctx, const u8 *enc,
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if (!pk_e)
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if (!pk_e)
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return -1; /* invalid public key point */
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return -1; /* invalid public key point */
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/* dh = DH(skR, pkE) */
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/* dh = DH(skR, pkE) */
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dhss_len = sizeof(dhss);
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new((EVP_PKEY *) sk_r, NULL);
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new((EVP_PKEY *) sk_r, NULL);
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if (!pctx ||
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if (!pctx ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, (EVP_PKEY *) pk_e) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, (EVP_PKEY *) pk_e) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
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EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, dhss, &dhss_len) != 1 ||
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dhss_len > HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN ||
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dhss_len > HPKE_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN) {
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EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, dhss, &dhss_len) != 1) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: EVP_PKEY_derive failed: %s",
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: EVP_PKEY_derive failed: %s",
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ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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goto fail;
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goto fail;
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