DGNum/hostapd
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests 1 Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

DPP: Rename PKEX secret element from Z to K

Browse source 
This matches the change in the DPP tech spec to make this less likely to
be confused with the shared secret z.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen 2017-10-10 00:52:35 +03:00 committed by Jouni Malinen
parent 6573171792
commit 0e6709a4ea
1 changed files with 24 additions and 24 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

48
src/common/dpp.c
View file

@ -5303,7 +5303,7 @@ static int dpp_pkex_derive_z(const u8 *mac_init, const u8 *mac_resp,
const u8 *Mx, size_t Mx_len, const u8 *Mx, size_t Mx_len,
const u8 *Nx, size_t Nx_len, const u8 *Nx, size_t Nx_len,
const char *code, const char *code,
const u8 *Zx, size_t Zx_len, const u8 *Kx, size_t Kx_len,
u8 *z, unsigned int hash_len) u8 *z, unsigned int hash_len)
{ {
u8 salt[DPP_MAX_HASH_LEN], prk[DPP_MAX_HASH_LEN]; u8 salt[DPP_MAX_HASH_LEN], prk[DPP_MAX_HASH_LEN];
@ -5311,12 +5311,12 @@ static int dpp_pkex_derive_z(const u8 *mac_init, const u8 *mac_resp,
u8 *info, *pos; u8 *info, *pos;
size_t info_len; size_t info_len;
/* z = HKDF(<>, MAC-Initiator | MAC-Responder | M.x | N.x | code, Z.x) /* z = HKDF(<>, MAC-Initiator | MAC-Responder | M.x | N.x | code, K.x)
*/ */
/* HKDF-Extract(<>, IKM=Z.x) */ /* HKDF-Extract(<>, IKM=K.x) */
os_memset(salt, 0, hash_len); os_memset(salt, 0, hash_len);
if (dpp_hmac(hash_len, salt, hash_len, Zx, Zx_len, prk) < 0) if (dpp_hmac(hash_len, salt, hash_len, Kx, Kx_len, prk) < 0)
return -1; return -1;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PRK = HKDF-Extract(<>, IKM)", wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PRK = HKDF-Extract(<>, IKM)",
prk, hash_len); prk, hash_len);
@ -5374,8 +5374,8 @@ struct wpabuf * dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
BIGNUM *Nx = NULL, *Ny = NULL; BIGNUM *Nx = NULL, *Ny = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
EC_KEY *Y_ec = NULL; EC_KEY *Y_ec = NULL;
size_t Jx_len, Zx_len; size_t Jx_len, Kx_len;
u8 Jx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN], Zx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN]; u8 Jx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN], Kx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN];
const u8 *addr[4]; const u8 *addr[4];
size_t len[4]; size_t len[4];
u8 u[DPP_MAX_HASH_LEN]; u8 u[DPP_MAX_HASH_LEN];
@ -5485,30 +5485,30 @@ struct wpabuf * dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
goto fail; goto fail;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: u", u, curve->hash_len); wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: u", u, curve->hash_len);
/* Z = x * Y’ */ /* K = x * Y’ */
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkex->x, NULL); ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkex->x, NULL);
if (!ctx || if (!ctx ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, pkex->y) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, pkex->y) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &Zx_len) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &Kx_len) != 1 ||
Zx_len > DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN || Kx_len > DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, Zx, &Zx_len) != 1) { EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, Kx, &Kx_len) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"DPP: Failed to derive ECDH shared secret: %s", "DPP: Failed to derive ECDH shared secret: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto fail; goto fail;
} }
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: ECDH shared secret (Z.x)", wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: ECDH shared secret (K.x)",
Zx, Zx_len); Kx, Kx_len);
/* z = HKDF(<>, MAC-Initiator | MAC-Responder | M.x | N.x | code, Z.x) /* z = HKDF(<>, MAC-Initiator | MAC-Responder | M.x | N.x | code, K.x)
*/ */
if (dpp_pkex_derive_z(pkex->own_mac, pkex->peer_mac, if (dpp_pkex_derive_z(pkex->own_mac, pkex->peer_mac,
pkex->Mx, curve->prime_len, pkex->Mx, curve->prime_len,
attr_key /* N.x */, attr_key_len / 2, pkex->code, attr_key /* N.x */, attr_key_len / 2, pkex->code,
Zx, Zx_len, pkex->z, curve->hash_len) < 0) Kx, Kx_len, pkex->z, curve->hash_len) < 0)
goto fail; goto fail;
/* {A, u, [bootstrapping info]}z */ /* {A, u, [bootstrapping info]}z */
@ -5573,8 +5573,8 @@ struct wpabuf * dpp_pkex_rx_commit_reveal_req(struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
{ {
const struct dpp_curve_params *curve = pkex->own_bi->curve; const struct dpp_curve_params *curve = pkex->own_bi->curve;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
size_t Jx_len, Zx_len, Lx_len; size_t Jx_len, Kx_len, Lx_len;
u8 Jx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN], Zx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN]; u8 Jx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN], Kx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN];
u8 Lx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN]; u8 Lx[DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN];
const u8 *wrapped_data, *b_key, *peer_u; const u8 *wrapped_data, *b_key, *peer_u;
u16 wrapped_data_len, b_key_len, peer_u_len = 0; u16 wrapped_data_len, b_key_len, peer_u_len = 0;
@ -5590,29 +5590,29 @@ struct wpabuf * dpp_pkex_rx_commit_reveal_req(struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
struct wpabuf *clear = NULL; struct wpabuf *clear = NULL;
u8 *wrapped; u8 *wrapped;
/* Z = y * X' */ /* K = y * X' */
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkex->y, NULL); ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkex->y, NULL);
if (!ctx || if (!ctx ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, pkex->x) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, pkex->x) != 1 ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &Zx_len) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &Kx_len) != 1 ||
Zx_len > DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN || Kx_len > DPP_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_LEN ||
EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, Zx, &Zx_len) != 1) { EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, Kx, &Kx_len) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"DPP: Failed to derive ECDH shared secret: %s", "DPP: Failed to derive ECDH shared secret: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto fail; goto fail;
} }
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: ECDH shared secret (Z.x)", wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: ECDH shared secret (K.x)",
Zx, Zx_len); Kx, Kx_len);
/* z = HKDF(<>, MAC-Initiator | MAC-Responder | M.x | N.x | code, Z.x) /* z = HKDF(<>, MAC-Initiator | MAC-Responder | M.x | N.x | code, K.x)
*/ */
if (dpp_pkex_derive_z(pkex->peer_mac, pkex->own_mac, if (dpp_pkex_derive_z(pkex->peer_mac, pkex->own_mac,
pkex->Mx, curve->prime_len, pkex->Mx, curve->prime_len,
pkex->Nx, curve->prime_len, pkex->code, pkex->Nx, curve->prime_len, pkex->code,
Zx, Zx_len, pkex->z, curve->hash_len) < 0) Kx, Kx_len, pkex->z, curve->hash_len) < 0)
goto fail; goto fail;
wrapped_data = dpp_get_attr(buf, buflen, DPP_ATTR_WRAPPED_DATA, wrapped_data = dpp_get_attr(buf, buflen, DPP_ATTR_WRAPPED_DATA,