SAE: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing information to potential attackers from comparisons of information received from a remote device and private material known only by the authorized devices. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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2 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static int check_sae_token(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
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return -1;
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if (hmac_sha256(hapd->sae_token_key, sizeof(hapd->sae_token_key),
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addr, ETH_ALEN, mac) < 0 ||
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os_memcmp(token, mac, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0)
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os_memcmp_const(token, mac, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ int sae_check_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len)
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sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc,
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verifier);
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if (os_memcmp(verifier, data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
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if (os_memcmp_const(verifier, data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm mismatch");
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received confirm",
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data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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