hostapd/wpa_supplicant/wpas_glue.c

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/*
* WPA Supplicant - Glue code to setup EAPOL and RSN modules
* Copyright (c) 2003-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "eapol_supp/eapol_supp_sm.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap.h"
#include "rsn_supp/wpa.h"
#include "eloop.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "l2_packet/l2_packet.h"
#include "common/wpa_common.h"
#include "common/ptksa_cache.h"
#include "wpa_supplicant_i.h"
#include "driver_i.h"
#include "rsn_supp/pmksa_cache.h"
#include "sme.h"
#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
#include "common/wpa_ctrl.h"
#include "wpas_glue.h"
#include "wps_supplicant.h"
#include "bss.h"
#include "scan.h"
#include "notify.h"
#include "wpas_kay.h"
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS
#if defined(IEEE8021X_EAPOL) || !defined(CONFIG_NO_WPA)
static void wpa_supplicant_set_config_blob(void *ctx,
struct wpa_config_blob *blob)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpa_config_set_blob(wpa_s->conf, blob);
if (wpa_s->conf->update_config) {
int ret = wpa_config_write(wpa_s->confname, wpa_s->conf);
if (ret) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to update config after "
"blob set");
}
}
}
static const struct wpa_config_blob *
wpa_supplicant_get_config_blob(void *ctx, const char *name)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_config_get_blob(wpa_s->conf, name);
}
#endif /* defined(IEEE8021X_EAPOL) || !defined(CONFIG_NO_WPA) */
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS */
#if defined(IEEE8021X_EAPOL) || !defined(CONFIG_NO_WPA)
static u8 * wpa_alloc_eapol(const struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u8 type,
const void *data, u16 data_len,
size_t *msg_len, void **data_pos)
{
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
*msg_len = sizeof(*hdr) + data_len;
hdr = os_malloc(*msg_len);
if (hdr == NULL)
return NULL;
hdr->version = wpa_s->conf->eapol_version;
hdr->type = type;
hdr->length = host_to_be16(data_len);
if (data)
os_memcpy(hdr + 1, data, data_len);
else
os_memset(hdr + 1, 0, data_len);
if (data_pos)
*data_pos = hdr + 1;
return (u8 *) hdr;
}
/**
* wpa_ether_send - Send Ethernet frame
* @wpa_s: Pointer to wpa_supplicant data
* @dest: Destination MAC address
* @proto: Ethertype in host byte order
* @buf: Frame payload starting from IEEE 802.1X header
* @len: Frame payload length
* Returns: >=0 on success, <0 on failure
*/
int wpa_ether_send(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const u8 *dest,
u16 proto, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
if (wpa_s->ext_eapol_frame_io && proto == ETH_P_EAPOL) {
size_t hex_len = 2 * len + 1;
char *hex = os_malloc(hex_len);
if (hex == NULL)
return -1;
wpa_snprintf_hex(hex, hex_len, buf, len);
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, "EAPOL-TX " MACSTR " %s",
MAC2STR(dest), hex);
os_free(hex);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
if (wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_CONTROL_PORT) {
int encrypt = wpa_s->wpa &&
wpa_sm_has_ptk_installed(wpa_s->wpa);
return wpa_drv_tx_control_port(wpa_s, dest, proto, buf, len,
!encrypt);
}
wpa_supplicant: Send EAPOL frames over nl80211 where available Linux kernel v4.17 added the ability to request sending control port frames via nl80211 instead of a normal network socket. Doing this provides the device driver with ordering information between the control port frames and the installation of keys. This empowers it to avoid race conditions between, for example, PTK replacement and the sending of frame 4 of the 4-way rekeying handshake in an RSNA. The key difference between a TX_CONTROL_PORT and normal socket send is that the device driver will certainly get any EAPOL frames comprising a 4-way handshake before it gets the key installation call for the derived key. By flushing its TX buffers it can then ensure that no pending EAPOL frames are inadvertently encrypted with a key that the peer will not yet have installed. Update the RSN supplicant system to use this new operation for sending EAPOL-Key frames when the driver reports that this capability is available; otherwise, fall back to a normal Ethernet TX. I have tested this on DMG (11ad/ay) devices with an out-of-tree Linux driver that does not use mac80211. Without this patch I consistently see PTK rekeying fail if message 4/4 shares a stream with other in-flight traffic. With this patch, and the driver updated to flush the relevant TX queue before overwriting a PTK (knowing, now, that if there was a message 4/4 related to the key installation, it has already entered the driver queue), rekeying is reliable. There is still data loss surrounding key installation - this problem is alluded to in IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 12.6.21, where extended Key ID support is described as the eventual solution. This patch aims to at least prevent rekeying from totally breaking the association, in a way that works on kernels as far back as 4.17 (as per Alexander Wetzel extended Key ID support should be possible on 5.2). See http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2019-May/040089.html for a little more context. Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <brendan.jackman@bluwireless.co.uk>
2020-01-03 16:17:41 +01:00
if (wpa_s->l2) {
return l2_packet_send(wpa_s->l2, dest, proto, buf, len);
}
return -1;
}
#endif /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL || !CONFIG_NO_WPA */
#ifdef IEEE8021X_EAPOL
/**
* wpa_supplicant_eapol_send - Send IEEE 802.1X EAPOL packet to Authenticator
* @ctx: Pointer to wpa_supplicant data (wpa_s)
* @type: IEEE 802.1X packet type (IEEE802_1X_TYPE_*)
* @buf: EAPOL payload (after IEEE 802.1X header)
* @len: EAPOL payload length
* Returns: >=0 on success, <0 on failure
*
* This function adds Ethernet and IEEE 802.1X header and sends the EAPOL frame
* to the current Authenticator.
*/
static int wpa_supplicant_eapol_send(void *ctx, int type, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
u8 *msg, *dst, bssid[ETH_ALEN];
struct driver_sta_mlo_info drv_mlo;
size_t msglen;
int res;
/* TODO: could add l2_packet_sendmsg that allows fragments to avoid
* extra copy here */
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(wpa_s->key_mgmt) ||
wpa_s->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE ||
wpa_s->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP ||
wpa_s->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_NONE) {
/* Current SSID is not using IEEE 802.1X/EAP, so drop possible
* EAPOL frames (mainly, EAPOL-Start) from EAPOL state
* machines. */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: drop TX EAPOL in non-IEEE 802.1X "
"mode (type=%d len=%lu)", type,
(unsigned long) len);
return -1;
}
if (pmksa_cache_get_current(wpa_s->wpa) &&
type == IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_START) {
/*
* We were trying to use PMKSA caching and sending EAPOL-Start
* would abort that and trigger full EAPOL authentication.
* However, we've already waited for the AP/Authenticator to
* start 4-way handshake or EAP authentication, and apparently
* it has not done so since the startWhen timer has reached zero
* to get the state machine sending EAPOL-Start. This is not
* really supposed to happen, but an interoperability issue with
* a deployed AP has been identified where the connection fails
* due to that AP failing to operate correctly if PMKID is
* included in the Association Request frame. To work around
* this, assume PMKSA caching failed and try to initiate full
* EAP authentication.
*/
if (!wpa_s->current_ssid ||
wpa_s->current_ssid->eap_workaround) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"RSN: Timeout on waiting for the AP to initiate 4-way handshake for PMKSA caching or EAP authentication - try to force it to start EAP authentication");
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"RSN: PMKSA caching - do not send EAPOL-Start");
return -1;
}
}
if (is_zero_ether_addr(wpa_s->bssid)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "BSSID not set when trying to send an "
"EAPOL frame");
os_memset(&drv_mlo, 0, sizeof(drv_mlo));
if (wpa_drv_get_bssid(wpa_s, bssid) == 0 &&
(!wpa_s->valid_links ||
wpas_drv_get_sta_mlo_info(wpa_s, &drv_mlo) == 0) &&
!is_zero_ether_addr(bssid)) {
dst = drv_mlo.valid_links ? drv_mlo.ap_mld_addr : bssid;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Using current %s " MACSTR
" from the driver as the EAPOL destination",
drv_mlo.valid_links ? "AP MLD MAC address" :
"BSSID",
MAC2STR(dst));
} else {
dst = wpa_s->last_eapol_src;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Using the source address of the"
" last received EAPOL frame " MACSTR " as "
"the EAPOL destination",
MAC2STR(dst));
}
} else {
/* BSSID was already set (from (Re)Assoc event, so use BSSID or
* AP MLD MAC address (in the case of MLO connection) as the
* EAPOL destination. */
dst = wpa_s->valid_links ? wpa_s->ap_mld_addr : wpa_s->bssid;
}
msg = wpa_alloc_eapol(wpa_s, type, buf, len, &msglen, NULL);
if (msg == NULL)
return -1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TX EAPOL: dst=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(dst));
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "TX EAPOL", msg, msglen);
res = wpa_ether_send(wpa_s, dst, ETH_P_EAPOL, msg, msglen);
os_free(msg);
return res;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
/**
* wpa_eapol_set_wep_key - set WEP key for the driver
* @ctx: Pointer to wpa_supplicant data (wpa_s)
* @unicast: 1 = individual unicast key, 0 = broadcast key
* @keyidx: WEP key index (0..3)
* @key: Pointer to key data
* @keylen: Key length in bytes
* Returns: 0 on success or < 0 on error.
*/
static int wpa_eapol_set_wep_key(void *ctx, int unicast, int keyidx,
const u8 *key, size_t keylen)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
if (wpa_s->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_NO_WPA) {
int cipher = (keylen == 5) ? WPA_CIPHER_WEP40 :
WPA_CIPHER_WEP104;
if (unicast)
wpa_s->pairwise_cipher = cipher;
else
wpa_s->group_cipher = cipher;
}
return wpa_drv_set_key(wpa_s, -1, WPA_ALG_WEP,
unicast ? wpa_s->bssid : NULL,
Introduce and add key_flag Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have moved to using the new key_flag. The following flag are defined: KEY_FLAG_MODIFY Set when an already installed key must be updated. So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed keys. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.) KEY_FLAG_RX The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_TX The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP The key is a broadcast or group key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE The key is a pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PMK The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are: KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX WEP key not used as default key (yet). KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT Default WEP or WPA-NONE key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX GTK key valid for RX only. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID support.) KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX. KEY_FLAG_RX_TX Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX. This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using it, yet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
2020-01-04 23:10:04 +01:00
keyidx, unicast, NULL, 0, key, keylen,
unicast ? KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX :
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
static void wpa_supplicant_aborted_cached(void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpa_sm_aborted_cached(wpa_s->wpa);
}
static const char * result_str(enum eapol_supp_result result)
{
switch (result) {
case EAPOL_SUPP_RESULT_FAILURE:
return "FAILURE";
case EAPOL_SUPP_RESULT_SUCCESS:
return "SUCCESS";
case EAPOL_SUPP_RESULT_EXPECTED_FAILURE:
return "EXPECTED_FAILURE";
}
return "?";
}
static void wpa_supplicant_eapol_cb(struct eapol_sm *eapol,
enum eapol_supp_result result,
void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
int res, pmk_len;
u8 pmk[PMK_LEN_MAX];
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAPOL authentication completed - result=%s",
result_str(result));
if (wpas_wps_eapol_cb(wpa_s) > 0)
return;
wpa_s->eap_expected_failure = result ==
EAPOL_SUPP_RESULT_EXPECTED_FAILURE;
if (result != EAPOL_SUPP_RESULT_SUCCESS) {
int timeout = 2;
/*
* Make sure we do not get stuck here waiting for long EAPOL
* timeout if the AP does not disconnect in case of
* authentication failure.
*/
if (wpa_s->eapol_failed) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAPOL authentication failed again and AP did not disconnect us");
timeout = 0;
}
wpa_s->eapol_failed = 1;
wpa_supplicant_req_auth_timeout(wpa_s, timeout, 0);
} else {
wpa_s->eapol_failed = 0;
ieee802_1x_notify_create_actor(wpa_s, wpa_s->last_eapol_src);
}
if (result != EAPOL_SUPP_RESULT_SUCCESS ||
!(wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_8021X))
return;
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(wpa_s->key_mgmt))
return;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Configure PMK for driver-based RSN 4-way "
"handshake");
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(wpa_s->key_mgmt))
pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
else
pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(wpa_s->key_mgmt)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
u8 buf[2 * PMK_LEN];
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Use FT XXKey as PMK for "
"driver-based 4-way hs and FT");
res = eapol_sm_get_key(eapol, buf, 2 * PMK_LEN);
if (res == 0) {
os_memcpy(pmk, buf + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
}
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
res = -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
} else {
res = eapol_sm_get_key(eapol, pmk, pmk_len);
if (res) {
/*
* EAP-LEAP is an exception from other EAP methods: it
* uses only 16-byte PMK.
*/
res = eapol_sm_get_key(eapol, pmk, 16);
pmk_len = 16;
}
}
if (res) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to get PMK from EAPOL state "
"machines");
return;
}
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Configure PMK for driver-based 4-way "
"handshake", pmk, pmk_len);
if (wpa_drv_set_key(wpa_s, -1, 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, 0, pmk,
Introduce and add key_flag Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have moved to using the new key_flag. The following flag are defined: KEY_FLAG_MODIFY Set when an already installed key must be updated. So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed keys. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.) KEY_FLAG_RX The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_TX The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP The key is a broadcast or group key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE The key is a pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PMK The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are: KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX WEP key not used as default key (yet). KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT Default WEP or WPA-NONE key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX GTK key valid for RX only. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID support.) KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX. KEY_FLAG_RX_TX Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX. This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using it, yet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
2020-01-04 23:10:04 +01:00
pmk_len, KEY_FLAG_PMK)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to set PMK to the driver");
}
wpa_supplicant_cancel_scan(wpa_s);
wpa_supplicant_cancel_auth_timeout(wpa_s);
wpa_supplicant_set_state(wpa_s, WPA_COMPLETED);
}
static void wpa_supplicant_notify_eapol_done(void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL processing complete");
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(wpa_s->key_mgmt)) {
wpa_supplicant_set_state(wpa_s, WPA_4WAY_HANDSHAKE);
} else {
wpa_supplicant_cancel_auth_timeout(wpa_s);
wpa_supplicant_set_state(wpa_s, WPA_COMPLETED);
}
}
#endif /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL */
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA
static int wpa_get_beacon_ie(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
{
int ret = 0;
struct wpa_bss *curr = NULL, *bss;
struct wpa_ssid *ssid = wpa_s->current_ssid;
const u8 *ie;
dl_list_for_each(bss, &wpa_s->bss, struct wpa_bss, list) {
if (!ether_addr_equal(bss->bssid, wpa_s->bssid))
continue;
if (ssid == NULL ||
((bss->ssid_len == ssid->ssid_len &&
os_memcmp(bss->ssid, ssid->ssid, ssid->ssid_len) == 0) ||
ssid->ssid_len == 0)) {
curr = bss;
break;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_OWE
if (ssid && (ssid->key_mgmt & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) &&
(bss->flags & WPA_BSS_OWE_TRANSITION)) {
curr = bss;
break;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_OWE */
}
if (curr) {
ie = wpa_bss_get_vendor_ie(curr, WPA_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
if (wpa_sm_set_ap_wpa_ie(wpa_s->wpa, ie, ie ? 2 + ie[1] : 0))
ret = -1;
ie = wpa_bss_get_ie(curr, WLAN_EID_RSN);
if (wpa_sm_set_ap_rsn_ie(wpa_s->wpa, ie, ie ? 2 + ie[1] : 0))
ret = -1;
ie = wpa_bss_get_ie(curr, WLAN_EID_RSNX);
if (wpa_sm_set_ap_rsnxe(wpa_s->wpa, ie, ie ? 2 + ie[1] : 0))
ret = -1;
ie = wpa_bss_get_vendor_ie(curr, RSNE_OVERRIDE_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
if (wpa_sm_set_ap_rsne_override(wpa_s->wpa, ie,
ie ? 2 + ie[1] : 0))
ret = -1;
ie = wpa_bss_get_vendor_ie(curr,
RSNE_OVERRIDE_2_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
if (wpa_sm_set_ap_rsne_override_2(wpa_s->wpa, ie,
ie ? 2 + ie[1] : 0))
ret = -1;
ie = wpa_bss_get_vendor_ie(curr, RSNXE_OVERRIDE_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
if (wpa_sm_set_ap_rsnxe_override(wpa_s->wpa, ie,
ie ? 2 + ie[1] : 0))
ret = -1;
} else {
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
static int wpa_supplicant_get_beacon_ie(void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
if (wpa_get_beacon_ie(wpa_s) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/* No WPA/RSN IE found in the cached scan results. Try to get updated
* scan results from the driver. */
if (wpa_supplicant_update_scan_results(wpa_s, wpa_s->bssid) < 0)
return -1;
return wpa_get_beacon_ie(wpa_s);
}
static u8 * _wpa_alloc_eapol(void *wpa_s, u8 type,
const void *data, u16 data_len,
size_t *msg_len, void **data_pos)
{
return wpa_alloc_eapol(wpa_s, type, data, data_len, msg_len, data_pos);
}
static int _wpa_ether_send(void *wpa_s, const u8 *dest, u16 proto,
const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
return wpa_ether_send(wpa_s, dest, proto, buf, len);
}
static void _wpa_supplicant_cancel_auth_timeout(void *wpa_s)
{
wpa_supplicant_cancel_auth_timeout(wpa_s);
}
static void _wpa_supplicant_set_state(void *wpa_s, enum wpa_states state)
{
wpa_supplicant_set_state(wpa_s, state);
}
/**
* wpa_supplicant_get_state - Get the connection state
* @wpa_s: Pointer to wpa_supplicant data
* Returns: The current connection state (WPA_*)
*/
static enum wpa_states wpa_supplicant_get_state(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
{
return wpa_s->wpa_state;
}
static enum wpa_states _wpa_supplicant_get_state(void *wpa_s)
{
return wpa_supplicant_get_state(wpa_s);
}
static void _wpa_supplicant_deauthenticate(void *wpa_s, u16 reason_code)
{
wpa_supplicant_deauthenticate(wpa_s, reason_code);
/* Schedule a scan to make sure we continue looking for networks */
wpa_supplicant_req_scan(wpa_s, 5, 0);
}
static void _wpa_supplicant_reconnect(void *wpa_s)
{
wpa_supplicant_reconnect(wpa_s);
}
static void * wpa_supplicant_get_network_ctx(void *wpa_s)
{
return wpa_supplicant_get_ssid(wpa_s);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_get_bssid(void *ctx, u8 *bssid)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_drv_get_bssid(wpa_s, bssid);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_set_key(void *_wpa_s, int link_id, enum wpa_alg alg,
const u8 *addr, int key_idx, int set_tx,
const u8 *seq, size_t seq_len,
Introduce and add key_flag Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have moved to using the new key_flag. The following flag are defined: KEY_FLAG_MODIFY Set when an already installed key must be updated. So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed keys. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.) KEY_FLAG_RX The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_TX The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP The key is a broadcast or group key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE The key is a pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PMK The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are: KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX WEP key not used as default key (yet). KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT Default WEP or WPA-NONE key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX GTK key valid for RX only. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID support.) KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX. KEY_FLAG_RX_TX Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX. This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using it, yet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
2020-01-04 23:10:04 +01:00
const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
enum key_flag key_flag)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
int ret;
if (alg == WPA_ALG_TKIP && key_idx == 0 && key_len == 32) {
/* Clear the MIC error counter when setting a new PTK. */
wpa_s->mic_errors_seen = 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_GET_GTK
if (key_idx > 0 && addr && is_broadcast_ether_addr(addr) &&
alg != WPA_ALG_NONE && key_len <= sizeof(wpa_s->last_gtk)) {
os_memcpy(wpa_s->last_gtk, key, key_len);
wpa_s->last_gtk_len = key_len;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_GET_GTK */
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
if (addr && !is_broadcast_ether_addr(addr) &&
!(key_flag & KEY_FLAG_MODIFY)) {
wpa_s->last_tk_alg = alg;
os_memcpy(wpa_s->last_tk_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
wpa_s->last_tk_key_idx = key_idx;
if (key)
os_memcpy(wpa_s->last_tk, key, key_len);
wpa_s->last_tk_len = key_len;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
ret = wpa_drv_set_key(wpa_s, link_id, alg, addr, key_idx, set_tx, seq,
seq_len, key, key_len, key_flag);
if (ret == 0 && (key_idx == 6 || key_idx == 7) &&
alg != WPA_ALG_NONE && key_len > 0)
wpa_s->bigtk_set = true;
return ret;
}
static int wpa_supplicant_mlme_setprotection(void *wpa_s, const u8 *addr,
int protection_type,
int key_type)
{
return wpa_drv_mlme_setprotection(wpa_s, addr, protection_type,
key_type);
}
static struct wpa_ssid * wpas_get_network_ctx(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
void *network_ctx)
{
struct wpa_ssid *ssid;
for (ssid = wpa_s->conf->ssid; ssid; ssid = ssid->next) {
if (network_ctx == ssid)
return ssid;
}
return NULL;
}
static int wpa_supplicant_add_pmkid(void *_wpa_s, void *network_ctx,
const u8 *bssid, const u8 *pmkid,
const u8 *fils_cache_id,
const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len,
u32 pmk_lifetime, u8 pmk_reauth_threshold,
int akmp)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
struct wpa_ssid *ssid;
struct wpa_pmkid_params params;
os_memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
ssid = wpas_get_network_ctx(wpa_s, network_ctx);
if (ssid) {
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, PMKSA_CACHE_ADDED MACSTR " %d",
MAC2STR(bssid), ssid->id);
if ((akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X ||
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384) &&
!ssid->ft_eap_pmksa_caching) {
/* Since we will not be using PMKSA caching for FT-EAP
* within wpa_supplicant to avoid known interop issues
* with APs, do not add this PMKID to the driver either
* so that we won't be hitting those interop issues
* with driver-based RSNE generation. */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"FT: Do not add PMKID entry to the driver since FT-EAP PMKSA caching is not enabled in configuration");
return 0;
}
}
if (ssid && fils_cache_id) {
params.ssid = ssid->ssid;
params.ssid_len = ssid->ssid_len;
params.fils_cache_id = fils_cache_id;
} else {
params.bssid = bssid;
}
params.pmkid = pmkid;
params.pmk = pmk;
params.pmk_len = pmk_len;
params.pmk_lifetime = pmk_lifetime;
params.pmk_reauth_threshold = pmk_reauth_threshold;
return wpa_drv_add_pmkid(wpa_s, &params);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_remove_pmkid(void *_wpa_s, void *network_ctx,
const u8 *bssid, const u8 *pmkid,
const u8 *fils_cache_id)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
struct wpa_ssid *ssid;
struct wpa_pmkid_params params;
os_memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
ssid = wpas_get_network_ctx(wpa_s, network_ctx);
if (ssid)
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, PMKSA_CACHE_REMOVED MACSTR " %d",
MAC2STR(bssid), ssid->id);
if (ssid && fils_cache_id) {
params.ssid = ssid->ssid;
params.ssid_len = ssid->ssid_len;
params.fils_cache_id = fils_cache_id;
} else {
params.bssid = bssid;
}
params.pmkid = pmkid;
return wpa_drv_remove_pmkid(wpa_s, &params);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
static int wpa_supplicant_update_ft_ies(void *ctx, const u8 *md,
const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
if (wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_SME)
return sme_update_ft_ies(wpa_s, md, ies, ies_len);
return wpa_drv_update_ft_ies(wpa_s, md, ies, ies_len);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_send_ft_action(void *ctx, u8 action,
const u8 *target_ap,
const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
int ret;
u8 *data, *pos;
size_t data_len;
if (action != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Unsupported send_ft_action action %d",
action);
return -1;
}
/*
* Action frame payload:
* Category[1] = 6 (Fast BSS Transition)
* Action[1] = 1 (Fast BSS Transition Request)
* STA Address
* Target AP Address
* FT IEs
*/
data_len = 2 + 2 * ETH_ALEN + ies_len;
data = os_malloc(data_len);
if (data == NULL)
return -1;
pos = data;
*pos++ = 0x06; /* FT Action category */
*pos++ = action;
os_memcpy(pos, wpa_s->own_addr, ETH_ALEN);
pos += ETH_ALEN;
os_memcpy(pos, target_ap, ETH_ALEN);
pos += ETH_ALEN;
os_memcpy(pos, ies, ies_len);
ret = wpa_drv_send_action(wpa_s, wpa_s->assoc_freq, 0,
wpa_s->bssid, wpa_s->own_addr, wpa_s->bssid,
data, data_len, 0);
os_free(data);
return ret;
}
static int wpa_supplicant_mark_authenticated(void *ctx, const u8 *target_ap)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
struct wpa_driver_auth_params params;
struct wpa_bss *bss;
bss = wpa_bss_get_bssid(wpa_s, target_ap);
if (bss == NULL)
return -1;
os_memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
params.bssid = target_ap;
params.freq = bss->freq;
params.ssid = bss->ssid;
params.ssid_len = bss->ssid_len;
params.auth_alg = WPA_AUTH_ALG_FT;
params.local_state_change = 1;
return wpa_drv_authenticate(wpa_s, &params);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
#ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
static int wpa_supplicant_tdls_get_capa(void *ctx, int *tdls_supported,
int *tdls_ext_setup,
int *tdls_chan_switch)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
*tdls_supported = 0;
*tdls_ext_setup = 0;
*tdls_chan_switch = 0;
if (!wpa_s->drv_capa_known)
return -1;
if (wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_TDLS_SUPPORT)
*tdls_supported = 1;
if (wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_TDLS_EXTERNAL_SETUP)
*tdls_ext_setup = 1;
if (wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_TDLS_CHANNEL_SWITCH)
*tdls_chan_switch = 1;
return 0;
}
static int wpa_supplicant_send_tdls_mgmt(void *ctx, const u8 *dst,
u8 action_code, u8 dialog_token,
u16 status_code, u32 peer_capab,
int initiator, const u8 *buf,
size_t len, int link_id)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_drv_send_tdls_mgmt(wpa_s, dst, action_code, dialog_token,
status_code, peer_capab, initiator, buf,
len, link_id);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_tdls_oper(void *ctx, int oper, const u8 *peer)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_drv_tdls_oper(wpa_s, oper, peer);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_tdls_peer_addset(
void *ctx, const u8 *peer, int add, u16 aid, u16 capability,
const u8 *supp_rates, size_t supp_rates_len,
const struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities *ht_capab,
const struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities *vht_capab,
const struct ieee80211_he_capabilities *he_capab,
size_t he_capab_len,
const struct ieee80211_he_6ghz_band_cap *he_6ghz_he_capab,
u8 qosinfo, int wmm, const u8 *ext_capab, size_t ext_capab_len,
const u8 *supp_channels, size_t supp_channels_len,
const u8 *supp_oper_classes, size_t supp_oper_classes_len,
const struct ieee80211_eht_capabilities *eht_capab,
size_t eht_capab_len, int mld_link_id)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
struct hostapd_sta_add_params params;
os_memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
params.addr = peer;
params.aid = aid;
params.capability = capability;
params.flags = WPA_STA_TDLS_PEER | WPA_STA_AUTHORIZED;
/*
* Don't rely only on qosinfo for WMM capability. It may be 0 even when
* present. Allow the WMM IE to also indicate QoS support.
*/
if (wmm || qosinfo)
params.flags |= WPA_STA_WMM;
params.ht_capabilities = ht_capab;
params.vht_capabilities = vht_capab;
params.he_capab = he_capab;
params.he_capab_len = he_capab_len;
params.he_6ghz_capab = he_6ghz_he_capab;
params.qosinfo = qosinfo;
params.listen_interval = 0;
params.supp_rates = supp_rates;
params.supp_rates_len = supp_rates_len;
params.set = !add;
params.ext_capab = ext_capab;
params.ext_capab_len = ext_capab_len;
params.supp_channels = supp_channels;
params.supp_channels_len = supp_channels_len;
params.supp_oper_classes = supp_oper_classes;
params.supp_oper_classes_len = supp_oper_classes_len;
params.eht_capab = eht_capab;
params.eht_capab_len = eht_capab_len;
params.mld_link_id = mld_link_id;
return wpa_drv_sta_add(wpa_s, &params);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_tdls_enable_channel_switch(
void *ctx, const u8 *addr, u8 oper_class,
const struct hostapd_freq_params *params)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_drv_tdls_enable_channel_switch(wpa_s, addr, oper_class,
params);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_tdls_disable_channel_switch(void *ctx, const u8 *addr)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_drv_tdls_disable_channel_switch(wpa_s, addr);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_WPA */
enum wpa_ctrl_req_type wpa_supplicant_ctrl_req_from_string(const char *field)
{
if (os_strcmp(field, "IDENTITY") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_IDENTITY;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "PASSWORD") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_PASSWORD;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "NEW_PASSWORD") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_NEW_PASSWORD;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "PIN") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_PIN;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "OTP") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_OTP;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "PASSPHRASE") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_PASSPHRASE;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "SIM") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_SIM;
else if (os_strcmp(field, "PSK_PASSPHRASE") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_PSK_PASSPHRASE;
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
else if (os_strcmp(field, "EXT_CERT_CHECK") == 0)
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_EXT_CERT_CHECK;
return WPA_CTRL_REQ_UNKNOWN;
}
const char * wpa_supplicant_ctrl_req_to_string(enum wpa_ctrl_req_type field,
const char *default_txt,
const char **txt)
{
const char *ret = NULL;
*txt = default_txt;
switch (field) {
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_IDENTITY:
*txt = "Identity";
ret = "IDENTITY";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_PASSWORD:
*txt = "Password";
ret = "PASSWORD";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_NEW_PASSWORD:
*txt = "New Password";
ret = "NEW_PASSWORD";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_PIN:
*txt = "PIN";
ret = "PIN";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_OTP:
ret = "OTP";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EAP_PASSPHRASE:
*txt = "Private key passphrase";
ret = "PASSPHRASE";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_SIM:
ret = "SIM";
break;
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_PSK_PASSPHRASE:
*txt = "PSK or passphrase";
ret = "PSK_PASSPHRASE";
break;
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
case WPA_CTRL_REQ_EXT_CERT_CHECK:
*txt = "External server certificate validation";
ret = "EXT_CERT_CHECK";
break;
default:
break;
}
/* txt needs to be something */
if (*txt == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "No message for request %d", field);
ret = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
void wpas_send_ctrl_req(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid,
const char *field_name, const char *txt)
{
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_CTRL_REQ "%s-%d:%s needed for SSID %s",
field_name, ssid->id, txt,
wpa_ssid_txt(ssid->ssid, ssid->ssid_len));
}
#ifdef IEEE8021X_EAPOL
#if defined(CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE) || !defined(CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG)
static void wpa_supplicant_eap_param_needed(void *ctx,
enum wpa_ctrl_req_type field,
const char *default_txt)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
struct wpa_ssid *ssid = wpa_s->current_ssid;
const char *field_name, *txt = NULL;
if (ssid == NULL)
return;
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
if (field == WPA_CTRL_REQ_EXT_CERT_CHECK)
ssid->eap.pending_ext_cert_check = PENDING_CHECK;
wpas_notify_network_request(wpa_s, ssid, field, default_txt);
field_name = wpa_supplicant_ctrl_req_to_string(field, default_txt,
&txt);
if (field_name == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "Unhandled EAP param %d needed",
field);
return;
}
wpas_notify_eap_status(wpa_s, "eap parameter needed", field_name);
wpas_send_ctrl_req(wpa_s, ssid, field_name, txt);
}
#else /* CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE || !CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
#define wpa_supplicant_eap_param_needed NULL
#endif /* CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE || !CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
#ifdef CONFIG_EAP_PROXY
static void wpa_supplicant_eap_proxy_cb(void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
size_t len;
wpa_s->mnc_len = eapol_sm_get_eap_proxy_imsi(wpa_s->eapol, -1,
wpa_s->imsi, &len);
if (wpa_s->mnc_len > 0) {
wpa_s->imsi[len] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "eap_proxy: IMSI %s (MNC length %d)",
wpa_s->imsi, wpa_s->mnc_len);
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "eap_proxy: IMSI not available");
}
}
static void wpa_sm_sim_state_error_handler(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
{
int i;
struct wpa_ssid *ssid;
const struct eap_method_type *eap_methods;
if (!wpa_s->conf)
return;
for (ssid = wpa_s->conf->ssid; ssid; ssid = ssid->next) {
eap_methods = ssid->eap.eap_methods;
if (!eap_methods)
continue;
for (i = 0; eap_methods[i].method != EAP_TYPE_NONE; i++) {
if (eap_methods[i].vendor == EAP_VENDOR_IETF &&
(eap_methods[i].method == EAP_TYPE_SIM ||
eap_methods[i].method == EAP_TYPE_AKA ||
eap_methods[i].method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)) {
wpa_sm_pmksa_cache_flush(wpa_s->wpa, ssid);
break;
}
}
}
}
static void
wpa_supplicant_eap_proxy_notify_sim_status(void *ctx,
enum eap_proxy_sim_state sim_state)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "eap_proxy: SIM card status %u", sim_state);
switch (sim_state) {
case SIM_STATE_ERROR:
wpa_sm_sim_state_error_handler(wpa_s);
break;
default:
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "eap_proxy: SIM card status unknown");
break;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_EAP_PROXY */
static void wpa_supplicant_port_cb(void *ctx, int authorized)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
#ifdef CONFIG_AP
if (wpa_s->ap_iface) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AP mode active - skip EAPOL Supplicant "
"port status: %s",
authorized ? "Authorized" : "Unauthorized");
return;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AP */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAPOL: Supplicant port status: %s",
authorized ? "Authorized" : "Unauthorized");
wpa_drv_set_supp_port(wpa_s, authorized);
}
static void wpa_supplicant_cert_cb(void *ctx, struct tls_cert_data *cert,
const char *cert_hash)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpas_notify_certification(wpa_s, cert, cert_hash);
}
static void wpa_supplicant_status_cb(void *ctx, const char *status,
const char *parameter)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpas_notify_eap_status(wpa_s, status, parameter);
}
static void wpa_supplicant_eap_error_cb(void *ctx, int error_code)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpas_notify_eap_error(wpa_s, error_code);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_eap_auth_start_cb(void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
if (!wpa_s->new_connection && wpa_s->deny_ptk0_rekey &&
!wpa_sm_ext_key_id_active(wpa_s->wpa)) {
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
"WPA: PTK0 rekey not allowed, reconnecting");
wpa_supplicant_reconnect(wpa_s);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void wpa_supplicant_set_anon_id(void *ctx, const u8 *id, size_t len)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
char *str;
int res;
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP method updated anonymous_identity",
id, len);
if (wpa_s->current_ssid == NULL)
return;
if (id == NULL) {
if (wpa_config_set(wpa_s->current_ssid, "anonymous_identity",
"NULL", 0) < 0)
return;
} else {
str = os_malloc(len * 2 + 1);
if (str == NULL)
return;
wpa_snprintf_hex(str, len * 2 + 1, id, len);
res = wpa_config_set(wpa_s->current_ssid, "anonymous_identity",
str, 0);
os_free(str);
if (res < 0)
return;
}
if (wpa_s->conf->update_config) {
res = wpa_config_write(wpa_s->confname, wpa_s->conf);
if (res) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to update config after "
"anonymous_id update");
}
}
}
Discard unencrypted EAPOL-EAP when TK is set and PMF is enabled RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed implementations that do not really follow this design and there are various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL frames might results in undesired interoperation issues. However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP. Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 16:42:51 +02:00
static bool wpas_encryption_required(void *ctx)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
return wpa_s->wpa &&
wpa_sm_has_ptk_installed(wpa_s->wpa) &&
wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa);
}
#endif /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL */
int wpa_supplicant_init_eapol(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
{
#ifdef IEEE8021X_EAPOL
struct eapol_ctx *ctx;
ctx = os_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate EAPOL context.");
return -1;
}
ctx->ctx = wpa_s;
ctx->msg_ctx = wpa_s;
ctx->eapol_send_ctx = wpa_s;
ctx->preauth = 0;
ctx->eapol_done_cb = wpa_supplicant_notify_eapol_done;
ctx->eapol_send = wpa_supplicant_eapol_send;
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
ctx->set_wep_key = wpa_eapol_set_wep_key;
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS
ctx->set_config_blob = wpa_supplicant_set_config_blob;
ctx->get_config_blob = wpa_supplicant_get_config_blob;
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS */
ctx->aborted_cached = wpa_supplicant_aborted_cached;
#ifndef CONFIG_OPENSC_ENGINE_PATH
ctx->opensc_engine_path = wpa_s->conf->opensc_engine_path;
#endif /* CONFIG_OPENSC_ENGINE_PATH */
#ifndef CONFIG_PKCS11_ENGINE_PATH
ctx->pkcs11_engine_path = wpa_s->conf->pkcs11_engine_path;
#endif /* CONFIG_PKCS11_ENGINE_PATH */
#ifndef CONFIG_PKCS11_MODULE_PATH
ctx->pkcs11_module_path = wpa_s->conf->pkcs11_module_path;
#endif /* CONFIG_PKCS11_MODULE_PATH */
ctx->openssl_ciphers = wpa_s->conf->openssl_ciphers;
ctx->wps = wpa_s->wps;
ctx->eap_param_needed = wpa_supplicant_eap_param_needed;
#ifdef CONFIG_EAP_PROXY
ctx->eap_proxy_cb = wpa_supplicant_eap_proxy_cb;
ctx->eap_proxy_notify_sim_status =
wpa_supplicant_eap_proxy_notify_sim_status;
#endif /* CONFIG_EAP_PROXY */
ctx->port_cb = wpa_supplicant_port_cb;
ctx->cb = wpa_supplicant_eapol_cb;
ctx->cert_cb = wpa_supplicant_cert_cb;
ctx->cert_in_cb = wpa_s->conf->cert_in_cb;
ctx->status_cb = wpa_supplicant_status_cb;
ctx->eap_error_cb = wpa_supplicant_eap_error_cb;
ctx->confirm_auth_cb = wpa_supplicant_eap_auth_start_cb;
ctx->set_anon_id = wpa_supplicant_set_anon_id;
Discard unencrypted EAPOL-EAP when TK is set and PMF is enabled RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed implementations that do not really follow this design and there are various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL frames might results in undesired interoperation issues. However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum, getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP. Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2022-05-07 16:42:51 +02:00
ctx->encryption_required = wpas_encryption_required;
ctx->cb_ctx = wpa_s;
wpa_s->eapol = eapol_sm_init(ctx);
if (wpa_s->eapol == NULL) {
os_free(ctx);
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to initialize EAPOL state "
"machines.");
return -1;
}
#endif /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL */
return 0;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA
static void wpa_supplicant_set_rekey_offload(void *ctx,
const u8 *kek, size_t kek_len,
const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len,
const u8 *replay_ctr)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
wpa_drv_set_rekey_info(wpa_s, kek, kek_len, kck, kck_len, replay_ctr);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_key_mgmt_set_pmk(void *ctx, const u8 *pmk,
size_t pmk_len)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
if (wpa_s->conf->key_mgmt_offload &&
(wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_KEY_MGMT_OFFLOAD))
return wpa_drv_set_key(wpa_s, -1, 0, NULL, 0, 0,
Introduce and add key_flag Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have moved to using the new key_flag. The following flag are defined: KEY_FLAG_MODIFY Set when an already installed key must be updated. So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed keys. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.) KEY_FLAG_RX The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_TX The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP The key is a broadcast or group key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE The key is a pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PMK The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are: KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX WEP key not used as default key (yet). KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT Default WEP or WPA-NONE key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX GTK key valid for RX only. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID support.) KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX. KEY_FLAG_RX_TX Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX. This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using it, yet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
2020-01-04 23:10:04 +01:00
NULL, 0, pmk, pmk_len, KEY_FLAG_PMK);
else
return 0;
}
static void wpa_supplicant_fils_hlp_rx(void *ctx, const u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
const u8 *pkt, size_t pkt_len)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
char *hex;
size_t hexlen;
hexlen = pkt_len * 2 + 1;
hex = os_malloc(hexlen);
if (!hex)
return;
wpa_snprintf_hex(hex, hexlen, pkt, pkt_len);
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, FILS_HLP_RX "dst=" MACSTR " src=" MACSTR
" frame=%s", MAC2STR(dst), MAC2STR(src), hex);
os_free(hex);
}
static int wpa_supplicant_channel_info(void *_wpa_s,
struct wpa_channel_info *ci)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
return wpa_drv_channel_info(wpa_s, ci);
}
static void disable_wpa_wpa2(struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
{
ssid->proto &= ~WPA_PROTO_WPA;
ssid->proto |= WPA_PROTO_RSN;
ssid->key_mgmt &= ~(WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK | WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK |
WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256);
ssid->group_cipher &= ~WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
if (!(ssid->group_cipher & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_GCMP |
WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256)))
ssid->group_cipher |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
ssid->ieee80211w = MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION_REQUIRED;
}
void wpas_transition_disable(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u8 bitmap)
{
struct wpa_ssid *ssid;
int changed = 0;
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, TRANSITION_DISABLE "%02x", bitmap);
ssid = wpa_s->current_ssid;
if (!ssid)
return;
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
if ((bitmap & TRANSITION_DISABLE_WPA3_PERSONAL) &&
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(wpa_s->key_mgmt) &&
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(ssid->key_mgmt) &&
(ssid->ieee80211w != MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION_REQUIRED ||
(ssid->group_cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA3-Personal transition mode disabled based on AP notification");
disable_wpa_wpa2(ssid);
changed = 1;
}
if ((bitmap & TRANSITION_DISABLE_SAE_PK) &&
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(wpa_s->key_mgmt) &&
#ifdef CONFIG_SME
wpa_s->sme.sae.state == SAE_ACCEPTED &&
wpa_s->sme.sae.pk &&
#endif /* CONFIG_SME */
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(ssid->key_mgmt) &&
(ssid->sae_pk != SAE_PK_MODE_ONLY ||
ssid->ieee80211w != MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION_REQUIRED ||
(ssid->group_cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"SAE-PK: SAE authentication without PK disabled based on AP notification");
disable_wpa_wpa2(ssid);
ssid->sae_pk = SAE_PK_MODE_ONLY;
changed = 1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
if ((bitmap & TRANSITION_DISABLE_WPA3_ENTERPRISE) &&
wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(wpa_s->key_mgmt) &&
(ssid->key_mgmt & (WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X |
WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X |
WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256 |
WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA384)) &&
(ssid->ieee80211w != MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION_REQUIRED ||
(ssid->group_cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP))) {
disable_wpa_wpa2(ssid);
changed = 1;
}
if ((bitmap & TRANSITION_DISABLE_ENHANCED_OPEN) &&
wpa_s->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE &&
(ssid->key_mgmt & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) &&
!ssid->owe_only) {
ssid->owe_only = 1;
changed = 1;
}
if (!changed)
return;
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE
if (wpa_s->conf->update_config &&
wpa_config_write(wpa_s->confname, wpa_s->conf))
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to update configuration");
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE */
}
static void wpa_supplicant_transition_disable(void *_wpa_s, u8 bitmap)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
wpas_transition_disable(wpa_s, bitmap);
}
static void wpa_supplicant_store_ptk(void *ctx, const u8 *addr, int cipher,
u32 life_time, const struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
ptksa_cache_add(wpa_s->ptksa, wpa_s->own_addr, addr, cipher, life_time,
ptk, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_WPA */
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
static int wpa_supplicant_set_ltf_keyseed(void *_wpa_s, const u8 *own_addr,
const u8 *peer_addr,
size_t ltf_keyseed_len,
const u8 *ltf_keyseed)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
return wpa_drv_set_secure_ranging_ctx(wpa_s, own_addr, peer_addr, 0, 0,
NULL, ltf_keyseed_len,
ltf_keyseed, 0);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
static void
wpa_supplicant_notify_pmksa_cache_entry(void *_wpa_s,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
wpas_notify_pmk_cache_added(wpa_s, entry);
}
static void wpa_supplicant_ssid_verified(void *_wpa_s)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = _wpa_s;
wpa_s->ssid_verified = true;
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, "RSN: SSID matched expected value");
}
int wpa_supplicant_init_wpa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA
struct wpa_sm_ctx *ctx;
wpa_s->ptksa = ptksa_cache_init();
if (!wpa_s->ptksa) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate PTKSA");
return -1;
}
ctx = os_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate WPA context.");
ptksa_cache_deinit(wpa_s->ptksa);
wpa_s->ptksa = NULL;
return -1;
}
ctx->ctx = wpa_s;
ctx->msg_ctx = wpa_s;
ctx->set_state = _wpa_supplicant_set_state;
ctx->get_state = _wpa_supplicant_get_state;
ctx->deauthenticate = _wpa_supplicant_deauthenticate;
ctx->reconnect = _wpa_supplicant_reconnect;
ctx->set_key = wpa_supplicant_set_key;
ctx->get_network_ctx = wpa_supplicant_get_network_ctx;
ctx->get_bssid = wpa_supplicant_get_bssid;
ctx->ether_send = _wpa_ether_send;
ctx->get_beacon_ie = wpa_supplicant_get_beacon_ie;
ctx->alloc_eapol = _wpa_alloc_eapol;
ctx->cancel_auth_timeout = _wpa_supplicant_cancel_auth_timeout;
ctx->add_pmkid = wpa_supplicant_add_pmkid;
ctx->remove_pmkid = wpa_supplicant_remove_pmkid;
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS
ctx->set_config_blob = wpa_supplicant_set_config_blob;
ctx->get_config_blob = wpa_supplicant_get_config_blob;
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS */
ctx->mlme_setprotection = wpa_supplicant_mlme_setprotection;
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
ctx->update_ft_ies = wpa_supplicant_update_ft_ies;
ctx->send_ft_action = wpa_supplicant_send_ft_action;
ctx->mark_authenticated = wpa_supplicant_mark_authenticated;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
#ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
ctx->tdls_get_capa = wpa_supplicant_tdls_get_capa;
ctx->send_tdls_mgmt = wpa_supplicant_send_tdls_mgmt;
ctx->tdls_oper = wpa_supplicant_tdls_oper;
ctx->tdls_peer_addset = wpa_supplicant_tdls_peer_addset;
ctx->tdls_enable_channel_switch =
wpa_supplicant_tdls_enable_channel_switch;
ctx->tdls_disable_channel_switch =
wpa_supplicant_tdls_disable_channel_switch;
#endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
ctx->set_rekey_offload = wpa_supplicant_set_rekey_offload;
ctx->key_mgmt_set_pmk = wpa_supplicant_key_mgmt_set_pmk;
ctx->fils_hlp_rx = wpa_supplicant_fils_hlp_rx;
ctx->channel_info = wpa_supplicant_channel_info;
ctx->transition_disable = wpa_supplicant_transition_disable;
ctx->store_ptk = wpa_supplicant_store_ptk;
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
ctx->set_ltf_keyseed = wpa_supplicant_set_ltf_keyseed;
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
ctx->notify_pmksa_cache_entry = wpa_supplicant_notify_pmksa_cache_entry;
ctx->ssid_verified = wpa_supplicant_ssid_verified;
wpa_s->wpa = wpa_sm_init(ctx);
if (wpa_s->wpa == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Failed to initialize WPA state machine");
os_free(ctx);
ptksa_cache_deinit(wpa_s->ptksa);
wpa_s->ptksa = NULL;
return -1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_WPA */
return 0;
}
void wpa_supplicant_rsn_supp_set_config(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
{
struct rsn_supp_config conf;
if (ssid) {
os_memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf));
conf.network_ctx = ssid;
conf.allowed_pairwise_cipher = ssid->pairwise_cipher;
#ifdef IEEE8021X_EAPOL
conf.proactive_key_caching = ssid->proactive_key_caching < 0 ?
wpa_s->conf->okc : ssid->proactive_key_caching;
conf.eap_workaround = ssid->eap_workaround;
conf.eap_conf_ctx = &ssid->eap;
#endif /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL */
conf.ssid = ssid->ssid;
conf.ssid_len = ssid->ssid_len;
conf.wpa_ptk_rekey = ssid->wpa_ptk_rekey;
conf.wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey = ssid->wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey;
conf.owe_ptk_workaround = ssid->owe_ptk_workaround;
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
if (ssid->p2p_group && wpa_s->current_bss &&
!wpa_s->p2p_disable_ip_addr_req) {
struct wpabuf *p2p;
p2p = wpa_bss_get_vendor_ie_multi(wpa_s->current_bss,
P2P_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
if (p2p) {
u8 group_capab;
group_capab = p2p_get_group_capab(p2p);
if (group_capab &
P2P_GROUP_CAPAB_IP_ADDR_ALLOCATION)
conf.p2p = 1;
wpabuf_free(p2p);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
conf.wpa_rsc_relaxation = wpa_s->conf->wpa_rsc_relaxation;
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(wpa_s->key_mgmt))
conf.fils_cache_id =
wpa_bss_get_fils_cache_id(wpa_s->current_bss);
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
if ((wpa_s->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_BEACON_PROTECTION) ||
(wpa_s->drv_flags2 &
WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS2_BEACON_PROTECTION_CLIENT))
conf.beacon_prot = ssid->beacon_prot;
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
conf.force_kdk_derivation = wpa_s->conf->force_kdk_derivation;
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
}
wpa_sm_set_config(wpa_s->wpa, ssid ? &conf : NULL);
}