2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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/*
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* WPA/RSN - Shared functions for supplicant and authenticator
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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* Copyright (c) 2002-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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*
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2012-02-11 15:46:35 +01:00
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "common.h"
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2009-11-29 22:04:43 +01:00
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#include "crypto/md5.h"
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#include "crypto/sha1.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
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#include "crypto/sha384.h"
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2009-11-29 22:04:43 +01:00
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#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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#include "ieee802_11_defs.h"
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#include "defs.h"
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#include "wpa_common.h"
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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static unsigned int wpa_kck_len(int akmp)
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{
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2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
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if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192)
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return 24;
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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return 16;
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}
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static unsigned int wpa_kek_len(int akmp)
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{
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2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
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if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192)
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return 32;
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return 16;
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}
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unsigned int wpa_mic_len(int akmp)
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{
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if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192)
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return 24;
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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return 16;
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}
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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/**
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* wpa_eapol_key_mic - Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC
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* @key: EAPOL-Key Key Confirmation Key (KCK)
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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* @key_len: KCK length in octets
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2014-11-16 14:40:02 +01:00
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* @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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* @ver: Key descriptor version (WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_*)
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* @buf: Pointer to the beginning of the EAPOL header (version field)
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* @len: Length of the EAPOL frame (from EAPOL header to the end of the frame)
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* @mic: Pointer to the buffer to which the EAPOL-Key MIC is written
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* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
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*
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* Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC for an EAPOL-Key packet. The EAPOL-Key MIC field has
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* to be cleared (all zeroes) when calling this function.
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*
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* Note: 'IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames' has an error in the
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* description of the Key MIC calculation. It includes packet data from the
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* beginning of the EAPOL-Key header, not EAPOL header. This incorrect change
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* happened during final editing of the standard and the correct behavior is
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* defined in the last draft (IEEE 802.11i/D10).
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*/
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, int akmp, int ver,
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const u8 *buf, size_t len, u8 *mic)
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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{
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2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
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u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN];
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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switch (ver) {
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2012-08-16 19:03:17 +02:00
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#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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return hmac_md5(key, key_len, buf, len, mic);
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2012-08-16 19:03:17 +02:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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if (hmac_sha1(key, key_len, buf, len, hash))
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2009-08-16 21:35:15 +02:00
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return -1;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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os_memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN);
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break;
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2009-02-19 18:49:34 +01:00
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#if defined(CONFIG_IEEE80211R) || defined(CONFIG_IEEE80211W)
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC:
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return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic);
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2009-02-19 18:49:34 +01:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R || CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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2013-07-23 20:23:25 +02:00
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED:
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2014-11-16 14:40:02 +01:00
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switch (akmp) {
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#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
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case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN:
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return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic);
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2013-07-23 20:23:25 +02:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
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2014-11-16 14:40:02 +01:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
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case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B:
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash))
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2014-11-16 14:40:02 +01:00
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return -1;
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os_memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN);
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break;
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#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
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2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB192
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case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192:
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if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash))
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return -1;
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os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24);
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break;
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#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */
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2014-11-16 14:40:02 +01:00
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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break;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* wpa_pmk_to_ptk - Calculate PTK from PMK, addresses, and nonces
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* @pmk: Pairwise master key
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* @pmk_len: Length of PMK
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* @label: Label to use in derivation
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* @addr1: AA or SA
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* @addr2: SA or AA
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* @nonce1: ANonce or SNonce
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* @nonce2: SNonce or ANonce
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* @ptk: Buffer for pairwise transient key
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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* @akmp: Negotiated AKM
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* @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher
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* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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*
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* IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
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* PTK = PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion",
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* Min(AA, SA) || Max(AA, SA) ||
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* Min(ANonce, SNonce) || Max(ANonce, SNonce))
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*
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* STK = PRF-X(SMK, "Peer key expansion",
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* Min(MAC_I, MAC_P) || Max(MAC_I, MAC_P) ||
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* Min(INonce, PNonce) || Max(INonce, PNonce))
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*/
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const char *label,
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const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2,
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const u8 *nonce1, const u8 *nonce2,
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struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int akmp, int cipher)
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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{
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u8 data[2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN];
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN];
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size_t ptk_len;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
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os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
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os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
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} else {
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os_memcpy(data, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
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os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
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}
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if (os_memcmp(nonce1, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
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os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce2,
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WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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} else {
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os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce1,
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WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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}
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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ptk->kck_len = wpa_kck_len(akmp);
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ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp);
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ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher);
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ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len;
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2008-08-31 21:57:28 +02:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp))
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2008-08-31 21:57:28 +02:00
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sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, sizeof(data),
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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tmp, ptk_len);
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2008-08-31 21:57:28 +02:00
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else
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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sha1_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, sizeof(data), tmp, ptk_len);
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation - A1=" MACSTR " A2=" MACSTR,
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MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2));
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2011-01-15 15:57:08 +01:00
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Nonce1", nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Nonce2", nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK", pmk, pmk_len);
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK", tmp, ptk_len);
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os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, ptk->kck_len);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KCK", ptk->kck, ptk->kck_len);
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os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + ptk->kck_len, ptk->kek_len);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len);
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os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len, ptk->tk_len);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len);
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os_memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
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return 0;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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int wpa_ft_mic(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *sta_addr,
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const u8 *ap_addr, u8 transaction_seqnum,
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const u8 *mdie, size_t mdie_len,
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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const u8 *ftie, size_t ftie_len,
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const u8 *rsnie, size_t rsnie_len,
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const u8 *ric, size_t ric_len, u8 *mic)
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{
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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const u8 *addr[9];
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size_t len[9];
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size_t i, num_elem = 0;
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u8 zero_mic[16];
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
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if (kck_len != 16) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "FT: Unsupported KCK length %u",
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(unsigned int) kck_len);
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return -1;
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}
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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addr[num_elem] = sta_addr;
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len[num_elem] = ETH_ALEN;
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num_elem++;
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addr[num_elem] = ap_addr;
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len[num_elem] = ETH_ALEN;
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num_elem++;
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addr[num_elem] = &transaction_seqnum;
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len[num_elem] = 1;
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num_elem++;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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if (rsnie) {
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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addr[num_elem] = rsnie;
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len[num_elem] = rsnie_len;
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num_elem++;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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}
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if (mdie) {
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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addr[num_elem] = mdie;
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len[num_elem] = mdie_len;
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num_elem++;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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}
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if (ftie) {
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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if (ftie_len < 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie))
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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return -1;
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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/* IE hdr and mic_control */
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addr[num_elem] = ftie;
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len[num_elem] = 2 + 2;
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num_elem++;
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/* MIC field with all zeros */
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os_memset(zero_mic, 0, sizeof(zero_mic));
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addr[num_elem] = zero_mic;
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len[num_elem] = sizeof(zero_mic);
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num_elem++;
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/* Rest of FTIE */
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addr[num_elem] = ftie + 2 + 2 + 16;
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len[num_elem] = ftie_len - (2 + 2 + 16);
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num_elem++;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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}
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if (ric) {
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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addr[num_elem] = ric;
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len[num_elem] = ric_len;
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num_elem++;
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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}
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2015-03-15 19:18:14 +01:00
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for (i = 0; i < num_elem; i++)
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "FT: MIC data", addr[i], len[i]);
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if (omac1_aes_128_vector(kck, num_elem, addr, len, mic))
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2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
|
2011-07-16 10:13:39 +02:00
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static int wpa_ft_parse_ftie(const u8 *ie, size_t ie_len,
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struct wpa_ft_ies *parse)
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{
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const u8 *end, *pos;
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parse->ftie = ie;
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parse->ftie_len = ie_len;
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pos = ie + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie);
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end = ie + ie_len;
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|
|
while (pos + 2 <= end && pos + 2 + pos[1] <= end) {
|
|
|
|
switch (pos[0]) {
|
|
|
|
case FTIE_SUBELEM_R1KH_ID:
|
|
|
|
if (pos[1] != FT_R1KH_ID_LEN) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Invalid R1KH-ID "
|
|
|
|
"length in FTIE: %d", pos[1]);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse->r1kh_id = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case FTIE_SUBELEM_GTK:
|
|
|
|
parse->gtk = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
parse->gtk_len = pos[1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case FTIE_SUBELEM_R0KH_ID:
|
|
|
|
if (pos[1] < 1 || pos[1] > FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Invalid R0KH-ID "
|
|
|
|
"length in FTIE: %d", pos[1]);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse->r0kh_id = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
parse->r0kh_id_len = pos[1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
case FTIE_SUBELEM_IGTK:
|
|
|
|
parse->igtk = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
parse->igtk_len = pos[1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos += 2 + pos[1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_ft_parse_ies(const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len,
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ft_ies *parse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 *end, *pos;
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data data;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
const struct rsn_ftie *ftie;
|
|
|
|
int prot_ie_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memset(parse, 0, sizeof(*parse));
|
|
|
|
if (ies == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = ies;
|
|
|
|
end = ies + ies_len;
|
|
|
|
while (pos + 2 <= end && pos + 2 + pos[1] <= end) {
|
|
|
|
switch (pos[0]) {
|
|
|
|
case WLAN_EID_RSN:
|
|
|
|
parse->rsn = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
parse->rsn_len = pos[1];
|
|
|
|
ret = wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(parse->rsn - 2,
|
|
|
|
parse->rsn_len + 2,
|
|
|
|
&data);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse "
|
|
|
|
"RSN IE: %d", ret);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data.num_pmkid == 1 && data.pmkid)
|
|
|
|
parse->rsn_pmkid = data.pmkid;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN:
|
2015-04-19 15:28:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (pos[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2011-07-16 10:13:39 +02:00
|
|
|
parse->mdie = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
parse->mdie_len = pos[1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WLAN_EID_FAST_BSS_TRANSITION:
|
|
|
|
if (pos[1] < sizeof(*ftie))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ftie = (const struct rsn_ftie *) (pos + 2);
|
|
|
|
prot_ie_count = ftie->mic_control[1];
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_ft_parse_ftie(pos + 2, pos[1], parse) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL:
|
2015-04-19 15:28:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (pos[1] != 5)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-07-16 10:13:39 +02:00
|
|
|
parse->tie = pos + 2;
|
|
|
|
parse->tie_len = pos[1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WLAN_EID_RIC_DATA:
|
|
|
|
if (parse->ric == NULL)
|
|
|
|
parse->ric = pos;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos += 2 + pos[1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prot_ie_count == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* no MIC */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check that the protected IE count matches with IEs included in the
|
|
|
|
* frame.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (parse->rsn)
|
|
|
|
prot_ie_count--;
|
|
|
|
if (parse->mdie)
|
|
|
|
prot_ie_count--;
|
|
|
|
if (parse->ftie)
|
|
|
|
prot_ie_count--;
|
|
|
|
if (prot_ie_count < 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Some required IEs not included in "
|
|
|
|
"the protected IE count");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prot_ie_count == 0 && parse->ric) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RIC IE(s) in the frame, but not "
|
|
|
|
"included in protected IE count");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determine the end of the RIC IE(s) */
|
|
|
|
pos = parse->ric;
|
|
|
|
while (pos && pos + 2 <= end && pos + 2 + pos[1] <= end &&
|
|
|
|
prot_ie_count) {
|
|
|
|
prot_ie_count--;
|
|
|
|
pos += 2 + pos[1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse->ric_len = pos - parse->ric;
|
|
|
|
if (prot_ie_count) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: %d protected IEs missing from "
|
|
|
|
"frame", (int) prot_ie_count);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsn_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_NONE;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
2012-08-29 10:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP;
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256;
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
2008-08-31 21:57:28 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SHA256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
2012-09-30 18:51:07 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
|
2014-11-16 12:20:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B;
|
2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B_192)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192;
|
2015-03-17 21:52:29 +01:00
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OSEN)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-01 22:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_valid_group(int cipher)
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return wpa_cipher_valid_pairwise(cipher) ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_valid_mgmt_group(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128 ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256 ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn - Parse RSN IE
|
|
|
|
* @rsn_ie: Buffer containing RSN IE
|
|
|
|
* @rsn_ie_len: RSN IE buffer length (including IE number and length octets)
|
|
|
|
* @data: Pointer to structure that will be filled in with parsed data
|
|
|
|
* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(const u8 *rsn_ie, size_t rsn_ie_len,
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
int left;
|
|
|
|
int i, count;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
|
|
|
|
data->proto = WPA_PROTO_RSN;
|
|
|
|
data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
|
|
|
|
data->capabilities = 0;
|
|
|
|
data->pmkid = NULL;
|
|
|
|
data->num_pmkid = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
data->mgmt_group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC;
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
data->mgmt_group_cipher = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rsn_ie_len == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* No RSN IE - fail silently */
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rsn_ie_len < sizeof(struct rsn_ie_hdr)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu",
|
|
|
|
__func__, (unsigned long) rsn_ie_len);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 21:52:29 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rsn_ie_len >= 6 && rsn_ie[1] >= 4 &&
|
|
|
|
rsn_ie[1] == rsn_ie_len - 2 &&
|
|
|
|
WPA_GET_BE32(&rsn_ie[2]) == OSEN_IE_VENDOR_TYPE) {
|
|
|
|
pos = rsn_ie + 6;
|
|
|
|
left = rsn_ie_len - 6;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 21:52:29 +01:00
|
|
|
data->proto = WPA_PROTO_OSEN;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
const struct rsn_ie_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdr = (const struct rsn_ie_hdr *) rsn_ie;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 21:52:29 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_RSN ||
|
|
|
|
hdr->len != rsn_ie_len - 2 ||
|
|
|
|
WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != RSN_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version",
|
|
|
|
__func__);
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
|
left = rsn_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) {
|
|
|
|
data->group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!wpa_cipher_valid_group(data->group_cipher)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: invalid group cipher 0x%x",
|
|
|
|
__func__, data->group_cipher);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
} else if (left > 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much",
|
|
|
|
__func__, left);
|
|
|
|
return -3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
|
|
|
data->pairwise_cipher = 0;
|
|
|
|
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
2014-11-23 20:08:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (count == 0 || count > left / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), "
|
|
|
|
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
|
|
|
|
return -4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
|
|
|
data->pairwise_cipher |= rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (data->pairwise_cipher & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: AES-128-CMAC used as "
|
|
|
|
"pairwise cipher", __func__);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
} else if (left == 1) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)",
|
|
|
|
__func__);
|
|
|
|
return -5;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
|
|
|
data->key_mgmt = 0;
|
|
|
|
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
2014-11-23 20:08:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (count == 0 || count > left / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), "
|
|
|
|
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
|
|
|
|
return -6;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
|
|
|
data->key_mgmt |= rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (left == 1) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)",
|
|
|
|
__func__);
|
|
|
|
return -7;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
|
|
|
data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
2014-11-23 17:43:59 +01:00
|
|
|
u16 num_pmkid = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
2014-11-23 17:43:59 +01:00
|
|
|
if (num_pmkid > (unsigned int) left / PMKID_LEN) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: PMKID underflow "
|
2014-11-23 17:43:59 +01:00
|
|
|
"(num_pmkid=%u left=%d)",
|
|
|
|
__func__, num_pmkid, left);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->num_pmkid = 0;
|
|
|
|
return -9;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-11-23 17:43:59 +01:00
|
|
|
data->num_pmkid = num_pmkid;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pmkid = pos;
|
|
|
|
pos += data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 4) {
|
|
|
|
data->mgmt_group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!wpa_cipher_valid_mgmt_group(data->mgmt_group_cipher)) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Unsupported management "
|
|
|
|
"group cipher 0x%x", __func__,
|
|
|
|
data->mgmt_group_cipher);
|
|
|
|
return -10;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left > 0) {
|
2014-03-02 14:35:11 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn: ignore trailing bytes",
|
|
|
|
pos, left);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-12 20:52:14 +01:00
|
|
|
static int wpa_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_NONE;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
|
|
|
|
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_NONE)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPA_NONE;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa(const u8 *wpa_ie, size_t wpa_ie_len,
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct wpa_ie_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
|
const u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
int left;
|
|
|
|
int i, count;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
|
|
|
|
data->proto = WPA_PROTO_WPA;
|
|
|
|
data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
|
|
|
|
data->capabilities = 0;
|
|
|
|
data->pmkid = NULL;
|
|
|
|
data->num_pmkid = 0;
|
|
|
|
data->mgmt_group_cipher = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_ie_len < sizeof(struct wpa_ie_hdr)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu",
|
|
|
|
__func__, (unsigned long) wpa_ie_len);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdr = (const struct wpa_ie_hdr *) wpa_ie;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC ||
|
|
|
|
hdr->len != wpa_ie_len - 2 ||
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(hdr->oui) != WPA_OUI_TYPE ||
|
|
|
|
WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != WPA_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version",
|
|
|
|
__func__);
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
|
left = wpa_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) {
|
|
|
|
data->group_cipher = wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
} else if (left > 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much",
|
|
|
|
__func__, left);
|
|
|
|
return -3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
|
|
|
data->pairwise_cipher = 0;
|
|
|
|
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
2014-11-23 20:08:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (count == 0 || count > left / WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) {
|
2010-11-12 20:52:14 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), "
|
|
|
|
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
|
|
|
|
return -4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
|
|
|
data->pairwise_cipher |= wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (left == 1) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)",
|
|
|
|
__func__);
|
|
|
|
return -5;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
|
|
|
data->key_mgmt = 0;
|
|
|
|
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
2014-11-23 20:08:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (count == 0 || count > left / WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) {
|
2010-11-12 20:52:14 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), "
|
|
|
|
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
|
|
|
|
return -6;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
|
|
|
data->key_mgmt |= wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (left == 1) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)",
|
|
|
|
__func__);
|
|
|
|
return -7;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left >= 2) {
|
|
|
|
data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
|
|
left -= 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left > 0) {
|
2014-03-02 14:35:11 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa: ignore trailing bytes",
|
|
|
|
pos, left);
|
2010-11-12 20:52:14 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_derive_pmk_r0 - Derive PMK-R0 and PMKR0Name
|
|
|
|
*
|
2008-08-15 10:25:24 +02:00
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.3
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void wpa_derive_pmk_r0(const u8 *xxkey, size_t xxkey_len,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *mdid, const u8 *r0kh_id, size_t r0kh_id_len,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *s0kh_id, u8 *pmk_r0, u8 *pmk_r0_name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-04-07 11:38:56 +02:00
|
|
|
u8 buf[1 + SSID_MAX_LEN + MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN + 1 +
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN + ETH_ALEN];
|
|
|
|
u8 *pos, r0_key_data[48], hash[32];
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[2];
|
|
|
|
size_t len[2];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* R0-Key-Data = KDF-384(XXKey, "FT-R0",
|
|
|
|
* SSIDlength || SSID || MDID || R0KHlength ||
|
|
|
|
* R0KH-ID || S0KH-ID)
|
|
|
|
* XXKey is either the second 256 bits of MSK or PSK.
|
|
|
|
* PMK-R0 = L(R0-Key-Data, 0, 256)
|
|
|
|
* PMK-R0Name-Salt = L(R0-Key-Data, 256, 128)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-04-07 11:38:56 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ssid_len > SSID_MAX_LEN || r0kh_id_len > FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN)
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
pos = buf;
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = ssid_len;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ssid, ssid_len);
|
|
|
|
pos += ssid_len;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, mdid, MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = r0kh_id_len;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, r0kh_id, r0kh_id_len);
|
|
|
|
pos += r0kh_id_len;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, s0kh_id, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sha256_prf(xxkey, xxkey_len, "FT-R0", buf, pos - buf,
|
|
|
|
r0_key_data, sizeof(r0_key_data));
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pmk_r0, r0_key_data, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PMKR0Name = Truncate-128(SHA-256("FT-R0N" || PMK-R0Name-Salt)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = (const u8 *) "FT-R0N";
|
|
|
|
len[0] = 6;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = r0_key_data + PMK_LEN;
|
|
|
|
len[1] = 16;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sha256_vector(2, addr, len, hash);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pmk_r0_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name - Derive PMKR1Name
|
|
|
|
*
|
2008-08-15 10:25:24 +02:00
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.4
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(const u8 *pmk_r0_name, const u8 *r1kh_id,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *s1kh_id, u8 *pmk_r1_name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 hash[32];
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[4];
|
|
|
|
size_t len[4];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PMKR1Name = Truncate-128(SHA-256("FT-R1N" || PMKR0Name ||
|
|
|
|
* R1KH-ID || S1KH-ID))
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = (const u8 *) "FT-R1N";
|
|
|
|
len[0] = 6;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = pmk_r0_name;
|
|
|
|
len[1] = WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN;
|
|
|
|
addr[2] = r1kh_id;
|
|
|
|
len[2] = FT_R1KH_ID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
addr[3] = s1kh_id;
|
|
|
|
len[3] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sha256_vector(4, addr, len, hash);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pmk_r1_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_derive_pmk_r1 - Derive PMK-R1 and PMKR1Name from PMK-R0
|
|
|
|
*
|
2008-08-15 10:25:24 +02:00
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.4
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void wpa_derive_pmk_r1(const u8 *pmk_r0, const u8 *pmk_r0_name,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *r1kh_id, const u8 *s1kh_id,
|
|
|
|
u8 *pmk_r1, u8 *pmk_r1_name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 buf[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN + ETH_ALEN];
|
|
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* PMK-R1 = KDF-256(PMK-R0, "FT-R1", R1KH-ID || S1KH-ID) */
|
|
|
|
pos = buf;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, r1kh_id, FT_R1KH_ID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += FT_R1KH_ID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, s1kh_id, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sha256_prf(pmk_r0, PMK_LEN, "FT-R1", buf, pos - buf, pmk_r1, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name, r1kh_id, s1kh_id, pmk_r1_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk - Derive PTK and PTKName from PMK-R1
|
|
|
|
*
|
2008-08-15 10:25:24 +02:00
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.5
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
|
|
|
int wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk_r1, const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *bssid,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *pmk_r1_name,
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ptk *ptk, u8 *ptk_name, int akmp, int cipher)
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 buf[2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN];
|
|
|
|
u8 *pos, hash[32];
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[6];
|
|
|
|
size_t len[6];
|
2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
|
|
|
u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN];
|
|
|
|
size_t ptk_len;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PTK = KDF-PTKLen(PMK-R1, "FT-PTK", SNonce || ANonce ||
|
|
|
|
* BSSID || STA-ADDR)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pos = buf;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, bssid, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, sta_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
|
|
|
ptk->kck_len = wpa_kck_len(akmp);
|
|
|
|
ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp);
|
|
|
|
ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher);
|
|
|
|
ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sha256_prf(pmk_r1, PMK_LEN, "FT-PTK", buf, pos - buf, tmp, ptk_len);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PTKName = Truncate-128(SHA-256(PMKR1Name || "FT-PTKN" || SNonce ||
|
|
|
|
* ANonce || BSSID || STA-ADDR))
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = pmk_r1_name;
|
|
|
|
len[0] = WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = (const u8 *) "FT-PTKN";
|
|
|
|
len[1] = 7;
|
|
|
|
addr[2] = snonce;
|
|
|
|
len[2] = WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
addr[3] = anonce;
|
|
|
|
len[3] = WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
addr[4] = bssid;
|
|
|
|
len[4] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
addr[5] = sta_addr;
|
|
|
|
len[5] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sha256_vector(6, addr, len, hash);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(ptk_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
2015-01-25 15:49:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, ptk->kck_len);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + ptk->kck_len, ptk->kek_len);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len, ptk->tk_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KCK", ptk->kck, ptk->kck_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTKName", ptk_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
2009-01-14 20:31:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* rsn_pmkid - Calculate PMK identifier
|
|
|
|
* @pmk: Pairwise master key
|
|
|
|
* @pmk_len: Length of pmk in bytes
|
|
|
|
* @aa: Authenticator address
|
|
|
|
* @spa: Supplicant address
|
|
|
|
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID
|
|
|
|
* @use_sha256: Whether to use SHA256-based KDF
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
|
|
|
|
* PMKID = HMAC-SHA1-128(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void rsn_pmkid(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *aa, const u8 *spa,
|
|
|
|
u8 *pmkid, int use_sha256)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *title = "PMK Name";
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[3];
|
|
|
|
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN };
|
|
|
|
unsigned char hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = (u8 *) title;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = aa;
|
|
|
|
addr[2] = spa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (use_sha256)
|
|
|
|
hmac_sha256_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
hmac_sha1_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 17:35:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-16 12:22:46 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* rsn_pmkid_suite_b - Calculate PMK identifier for Suite B AKM
|
|
|
|
* @kck: Key confirmation key
|
|
|
|
* @kck_len: Length of kck in bytes
|
|
|
|
* @aa: Authenticator address
|
|
|
|
* @spa: Supplicant address
|
|
|
|
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID
|
|
|
|
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 - 11.6.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy
|
|
|
|
* PMKID = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-256(KCK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA))
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int rsn_pmkid_suite_b(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *aa,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *spa, u8 *pmkid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *title = "PMK Name";
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[3];
|
|
|
|
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN };
|
|
|
|
unsigned char hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = (u8 *) title;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = aa;
|
|
|
|
addr[2] = spa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hmac_sha256_vector(kck, kck_len, 3, addr, len, hash) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB192
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192 - Calculate PMK identifier for Suite B AKM
|
|
|
|
* @kck: Key confirmation key
|
|
|
|
* @kck_len: Length of kck in bytes
|
|
|
|
* @aa: Authenticator address
|
|
|
|
* @spa: Supplicant address
|
|
|
|
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID
|
|
|
|
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 - 11.6.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy
|
|
|
|
* PMKID = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-384(KCK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA))
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *aa,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *spa, u8 *pmkid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *title = "PMK Name";
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[3];
|
|
|
|
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN };
|
|
|
|
unsigned char hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = (u8 *) title;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = aa;
|
|
|
|
addr[2] = spa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hmac_sha384_vector(kck, kck_len, 3, addr, len, hash) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-16 17:35:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_cipher_txt - Convert cipher suite to a text string
|
|
|
|
* @cipher: Cipher suite (WPA_CIPHER_* enum)
|
|
|
|
* Returns: Pointer to a text string of the cipher suite name
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const char * wpa_cipher_txt(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return "NONE";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
|
|
|
|
return "WEP-40";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
|
|
|
|
return "WEP-104";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return "TKIP";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
return "CCMP";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return "CCMP+TKIP";
|
2012-08-29 10:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP:
|
|
|
|
return "GCMP";
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256:
|
|
|
|
return "GCMP-256";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256:
|
|
|
|
return "CCMP-256";
|
2013-07-23 20:24:05 +02:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED:
|
|
|
|
return "GTK_NOT_USED";
|
2009-10-16 17:35:45 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_key_mgmt_txt - Convert key management suite to a text string
|
|
|
|
* @key_mgmt: Key management suite (WPA_KEY_MGMT_* enum)
|
|
|
|
* @proto: WPA/WPA2 version (WPA_PROTO_*)
|
|
|
|
* Returns: Pointer to a text string of the key management suite name
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const char * wpa_key_mgmt_txt(int key_mgmt, int proto)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (key_mgmt) {
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X:
|
|
|
|
if (proto == (WPA_PROTO_RSN | WPA_PROTO_WPA))
|
|
|
|
return "WPA2+WPA/IEEE 802.1X/EAP";
|
|
|
|
return proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
"WPA2/IEEE 802.1X/EAP" : "WPA/IEEE 802.1X/EAP";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK:
|
|
|
|
if (proto == (WPA_PROTO_RSN | WPA_PROTO_WPA))
|
|
|
|
return "WPA2-PSK+WPA-PSK";
|
|
|
|
return proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
"WPA2-PSK" : "WPA-PSK";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return "NONE";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_NO_WPA:
|
|
|
|
return "IEEE 802.1X (no WPA)";
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X:
|
|
|
|
return "FT-EAP";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK:
|
|
|
|
return "FT-PSK";
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
return "WPA2-EAP-SHA256";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
return "WPA2-PSK-SHA256";
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
2014-12-12 12:40:07 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPS:
|
|
|
|
return "WPS";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE:
|
|
|
|
return "SAE";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE:
|
|
|
|
return "FT-SAE";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN:
|
|
|
|
return "OSEN";
|
2014-11-16 12:20:51 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B:
|
|
|
|
return "WPA2-EAP-SUITE-B";
|
2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192:
|
|
|
|
return "WPA2-EAP-SUITE-B-192";
|
2009-10-16 17:35:45 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-04-07 20:04:13 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-31 18:53:25 +02:00
|
|
|
u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_FT_8021X;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_FT_PSK;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_8021X;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_8021X;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_PSK;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_CCKM)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_CCKM;
|
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN;
|
2014-11-16 12:20:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SUITE_B;
|
2015-01-25 22:32:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192)
|
|
|
|
return WLAN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SUITE_B_192;
|
2014-07-31 18:53:25 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-07 20:04:13 +02:00
|
|
|
int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_assoc,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *ie1, size_t ie1len,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *ie2, size_t ie2len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-04-10 15:47:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ie1 == NULL || ie2 == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-07 20:04:13 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ie1len == ie2len && os_memcmp(ie1, ie2, ie1len) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* identical IEs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
|
if (ft_initial_assoc) {
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data ie1d, ie2d;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The PMKID-List in RSN IE is different between Beacon/Probe
|
|
|
|
* Response/(Re)Association Request frames and EAPOL-Key
|
|
|
|
* messages in FT initial mobility domain association. Allow
|
|
|
|
* for this, but verify that other parts of the RSN IEs are
|
|
|
|
* identical.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie1, ie1len, &ie1d) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie2, ie2len, &ie2d) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (ie1d.proto == ie2d.proto &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.pairwise_cipher == ie2d.pairwise_cipher &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.group_cipher == ie2d.group_cipher &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.key_mgmt == ie2d.key_mgmt &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.capabilities == ie2d.capabilities &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.mgmt_group_cipher == ie2d.mgmt_group_cipher)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
|
int wpa_insert_pmkid(u8 *ies, size_t ies_len, const u8 *pmkid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 *start, *end, *rpos, *rend;
|
|
|
|
int added = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start = ies;
|
|
|
|
end = ies + ies_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (start < end) {
|
|
|
|
if (*start == WLAN_EID_RSN)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
start += 2 + start[1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (start >= end) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Could not find RSN IE in "
|
|
|
|
"IEs data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RSN IE before modification",
|
|
|
|
start, 2 + start[1]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Find start of PMKID-Count */
|
|
|
|
rpos = start + 2;
|
|
|
|
rend = rpos + start[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip Version and Group Data Cipher Suite */
|
|
|
|
rpos += 2 + 4;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip Pairwise Cipher Suite Count and List */
|
|
|
|
rpos += 2 + WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip AKM Suite Count and List */
|
|
|
|
rpos += 2 + WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rpos == rend) {
|
|
|
|
/* Add RSN Capabilities */
|
|
|
|
os_memmove(rpos + 2, rpos, end - rpos);
|
|
|
|
*rpos++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
*rpos++ = 0;
|
2015-08-08 18:19:57 +02:00
|
|
|
added += 2;
|
|
|
|
start[1] += 2;
|
|
|
|
rend = rpos;
|
2010-04-07 20:04:13 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Skip RSN Capabilities */
|
|
|
|
rpos += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (rpos > rend) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Could not parse RSN IE in "
|
|
|
|
"IEs data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rpos == rend) {
|
|
|
|
/* No PMKID-Count field included; add it */
|
2015-08-08 18:19:57 +02:00
|
|
|
os_memmove(rpos + 2 + PMKID_LEN, rpos, end + added - rpos);
|
2010-04-07 20:04:13 +02:00
|
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(rpos, 1);
|
|
|
|
rpos += 2;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(rpos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
added += 2 + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
start[1] += 2 + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* PMKID-Count was included; use it */
|
|
|
|
if (WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Unexpected PMKID "
|
|
|
|
"in RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(rpos, 1);
|
|
|
|
rpos += 2;
|
2015-08-08 18:19:57 +02:00
|
|
|
os_memmove(rpos + PMKID_LEN, rpos, end + added - rpos);
|
2010-04-07 20:04:13 +02:00
|
|
|
os_memcpy(rpos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
added += PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
start[1] += PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RSN IE after modification "
|
|
|
|
"(PMKID inserted)", start, 2 + start[1]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return added;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_key_len(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256:
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256:
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
return 32;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP:
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128:
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
return 16;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return 32;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_rsc_len(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256:
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return 6;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_to_alg(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_CCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_GCMP_256;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_GCMP;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_TKIP;
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_IGTK;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_BIP_GMAC_128;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_BIP_GMAC_256;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_BIP_CMAC_256;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_NONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_valid_pairwise(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ||
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP ||
|
|
|
|
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u32 wpa_cipher_to_suite(int proto, int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE);
|
2013-07-23 20:24:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED;
|
2014-03-12 19:26:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-02 15:03:22 +01:00
|
|
|
int rsn_cipher_put_suites(u8 *start, int ciphers)
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-03-02 15:03:22 +01:00
|
|
|
u8 *pos = start;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-02 15:03:22 +01:00
|
|
|
return (pos - start) / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-02 15:03:22 +01:00
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_put_suites(u8 *start, int ciphers)
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-03-02 15:03:22 +01:00
|
|
|
u8 *pos = start;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-02 15:03:22 +01:00
|
|
|
return (pos - start) / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
2012-08-30 10:53:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-13 15:58:54 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_pick_pairwise_cipher(int ciphers, int none_allowed)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256;
|
2013-01-13 15:58:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
if (none_allowed && (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE))
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_NONE;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_pick_group_cipher(int ciphers)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256;
|
2013-01-13 15:58:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP;
|
2013-07-23 20:24:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED;
|
2013-01-13 15:58:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-13 16:06:22 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_parse_cipher(const char *value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int val = 0, last;
|
|
|
|
char *start, *end, *buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf = os_strdup(value);
|
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
start = buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (*start != '\0') {
|
|
|
|
while (*start == ' ' || *start == '\t')
|
|
|
|
start++;
|
|
|
|
if (*start == '\0')
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
end = start;
|
|
|
|
while (*end != ' ' && *end != '\t' && *end != '\0')
|
|
|
|
end++;
|
|
|
|
last = *end == '\0';
|
|
|
|
*end = '\0';
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_strcmp(start, "CCMP-256") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "GCMP-256") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "CCMP") == 0)
|
2013-01-13 16:06:22 +01:00
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "GCMP") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_GCMP;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "TKIP") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "WEP104") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_WEP104;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "WEP40") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_WEP40;
|
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "NONE") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_NONE;
|
2013-07-23 20:24:05 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (os_strcmp(start, "GTK_NOT_USED") == 0)
|
|
|
|
val |= WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED;
|
2013-01-13 16:06:22 +01:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (last)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
start = end + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-13 16:31:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_write_ciphers(char *start, char *end, int ciphers, const char *delim)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *pos = start;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) {
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sCCMP-256",
|
|
|
|
pos == start ? "" : delim);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos += ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) {
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sGCMP-256",
|
|
|
|
pos == start ? "" : delim);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos += ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-13 16:31:36 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) {
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sCCMP",
|
|
|
|
pos == start ? "" : delim);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
|
2013-01-13 16:31:36 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos += ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sGCMP",
|
|
|
|
pos == start ? "" : delim);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
|
2013-01-13 16:31:36 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos += ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sTKIP",
|
|
|
|
pos == start ? "" : delim);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
|
2013-01-13 16:31:36 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos += ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sNONE",
|
|
|
|
pos == start ? "" : delim);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
|
2013-01-13 16:31:36 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos += ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return pos - start;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-13 16:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_select_ap_group_cipher(int wpa, int wpa_pairwise, int rsn_pairwise)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int pairwise = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Select group cipher based on the enabled pairwise cipher suites */
|
|
|
|
if (wpa & 1)
|
|
|
|
pairwise |= wpa_pairwise;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa & 2)
|
|
|
|
pairwise |= rsn_pairwise;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pairwise & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP;
|
2013-12-24 21:21:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP |
|
|
|
|
WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256;
|
|
|
|
if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP |
|
|
|
|
WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256)
|
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256;
|
2013-01-13 16:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
}
|