ubus/ubusd_main.c

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2014 Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only
*/
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef FreeBSD
#include <sys/param.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <libubox/usock.h>
#include "ubusd.h"
static void handle_client_disconnect(struct ubus_client *cl)
{
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
struct ubus_msg_buf_list *ubl, *ubl2;
list_for_each_entry_safe(ubl, ubl2, &cl->tx_queue, list)
ubus_msg_list_free(ubl);
ubusd_monitor_disconnect(cl);
ubusd_proto_free_client(cl);
if (cl->pending_msg_fd >= 0)
close(cl->pending_msg_fd);
uloop_fd_delete(&cl->sock);
close(cl->sock.fd);
free(cl);
}
static void client_cb(struct uloop_fd *sock, unsigned int events)
{
struct ubus_client *cl = container_of(sock, struct ubus_client, sock);
uint8_t fd_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = { 0 };
struct msghdr msghdr = { 0 };
struct ubus_msg_buf *ub;
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
struct ubus_msg_buf_list *ubl, *ubl2;
static struct iovec iov;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
int *pfd;
msghdr.msg_iov = &iov,
msghdr.msg_iovlen = 1,
msghdr.msg_control = fd_buf;
msghdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(fd_buf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msghdr);
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
pfd = (int *) CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
msghdr.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
/* first try to tx more pending data */
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
list_for_each_entry_safe(ubl, ubl2, &cl->tx_queue, list) {
ssize_t written;
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
ub = ubl->msg;
written = ubus_msg_writev(sock->fd, ub, cl->txq_ofs);
if (written < 0) {
switch(errno) {
case EINTR:
case EAGAIN:
break;
default:
goto disconnect;
}
break;
}
cl->txq_ofs += written;
cl->txq_len -= written;
if (cl->txq_ofs < ub->len + sizeof(ub->hdr))
break;
cl->txq_ofs = 0;
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
ubus_msg_list_free(ubl);
}
/* prevent further ULOOP_WRITE events if we don't have data
* to send anymore */
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
if (list_empty(&cl->tx_queue) && (events & ULOOP_WRITE))
uloop_fd_add(sock, ULOOP_READ | ULOOP_EDGE_TRIGGER);
retry:
if (!sock->eof && cl->pending_msg_offset < (int) sizeof(cl->hdrbuf)) {
int offset = cl->pending_msg_offset;
int bytes;
*pfd = -1;
iov.iov_base = ((char *) &cl->hdrbuf) + offset;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(cl->hdrbuf) - offset;
if (cl->pending_msg_fd < 0) {
msghdr.msg_control = fd_buf;
msghdr.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
} else {
msghdr.msg_control = NULL;
msghdr.msg_controllen = 0;
}
bytes = recvmsg(sock->fd, &msghdr, 0);
if (bytes < 0)
goto out;
if (*pfd >= 0)
cl->pending_msg_fd = *pfd;
cl->pending_msg_offset += bytes;
if (cl->pending_msg_offset < (int) sizeof(cl->hdrbuf))
goto out;
ubusd: protect against too-short messages A bad client can send a message whose blob_attr len is less than 4, and ubus_msg_new happily points ->data off the end of the allocated buffer, leading to invalid reads, writes, and eventually a crash if ubus monitor is running: ==17683== Invalid write of size 4 ==17683== at 0x10A915: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:143) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== Address 0x4a63200 is 0 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd ==17683== at 0x4837B65: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:752) ==17683== by 0x10AA87: ubus_msg_new (ubusd.c:47) ==17683== by 0x10A8CE: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:135) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== ==17683== Invalid read of size 4 ==17683== at 0x10A645: blob_len (blob.h:102) ==17683== by 0x10A93D: blob_raw_len (blob.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A93D: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:149) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== Address 0x4a63200 is 0 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd ==17683== at 0x4837B65: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:752) ==17683== by 0x10AA87: ubus_msg_new (ubusd.c:47) ==17683== by 0x10A8CE: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:135) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== ==17683== Invalid read of size 4 ==17683== at 0x10ACE8: blob_len (blob.h:102) ==17683== by 0x10B7E1: blob_raw_len (blob.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10B7E1: ubusd_proto_receive_message (ubusd_proto.c:457) ==17683== by 0x10A9A7: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:169) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== Address 0x4a63200 is 0 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd ==17683== at 0x4837B65: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:752) ==17683== by 0x10AA87: ubus_msg_new (ubusd.c:47) ==17683== by 0x10A8CE: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:135) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== ==17683== Invalid read of size 4 ==17683== at 0x10D39B: blob_len (blob.h:102) ==17683== by 0x10D53E: ubusd_monitor_message (ubusd_monitor.c:91) ==17683== by 0x10A99C: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:168) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== Address 0x4a6b3e0 is 0 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd ==17683== at 0x4837B65: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:752) ==17683== by 0x10AA87: ubus_msg_new (ubusd.c:47) ==17683== by 0x10A8CE: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:135) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== ==17683== Invalid read of size 1 ==17683== at 0x4848286: blob_put (blob.c:167) ==17683== by 0x10D555: ubusd_monitor_message (ubusd_monitor.c:91) ==17683== by 0x10A99C: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:168) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== Address 0x4a6b3e4 is 4 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd ==17683== at 0x4837B65: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:752) ==17683== by 0x10AA87: ubus_msg_new (ubusd.c:47) ==17683== by 0x10A8CE: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:135) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) ==17683== ==17683== ==17683== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==17683== Bad permissions for mapped region at address 0x4E43000 ==17683== at 0x4848286: blob_put (blob.c:167) ==17683== by 0x10D555: ubusd_monitor_message (ubusd_monitor.c:91) ==17683== by 0x10A99C: client_cb (ubusd_main.c:168) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_events (uloop.c:198) ==17683== by 0x48495E3: uloop_run_timeout (uloop.c:555) ==17683== by 0x10A503: uloop_run (uloop.h:111) ==17683== by 0x10A503: main (ubusd_main.c:284) The following Python program minimally reproduces the issue: import socket sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.connect('/tmp/usock') sock.recv(12) sock.send(b'\x00\x04\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00') Signed-off-by: Julian Squires <julian@cipht.net>
2021-04-21 15:36:06 +02:00
if (blob_raw_len(&cl->hdrbuf.data) < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
goto disconnect;
if (blob_pad_len(&cl->hdrbuf.data) > UBUS_MAX_MSGLEN)
goto disconnect;
cl->pending_msg = ubus_msg_new(NULL, blob_raw_len(&cl->hdrbuf.data), false);
if (!cl->pending_msg)
goto disconnect;
cl->hdrbuf.hdr.seq = be16_to_cpu(cl->hdrbuf.hdr.seq);
cl->hdrbuf.hdr.peer = be32_to_cpu(cl->hdrbuf.hdr.peer);
memcpy(&cl->pending_msg->hdr, &cl->hdrbuf.hdr, sizeof(cl->hdrbuf.hdr));
memcpy(cl->pending_msg->data, &cl->hdrbuf.data, sizeof(cl->hdrbuf.data));
}
ub = cl->pending_msg;
if (ub) {
int offset = cl->pending_msg_offset - sizeof(ub->hdr);
int len = blob_raw_len(ub->data) - offset;
int bytes = 0;
if (len > 0) {
bytes = read(sock->fd, (char *) ub->data + offset, len);
if (bytes <= 0)
goto out;
}
if (bytes < len) {
cl->pending_msg_offset += bytes;
goto out;
}
/* accept message */
ub->fd = cl->pending_msg_fd;
cl->pending_msg_fd = -1;
cl->pending_msg_offset = 0;
cl->pending_msg = NULL;
ubusd_monitor_message(cl, ub, false);
ubusd_proto_receive_message(cl, ub);
goto retry;
}
out:
ubusd: convert tx_queue to linked list ubusd maintains a per-client tx_queue containing references to message buffers that have not been sent yet (due to the socket blocking). This is a fixed-size, 64-element queue. When more than 64 elements are queued, subsequent elements are simply dropped. Thus, a client that is waiting for those messages will block indefinitely. In particular, this happens when more than +- 250 objects are registered on the bus and either "ubus list" or "ubus wait_for" is called. The responses to these requests consist of a message buffer per object. Since in practice, ubusd will not yield between the sends of these message buffers, the client has no time to process them and eventually the output socket blocks. After 64 more objects, the rest is dropped, including the final message that indicates termination. Thus, the client waits indefinitely for the termination message. To solve this, turn the tx_queue into a variable-sized linked list instead of a fixed-size queue. To maintain the linked list, an additional structure ubus_msg_buf_list is created. It is not possible to add the linked list to ubus_msg_buf, because that is shared between clients. Note that this infinite tx_queue opens the door to a DoS attack. You can open a client and a server connection, then send messages from the client to the server without ever reading anything on the server side. This will eventually lead to an out-of-memory. However, such a DoS already existed anyway, it just requires opening multiple server connections and filling up the fixed-size queue on each one. To protect against such DoS attacks, we'd need to: - keep a global maximum queue size that applies to all rx and tx queues together; - stop reading from any connection when the maximum is reached; - close any connection when it hasn't become writeable after some timeout. Fixes: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1525 Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2021-03-25 22:45:01 +01:00
if (!sock->eof || !list_empty(&cl->tx_queue))
return;
disconnect:
handle_client_disconnect(cl);
}
static bool get_next_connection(int fd)
{
struct ubus_client *cl;
int client_fd;
client_fd = accept(fd, NULL, 0);
if (client_fd < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case ECONNABORTED:
case EINTR:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
cl = ubusd_proto_new_client(client_fd, client_cb);
if (cl)
uloop_fd_add(&cl->sock, ULOOP_READ | ULOOP_EDGE_TRIGGER);
else
close(client_fd);
return true;
}
static void server_cb(struct uloop_fd *fd, unsigned int events)
{
bool next;
do {
next = get_next_connection(fd->fd);
} while (next);
}
static struct uloop_fd server_fd = {
.cb = server_cb,
};
static int usage(const char *progname)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [<options>]\n"
"Options: \n"
" -A <path>: Set the path to ACL files\n"
" -s <socket>: Set the unix domain socket to listen on\n"
"\n", progname);
return 1;
}
static void sighup_handler(int sig)
{
ubusd_acl_load();
}
static void mkdir_sockdir()
{
char *ubus_sock_dir, *tmp;
ubus_sock_dir = strdup(UBUS_UNIX_SOCKET);
tmp = strrchr(ubus_sock_dir, '/');
if (tmp) {
*tmp = '\0';
mkdir(ubus_sock_dir, 0755);
}
free(ubus_sock_dir);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *ubus_socket = UBUS_UNIX_SOCKET;
int ret = 0;
int ch;
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
openlog("ubusd", LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
uloop_init();
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "A:s:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 's':
ubus_socket = optarg;
break;
case 'A':
ubusd_acl_dir = optarg;
break;
default:
return usage(argv[0]);
}
}
mkdir_sockdir();
unlink(ubus_socket);
umask(0111);
server_fd.fd = usock(USOCK_UNIX | USOCK_SERVER | USOCK_NONBLOCK, ubus_socket, NULL);
if (server_fd.fd < 0) {
perror("usock");
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
uloop_fd_add(&server_fd, ULOOP_READ | ULOOP_EDGE_TRIGGER);
ubusd_acl_load();
uloop_run();
unlink(ubus_socket);
out:
uloop_done();
return ret;
}