8543ed8a37
Since "pairwise" is defined as an integer, the current assignment leads to it having the value 0 or 8, which is a bit strange in debug output: WPA: Send EAPOL(version=2 secure=1 mic=1 ack=1 install=1 pairwise=8 kde_len=46 keyidx=2 encr=1) Use !!(...) to normalize it to 0 or 1. Signed-hostap: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
3034 lines
81 KiB
C
3034 lines
81 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
|
*
|
|
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
|
|
* See README for more details.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/includes.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/common.h"
|
|
#include "utils/eloop.h"
|
|
#include "utils/state_machine.h"
|
|
#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
|
|
#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
|
|
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
|
|
#include "crypto/sha1.h"
|
|
#include "crypto/sha256.h"
|
|
#include "crypto/random.h"
|
|
#include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
|
|
#include "ap_config.h"
|
|
#include "ieee802_11.h"
|
|
#include "wpa_auth.h"
|
|
#include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
|
|
#include "wpa_auth_i.h"
|
|
#include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
|
|
|
|
#define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
|
|
#define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
|
|
#define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
|
|
static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
|
|
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len);
|
|
static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
|
|
static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group);
|
|
static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
|
|
static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group);
|
|
static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group);
|
|
|
|
static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4;
|
|
static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4;
|
|
static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
|
|
static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
|
|
static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: make these configurable */
|
|
static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
|
|
static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70;
|
|
static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60;
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report)
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
|
|
int value)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol)
|
|
wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *addr, const u8 *prev_psk)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.get_psk == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.get_psk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, prev_psk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.get_msk == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.get_msk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, msk, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
int vlan_id,
|
|
enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
|
|
u8 *key, size_t key_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.set_key == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.set_key(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx,
|
|
key, key_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, idx, seq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, data, data_len,
|
|
encrypt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
|
|
void *cb_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx),
|
|
void *cb_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
logger_level level, const char *txt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
wpa_auth->cb.logger(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, level, txt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
|
|
{
|
|
char *format;
|
|
int maxlen;
|
|
va_list ap;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100;
|
|
format = os_malloc(maxlen);
|
|
if (!format)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
va_start(ap, fmt);
|
|
vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap);
|
|
va_end(ap);
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format);
|
|
|
|
os_free(format);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->cb.disconnect == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr));
|
|
wpa_auth->cb.disconnect(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
|
|
"initialization.");
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
|
|
wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
|
|
wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK");
|
|
for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) {
|
|
group->GTKReKey = TRUE;
|
|
do {
|
|
group->changed = FALSE;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} while (group->changed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
|
|
0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
|
|
wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->pmksa == ctx)
|
|
sm->pmksa = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry,
|
|
void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx;
|
|
wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
|
|
u8 rkey[32];
|
|
unsigned long ptr;
|
|
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
|
|
* Local MAC Address || Time)
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
|
|
ptr = (unsigned long) group;
|
|
os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &ptr, sizeof(ptr));
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
|
|
group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
|
|
group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
int vlan_id, int delay_init)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
|
|
if (group == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
group->GTKAuthenticator = TRUE;
|
|
group->vlan_id = vlan_id;
|
|
group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
|
|
|
|
if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
|
|
"for secure operations - update keys later when "
|
|
"the first station connects");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
|
|
* used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
|
|
* connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
|
|
* on embedded devices.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
|
|
"initialization.");
|
|
os_free(group);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group->GInit = TRUE;
|
|
if (delay_init) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
|
|
"until Beacon frames have been configured");
|
|
/* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->GInit = FALSE;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return group;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
|
|
* @addr: Authenticator address
|
|
* @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
|
|
* @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
|
|
* Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
|
|
os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->cb, cb, sizeof(*cb));
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1);
|
|
if (wpa_auth->group == NULL) {
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb,
|
|
wpa_auth);
|
|
if (wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
|
|
if (wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
|
|
wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0,
|
|
wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return wpa_auth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
|
|
"keys");
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->GInit = FALSE;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
|
|
* @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
|
|
*/
|
|
void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group, *prev;
|
|
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
while (wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations)
|
|
wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth, wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
|
pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache);
|
|
wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
while (group) {
|
|
prev = group;
|
|
group = group->next;
|
|
os_free(prev);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
|
|
* @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
|
|
* @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
|
|
*/
|
|
int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
|
|
if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
|
|
* configuration.
|
|
*/
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
|
|
group->GInit = TRUE;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->GInit = FALSE;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *
|
|
wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
|
|
|
|
sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
|
|
sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
|
|
return sm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (sm->ft_completed) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT authentication already completed - do not "
|
|
"start 4-way handshake");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
if (sm->started) {
|
|
os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
|
|
sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"start authentication");
|
|
sm->started = 1;
|
|
|
|
sm->Init = TRUE;
|
|
if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
|
|
return 1; /* should not really happen */
|
|
sm->Init = FALSE;
|
|
sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
/* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
|
|
* reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
|
|
* STA has not yet been removed. */
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
os_free(sm->wpa_ie);
|
|
os_free(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
|
|
"is leaving");
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
/* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
|
|
* Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
|
|
"machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
sm->pending_deinit = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sm->PTKRequest = TRUE;
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
|
|
const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
if (!ctr[i].valid)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
|
|
const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
if (ctr[i].valid &&
|
|
(replay_counter == NULL ||
|
|
os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
|
|
ctr[i].valid = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data ie;
|
|
struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
|
|
ie.num_pmkid != 1 || ie.pmkid == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
|
|
"FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
|
|
sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
|
|
"message 2/4", kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
|
|
if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
|
|
os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
|
|
MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
|
|
(kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
|
|
os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
|
|
2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
|
|
kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
|
|
sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
|
|
"(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
|
|
group);
|
|
|
|
if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
|
|
"group cipher is not TKIP");
|
|
} else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
|
|
"pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr) > 0)
|
|
return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
|
|
* Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
u8 *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
u16 key_info, key_data_length;
|
|
enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST,
|
|
SMK_M1, SMK_M3, SMK_ERROR } msg;
|
|
char *msgtxt;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
|
|
int ft;
|
|
const u8 *eapol_key_ie;
|
|
size_t eapol_key_ie_len;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_data_length);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
|
|
" key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
|
|
MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type, key_data_length);
|
|
if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
|
|
"key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
|
|
key_data_length,
|
|
(unsigned long) (data_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
|
|
sizeof(*key)));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some deployed station implementations seem to send
|
|
* msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
|
|
"with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
|
|
} else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
|
|
"unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
|
|
key->type);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
|
|
"unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
|
|
key->type);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
|
|
key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
|
|
* are set */
|
|
|
|
if ((key_info & (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) ==
|
|
(WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) {
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
|
|
msg = SMK_ERROR;
|
|
msgtxt = "SMK Error";
|
|
} else {
|
|
msg = SMK_M1;
|
|
msgtxt = "SMK M1";
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
|
|
msg = SMK_M3;
|
|
msgtxt = "SMK M3";
|
|
} else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
msg = REQUEST;
|
|
msgtxt = "Request";
|
|
} else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
|
|
msg = GROUP_2;
|
|
msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
|
|
} else if (key_data_length == 0) {
|
|
msg = PAIRWISE_4;
|
|
msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
|
|
} else {
|
|
msg = PAIRWISE_2;
|
|
msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
|
|
if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 ||
|
|
msg == GROUP_2) {
|
|
u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
|
|
if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ||
|
|
sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
|
|
if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
|
|
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"advertised support for "
|
|
"AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
|
|
"use it");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
|
|
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
|
|
"with CCMP/GCMP");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
|
|
os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key request with "
|
|
"replayed counter");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
!wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter) &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
|
|
* WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
|
|
* breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
|
|
* pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
|
|
* even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"Process SNonce update from STA "
|
|
"based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
|
|
"1/4");
|
|
sm->update_snonce = 1;
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter);
|
|
goto continue_processing;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter) &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
|
|
"SNonce did not change", msgtxt);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key %s with "
|
|
"unexpected replay counter", msgtxt);
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
|
|
break;
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
|
|
sm->key_replay[i].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
|
|
key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
continue_processing:
|
|
switch (msg) {
|
|
case PAIRWISE_2:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
(!sm->update_snonce ||
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
|
|
"invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The system did not have enough entropy to generate
|
|
* strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
|
|
* handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
|
|
* information from it. Once enough entropy is
|
|
* available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
|
|
* Counter update and the station will be allowed to
|
|
* continue.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
|
|
"collect more entropy for random number "
|
|
"generation");
|
|
random_mark_pool_ready();
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_length,
|
|
&kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
|
|
"invalid Key Data contents");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (kde.rsn_ie) {
|
|
eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
|
|
eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
|
|
eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
|
|
}
|
|
ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ie == NULL ||
|
|
wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft,
|
|
sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
|
|
eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
|
|
"match with msg 2/4");
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ie) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
|
|
sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
|
|
eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
|
|
/* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
break;
|
|
case PAIRWISE_4:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
|
|
!sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
|
|
"invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case GROUP_2:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
|
|
|| !sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
|
|
"invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
case SMK_M1:
|
|
case SMK_M3:
|
|
case SMK_ERROR:
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->conf.peerkey) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
|
|
"PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
|
|
"invalid state - dropped");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
case SMK_M1:
|
|
case SMK_M3:
|
|
case SMK_ERROR:
|
|
return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
case REQUEST:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt);
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->MICVerified = FALSE;
|
|
if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
|
|
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm->PTK, data, data_len)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
if (sm->MICVerified) {
|
|
sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key request with "
|
|
"invalid MIC");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
|
|
* even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
|
|
* supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (msg == SMK_ERROR) {
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth, sm, key);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
|
|
if (wpa_receive_error_report(
|
|
wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0)
|
|
return; /* STA entry was removed */
|
|
} else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
|
|
"4-Way Handshake");
|
|
wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
} else if (msg == SMK_M1) {
|
|
wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth, sm, key);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
} else if (key_data_length > 0 &&
|
|
wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8 *) (key + 1),
|
|
key_data_length, &kde) == 0 &&
|
|
kde.mac_addr) {
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
|
|
"rekeying");
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
|
|
* case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
|
|
* needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
|
|
* pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
|
|
* unexpected supplicant behavior.
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
|
|
sizeof(sm->key_replay));
|
|
} else {
|
|
os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
|
|
sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
|
|
* do not get copied again.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
if (msg == SMK_M3) {
|
|
wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth, sm, key);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
|
os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_malloc(data_len);
|
|
if (sm->last_rx_eapol_key == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->last_rx_eapol_key, data, data_len);
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = TRUE;
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
|
|
const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16];
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
|
|
* AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
|
|
* The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
|
|
* GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
|
|
* is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
|
|
* exactly same.
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
|
|
pos += 8;
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(pos, 16) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len)
|
|
< 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
|
|
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE;
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
|
|
const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
|
|
const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
|
|
int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
int alg;
|
|
int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
|
|
u8 *buf, *pos;
|
|
int version, pairwise;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key);
|
|
|
|
if (force_version)
|
|
version = force_version;
|
|
else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm))
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
|
|
else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
|
|
else
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
|
|
|
|
pairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
|
|
"ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
|
|
"encr=%d)",
|
|
version,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
pairwise, (unsigned long) kde_len, keyidx, encr);
|
|
|
|
key_data_len = kde_len;
|
|
|
|
if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
|
|
pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
|
|
if (pad_len)
|
|
pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
|
|
key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len += key_data_len;
|
|
|
|
hdr = os_zalloc(len);
|
|
if (hdr == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
hdr->version = wpa_auth->conf.eapol_version;
|
|
hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
|
|
hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr));
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
|
key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
|
|
EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
|
|
key_info |= version;
|
|
if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
|
|
if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
|
|
|
|
alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group;
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg));
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE)
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
|
|
for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
|
|
sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
|
|
sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
sm->key_replay[0].valid = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
if (nonce)
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (key_rsc)
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (kde && !encr) {
|
|
os_memcpy(key + 1, kde, kde_len);
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, kde_len);
|
|
} else if (encr && kde) {
|
|
buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len);
|
|
if (buf == NULL) {
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
pos = buf;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
|
|
pos += kde_len;
|
|
|
|
if (pad_len)
|
|
*pos++ = 0xdd;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
|
|
buf, key_data_len);
|
|
if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf,
|
|
(u8 *) (key + 1))) {
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
u8 ek[32];
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_iv,
|
|
sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
|
|
inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
|
|
os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, 16);
|
|
os_memcpy(key + 1, buf, key_data_len);
|
|
rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, (u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_len);
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
|
|
if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
|
|
"frame");
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, version, (u8 *) hdr, len,
|
|
key->key_mic);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (!pairwise &&
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability > 0.0d &&
|
|
drand48() <
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
|
|
key->key_mic[0]++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx,
|
|
1);
|
|
wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len,
|
|
sm->pairwise_set);
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
|
|
const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
|
|
const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
|
|
int keyidx, int encr)
|
|
{
|
|
int timeout_ms;
|
|
int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
|
|
int ctr;
|
|
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
__wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
|
|
keyidx, encr, 0);
|
|
|
|
ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
|
|
if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status)
|
|
timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first :
|
|
eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
|
|
else
|
|
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
|
|
if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
|
|
"counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr);
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
|
|
wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
u16 key_info;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
u8 mic[16];
|
|
|
|
if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
os_memcpy(mic, key->key_mic, 16);
|
|
os_memset(key->key_mic, 0, 16);
|
|
if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
|
|
data, data_len, key->key_mic) ||
|
|
os_memcmp(mic, key->key_mic, 16) != 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_mic, mic, 16);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
|
|
os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL, 0);
|
|
sm->pairwise_set = FALSE;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event)
|
|
{
|
|
int remove_ptk = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"event %d notification", event);
|
|
|
|
switch (event) {
|
|
case WPA_AUTH:
|
|
case WPA_ASSOC:
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_DEAUTH:
|
|
case WPA_DISASSOC:
|
|
sm->DeauthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_REAUTH:
|
|
case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
|
|
if (!sm->started) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
|
|
* manages to re-associate without the previous STA
|
|
* entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
|
|
* sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
|
|
* properly at this point.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA state machine had not been "
|
|
"started - initialize now");
|
|
sm->started = 1;
|
|
sm->Init = TRUE;
|
|
if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
|
|
return 1; /* should not really happen */
|
|
sm->Init = FALSE;
|
|
sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
|
|
* update for this STA.
|
|
*/
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
sm->PtkGroupInit = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_ASSOC_FT:
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
|
|
"after association");
|
|
wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
|
|
|
|
/* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
|
|
sm->ft_completed = 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
sm->ft_completed = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
|
|
remove_ptk = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
if (remove_ptk) {
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
|
|
os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
|
|
if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
|
|
wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
|
|
if (sm->Init) {
|
|
/* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
|
|
* loop by claiming nothing changed. */
|
|
sm->changed = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->keycount = 0;
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
|
|
if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
|
|
* Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
|
|
sm->Pair = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
|
|
wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->Disconnect = FALSE;
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->DeauthenticationRequest = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
|
|
os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
|
|
1);
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
|
|
sm->AuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
if (group->first_sta_seen)
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
|
|
* potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
|
|
* of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
|
|
* GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
|
|
* enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
|
|
"station");
|
|
if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
|
|
"to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
|
|
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
group->first_sta_seen = TRUE;
|
|
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
|
|
* ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
|
|
* incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
|
|
* analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
|
|
* help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
|
|
* machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
|
|
* stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
|
|
"ANonce.");
|
|
sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
/* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
|
|
* logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
|
|
* re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
|
|
* INITIALIZE. */
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
|
|
size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
if (sm->pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
} else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
|
|
"(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
|
|
/* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
|
|
* will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
|
|
* get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
|
|
* machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
|
|
* state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
|
|
* eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
|
|
* derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
|
|
* be good workaround for this issue. */
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *psk;
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
|
|
psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL);
|
|
if (psk) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
}
|
|
sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL;
|
|
size_t pmkid_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->PTKRequest = FALSE;
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr++;
|
|
if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
* immediately following this. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
|
|
* one possible PSK for this STA.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
pmkid = buf;
|
|
pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
|
|
if (sm->pmksa)
|
|
os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
|
|
* available with pre-calculated PMKID.
|
|
*/
|
|
rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, PMK_LEN, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
|
|
sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
|
|
sm->ANonce, pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t ptk_len = sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP ? 48 : 64;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, pmk, ptk, ptk_len);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, PMK_LEN, "Pairwise key expansion",
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, sm->SNonce,
|
|
(u8 *) ptk, ptk_len,
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
const u8 *pmk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
|
|
sm->update_snonce = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
|
|
* WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
|
|
* the packet */
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, pmk);
|
|
if (pmk == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
} else
|
|
pmk = sm->PMK;
|
|
|
|
wpa_derive_ptk(sm, pmk, &PTK);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
|
|
* with the value we derived.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (os_memcmp(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name,
|
|
WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
|
|
"handshake");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
|
|
"Supplicant",
|
|
sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
|
|
sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
/* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
|
|
* state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
|
|
return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
|
|
igtk.keyid[1] = 0;
|
|
if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, igtk.pn) < 0)
|
|
os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
|
|
os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
|
|
* IGTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
|
|
(const u8 *) &igtk, sizeof(igtk), NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos, dummy_gtk[32];
|
|
size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *wpa_ie;
|
|
int wpa_ie_len, secure, keyidx, encr = 0;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr++;
|
|
if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
* immediately following this. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
|
|
GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
|
|
/* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
|
|
wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
|
|
wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
|
|
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
|
|
wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
|
|
/* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
/* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
|
|
secure = 1;
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
gtk = dummy_gtk;
|
|
}
|
|
keyidx = gsm->GN;
|
|
_rsc = rsc;
|
|
encr = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
|
|
secure = 0;
|
|
gtk = NULL;
|
|
gtk_len = 0;
|
|
keyidx = 0;
|
|
_rsc = NULL;
|
|
if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
|
|
* Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
|
|
* MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
|
|
* if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
|
|
* by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
|
|
* WPA if the supplicant used it first.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
|
|
"set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
|
|
secure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
|
|
if (gtk)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
|
|
kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (kde == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
pos = kde;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
|
|
pos += wpa_ie_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
int res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, pos - kde, sm->pmk_r1_name);
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert "
|
|
"PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += res;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
if (gtk) {
|
|
u8 hdr[2];
|
|
hdr[0] = keyidx & 0x03;
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
}
|
|
pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
int res;
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
|
|
|
|
conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, conf->r0_key_holder,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder_len,
|
|
NULL, NULL, pos, kde + kde_len - pos,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
|
|
"into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += res;
|
|
|
|
/* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
*pos++ = 5;
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
*pos++ = 5;
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime * 60);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
(secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
|
|
_rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, keyidx, encr);
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
|
|
if (sm->Pair) {
|
|
enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
|
|
int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
|
|
if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
|
|
sm->PTK.tk1, klen)) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
|
|
sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.
|
|
wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk,
|
|
sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
|
|
sm->keycount++;
|
|
if (sm->keycount == 2) {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
|
|
1);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable, 0);
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, 1);
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
sm->PInitAKeys = TRUE;
|
|
else
|
|
sm->has_GTK = TRUE;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
|
|
sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->Init)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
|
|
else if (sm->Disconnect
|
|
/* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
|
|
else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
|
|
else if (sm->PTKRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
|
|
case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_keyRun) > 0)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
|
|
else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)
|
|
/* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable) > 0)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
else {
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL))
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"no PSK configured for the STA");
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
|
|
if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
|
|
(int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
} else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
|
|
if (sm->MICVerified)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
|
|
else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
|
|
if (sm->update_snonce)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
|
|
(int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
|
|
"reached",
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
} else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
if (sm->Init) {
|
|
/* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
|
|
* loop by claiming nothing changed. */
|
|
sm->changed = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *kde, *pos, hdr[2];
|
|
size_t kde_len;
|
|
u8 *gtk, dummy_gtk[32];
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
|
|
if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) {
|
|
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
* immediately following this. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
|
|
/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
|
|
os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
|
|
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
gtk = dummy_gtk;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
|
|
ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
|
|
kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (kde == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
pos = kde;
|
|
hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
} else {
|
|
kde = gtk;
|
|
pos = kde + gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK |
|
|
(!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
|
|
rsc, gsm->GNonce, kde, pos - kde, gsm->GN, 1);
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
/* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"group key handshake completed (%s)",
|
|
sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
|
|
sm->has_GTK = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
sm->PtkGroupInit = FALSE;
|
|
} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
|
|
(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
|
|
if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
!sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
|
|
else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
|
|
(int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
|
|
wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
|
|
group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
|
|
os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
|
|
wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
|
|
WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
|
|
group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
|
|
"GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
|
|
group->changed = FALSE; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
|
|
|
|
/* GTK[0..N] = 0 */
|
|
os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
|
|
group->GN = 1;
|
|
group->GM = 2;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
group->GN_igtk = 4;
|
|
group->GM_igtk = 5;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
/* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
|
|
* Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
|
|
* station needs to be counted here anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
|
|
"marking station for GTK rekeying");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
|
|
if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_WNM
|
|
/* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
|
|
void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag)
|
|
{
|
|
sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *start = pos;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* GTK subelement:
|
|
* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
|
|
* Key[5..32]
|
|
*/
|
|
*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK;
|
|
*pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
/* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
*pos++ = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pos += 8;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
pos += gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
|
|
return pos - start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *start = pos;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* IGTK subelement:
|
|
* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
|
|
*/
|
|
*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK;
|
|
*pos++ = 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pos += 6;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
pos += WPA_IGTK_LEN;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GN_igtk);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return pos - start;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
int tmp;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
|
|
"SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
|
|
group->changed = TRUE;
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
|
|
group->GTKReKey = FALSE;
|
|
tmp = group->GM;
|
|
group->GM = group->GN;
|
|
group->GN = tmp;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
tmp = group->GM_igtk;
|
|
group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
|
|
group->GN_igtk = tmp;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
/* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
|
|
* counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
|
|
* including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
|
if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
|
|
"GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
|
|
group->GKeyDoneStations);
|
|
group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
|
|
group->GKeyDoneStations);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
|
|
wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group),
|
|
broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
|
|
group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, WPA_ALG_IGTK,
|
|
broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
|
|
group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
|
|
WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
|
|
"SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
|
|
group->changed = TRUE;
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
if (group->GInit) {
|
|
wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
|
|
group->GTKAuthenticator) {
|
|
wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
|
|
group->GTKReKey) {
|
|
wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
|
|
if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
|
|
wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
else if (group->GTKReKey)
|
|
wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
/* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
|
|
* end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
|
|
* recursive call. */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->in_step_loop = 1;
|
|
do {
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
sm->changed = FALSE;
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
break;
|
|
SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
break;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
} while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
|
|
sm->in_step_loop = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
|
|
"machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx;
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
int tmp, i;
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
tmp = group->GM;
|
|
group->GM = group->GN;
|
|
group->GN = tmp;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
tmp = group->GM_igtk;
|
|
group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
|
|
group->GN_igtk = tmp;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
|
|
{
|
|
return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
|
|
#define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
|
|
((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
|
|
|
|
int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
int len = 0, ret;
|
|
char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1];
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
|
|
const int preauth = 1;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
|
|
const int preauth = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
"dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
|
|
wpa_bool_txt(preauth),
|
|
wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN),
|
|
wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.rsn_preauth));
|
|
if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt),
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(
|
|
buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
|
|
RSN_VERSION,
|
|
!!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount,
|
|
wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group) * 8,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout,
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected),
|
|
pmkid_txt,
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested),
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked,
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures);
|
|
if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
|
|
|
|
/* Private MIB */
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
|
|
wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state);
|
|
if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
int len = 0, ret;
|
|
u32 pairwise = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
|
|
|
|
/* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
|
|
|
|
pairwise = wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
|
|
WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA,
|
|
sm->pairwise);
|
|
if (pairwise == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(
|
|
buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
|
|
MAC2STR(sm->addr),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise),
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures,
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures);
|
|
if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Private MIB */
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
"hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
|
|
"hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state,
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
|
|
if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth)
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sm && sm->pairwise_set;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sm->pairwise;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return sm->wpa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL || sm->pmksa != entry)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
sm->pmksa = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
|
|
wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm)
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
*len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
return wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ||
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, PMK_LEN,
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, session_timeout,
|
|
eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr,
|
|
int session_timeout,
|
|
struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, wpa_auth->addr,
|
|
sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol,
|
|
WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpa_group *
|
|
wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->group == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
|
|
vlan_id);
|
|
group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0);
|
|
if (group == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
group->next = wpa_auth->group->next;
|
|
wpa_auth->group->next = group;
|
|
|
|
return group;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa_auth == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
group = sm->wpa_auth->group;
|
|
while (group) {
|
|
if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
group = group->next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (group == NULL) {
|
|
group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id);
|
|
if (group == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->group == group)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR " to use group state "
|
|
"machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), vlan_id);
|
|
|
|
sm->group = group;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth == NULL || sm == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
|
|
" ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), ack);
|
|
if (sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout && ack) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
|
|
* for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
|
|
* handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
|
|
* deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
|
|
* handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
|
|
* reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
|
|
* around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
|
|
* the station has received the frame.
|
|
*/
|
|
int timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
|
|
"timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
|
|
timeout_ms);
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000,
|
|
(timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
|
|
wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
}
|