dbdf7ef679
This was done using the below semantic patch. There are a few more places that were missed due to variable declarations or additional checks in the for loop. @@ iterator name for_each_link; identifier max_links =~ "MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS|MAX_NUM_MLO_LINKS"; expression links; expression further_tests; identifier i; statement stmt; @@ -for (i = 0; i < max_links; i++) +for_each_link(links, i) { ( - if (!(links & BIT(i))) - continue; ... | - if (!(links & BIT(i)) || further_tests) + if (further_tests) continue; ... | - if (further_tests || !(links & BIT(i))) + if (further_tests) continue; ... | - if (links & BIT(i)) stmt | - if (further_tests && (links & BIT(i))) + if (further_tests) stmt | - if ((links & BIT(i)) && further_tests) + if (further_tests) stmt ) } Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
6887 lines
185 KiB
C
6887 lines
185 KiB
C
/*
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* IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2022, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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*
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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*/
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#include "utils/includes.h"
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#include "utils/common.h"
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#include "utils/eloop.h"
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#include "utils/state_machine.h"
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#include "utils/bitfield.h"
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#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
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#include "common/ocv.h"
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#include "common/dpp.h"
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#include "common/wpa_ctrl.h"
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#include "crypto/aes.h"
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#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
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#include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "crypto/sha1.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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#include "crypto/sha384.h"
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#include "crypto/sha512.h"
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#include "crypto/random.h"
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#include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
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#include "drivers/driver.h"
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#include "ap_config.h"
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#include "ieee802_11.h"
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#include "sta_info.h"
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#include "wpa_auth.h"
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#include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
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#include "wpa_auth_i.h"
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#include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
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#define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
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#define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
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#define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)
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static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
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static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, size_t pmk_len, struct wpa_ptk *PTK,
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u8 *data, size_t data_len);
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#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
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static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, struct wpa_ptk *ptk,
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u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, u16 *_key_data_len);
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static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
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const struct wpabuf *hlp);
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#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
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static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
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static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group);
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static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group);
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static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group);
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static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
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const u8 *pmk, unsigned int pmk_len,
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struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int force_sha256,
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u8 *pmk_r0, u8 *pmk_r1, u8 *pmk_r0_name,
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size_t *key_len);
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static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group);
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static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group);
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static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group);
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static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos);
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */
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/* TODO: make these configurable */
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static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
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static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70;
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static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60;
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static const u8 * wpa_auth_get_aa(const struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
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if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0)
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return sm->own_mld_addr;
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
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return sm->wpa_auth->addr;
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}
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static const u8 * wpa_auth_get_spa(const struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
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if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0)
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return sm->peer_mld_addr;
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
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return sm->addr;
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}
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static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
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struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
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{
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if (wpa_auth->cb->mic_failure_report)
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return wpa_auth->cb->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr);
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return 0;
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}
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static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
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struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
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{
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if (wpa_auth->cb->psk_failure_report)
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wpa_auth->cb->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr);
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}
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static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
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int value)
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{
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if (wpa_auth->cb->set_eapol)
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wpa_auth->cb->set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, var, value);
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}
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static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_eapol)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, var);
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}
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static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr,
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const u8 *p2p_dev_addr,
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const u8 *prev_psk, size_t *psk_len,
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int *vlan_id)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_psk)
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return NULL;
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return wpa_auth->cb->get_psk(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, p2p_dev_addr,
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prev_psk, psk_len, vlan_id);
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}
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static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_msk)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->get_msk(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, msk, len);
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}
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static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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int vlan_id,
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enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
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u8 *key, size_t key_len,
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enum key_flag key_flag)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->set_key)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->set_key(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx,
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key, key_len, key_flag);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
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static inline int wpa_auth_set_ltf_keyseed(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *peer_addr,
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const u8 *ltf_keyseed,
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size_t ltf_keyseed_len)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->set_ltf_keyseed)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->set_ltf_keyseed(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, peer_addr,
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ltf_keyseed, ltf_keyseed_len);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
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static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
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{
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int res;
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_seqnum)
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return -1;
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#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
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os_memset(seq, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
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#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
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res = wpa_auth->cb->get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, idx, seq);
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#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
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if (!addr && idx < 4 && wpa_auth->conf.gtk_rsc_override_set) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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"TESTING: Override GTK RSC %016llx --> %016llx",
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(long long unsigned) WPA_GET_LE64(seq),
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(long long unsigned)
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WPA_GET_LE64(wpa_auth->conf.gtk_rsc_override));
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os_memcpy(seq, wpa_auth->conf.gtk_rsc_override,
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WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
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}
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if (!addr && idx >= 4 && idx <= 5 &&
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wpa_auth->conf.igtk_rsc_override_set) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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"TESTING: Override IGTK RSC %016llx --> %016llx",
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(long long unsigned) WPA_GET_LE64(seq),
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(long long unsigned)
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WPA_GET_LE64(wpa_auth->conf.igtk_rsc_override));
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os_memcpy(seq, wpa_auth->conf.igtk_rsc_override,
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WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
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return res;
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}
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static inline int
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wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
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const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->send_eapol)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, data, data_len,
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encrypt);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_MESH
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static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->start_ampe)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->start_ampe(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
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int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
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void *cb_ctx)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->for_each_sta)
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return 0;
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return wpa_auth->cb->for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
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}
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int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx),
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void *cb_ctx)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->for_each_auth)
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return 0;
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return wpa_auth->cb->for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
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}
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void wpa_auth_store_ptksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, int cipher,
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u32 life_time, const struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
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{
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if (wpa_auth->cb->store_ptksa)
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wpa_auth->cb->store_ptksa(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, cipher,
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life_time, ptk);
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}
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static void wpa_auth_remove_ptksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, int cipher)
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{
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if (wpa_auth->cb->clear_ptksa)
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wpa_auth->cb->clear_ptksa(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, cipher);
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}
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void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
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logger_level level, const char *txt)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->logger)
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return;
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wpa_auth->cb->logger(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, level, txt);
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}
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void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
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logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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char *format;
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int maxlen;
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va_list ap;
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->logger)
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return;
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maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100;
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format = os_malloc(maxlen);
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if (!format)
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return;
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va_start(ap, fmt);
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vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap);
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va_end(ap);
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wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format);
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os_free(format);
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}
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static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, u16 reason)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->disconnect)
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return;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR " (reason %u)",
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MAC2STR(addr), reason);
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wpa_auth->cb->disconnect(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, reason);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
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static int wpa_channel_info(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_channel_info *ci)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->channel_info)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->channel_info(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, ci);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
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static int wpa_auth_update_vlan(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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const u8 *addr, int vlan_id)
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{
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if (!wpa_auth->cb->update_vlan)
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return -1;
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return wpa_auth->cb->update_vlan(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, addr, vlan_id);
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}
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static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
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{
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struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
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if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
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"Failed to get random data for WPA initialization.");
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} else {
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wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
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wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
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}
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if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
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eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
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wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
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}
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}
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static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
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{
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struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
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struct wpa_group *group, *next;
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wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK");
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group = wpa_auth->group;
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while (group) {
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wpa_group_get(wpa_auth, group);
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group->GTKReKey = true;
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do {
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group->changed = false;
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wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
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} while (group->changed);
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next = group->next;
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wpa_group_put(wpa_auth, group);
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group = next;
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}
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if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
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eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
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0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
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}
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}
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|
|
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static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
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{
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struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
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struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
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wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
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"rekeying PTK");
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wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
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wpa_sm_step(sm);
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}
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|
|
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void wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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{
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if (sm && sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start PTK rekeying timer for "
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MACSTR " (%d seconds)",
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MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)),
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sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey);
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eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
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eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey, 0,
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wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
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}
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}
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|
|
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static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
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{
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if (sm->pmksa == ctx)
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sm->pmksa = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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|
|
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static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry,
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void *ctx)
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{
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struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx;
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wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry);
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}
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|
|
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static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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struct wpa_group *group)
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{
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u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
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|
u8 rkey[32];
|
|
unsigned long ptr;
|
|
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
|
|
* Local MAC Address || Time)
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
|
|
ptr = (unsigned long) group;
|
|
os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &ptr, sizeof(ptr));
|
|
#ifdef TEST_FUZZ
|
|
os_memset(buf + ETH_ALEN, 0xab, 8);
|
|
os_memset(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, 0xcd, sizeof(ptr));
|
|
#endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
|
|
group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
|
|
group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
int vlan_id, int delay_init)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
|
|
if (!group)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
group->GTKAuthenticator = true;
|
|
group->vlan_id = vlan_id;
|
|
group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
|
|
|
|
if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool for secure operations - update keys later when the first station connects");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
|
|
* used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
|
|
* connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
|
|
* on embedded devices.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"Failed to get random data for WPA initialization.");
|
|
os_free(group);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group->GInit = true;
|
|
if (delay_init) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Delay group state machine start until Beacon frames have been configured");
|
|
/* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->GInit = false;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return group;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
|
|
* @addr: Authenticator address
|
|
* @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
|
|
* @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
|
|
* Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
|
|
const struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb,
|
|
void *cb_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
|
|
wpa_auth->cb = cb;
|
|
wpa_auth->cb_ctx = cb_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1);
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->group) {
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb,
|
|
wpa_auth);
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->group);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->group);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
|
|
wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0,
|
|
wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start)) {
|
|
int count = WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_end) -
|
|
WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start) + 1;
|
|
if (count > 1000)
|
|
count = 1000;
|
|
if (count > 0)
|
|
wpa_auth->ip_pool = bitfield_alloc(count);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
|
|
if (conf->tx_bss_auth && conf->beacon_prot) {
|
|
conf->tx_bss_auth->non_tx_beacon_prot = true;
|
|
if (!conf->tx_bss_auth->conf.beacon_prot)
|
|
conf->tx_bss_auth->conf.beacon_prot = true;
|
|
if (!conf->tx_bss_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher)
|
|
conf->tx_bss_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher =
|
|
conf->group_mgmt_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return wpa_auth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Start group state machine to set initial keys");
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->GInit = false;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_auth_free_conf(struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
wpabuf_free(conf->eapol_m1_elements);
|
|
conf->eapol_m1_elements = NULL;
|
|
wpabuf_free(conf->eapol_m3_elements);
|
|
conf->eapol_m3_elements = NULL;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
|
|
* @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
|
|
*/
|
|
void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group, *prev;
|
|
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
|
|
pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache);
|
|
wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL;
|
|
wpa_ft_deinit(wpa_auth);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
bitfield_free(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
|
|
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
while (group) {
|
|
prev = group;
|
|
group = group->next;
|
|
bin_clear_free(prev, sizeof(*prev));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_free_conf(&wpa_auth->conf);
|
|
os_free(wpa_auth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
|
|
* @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
|
|
* @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
|
|
*/
|
|
int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_free_conf(&wpa_auth->conf);
|
|
os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
|
|
if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
|
|
* configuration.
|
|
*/
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
|
|
group->GInit = true;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->GInit = false;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *
|
|
wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
const u8 *p2p_dev_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
if (p2p_dev_addr)
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->p2p_dev_addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
|
|
sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
wpa_group_get(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
sm->mld_assoc_link_id = -1;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
return sm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || !sm)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (sm->ft_completed) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
|
|
/* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state = WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE;
|
|
sm->Pair = true;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
if (sm->fils_completed) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
|
|
/* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state = WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE;
|
|
sm->Pair = true;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
if (sm->started) {
|
|
os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
|
|
sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = true;
|
|
return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"start authentication");
|
|
sm->started = 1;
|
|
|
|
sm->Init = true;
|
|
if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
|
|
return 1; /* should not really happen */
|
|
sm->Init = false;
|
|
sm->AuthenticationRequest = true;
|
|
return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
/* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
|
|
* reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
|
|
* STA has not yet been removed. */
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"P2P: Free assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u from "
|
|
MACSTR " (bit %u)",
|
|
sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
|
|
sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)),
|
|
sm->ip_addr_bit);
|
|
bitfield_clear(sm->wpa_auth->ip_pool, sm->ip_addr_bit);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
|
|
wpabuf_free(sm->ft_pending_req_ies);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
os_free(sm->wpa_ie);
|
|
os_free(sm->rsnxe);
|
|
wpa_group_put(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(sm->dpp_z);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
|
|
bin_clear_free(sm, sizeof(*sm));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA is leaving");
|
|
if (eloop_deplete_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk,
|
|
wpa_auth, NULL) == -1)
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk,
|
|
wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
wpa_ft_sta_deinit(sm);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
/* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
|
|
* Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Registering pending STA state machine deinit for "
|
|
MACSTR, MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)));
|
|
sm->pending_deinit = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->use_ext_key_id && sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"WPA: PTK0 rekey not allowed, disconnect " MACSTR,
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)));
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
/* Try to encourage the STA to reconnect */
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason =
|
|
WLAN_REASON_CLASS3_FRAME_FROM_NONASSOC_STA;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
|
|
sm->keyidx_active ^= 1; /* flip Key ID */
|
|
sm->PTKRequest = true;
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
|
|
const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
if (!ctr[i].valid)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
|
|
const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
if (ctr[i].valid &&
|
|
(!replay_counter ||
|
|
os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
|
|
ctr[i].valid = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data ie, assoc_ie;
|
|
struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
|
|
unsigned int i, j;
|
|
bool found = false;
|
|
|
|
/* Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches the value
|
|
* we derived. */
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
|
|
ie.num_pmkid < 1 || !ie.pmkid) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: No PMKR1Name in FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len, &assoc_ie) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: Could not parse (Re)Association Request frame RSNE");
|
|
os_memset(&assoc_ie, 0, sizeof(assoc_ie));
|
|
/* Continue to allow PMKR1Name matching to be done to cover the
|
|
* case where it is the only listed PMKID. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ie.num_pmkid; i++) {
|
|
const u8 *pmkid = ie.pmkid + i * PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
|
if (os_memcmp_const(pmkid, sm->pmk_r1_name,
|
|
WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) == 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: RSNE[PMKID[%u]] from supplicant matches PMKR1Name",
|
|
i);
|
|
found = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < assoc_ie.num_pmkid; j++) {
|
|
if (os_memcmp(pmkid,
|
|
assoc_ie.pmkid + j * PMKID_LEN,
|
|
PMKID_LEN) == 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (j == assoc_ie.num_pmkid) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: RSNE[PMKID[%u]] from supplicant is neither PMKR1Name nor included in AssocReq",
|
|
i);
|
|
found = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: RSNE[PMKID[%u]] from supplicant is not PMKR1Name, but matches a PMKID in AssocReq",
|
|
i);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!found) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way handshake");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: PMKIDs/PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
|
|
ie.pmkid, ie.num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
|
|
sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake message 2/4",
|
|
kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
|
|
if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
|
|
os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
|
|
MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
|
|
(kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
|
|
os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
|
|
2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
|
|
kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
|
|
sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Error Request (STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
|
|
group);
|
|
|
|
if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"ignore Michael MIC failure report since group cipher is not TKIP");
|
|
} else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"ignore Michael MIC failure report since pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)) > 0)
|
|
return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
|
|
* Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *data,
|
|
size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
const u8 *pmk = NULL;
|
|
size_t pmk_len;
|
|
int vlan_id = 0;
|
|
u8 pmk_r0[PMK_LEN_MAX], pmk_r0_name[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN];
|
|
u8 pmk_r1[PMK_LEN_MAX];
|
|
size_t key_len;
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
os_memset(&PTK, 0, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
!wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk, &pmk_len,
|
|
&vlan_id);
|
|
if (!pmk)
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
} else {
|
|
pmk = sm->PMK;
|
|
pmk_len = sm->pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, sm->alt_SNonce, pmk, pmk_len, &PTK, 0,
|
|
pmk_r0, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_name, &key_len) < 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, pmk_len, &PTK,
|
|
data, data_len) == 0) {
|
|
if (sm->PMK != pmk) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
|
|
sm->alt_snonce_valid = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (vlan_id && wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_update_vlan(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, vlan_id) < 0)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) && !sm->ft_completed) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Store PMK-R0/PMK-R1");
|
|
wpa_auth_ft_store_keys(sm, pmk_r0, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_name,
|
|
key_len);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, sm->alt_SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
forced_memzero(&PTK, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = true;
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
fail:
|
|
forced_memzero(pmk_r0, sizeof(pmk_r0));
|
|
forced_memzero(pmk_r1, sizeof(pmk_r1));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool wpa_auth_gtk_rekey_in_process(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) {
|
|
if (group->GKeyDoneStations)
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum eapol_key_msg { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST };
|
|
|
|
static bool wpa_auth_valid_key_desc_ver(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u16 ver)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ver > WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "RSN: " MACSTR
|
|
" used undefined Key Descriptor Version %d",
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)), ver);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_use_cmac(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"advertised support for AES-128-CMAC, but did not use it");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP &&
|
|
!wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
!wpa_use_cmac(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES with CCMP/GCMP");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool wpa_auth_valid_request_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
|
|
os_memcmp(replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_WARNING,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key request with replayed counter");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool wpa_auth_valid_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
const struct wpa_eapol_key *key,
|
|
enum eapol_key_msg msg,
|
|
const char *msgtxt)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (msg == REQUEST)
|
|
return wpa_auth_valid_request_counter(wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
key->replay_counter);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter))
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter) &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
|
|
* WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
|
|
* breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
|
|
* pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
|
|
* even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"Process SNonce update from STA based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key 1/4");
|
|
sm->update_snonce = 1;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->alt_SNonce, sm->SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
sm->alt_snonce_valid = true;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->alt_replay_counter,
|
|
sm->key_replay[0].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_4 && sm->alt_snonce_valid &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->alt_replay_counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
|
|
* there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
|
|
* different SNonce values.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter) &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - SNonce did not change",
|
|
msgtxt);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key %s with unexpected replay counter",
|
|
msgtxt);
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
|
|
break;
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
|
|
sm->key_replay[i].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
|
|
key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
u8 *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
u16 key_info, ver, key_data_length;
|
|
enum eapol_key_msg msg;
|
|
const char *msgtxt;
|
|
const u8 *key_data;
|
|
size_t keyhdrlen, mic_len;
|
|
u8 *mic;
|
|
u8 *key_data_buf = NULL;
|
|
size_t key_data_buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || !sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data, data_len);
|
|
|
|
mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
|
|
keyhdrlen = sizeof(*key) + mic_len + 2;
|
|
|
|
if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + keyhdrlen) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
|
|
key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
|
|
" key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%zu key_data_length=%u",
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)), key_info, key->type,
|
|
mic_len, key_data_length);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP,
|
|
"WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
|
|
key, sizeof(*key));
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
|
|
mic, mic_len);
|
|
if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - keyhdrlen) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - key_data overflow (%d > %zu)",
|
|
key_data_length,
|
|
data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - keyhdrlen);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some deployed station implementations seem to send
|
|
* msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
|
|
} else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"Ignore EAPOL-Key with unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
|
|
key->type);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"Ignore EAPOL-Key with unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
|
|
key->type);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
|
|
key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
|
|
* are set */
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Ignore SMK message");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
|
|
if (!wpa_auth_valid_key_desc_ver(wpa_auth, sm, ver))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (mic_len > 0 && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) &&
|
|
sm->PTK_valid &&
|
|
(ver == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
ver == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC ||
|
|
wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) &&
|
|
key_data_length >= 8 && key_data_length % 8 == 0) {
|
|
key_data_length -= 8; /* AES-WRAP adds 8 bytes */
|
|
key_data_buf = os_malloc(key_data_length);
|
|
if (!key_data_buf)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
key_data_buf_len = key_data_length;
|
|
if (aes_unwrap(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len,
|
|
key_data_length / 8, key_data, key_data_buf)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"RSN: AES unwrap failed - could not decrypt EAPOL-Key key data");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
key_data = key_data_buf;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Decrypted EAPOL-Key Key Data",
|
|
key_data, key_data_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
msg = REQUEST;
|
|
msgtxt = "Request";
|
|
} else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
|
|
msg = GROUP_2;
|
|
msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
|
|
} else if (key_data_length == 0 ||
|
|
(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
|
|
(!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) ||
|
|
key_data_buf) &&
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) &&
|
|
!get_ie(key_data, key_data_length, WLAN_EID_RSN)) ||
|
|
(mic_len == 0 && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) &&
|
|
key_data_length == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
|
|
msg = PAIRWISE_4;
|
|
msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
|
|
} else {
|
|
msg = PAIRWISE_2;
|
|
msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth_valid_counter(wpa_auth, sm, key, msg, msgtxt))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && mic_len == 0 &&
|
|
!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
switch (msg) {
|
|
case PAIRWISE_2:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
(!sm->update_snonce ||
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The system did not have enough entropy to generate
|
|
* strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
|
|
* handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
|
|
* information from it. Once enough entropy is
|
|
* available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
|
|
* Counter update and the station will be allowed to
|
|
* continue.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to collect more entropy for random number generation");
|
|
random_mark_pool_ready();
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case PAIRWISE_4:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
|
|
!sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case GROUP_2:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
|
|
|| !sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case REQUEST:
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKSTART ||
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING ||
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2 ||
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Request in invalid state (%d) - dropped",
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt);
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
sm->MICVerified = false;
|
|
if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
|
|
if (mic_len &&
|
|
wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len, &sm->PTK,
|
|
data, data_len) &&
|
|
(msg != PAIRWISE_4 || !sm->alt_snonce_valid ||
|
|
wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm, data, data_len))) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
|
|
#ifdef TEST_FUZZ
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
|
|
goto continue_fuzz;
|
|
#endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
if (!mic_len &&
|
|
wpa_aead_decrypt(sm, &sm->PTK, data, data_len,
|
|
&key_data_length) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
|
|
#ifdef TEST_FUZZ
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
|
|
goto continue_fuzz;
|
|
#endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
#ifdef TEST_FUZZ
|
|
continue_fuzz:
|
|
#endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
|
|
sm->MICVerified = true;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key request without Secure=1");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->MICVerified) {
|
|
sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key request with invalid MIC");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
|
|
if (wpa_receive_error_report(
|
|
wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0)
|
|
goto out; /* STA entry was removed */
|
|
} else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Request for new 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK rekeying");
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
if (wpa_auth_gtk_rekey_in_process(wpa_auth))
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"skip new GTK rekey - already in process");
|
|
else
|
|
wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
|
|
key->replay_counter);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
|
|
* case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
|
|
* needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
|
|
* pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
|
|
* unexpected supplicant behavior.
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
|
|
sizeof(sm->key_replay));
|
|
} else {
|
|
os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
|
|
sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
|
|
* do not get copied again.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_memdup(data, data_len);
|
|
if (!sm->last_rx_eapol_key)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = true;
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
bin_clear_free(key_data_buf, key_data_buf_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
|
|
const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
|
|
* AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
|
|
* The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
|
|
* GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
|
|
* is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
|
|
* exactly same.
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
|
|
#ifdef TEST_FUZZ
|
|
os_memset(pos, 0xef, 8);
|
|
#endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
|
|
pos += 8;
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(pos, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
|
|
if (sha384_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data),
|
|
gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
|
|
if (sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data),
|
|
gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
|
|
if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data),
|
|
gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
|
|
|
|
forced_memzero(data, sizeof(data));
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->waiting_radius_psk) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"Ignore EAPOL-Key timeout while waiting for RADIUS PSK");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"EAPOL-Key timeout");
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = true;
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
|
|
const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
|
|
const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
|
|
int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
size_t len, mic_len, keyhdrlen;
|
|
int alg;
|
|
int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
|
|
u8 *buf, *pos;
|
|
int version, pairwise;
|
|
int i;
|
|
u8 *key_mic, *key_data;
|
|
|
|
mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
|
|
keyhdrlen = sizeof(*key) + mic_len + 2;
|
|
|
|
len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + keyhdrlen;
|
|
|
|
if (force_version)
|
|
version = force_version;
|
|
else if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED;
|
|
else if (wpa_use_cmac(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
|
|
else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
|
|
else
|
|
version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
|
|
|
|
pairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%zu keyidx=%d encr=%d)",
|
|
version,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
pairwise, kde_len, keyidx, encr);
|
|
|
|
key_data_len = kde_len;
|
|
|
|
if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
|
|
pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
|
|
if (pad_len)
|
|
pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
|
|
key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len += key_data_len;
|
|
if (!mic_len && encr)
|
|
len += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
hdr = os_zalloc(len);
|
|
if (!hdr)
|
|
return;
|
|
hdr->version = conf->eapol_version;
|
|
hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
|
|
hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr));
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
key_mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_data = ((u8 *) (hdr + 1)) + keyhdrlen;
|
|
|
|
key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
|
|
EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
|
|
key_info |= version;
|
|
if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
|
|
if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
|
|
|
|
alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : conf->wpa_group;
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && !pairwise)
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
|
|
else
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg));
|
|
|
|
for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
|
|
sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
|
|
sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
|
|
WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Replay Counter",
|
|
key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
sm->key_replay[0].valid = true;
|
|
|
|
if (nonce)
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (key_rsc)
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (kde && !encr) {
|
|
os_memcpy(key_data, kde, kde_len);
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic + mic_len, kde_len);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
} else if (!mic_len && kde) {
|
|
const u8 *aad[1];
|
|
size_t aad_len[1];
|
|
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + kde_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
|
|
kde, kde_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KEK",
|
|
sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len);
|
|
/* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
|
|
* to Key Data (exclusive). */
|
|
aad[0] = (u8 *) hdr;
|
|
aad_len[0] = key_mic + 2 - (u8 *) hdr;
|
|
if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len, kde, kde_len,
|
|
1, aad, aad_len, key_mic + 2) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
|
|
key_mic + 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + kde_len);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
} else if (encr && kde) {
|
|
buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len);
|
|
if (!buf) {
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
pos = buf;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
|
|
pos += kde_len;
|
|
|
|
if (pad_len)
|
|
*pos++ = 0xdd;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data (+ padding)",
|
|
buf, key_data_len);
|
|
if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: AES-WRAP using KEK",
|
|
sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len);
|
|
if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len,
|
|
(key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf, key_data)) {
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
bin_clear_free(buf, key_data_len);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: Encrypted Key Data from AES-WRAP",
|
|
key_data, key_data_len);
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic + mic_len, key_data_len);
|
|
#if !defined(CONFIG_NO_RC4) && !defined(CONFIG_FIPS)
|
|
} else if (sm->PTK.kek_len == 16) {
|
|
u8 ek[32];
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
|
|
os_memcpy(key->key_iv,
|
|
sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
|
|
inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
|
|
os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len);
|
|
os_memcpy(key_data, buf, key_data_len);
|
|
rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, key_data, key_data_len);
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic + mic_len, key_data_len);
|
|
#endif /* !(CONFIG_NO_RC4 || CONFIG_FIPS) */
|
|
} else {
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
bin_clear_free(buf, key_data_len);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
bin_clear_free(buf, key_data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
|
|
if (!sm->PTK_valid || !mic_len) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key frame");
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, sm->PTK.kck_len,
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt, version,
|
|
(u8 *) hdr, len, key_mic) < 0) {
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (!pairwise &&
|
|
conf->corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability > 0.0 &&
|
|
drand48() < conf->corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
|
|
key_mic[0]++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx, 1);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Send EAPOL-Key msg", hdr, len);
|
|
wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len,
|
|
sm->pairwise_set);
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_auth_get_sta_count(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_sta_count)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb->get_sta_count(wpa_auth->cb_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
|
|
const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
|
|
const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
|
|
int keyidx, int encr)
|
|
{
|
|
int timeout_ms;
|
|
int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
|
|
u32 ctr;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
/* When delay_eapol_tx is true, delay the EAPOL-Key transmission by
|
|
* sending it only on the last attempt after all timeouts for the prior
|
|
* skipped attemps. */
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.delay_eapol_tx &&
|
|
ctr != wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
|
|
wpa_msg(sm->wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
|
|
"DELAY-EAPOL-TX-%d", ctr);
|
|
goto skip_tx;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
__wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
|
|
keyidx, encr, 0);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
skip_tx:
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status) {
|
|
if (pairwise)
|
|
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_first;
|
|
else if (wpa_auth_get_sta_count(wpa_auth) > 100)
|
|
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_first_group * 2;
|
|
else
|
|
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
|
|
} else {
|
|
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
|
|
}
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
|
|
(!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)))
|
|
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans;
|
|
if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
|
|
#ifdef TEST_FUZZ
|
|
timeout_ms = 1;
|
|
#endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry counter %u)",
|
|
timeout_ms, ctr);
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
|
|
wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, size_t pmk_len, struct wpa_ptk *PTK,
|
|
u8 *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
u16 key_info;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
u8 mic[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN], *mic_pos;
|
|
size_t mic_len = wpa_mic_len(akmp, pmk_len);
|
|
|
|
if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
mic_pos = (u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
os_memcpy(mic, mic_pos, mic_len);
|
|
os_memset(mic_pos, 0, mic_len);
|
|
if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, PTK->kck_len, akmp,
|
|
key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
|
|
data, data_len, mic_pos) ||
|
|
os_memcmp_const(mic, mic_pos, mic_len) != 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
os_memcpy(mic_pos, mic, mic_len);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = false;
|
|
os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_remove_ptksa(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->pairwise);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL,
|
|
0, KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE))
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 1, NULL,
|
|
0, KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE))
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: PTK Key ID 1 removal from the driver failed");
|
|
sm->pairwise_set = false;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
|
|
{
|
|
int remove_ptk = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"event %d notification", event);
|
|
|
|
switch (event) {
|
|
case WPA_AUTH:
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MESH
|
|
/* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
|
|
if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr)) {
|
|
/* not mesh */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
|
|
case WPA_ASSOC:
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_DEAUTH:
|
|
case WPA_DISASSOC:
|
|
sm->DeauthenticationRequest = true;
|
|
os_memset(sm->PMK, 0, sizeof(sm->PMK));
|
|
sm->pmk_len = 0;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = 0;
|
|
os_memset(sm->pmk_r1, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r1));
|
|
sm->pmk_r1_len = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_REAUTH:
|
|
case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
|
|
if (!sm->started) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
|
|
* manages to re-associate without the previous STA
|
|
* entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
|
|
* sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
|
|
* properly at this point.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA state machine had not been started - initialize now");
|
|
sm->started = 1;
|
|
sm->Init = true;
|
|
if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
|
|
return 1; /* should not really happen */
|
|
sm->Init = false;
|
|
sm->AuthenticationRequest = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->ptkstart_without_success > 3) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"WPA: Multiple EAP reauth attempts without 4-way handshake completion, disconnect "
|
|
MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->use_ext_key_id &&
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"WPA: PTK0 rekey not allowed, disconnect "
|
|
MACSTR, MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)));
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
/* Try to encourage the STA to reconnect */
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason =
|
|
WLAN_REASON_CLASS3_FRAME_FROM_NONASSOC_STA;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
|
|
sm->keyidx_active ^= 1; /* flip Key ID */
|
|
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
|
|
* update for this STA.
|
|
*/
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
|
|
sm->PtkGroupInit = true;
|
|
}
|
|
sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_ASSOC_FT:
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: Retry PTK configuration after association");
|
|
wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
|
|
sm->ft_completed = 1;
|
|
wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
case WPA_ASSOC_FILS:
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: TK configuration after association");
|
|
fils_set_tk(sm);
|
|
sm->fils_completed = 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
|
|
sm->tk_already_set = false;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
sm->ft_completed = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
|
|
remove_ptk = 0;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
(event == WPA_AUTH || event == WPA_ASSOC))
|
|
remove_ptk = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
if (remove_ptk) {
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = false;
|
|
os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
|
|
if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
|
|
wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
|
|
* it by making the existing loop process the new update.
|
|
*/
|
|
sm->changed = true;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
|
|
if (sm->Init) {
|
|
/* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
|
|
* loop by claiming nothing changed. */
|
|
sm->changed = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->keycount = 0;
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
sm->PInitAKeys = false;
|
|
if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
|
|
* Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
|
|
sm->Pair = true;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
|
|
wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
|
|
{
|
|
u16 reason = sm->disconnect_reason;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->Disconnect = false;
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason = 0;
|
|
if (!reason)
|
|
reason = WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID;
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, reason);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->DeauthenticationRequest = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
|
|
os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = false;
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
|
|
1);
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
|
|
sm->AuthenticationRequest = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
if (group->first_sta_seen)
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
|
|
* potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
|
|
* of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
|
|
* GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
|
|
* enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first station");
|
|
if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
|
|
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
group->first_sta_seen = true;
|
|
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
|
|
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
|
|
group->first_sta_seen = false;
|
|
group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
|
|
* ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
|
|
* incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
|
|
* analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
|
|
* help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
|
|
* machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
|
|
* stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce.");
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
/* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
|
|
* logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
|
|
* re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
|
|
* INITIALIZE. */
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
|
|
size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
if (sm->pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP
|
|
} else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"DPP: No PMKSA cache entry for STA - reject connection");
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason = WLAN_REASON_INVALID_PMKID;
|
|
return;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
|
|
} else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
msk, &len) == 0) {
|
|
unsigned int pmk_len;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
|
|
else
|
|
pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine (MSK len=%zu PMK len=%u)",
|
|
len, pmk_len);
|
|
if (len < pmk_len) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: MSK not long enough (%zu) to create PMK (%u)",
|
|
len, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk, SHA384_MAC_LEN);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = SHA384_MAC_LEN;
|
|
} else {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->cb->get_msk);
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
forced_memzero(msk, sizeof(msk));
|
|
|
|
sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
|
|
/* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to false, but not doing this
|
|
* will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
|
|
* get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
|
|
* machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
|
|
* state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
|
|
* eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
|
|
* derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = false here seems to
|
|
* be good workaround for this issue. */
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *psk;
|
|
size_t psk_len;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
|
|
psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr, NULL,
|
|
&psk_len, NULL);
|
|
if (psk) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, psk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = psk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY &&
|
|
(psk_len == SHA512_MAC_LEN || psk_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN ||
|
|
psk_len == SHA256_MAC_LEN))
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = psk_len;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, sm->xxkey_len);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
|
|
if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm) && sm->pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMK from PMKSA cache (len=%zu)",
|
|
sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
|
|
sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *buf;
|
|
size_t buf_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
u8 *pmkid = NULL;
|
|
size_t kde_len = 0;
|
|
u16 key_info;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->PTKRequest = false;
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = false;
|
|
sm->alt_snonce_valid = false;
|
|
sm->ptkstart_without_success++;
|
|
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr++;
|
|
if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
|
|
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
* immediately following this. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0)
|
|
buf_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + ETH_ALEN;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (conf->eapol_m1_elements)
|
|
buf_len += wpabuf_len(conf->eapol_m1_elements);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
buf = os_zalloc(buf_len);
|
|
if (!buf)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
/*
|
|
* For infrastructure BSS cases, it is better for the AP not to include
|
|
* the PMKID KDE in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 since it could be used to initiate
|
|
* offline search for the passphrase/PSK without having to be able to
|
|
* capture a 4-way handshake from a STA that has access to the network.
|
|
*
|
|
* For IBSS cases, addition of PMKID KDE could be considered even with
|
|
* WPA2-PSK cases that use multiple PSKs, but only if there is a single
|
|
* possible PSK for this STA. However, this should not be done unless
|
|
* there is support for using that information on the supplicant side.
|
|
* The concern about exposing PMKID unnecessarily in infrastructure BSS
|
|
* cases would also apply here, but at least in the IBSS case, this
|
|
* would cover a potential real use case.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
|
|
(wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
(sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && sm->pmksa) ||
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) &&
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
pmkid = buf;
|
|
kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
|
|
if (sm->pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from PMKSA entry",
|
|
sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
/* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: No KCK available to derive PMKID for message 1/4");
|
|
pmkid = NULL;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
if (sm->pmkid_set) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from FILS/ERP",
|
|
sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* No PMKID available */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: No FILS/ERP PMKID available for message 1/4");
|
|
pmkid = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
sm->ft_completed) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FT: No PMKID in message 1/4 when using FT protocol");
|
|
pmkid = NULL;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
|
|
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
if (sm->pmkid_set) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from SAE",
|
|
sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
sm->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* No PMKID available */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: No SAE PMKID available for message 1/4");
|
|
pmkid = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
|
|
* available with pre-calculated PMKID.
|
|
*/
|
|
rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, sm->pmk_len,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_aa(sm),
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID derived from PMK",
|
|
&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN], PMKID_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pmkid)
|
|
kde_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: MLD: Add MAC Address KDE: kde_len=%zu",
|
|
kde_len);
|
|
wpa_add_kde(buf + kde_len, RSN_KEY_DATA_MAC_ADDR,
|
|
sm->own_mld_addr, ETH_ALEN, NULL, 0);
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + ETH_ALEN;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (conf->eapol_m1_elements) {
|
|
os_memcpy(buf + kde_len, wpabuf_head(conf->eapol_m1_elements),
|
|
wpabuf_len(conf->eapol_m1_elements));
|
|
kde_len += wpabuf_len(conf->eapol_m1_elements);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
key_info = WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
|
|
if (sm->pairwise_set && sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE;
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm, key_info, NULL,
|
|
sm->ANonce, kde_len ? buf : NULL, kde_len, 0, 0);
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
|
|
const u8 *pmk, unsigned int pmk_len,
|
|
struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int force_sha256,
|
|
u8 *pmk_r0, u8 *pmk_r1, u8 *pmk_r0_name,
|
|
size_t *key_len)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *z = NULL;
|
|
size_t z_len = 0, kdk_len;
|
|
int akmp;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
|
|
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)))
|
|
kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
|
|
else
|
|
kdk_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
if (sm->ft_completed) {
|
|
u8 ptk_name[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN];
|
|
|
|
ret = wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(sm->pmk_r1, sm->pmk_r1_len,
|
|
sm->SNonce, sm->ANonce,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
wpa_auth_get_aa(sm),
|
|
sm->pmk_r1_name, ptk,
|
|
ptk_name, sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
|
|
sm->pairwise, kdk_len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, ptk, pmk_r0, pmk_r1,
|
|
pmk_r0_name, key_len,
|
|
kdk_len);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: PTK derivation failed");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe,
|
|
WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)) {
|
|
ret = wpa_ltf_keyseed(ptk, sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
|
|
sm->pairwise);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FT: LTF keyseed derivation failed");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && sm->dpp_z) {
|
|
z = wpabuf_head(sm->dpp_z);
|
|
z_len = wpabuf_len(sm->dpp_z);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
|
|
|
|
akmp = sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
|
|
if (force_sha256)
|
|
akmp |= WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256;
|
|
ret = wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, "Pairwise key expansion",
|
|
wpa_auth_get_aa(sm), wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
sm->ANonce, snonce, ptk, akmp,
|
|
sm->pairwise, z, z_len, kdk_len);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: PTK derivation failed");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)) {
|
|
ret = wpa_ltf_keyseed(ptk, sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pairwise);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: LTF keyseed derivation failed");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
|
|
int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
size_t pmk_len, const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce,
|
|
const u8 *dhss, size_t dhss_len,
|
|
struct wpabuf *g_sta, struct wpabuf *g_ap)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 ick[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN];
|
|
size_t ick_len;
|
|
int res;
|
|
u8 fils_ft[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN];
|
|
size_t fils_ft_len = 0, kdk_len;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
|
|
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)))
|
|
kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
|
|
else
|
|
kdk_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
res = fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
wpa_auth_get_aa(sm),
|
|
snonce, anonce, dhss, dhss_len,
|
|
&sm->PTK, ick, &ick_len,
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pairwise,
|
|
fils_ft, &fils_ft_len, kdk_len);
|
|
if (res < 0)
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF)) {
|
|
res = wpa_ltf_keyseed(&sm->PTK, sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pairwise);
|
|
if (res) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FILS: LTF keyseed derivation failed");
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
|
|
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = true;
|
|
sm->tk_already_set = false;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (fils_ft_len) {
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
u8 pmk_r0[PMK_LEN_MAX], pmk_r0_name[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN];
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_derive_pmk_r0(fils_ft, fils_ft_len,
|
|
conf->ssid, conf->ssid_len,
|
|
conf->mobility_domain,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder_len,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), pmk_r0, pmk_r0_name,
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_ft_store_pmk_fils(sm, pmk_r0, pmk_r0_name);
|
|
forced_memzero(fils_ft, sizeof(fils_ft));
|
|
|
|
res = wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name, conf->r1_key_holder,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
sm->pmk_r1_name,
|
|
fils_ft_len);
|
|
forced_memzero(pmk_r0, PMK_LEN_MAX);
|
|
if (res < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS+FT: PMKR1Name", sm->pmk_r1_name,
|
|
WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
sm->pmk_r1_name_valid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
res = fils_key_auth_sk(ick, ick_len, snonce, anonce,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
wpa_auth_get_aa(sm),
|
|
g_sta ? wpabuf_head(g_sta) : NULL,
|
|
g_sta ? wpabuf_len(g_sta) : 0,
|
|
g_ap ? wpabuf_head(g_ap) : NULL,
|
|
g_ap ? wpabuf_len(g_ap) : 0,
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->fils_key_auth_sta,
|
|
sm->fils_key_auth_ap,
|
|
&sm->fils_key_auth_len);
|
|
forced_memzero(ick, sizeof(ick));
|
|
|
|
/* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->ANonce, anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, struct wpa_ptk *ptk,
|
|
u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, u16 *_key_data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
u16 key_data_len;
|
|
u8 *tmp;
|
|
const u8 *aad[1];
|
|
size_t aad_len[1];
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) buf;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
pos = (u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_data_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
|
|
if (key_data_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE ||
|
|
key_data_len > buf_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key) - 2) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
|
|
|
|
tmp = os_malloc(key_data_len);
|
|
if (!tmp)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
|
|
* to Key Data (exclusive). */
|
|
aad[0] = buf;
|
|
aad_len[0] = pos - buf;
|
|
if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len, pos, key_data_len,
|
|
1, aad, aad_len, tmp) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
|
|
bin_clear_free(tmp, key_data_len);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
|
|
key_data_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
|
|
tmp, key_data_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, tmp, key_data_len);
|
|
pos -= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE16(pos, key_data_len);
|
|
bin_clear_free(tmp, key_data_len);
|
|
if (_key_data_len)
|
|
*_key_data_len = key_data_len;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 * wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len,
|
|
const u8 *fils_session)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *ie, *end;
|
|
const u8 *session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify Session element */
|
|
ie = ies;
|
|
end = ((const u8 *) ie) + ies_len;
|
|
while (ie + 1 < end) {
|
|
if (ie + 2 + ie[1] > end)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (ie[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION &&
|
|
ie[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN &&
|
|
ie[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION) {
|
|
session = ie;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
ie += 2 + ie[1];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in Assoc Req - reject",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!fils_session) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in STA entry - reject",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (os_memcmp(fils_session, session + 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Session mismatch");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
|
|
fils_session, FILS_SESSION_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
|
|
session + 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return session;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *ies,
|
|
size_t ies_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee802_11_elems elems;
|
|
|
|
if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(ies, ies_len, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!elems.fils_session) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No FILS Session element");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!elems.fils_key_confirm) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (elems.fils_key_confirm_len != sm->fils_key_auth_len) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %zu)",
|
|
elems.fils_key_confirm_len,
|
|
sm->fils_key_auth_len);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (os_memcmp(elems.fils_key_confirm, sm->fils_key_auth_sta,
|
|
sm->fils_key_auth_len) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
|
|
elems.fils_key_confirm, elems.fils_key_confirm_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
|
|
sm->fils_key_auth_sta, sm->fils_key_auth_len);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *fils_session,
|
|
const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, size_t frame_len,
|
|
u8 *pos, size_t left)
|
|
{
|
|
u16 fc, stype;
|
|
const u8 *end, *ie_start, *ie, *session, *crypt;
|
|
const u8 *aad[5];
|
|
size_t aad_len[5];
|
|
|
|
if (!sm || !sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end = ((const u8 *) mgmt) + frame_len;
|
|
fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
|
|
stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
|
|
if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ)
|
|
ie_start = mgmt->u.reassoc_req.variable;
|
|
else
|
|
ie_start = mgmt->u.assoc_req.variable;
|
|
ie = ie_start;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
|
|
* the frame.
|
|
*/
|
|
session = wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(sm, ie, end - ie,
|
|
fils_session);
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Session validation failed");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypt = session + 2 + session[1];
|
|
|
|
if (end - crypt < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
|
|
|
|
/* The STA's MAC address */
|
|
aad[0] = mgmt->sa;
|
|
aad_len[0] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
/* The AP's BSSID */
|
|
aad[1] = mgmt->da;
|
|
aad_len[1] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
/* The STA's nonce */
|
|
aad[2] = sm->SNonce;
|
|
aad_len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
/* The AP's nonce */
|
|
aad[3] = sm->ANonce;
|
|
aad_len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
|
|
* field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
|
|
*/
|
|
aad[4] = (const u8 *) &mgmt->u.assoc_req.capab_info;
|
|
aad_len[4] = crypt - aad[4];
|
|
|
|
if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len, crypt, end - crypt,
|
|
5, aad, aad_len, pos + (crypt - ie_start)) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
|
|
pos, left - AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(sm, pos, left - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key Confirm validation failed");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return left - AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *buf,
|
|
size_t current_len, size_t max_len,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *hlp)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *end = buf + max_len;
|
|
u8 *pos = buf + current_len;
|
|
struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt;
|
|
struct wpabuf *plain;
|
|
const u8 *aad[5];
|
|
size_t aad_len[5];
|
|
|
|
if (!sm || !sm->PTK_valid)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
|
|
buf, current_len);
|
|
|
|
mgmt = (struct ieee80211_mgmt *) buf;
|
|
|
|
/* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
|
|
|
|
/* The AP's BSSID */
|
|
aad[0] = mgmt->sa;
|
|
aad_len[0] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
/* The STA's MAC address */
|
|
aad[1] = mgmt->da;
|
|
aad_len[1] = ETH_ALEN;
|
|
/* The AP's nonce */
|
|
aad[2] = sm->ANonce;
|
|
aad_len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
/* The STA's nonce */
|
|
aad[3] = sm->SNonce;
|
|
aad_len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
|
|
* field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
|
|
* Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
|
|
*/
|
|
aad[4] = (const u8 *) &mgmt->u.assoc_resp.capab_info;
|
|
aad_len[4] = pos - aad[4];
|
|
|
|
/* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
|
|
plain = fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm, hlp);
|
|
if (!plain) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pos + wpabuf_len(plain) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE > end) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
|
|
plain);
|
|
|
|
if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len,
|
|
wpabuf_head(plain), wpabuf_len(plain),
|
|
5, aad, aad_len, pos) < 0) {
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
|
|
pos, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + wpabuf_len(plain));
|
|
current_len += wpabuf_len(plain) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
|
|
sm->fils_completed = 1;
|
|
|
|
return current_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *hlp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpabuf *plain;
|
|
u8 *len, *tmp, *tmp2;
|
|
u8 hdr[2];
|
|
u8 *gtk, stub_gtk[32];
|
|
size_t gtk_len;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm;
|
|
size_t plain_len;
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
|
|
plain_len = 1000 + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
|
|
if (conf->transition_disable)
|
|
plain_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1;
|
|
plain = wpabuf_alloc(plain_len);
|
|
if (!plain)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: FILS Public Key */
|
|
|
|
/* FILS Key Confirmation */
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); /* Element ID */
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(plain, 1 + sm->fils_key_auth_len); /* Length */
|
|
/* Element ID Extension */
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM);
|
|
wpabuf_put_data(plain, sm->fils_key_auth_ap, sm->fils_key_auth_len);
|
|
|
|
/* FILS HLP Container */
|
|
if (hlp)
|
|
wpabuf_put_buf(plain, hlp);
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
|
|
|
|
/* Key Delivery */
|
|
gsm = sm->group;
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); /* Element ID */
|
|
len = wpabuf_put(plain, 1);
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY);
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN,
|
|
wpabuf_put(plain, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN));
|
|
/* GTK KDE */
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(stub_gtk, gtk_len) < 0) {
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
gtk = stub_gtk;
|
|
}
|
|
hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
|
|
tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
|
|
|
|
/* IGTK KDE and BIGTK KDE */
|
|
tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
|
|
tmp2 = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, tmp);
|
|
wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
|
|
|
|
if (conf->transition_disable) {
|
|
tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0);
|
|
tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, WFA_KEY_DATA_TRANSITION_DISABLE,
|
|
&conf->transition_disable, 1, NULL, 0);
|
|
wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = (u8 *) wpabuf_put(plain, 0) - len - 1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm)) {
|
|
struct wpa_channel_info ci;
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_channel_info(sm->wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING,
|
|
"FILS: Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (conf->oci_freq_override_fils_assoc) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"TEST: Override OCI frequency %d -> %u MHz",
|
|
ci.frequency,
|
|
conf->oci_freq_override_fils_assoc);
|
|
ci.frequency = conf->oci_freq_override_fils_assoc;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
pos = wpabuf_put(plain, OCV_OCI_EXTENDED_LEN);
|
|
if (ocv_insert_extended_oci(&ci, pos) < 0) {
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
|
|
return plain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
enum wpa_alg alg;
|
|
int klen;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm || !sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: No valid PTK available to set TK");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->tk_already_set) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK already set to the driver");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
|
|
klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
|
|
if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
|
|
sm->PTK.tk, klen, KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe, WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_ltf_keyseed(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->PTK.ltf_keyseed,
|
|
sm->PTK.ltf_keyseed_len)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FILS: Failed to set LTF keyseed to driver");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
|
|
|
|
sm->pairwise_set = true;
|
|
sm->tk_already_set = true;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_store_ptksa(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->pairwise,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime, &sm->PTK);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
u8 * hostapd_eid_assoc_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *buf,
|
|
const u8 *fils_session, struct wpabuf *hlp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpabuf *plain;
|
|
u8 *pos = buf;
|
|
|
|
/* FILS Session */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION; /* Element ID */
|
|
*pos++ = 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN; /* Length */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION; /* Element ID Extension */
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, fils_session, FILS_SESSION_LEN);
|
|
pos += FILS_SESSION_LEN;
|
|
|
|
plain = fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm, hlp);
|
|
if (!plain) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, wpabuf_head(plain), wpabuf_len(plain));
|
|
pos += wpabuf_len(plain);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: plain buf_len: %zu", __func__,
|
|
wpabuf_len(plain));
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(plain);
|
|
sm->fils_completed = 1;
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
int get_sta_tx_parameters(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ap_max_chanwidth,
|
|
int ap_seg1_idx, int *bandwidth, int *seg1_idx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_sta_tx_params)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return wpa_auth->cb->get_sta_tx_params(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, sm->addr,
|
|
ap_max_chanwidth, ap_seg1_idx,
|
|
bandwidth, seg1_idx);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_auth_validate_ml_kdes_m2(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned int n_links = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* MLD MAC address must be the same */
|
|
if (!kde->mac_addr ||
|
|
!ether_addr_equal(kde->mac_addr, sm->peer_mld_addr)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLD: Invalid MLD address");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find matching link ID and the MAC address for each link */
|
|
for_each_link(kde->valid_mlo_links, i) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Each entry should contain the link information and the MAC
|
|
* address.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (kde->mlo_link_len[i] != 1 + ETH_ALEN) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: MLD: Invalid MLO Link (ID %u) KDE len=%zu",
|
|
i, kde->mlo_link_len[i]);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[i].valid || i == sm->mld_assoc_link_id) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: MLD: Invalid link ID=%u", i);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ether_addr_equal(sm->mld_links[i].peer_addr,
|
|
kde->mlo_link[i] + 1)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: MLD: invalid MAC address=" MACSTR
|
|
" expected " MACSTR " (link ID %u)",
|
|
MAC2STR(kde->mlo_link[i] + 1),
|
|
MAC2STR(sm->mld_links[i].peer_addr), i);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n_links++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Must have the same number of MLO links (excluding the local one) */
|
|
if (n_links != sm->n_mld_affiliated_links) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: MLD: Expecting %u MLD links in msg 2, but got %u",
|
|
sm->n_mld_affiliated_links, n_links);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
|
|
int ok = 0, psk_found = 0;
|
|
const u8 *pmk = NULL;
|
|
size_t pmk_len;
|
|
int ft;
|
|
const u8 *eapol_key_ie, *key_data, *mic;
|
|
u16 key_info, ver, key_data_length;
|
|
size_t mic_len, eapol_key_ie_len;
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
|
|
int vlan_id = 0;
|
|
int owe_ptk_workaround = !!wpa_auth->conf.owe_ptk_workaround;
|
|
u8 pmk_r0[PMK_LEN_MAX], pmk_r0_name[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN];
|
|
u8 pmk_r1[PMK_LEN_MAX];
|
|
size_t key_len;
|
|
u8 *key_data_buf = NULL;
|
|
size_t key_data_buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
|
|
sm->update_snonce = false;
|
|
os_memset(&PTK, 0, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
|
|
mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
|
|
|
|
/* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
|
|
* WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
|
|
* the packet */
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
!wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk, &pmk_len,
|
|
&vlan_id);
|
|
if (!pmk)
|
|
break;
|
|
psk_found = 1;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->xxkey_len = pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
} else {
|
|
pmk = sm->PMK;
|
|
pmk_len = sm->pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((!pmk || !pmk_len) && sm->pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use PMK from PMKSA cache");
|
|
pmk = sm->pmksa->pmk;
|
|
pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, sm->SNonce, pmk, pmk_len, &PTK,
|
|
owe_ptk_workaround == 2, pmk_r0, pmk_r1,
|
|
pmk_r0_name, &key_len) < 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (mic_len &&
|
|
wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, pmk_len, &PTK,
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
|
|
if (sm->PMK != pmk) {
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
|
|
}
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
if (!mic_len &&
|
|
wpa_aead_decrypt(sm, &PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OWE
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && pmk_len > 32 &&
|
|
owe_ptk_workaround == 1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"OWE: Try PTK derivation workaround with SHA256");
|
|
owe_ptk_workaround = 2;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OWE */
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ok && wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk_no_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.radius_psk && wpa_auth->cb->request_radius_psk &&
|
|
!sm->waiting_radius_psk) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "No PSK available - ask RADIUS server");
|
|
wpa_auth->cb->request_radius_psk(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
|
|
sm->ANonce,
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
|
|
sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len);
|
|
sm->waiting_radius_psk = 1;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
if (psk_found)
|
|
wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
|
|
* wpa_receive().
|
|
*/
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) sm->last_rx_eapol_key;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
|
|
key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
|
|
if (key_data_length > sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
|
|
sizeof(*key) - mic_len - 2)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
|
|
if (mic_len && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
|
|
if (ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES &&
|
|
ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC &&
|
|
!wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"Unsupported EAPOL-Key Key Data field encryption");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_data_length < 8 || key_data_length % 8) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"RSN: Unsupported AES-WRAP len %u",
|
|
key_data_length);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
key_data_length -= 8; /* AES-WRAP adds 8 bytes */
|
|
key_data_buf = os_malloc(key_data_length);
|
|
if (!key_data_buf)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
key_data_buf_len = key_data_length;
|
|
if (aes_unwrap(PTK.kek, PTK.kek_len, key_data_length / 8,
|
|
key_data, key_data_buf)) {
|
|
bin_clear_free(key_data_buf, key_data_buf_len);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"RSN: AES unwrap failed - could not decrypt EAPOL-Key key data");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
key_data = key_data_buf;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Decrypted EAPOL-Key Key Data",
|
|
key_data, key_data_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (kde.rsn_ie) {
|
|
eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
|
|
eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
|
|
} else if (kde.osen) {
|
|
eapol_key_ie = kde.osen;
|
|
eapol_key_ie_len = kde.osen_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
|
|
eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
|
|
}
|
|
ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
if (!sm->wpa_ie ||
|
|
wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft, sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
|
|
eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ie) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
|
|
sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
|
|
eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
|
|
/* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((!sm->rsnxe && kde.rsnxe) ||
|
|
(sm->rsnxe && !kde.rsnxe) ||
|
|
(sm->rsnxe && kde.rsnxe &&
|
|
(sm->rsnxe_len != kde.rsnxe_len ||
|
|
os_memcmp(sm->rsnxe, kde.rsnxe, sm->rsnxe_len) != 0))) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"RSNXE from (Re)AssocReq did not match the one in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4");
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSNXE in AssocReq",
|
|
sm->rsnxe, sm->rsnxe_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSNXE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
|
|
kde.rsnxe, kde.rsnxe_len);
|
|
/* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm)) {
|
|
struct wpa_channel_info ci;
|
|
int tx_chanwidth;
|
|
int tx_seg1_idx;
|
|
enum oci_verify_result res;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key 2/4");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm,
|
|
channel_width_to_int(ci.chanwidth),
|
|
ci.seg1_idx, &tx_chanwidth,
|
|
&tx_seg1_idx) < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
res = ocv_verify_tx_params(kde.oci, kde.oci_len, &ci,
|
|
tx_chanwidth, tx_seg1_idx);
|
|
if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm) == 2 && res == OCI_NOT_FOUND) {
|
|
/* Work around misbehaving STAs */
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"Disable OCV with a STA that does not send OCI");
|
|
wpa_auth_set_ocv(sm, 0);
|
|
} else if (res != OCI_SUCCESS) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"OCV failed: %s", ocv_errorstr);
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx)
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
|
|
OCV_FAILURE "addr=" MACSTR
|
|
" frame=eapol-key-m2 error=%s",
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)),
|
|
ocv_errorstr);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
if (kde.ip_addr_req && kde.ip_addr_req[0] &&
|
|
wpa_auth->ip_pool && WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0) {
|
|
int idx;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
|
|
idx = bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
|
|
if (idx >= 0) {
|
|
u32 start = WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_start);
|
|
bitfield_set(wpa_auth->ip_pool, idx);
|
|
sm->ip_addr_bit = idx;
|
|
WPA_PUT_BE32(sm->ip_addr, start + idx);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
|
|
MACSTR " (bit %u)",
|
|
sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
|
|
sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)),
|
|
sm->ip_addr_bit);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
|
|
if (DPP_VERSION > 1 && kde.dpp_kde) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"DPP: peer Protocol Version %u Flags 0x%x",
|
|
kde.dpp_kde[0], kde.dpp_kde[1]);
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP &&
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.dpp_pfs != 2 &&
|
|
(kde.dpp_kde[1] & DPP_KDE_PFS_ALLOWED) &&
|
|
!sm->dpp_z) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"DPP: Peer indicated it supports PFS and local configuration allows this, but PFS was not negotiated for the association");
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_validate_ml_kdes_m2(sm, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vlan_id && wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_update_vlan(wpa_auth, sm->addr, vlan_id) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) && sm->PMK != pmk) {
|
|
/* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
|
|
* state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->MICVerified = true;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) && !sm->ft_completed) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Store PMK-R0/PMK-R1");
|
|
wpa_auth_ft_store_keys(sm, pmk_r0, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_name,
|
|
key_len);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
forced_memzero(&PTK, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
sm->PTK_valid = true;
|
|
out:
|
|
forced_memzero(pmk_r0, sizeof(pmk_r0));
|
|
forced_memzero(pmk_r1, sizeof(pmk_r1));
|
|
bin_clear_free(key_data_buf, key_data_buf_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
|
|
len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN;
|
|
len += wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth)
|
|
wpa_auth = wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth;
|
|
if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && sm->wpa_auth->conf.beacon_prot) {
|
|
len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN;
|
|
len += wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
|
|
struct wpa_bigtk_kde bigtk;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0)
|
|
return pos; /* Use per-link MLO KDEs instead */
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
|
|
igtk.keyid[1] = 0;
|
|
if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, rsc) < 0)
|
|
os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
|
|
else
|
|
os_memcpy(igtk.pn, rsc, sizeof(igtk.pn));
|
|
os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
|
|
if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
|
|
* IGTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, len) < 0)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
|
|
(const u8 *) &igtk, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
forced_memzero(&igtk, sizeof(igtk));
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth) {
|
|
wpa_auth = wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth;
|
|
conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
gsm = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->wpa_auth->conf.beacon_prot)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
bigtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_bigtk;
|
|
bigtk.keyid[1] = 0;
|
|
if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_bigtk, rsc) < 0)
|
|
os_memset(bigtk.pn, 0, sizeof(bigtk.pn));
|
|
else
|
|
os_memcpy(bigtk.pn, rsc, sizeof(bigtk.pn));
|
|
os_memcpy(bigtk.bigtk, gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random BIGTK to each OSEN STA to prevent use
|
|
* of BIGTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(bigtk.bigtk, len) < 0)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_BIGTK,
|
|
(const u8 *) &bigtk, WPA_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
forced_memzero(&bigtk, sizeof(bigtk));
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ocv_oci_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm))
|
|
return OCV_OCI_KDE_LEN;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ocv_oci_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 **argpos,
|
|
unsigned int freq)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
struct wpa_channel_info ci;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_channel_info(sm->wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING,
|
|
"Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (freq) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"TEST: Override OCI KDE frequency %d -> %u MHz",
|
|
ci.frequency, freq);
|
|
ci.frequency = freq;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
return ocv_insert_oci_kde(&ci, argpos);
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
static u8 * replace_ie(const char *name, const u8 *old_buf, size_t *len, u8 eid,
|
|
const u8 *ie, size_t ie_len)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *elem;
|
|
u8 *buf;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TESTING: %s EAPOL override", name);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TESTING: wpa_ie before override",
|
|
old_buf, *len);
|
|
buf = os_malloc(*len + ie_len);
|
|
if (!buf)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
os_memcpy(buf, old_buf, *len);
|
|
elem = get_ie(buf, *len, eid);
|
|
if (elem) {
|
|
u8 elem_len = 2 + elem[1];
|
|
|
|
os_memmove((void *) elem, elem + elem_len,
|
|
*len - (elem - buf) - elem_len);
|
|
*len -= elem_len;
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(buf + *len, ie, ie_len);
|
|
*len += ie_len;
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TESTING: wpa_ie after EAPOL override",
|
|
buf, *len);
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_ml_get_rsn_info(struct wpa_authenticator *a,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_ml_link_rsn_info *info)
|
|
{
|
|
info->rsn_ies = a->wpa_ie;
|
|
info->rsn_ies_len = a->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLD: link_id=%u, rsn_ies_len=%zu",
|
|
info->link_id, info->rsn_ies_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_auth_get_ml_rsn_info(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_ml_rsn_info *info)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_ml_rsn_info)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth->cb->get_ml_rsn_info(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_ml_get_key_info(struct wpa_authenticator *a,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_ml_link_key_info *info,
|
|
bool mgmt_frame_prot, bool beacon_prot)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = a->group;
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"MLD: Get group key info: link_id=%u, IGTK=%u, BIGTK=%u",
|
|
info->link_id, mgmt_frame_prot, beacon_prot);
|
|
|
|
info->gtkidx = gsm->GN & 0x03;
|
|
info->gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
info->gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(a, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc) < 0)
|
|
os_memset(info->pn, 0, sizeof(info->pn));
|
|
else
|
|
os_memcpy(info->pn, rsc, sizeof(info->pn));
|
|
|
|
if (!mgmt_frame_prot)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
info->igtkidx = gsm->GN_igtk;
|
|
info->igtk = gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4];
|
|
info->igtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(a->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(a, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, rsc) < 0)
|
|
os_memset(info->ipn, 0, sizeof(info->ipn));
|
|
else
|
|
os_memcpy(info->ipn, rsc, sizeof(info->ipn));
|
|
|
|
if (!beacon_prot)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (a->conf.tx_bss_auth) {
|
|
a = a->conf.tx_bss_auth;
|
|
gsm = a->group;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
info->bigtkidx = gsm->GN_bigtk;
|
|
info->bigtk = gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6];
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(a, NULL, gsm->GN_bigtk, rsc) < 0)
|
|
os_memset(info->bipn, 0, sizeof(info->bipn));
|
|
else
|
|
os_memcpy(info->bipn, rsc, sizeof(info->bipn));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_auth_get_ml_key_info(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_auth_ml_key_info *info)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->cb->get_ml_key_info)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth->cb->get_ml_key_info(wpa_auth->cb_ctx, info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static size_t wpa_auth_ml_group_kdes_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
size_t gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
size_t igtk_len;
|
|
size_t kde_len;
|
|
unsigned int n_links;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
n_links = sm->n_mld_affiliated_links + 1;
|
|
|
|
/* MLO GTK KDE for each link */
|
|
kde_len = n_links * (2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 + 6 + gtk_len);
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
|
|
return kde_len;
|
|
|
|
/* MLO IGTK KDE for each link */
|
|
igtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
kde_len += n_links * (2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + 6 + 1 + igtk_len);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth) {
|
|
wpa_auth = wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth;
|
|
igtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->conf.beacon_prot)
|
|
return kde_len;
|
|
|
|
/* MLO BIGTK KDE for each link */
|
|
kde_len += n_links * (2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + 6 + 1 + igtk_len);
|
|
|
|
return kde_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * wpa_auth_ml_group_kdes(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_ml_key_info ml_key_info;
|
|
unsigned int i, link_id;
|
|
|
|
/* First fetch the key information from all the authenticators */
|
|
os_memset(&ml_key_info, 0, sizeof(ml_key_info));
|
|
ml_key_info.n_mld_links = sm->n_mld_affiliated_links + 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Assume that management frame protection and beacon protection are the
|
|
* same on all links.
|
|
*/
|
|
ml_key_info.mgmt_frame_prot = sm->mgmt_frame_prot;
|
|
ml_key_info.beacon_prot = sm->wpa_auth->conf.beacon_prot;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[link_id].valid)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i++].link_id = link_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_get_ml_key_info(sm->wpa_auth, &ml_key_info);
|
|
|
|
/* Add MLO GTK KDEs */
|
|
for (i = 0, link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[link_id].valid ||
|
|
!ml_key_info.links[i].gtk_len)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLO GTK: link=%u", link_id);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLO GTK",
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].gtk,
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].gtk_len);
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
*pos++ = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 + 6 +
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].gtk_len;
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_GTK);
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = (ml_key_info.links[i].gtkidx & 0x3) | (link_id << 4);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ml_key_info.links[i].pn, 6);
|
|
pos += 6;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ml_key_info.links[i].gtk,
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].gtk_len);
|
|
pos += ml_key_info.links[i].gtk_len;
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
/* Add MLO IGTK KDEs */
|
|
for (i = 0, link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[link_id].valid ||
|
|
!ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLO IGTK: link=%u", link_id);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLO IGTK",
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk,
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len);
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
*pos++ = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + 1 +
|
|
sizeof(ml_key_info.links[i].ipn) +
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len;
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_IGTK);
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the Key ID */
|
|
*pos++ = ml_key_info.links[i].igtkidx;
|
|
*pos++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the IPN */
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ml_key_info.links[i].ipn,
|
|
sizeof(ml_key_info.links[i].ipn));
|
|
pos += sizeof(ml_key_info.links[i].ipn);
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = ml_key_info.links[i].link_id << 4;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ml_key_info.links[i].igtk,
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len);
|
|
pos += ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len;
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sm->wpa_auth->conf.beacon_prot)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
/* Add MLO BIGTK KDEs */
|
|
for (i = 0, link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[link_id].valid ||
|
|
!ml_key_info.links[i].bigtk ||
|
|
!ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLO BIGTK: link=%u", link_id);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLO BIGTK",
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].bigtk,
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len);
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
*pos++ = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + 1 +
|
|
sizeof(ml_key_info.links[i].bipn) +
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len;
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_BIGTK);
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the Key ID */
|
|
*pos++ = ml_key_info.links[i].bigtkidx;
|
|
*pos++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the BIPN */
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ml_key_info.links[i].bipn,
|
|
sizeof(ml_key_info.links[i].bipn));
|
|
pos += sizeof(ml_key_info.links[i].bipn);
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = ml_key_info.links[i].link_id << 4;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, ml_key_info.links[i].bigtk,
|
|
ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len);
|
|
pos += ml_key_info.links[i].igtk_len;
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static size_t wpa_auth_ml_kdes_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t kde_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
unsigned int link_id;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* For the MAC Address KDE */
|
|
kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
/* MLO Link KDE for each link */
|
|
for (link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[link_id].valid)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 + ETH_ALEN +
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len +
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kde_len += wpa_auth_ml_group_kdes_len(sm);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
return kde_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * wpa_auth_ml_kdes(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
u8 link_id;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id < 0)
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: MLD: Adding MAC Address KDE");
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_MAC_ADDR,
|
|
sm->own_mld_addr, ETH_ALEN, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
for (link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
if (!sm->mld_links[link_id].valid)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: MLO Link: link=%u, len=%zu", link_id,
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 + ETH_ALEN +
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len +
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len);
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
*pos++ = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 + ETH_ALEN +
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len +
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len;
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_LINK);
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the Link Information */
|
|
*pos = link_id;
|
|
if (sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len)
|
|
*pos |= RSN_MLO_LINK_KDE_LI_RSNE_INFO;
|
|
if (sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len)
|
|
*pos |= RSN_MLO_LINK_KDE_LI_RSNXE_INFO;
|
|
|
|
pos++;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, sm->mld_links[link_id].own_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
pos += ETH_ALEN;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len) {
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne,
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len);
|
|
pos += sm->mld_links[link_id].rsne_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len) {
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe,
|
|
sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len);
|
|
pos += sm->mld_links[link_id].rsnxe_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = wpa_auth_ml_group_kdes(sm, pos);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde = NULL, *pos, stub_gtk[32];
|
|
size_t gtk_len, kde_len = 0, wpa_ie_len;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *wpa_ie;
|
|
int secure, gtkidx, encr = 0;
|
|
u8 *wpa_ie_buf = NULL, *wpa_ie_buf2 = NULL;
|
|
u8 hdr[2];
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
bool is_mld = sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
bool is_mld = false;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = false;
|
|
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr++;
|
|
if (conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) {
|
|
/* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->TimeoutCtr > conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
|
|
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
* immediately following this. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
|
|
GTK[GN], IGTK, [BIGTK], [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
|
|
/* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
|
|
wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
|
|
wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && (conf->wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
|
|
wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2U && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
|
|
/* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSNX)
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN)
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (conf->rsne_override_eapol_set) {
|
|
wpa_ie_buf2 = replace_ie(
|
|
"RSNE", wpa_ie, &wpa_ie_len, WLAN_EID_RSN,
|
|
conf->rsne_override_eapol,
|
|
conf->rsne_override_eapol_len);
|
|
if (!wpa_ie_buf2)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie_buf2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (conf->rsnxe_override_eapol_set) {
|
|
wpa_ie_buf = replace_ie(
|
|
"RSNXE", wpa_ie, &wpa_ie_len, WLAN_EID_RSNX,
|
|
conf->rsnxe_override_eapol,
|
|
conf->rsnxe_override_eapol_len);
|
|
if (!wpa_ie_buf)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id && sm->TimeoutCtr == 1 &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0,
|
|
wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise),
|
|
sm->addr,
|
|
sm->keyidx_active, sm->PTK.tk,
|
|
wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise),
|
|
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX)) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe,
|
|
WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_ltf_keyseed(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->PTK.ltf_keyseed,
|
|
sm->PTK.ltf_keyseed_len)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"WPA: Failed to set LTF keyseed to driver");
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
|
|
|
|
/* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
|
|
secure = 1;
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
if (conf->disable_gtk ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(stub_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
gtk = stub_gtk;
|
|
}
|
|
gtkidx = gsm->GN;
|
|
_rsc = rsc;
|
|
encr = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
|
|
secure = 0;
|
|
gtk = NULL;
|
|
gtk_len = 0;
|
|
gtkidx = 0;
|
|
_rsc = NULL;
|
|
if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
|
|
* Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
|
|
* MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
|
|
* if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
|
|
* by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
|
|
* WPA if the supplicant used it first.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
|
|
secure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
|
|
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
|
|
|
|
if (gtk)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
|
|
kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 3 * 4;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
|
|
if (conf->transition_disable)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
|
|
|
|
kde_len += wpa_auth_ml_kdes_len(sm);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (conf->eapol_m3_elements)
|
|
kde_len += wpabuf_len(conf->eapol_m3_elements);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (!kde)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
pos = kde;
|
|
if (!is_mld) {
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
|
|
pos += wpa_ie_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
int res;
|
|
size_t elen;
|
|
|
|
elen = pos - kde;
|
|
res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, &elen, sm->pmk_r1_name, true);
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FT: Failed to insert PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
pos -= wpa_ie_len;
|
|
pos += elen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id) {
|
|
hdr[0] = sm->keyidx_active & 0x01;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID, hdr, 2, NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gtk && !is_mld) {
|
|
hdr[0] = gtkidx & 0x03;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
}
|
|
pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos, conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_m3) < 0)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
|
|
kde + kde_len - pos >= 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) {
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
|
|
2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
|
|
res = 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1];
|
|
} else {
|
|
res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
|
|
sm->xxkey_len,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder_len,
|
|
NULL, NULL, pos,
|
|
kde + kde_len - pos,
|
|
NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FT: Failed to insert FTIE into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += res;
|
|
|
|
/* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
*pos++ = 5;
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
*pos++ = 5;
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0) {
|
|
u8 addr[3 * 4];
|
|
os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
|
|
os_memcpy(addr + 4, conf->ip_addr_mask, 4);
|
|
os_memcpy(addr + 8, conf->ip_addr_go, 4);
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC,
|
|
addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
|
|
if (conf->transition_disable)
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_TRANSITION_DISABLE,
|
|
&conf->transition_disable, 1, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
|
|
if (DPP_VERSION > 1 && sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) {
|
|
u8 payload[2];
|
|
|
|
payload[0] = DPP_VERSION; /* Protocol Version */
|
|
payload[1] = 0; /* Flags */
|
|
if (conf->dpp_pfs == 0)
|
|
payload[1] |= DPP_KDE_PFS_ALLOWED;
|
|
else if (conf->dpp_pfs == 1)
|
|
payload[1] |= DPP_KDE_PFS_ALLOWED |
|
|
DPP_KDE_PFS_REQUIRED;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_DPP,
|
|
payload, sizeof(payload), NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
|
|
|
|
pos = wpa_auth_ml_kdes(sm, pos);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (conf->eapol_m3_elements) {
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, wpabuf_head(conf->eapol_m3_elements),
|
|
wpabuf_len(conf->eapol_m3_elements));
|
|
pos += wpabuf_len(conf->eapol_m3_elements);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conf->eapol_m3_no_encrypt)
|
|
encr = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
(secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) |
|
|
(wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
|
|
_rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, 0, encr);
|
|
done:
|
|
bin_clear_free(kde, kde_len);
|
|
os_free(wpa_ie_buf);
|
|
os_free(wpa_ie_buf2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_auth_validate_ml_kdes_m4(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
const struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
const struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
|
|
const u8 *key_data, *mic;
|
|
u16 key_data_length;
|
|
size_t mic_len;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
|
|
* wpa_receive().
|
|
*/
|
|
mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
|
|
|
|
hdr = (const struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) sm->last_rx_eapol_key;
|
|
key = (const struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
mic = (const u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
|
|
key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
|
|
if (key_data_length > sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
|
|
sizeof(*key) - mic_len - 2)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* MLD MAC address must be the same */
|
|
if (!kde.mac_addr ||
|
|
!ether_addr_equal(kde.mac_addr, sm->peer_mld_addr)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"MLD: Mismatching or missing MLD address in EAPOL-Key msg 4/4");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MLD: MLD address in EAPOL-Key msg 4/4: " MACSTR,
|
|
MAC2STR(kde.mac_addr));
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_validate_ml_kdes_m4(sm) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->Pair) {
|
|
enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
|
|
int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
|
|
res = wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, 0, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->keyidx_active, NULL, 0,
|
|
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY);
|
|
else
|
|
res = wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr,
|
|
0, sm->PTK.tk, klen,
|
|
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX);
|
|
if (res) {
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
|
|
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
|
|
ieee802_11_rsnx_capab(sm->rsnxe,
|
|
WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_ltf_keyseed(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
sm->PTK.ltf_keyseed,
|
|
sm->PTK.ltf_keyseed_len)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"WPA: Failed to set LTF keyseed to driver");
|
|
wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
|
|
|
|
/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
|
|
sm->pairwise_set = true;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm);
|
|
wpa_auth_store_ptksa(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->pairwise,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime, &sm->PTK);
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
|
|
sm->keycount++;
|
|
if (sm->keycount == 2) {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
|
|
1);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable,
|
|
false);
|
|
wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, true);
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
sm->PInitAKeys = true;
|
|
else
|
|
sm->has_GTK = true;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
|
|
sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
|
|
wpa_msg(sm->wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, "EAPOL-4WAY-HS-COMPLETED "
|
|
MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm));
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
sm->ptkstart_without_success = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->Init)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
|
|
else if (sm->Disconnect
|
|
/* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
|
|
else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
|
|
else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
|
|
if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
else
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
|
|
case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_auth_get_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_keyRun))
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
|
|
else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
|
|
/* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
|
|
else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable)) {
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP
|
|
} else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && sm->pmksa) {
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_psk(wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr,
|
|
NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE
|
|
} else if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm) && sm->pmksa) {
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
|
|
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk_no_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.radius_psk) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"INITPSK: No PSK yet available for STA - use RADIUS later");
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"no PSK configured for the STA");
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
|
|
if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
|
|
conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count);
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason =
|
|
WLAN_REASON_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT;
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
} else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
|
|
if (sm->MICVerified)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
|
|
else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
|
|
if (sm->update_snonce)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
|
|
conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count ||
|
|
(conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
|
|
sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) {
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
|
|
conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count);
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason =
|
|
WLAN_REASON_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT;
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
} else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
if (sm->Init) {
|
|
/* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
|
|
* loop by claiming nothing changed. */
|
|
sm->changed = false;
|
|
}
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
const u8 *kde = NULL;
|
|
u8 *kde_buf = NULL, *pos, hdr[2];
|
|
size_t kde_len = 0;
|
|
u8 *gtk, stub_gtk[32];
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
bool is_mld = false;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
is_mld = sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
|
|
if (conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) {
|
|
/* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > conf->wpa_group_update_count) {
|
|
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
* immediately following this. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
sm->PInitAKeys = false;
|
|
sm->TimeoutEvt = false;
|
|
/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
|
|
os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
|
|
wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
|
|
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(stub_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
gtk = stub_gtk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && !is_mld) {
|
|
kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
|
|
ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
|
|
kde_buf = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (!kde_buf)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
kde = pos = kde_buf;
|
|
hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos,
|
|
conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_g1) < 0) {
|
|
os_free(kde_buf);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
kde_len = pos - kde;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
} else if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && is_mld) {
|
|
kde_len = wpa_auth_ml_group_kdes_len(sm);
|
|
if (kde_len) {
|
|
kde_buf = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (!kde_buf)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
kde = pos = kde_buf;
|
|
pos = wpa_auth_ml_group_kdes(sm, pos);
|
|
kde_len = pos - kde_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
} else {
|
|
kde = gtk;
|
|
kde_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE |
|
|
(wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK |
|
|
(!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
|
|
rsc, NULL, kde, kde_len, gsm->GN, 1);
|
|
|
|
bin_clear_free(kde_buf, kde_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
const u8 *key_data, *mic;
|
|
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
|
|
size_t mic_len;
|
|
u16 key_data_length;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
|
|
mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
|
|
* wpa_receive().
|
|
*/
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) sm->last_rx_eapol_key;
|
|
key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
mic = (u8 *) (key + 1);
|
|
key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
|
|
key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
|
|
if (key_data_length > sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
|
|
sizeof(*key) - mic_len - 2)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"received EAPOL-Key group msg 2/2 with invalid Key Data contents");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm)) {
|
|
struct wpa_channel_info ci;
|
|
int tx_chanwidth;
|
|
int tx_seg1_idx;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth, &ci) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key group 2/2");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm,
|
|
channel_width_to_int(ci.chanwidth),
|
|
ci.seg1_idx, &tx_chanwidth,
|
|
&tx_seg1_idx) < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (ocv_verify_tx_params(kde.oci, kde.oci_len, &ci,
|
|
tx_chanwidth, tx_seg1_idx) !=
|
|
OCI_SUCCESS) {
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"OCV failed: %s", ocv_errorstr);
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx)
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_auth->conf.msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
|
|
OCV_FAILURE "addr=" MACSTR
|
|
" frame=eapol-key-g2 error=%s",
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)),
|
|
ocv_errorstr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
|
|
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
/* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"group key handshake completed (%s)",
|
|
sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
|
|
sm->has_GTK = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
|
|
{
|
|
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
sm->disconnect_reason = WLAN_REASON_GROUP_KEY_UPDATE_TIMEOUT;
|
|
wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_INFO,
|
|
"group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
|
|
sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN",
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
sm->PtkGroupInit = false;
|
|
} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
|
|
(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
|
|
if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
!sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
|
|
else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count ||
|
|
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
|
|
sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1))
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
|
|
else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
|
|
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
|
|
wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
|
|
group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
|
|
|
|
if (conf->ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
|
|
len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
|
|
wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
|
|
group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->non_tx_beacon_prot &&
|
|
conf->ieee80211w == NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (!conf->beacon_prot)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth) {
|
|
group = wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth->group;
|
|
if (group->bigtk_set)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Set up BIGTK for TX BSS");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "BIGTK key expansion",
|
|
wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
group->BIGTK[group->GN_bigtk - 6], len) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
group->bigtk_set = true;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "BIGTK",
|
|
group->BIGTK[group->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: group state machine entering state GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)",
|
|
group->vlan_id);
|
|
group->changed = false; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
|
|
|
|
/* GTK[0..N] = 0 */
|
|
os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
|
|
group->GN = 1;
|
|
group->GM = 2;
|
|
group->GN_igtk = 4;
|
|
group->GM_igtk = 5;
|
|
group->GN_bigtk = 6;
|
|
group->GM_bigtk = 7;
|
|
/* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = false;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
|
|
* Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
|
|
* station needs to be counted here anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"GUpdateStationKeys was already set when marking station for GTK rekeying");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
|
|
if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
|
|
sm->GUpdateStationKeys = true;
|
|
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_WNM_AP
|
|
/* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
|
|
void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || sm->is_wnmsleep)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm)
|
|
sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *start = pos;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* GTK subelement:
|
|
* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
|
|
* Key[5..32]
|
|
*/
|
|
*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK;
|
|
*pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
/* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
*pos++ = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pos += 8;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(pos, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
|
|
return pos - start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *start = pos;
|
|
size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* IGTK subelement:
|
|
* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
|
|
*/
|
|
*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK;
|
|
*pos++ = 2 + 6 + len;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pos += 6;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
|
|
if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of IGTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(pos, len) < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += len;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GN_igtk);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
|
|
|
|
return pos - start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_wnmsleep_bigtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
u8 *start = pos;
|
|
size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* BIGTK subelement:
|
|
* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
|
|
*/
|
|
*pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_BIGTK;
|
|
*pos++ = 2 + 6 + len;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_bigtk);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_bigtk, pos) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pos += 6;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
|
|
if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Provide unique random BIGTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
* of BIGTK in the BSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(pos, len) < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += len;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: BIGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->GN_bigtk);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: BIGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
gsm->BIGTK[gsm->GN_bigtk - 6], len);
|
|
|
|
return pos - start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_WNM_AP */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
int tmp;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: group state machine entering state SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)",
|
|
group->vlan_id);
|
|
group->changed = true;
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
|
|
group->GTKReKey = false;
|
|
tmp = group->GM;
|
|
group->GM = group->GN;
|
|
group->GN = tmp;
|
|
tmp = group->GM_igtk;
|
|
group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
|
|
group->GN_igtk = tmp;
|
|
tmp = group->GM_bigtk;
|
|
group->GM_bigtk = group->GN_bigtk;
|
|
group->GN_bigtk = tmp;
|
|
/* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
|
|
* counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
|
|
* including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
|
if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
|
|
group->GKeyDoneStations);
|
|
group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
|
|
group->GKeyDoneStations);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
|
|
wpa_cipher_to_alg(conf->wpa_group),
|
|
broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
|
|
group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len,
|
|
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (conf->ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
|
|
enum wpa_alg alg;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0 &&
|
|
wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, alg,
|
|
broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
|
|
group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len,
|
|
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (ret || !conf->beacon_prot)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth) {
|
|
wpa_auth = wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth;
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
if (!group->bigtk_set || group->bigtk_configured)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, alg,
|
|
broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_bigtk,
|
|
group->BIGTK[group->GN_bigtk - 6], len,
|
|
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
else
|
|
group->bigtk_configured = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm->group == ctx) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
|
|
" for disconnection due to fatal failure",
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)));
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
|
|
group->changed = true;
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE;
|
|
wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_disconnect_cb, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: group state machine entering state SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)",
|
|
group->vlan_id);
|
|
group->changed = true;
|
|
group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
if (group->GInit) {
|
|
wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE) {
|
|
/* Do not allow group operations */
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
|
|
group->GTKAuthenticator) {
|
|
wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
|
|
group->GTKReKey) {
|
|
wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
} else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
|
|
if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
|
|
wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
else if (group->GTKReKey)
|
|
wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
/* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
|
|
* end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
|
|
* recursive call. */
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->in_step_loop = 1;
|
|
do {
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
sm->changed = false;
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = false;
|
|
|
|
SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
break;
|
|
SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
break;
|
|
wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
} while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
|
|
sm->in_step_loop = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->pending_deinit) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Completing pending STA state machine deinit for "
|
|
MACSTR, MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)));
|
|
wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx;
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
int tmp, i;
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
tmp = group->GM;
|
|
group->GM = group->GN;
|
|
group->GN = tmp;
|
|
tmp = group->GM_igtk;
|
|
group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
|
|
group->GN_igtk = tmp;
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->conf.tx_bss_auth) {
|
|
tmp = group->GM_bigtk;
|
|
group->GM_bigtk = group->GN_bigtk;
|
|
group->GN_bigtk = tmp;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val)
|
|
{
|
|
return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
|
|
#define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
|
|
((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
|
|
|
|
int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
|
|
int len = 0, ret;
|
|
char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1];
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
|
|
const int preauth = 1;
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
|
|
const int preauth = 0;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return len;
|
|
conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
"dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
|
|
wpa_bool_txt(preauth),
|
|
wpa_bool_txt(conf->wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN),
|
|
wpa_bool_txt(conf->rsn_preauth));
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt),
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(
|
|
buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
|
|
/* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
|
|
RSN_VERSION,
|
|
!!conf->wpa_strict_rekey,
|
|
conf->wpa_group_update_count,
|
|
conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count,
|
|
wpa_cipher_key_len(conf->wpa_group) * 8,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
|
|
dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout,
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected),
|
|
pmkid_txt,
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested),
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked,
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures);
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
|
|
|
|
/* Private MIB */
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
|
|
wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state);
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
int len = 0, ret;
|
|
u32 pairwise = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
|
|
|
|
/* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
|
|
|
|
pairwise = wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
|
|
WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA,
|
|
sm->pairwise);
|
|
if (pairwise == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(
|
|
buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
|
|
"dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
|
|
/* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
|
|
MAC2STR(sm->addr),
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise),
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures,
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures);
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Private MIB */
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
"wpa=%d\n"
|
|
"AKMSuiteSelector=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
|
|
"hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
|
|
"hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n"
|
|
"hostapdMFPR=%d\n",
|
|
sm->wpa,
|
|
RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_akm_to_suite(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)),
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_state,
|
|
sm->wpa_ptk_group_state,
|
|
sm->mfpr);
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
|
return len;
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth)
|
|
wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sm && sm->pairwise_set;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sm->pairwise;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 * wpa_auth_get_pmk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
*len = sm->pmk_len;
|
|
return sm->PMK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 * wpa_auth_get_dpp_pkhash(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || !sm->pmksa)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return sm->pmksa->dpp_pkhash;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return sm->wpa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return sm->tk_already_set;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_fils_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return sm->tk_already_set;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || sm->pmksa != entry)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
sm->pmksa = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
|
|
wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm)
|
|
sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
*len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
return wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
unsigned int pmk_len,
|
|
int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ||
|
|
sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (pmk_len >= 2 * PMK_LEN && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
!wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
/* Cache MPMK/XXKey instead of initial part from MSK */
|
|
pmk = pmk + PMK_LEN;
|
|
pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
if (pmk_len > PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192)
|
|
pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
|
|
} else if (pmk_len > PMK_LEN) {
|
|
pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK", pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, pmk_len, NULL,
|
|
sm->PTK.kck, sm->PTK.kck_len,
|
|
wpa_auth_get_aa(sm),
|
|
wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), session_timeout,
|
|
eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr,
|
|
int session_timeout,
|
|
struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK from preauth", pmk, len);
|
|
if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, NULL,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
wpa_auth->addr,
|
|
sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol,
|
|
WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *pmkid,
|
|
int akmp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK from SAE", pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
if (!akmp)
|
|
akmp = WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE;
|
|
if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, pmk_len, pmkid,
|
|
NULL, 0, wpa_auth->addr, addr, 0, NULL, akmp))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_add_sae_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmkid)
|
|
{
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->pmkid, pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
sm->pmkid_set = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add2(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *pmkid,
|
|
int session_timeout, int akmp, const u8 *dpp_pkhash)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Cache PMK (3)", pmk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
entry = pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, pmk_len, pmkid,
|
|
NULL, 0, wpa_auth->addr, addr, session_timeout,
|
|
NULL, akmp);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (dpp_pkhash)
|
|
entry->dpp_pkhash = os_memdup(dpp_pkhash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *sta_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
return;
|
|
pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, NULL);
|
|
if (pmksa) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
|
|
MACSTR " based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr));
|
|
pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmksa);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth->pmksa, buf, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth && wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth->pmksa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MESH
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
|
|
char *buf, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth->pmksa, addr, buf, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
|
|
wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8 *aa, const u8 *spa, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
size_t pmk_len, int akmp,
|
|
const u8 *pmkid, int expiration)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry;
|
|
struct os_reltime now;
|
|
|
|
entry = pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk, pmk_len, pmkid, NULL, 0, aa,
|
|
spa, 0, NULL, akmp);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
os_get_reltime(&now);
|
|
entry->expiration = now.sec + expiration;
|
|
return entry;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ret = pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth->pmksa, entry);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
|
|
MACSTR, MAC2STR(entry->spa));
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache *
|
|
wpa_auth_get_pmksa_cache(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return wpa_auth->pmksa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
|
|
wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *sta_addr,
|
|
const u8 *pmkid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, pmkid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
u8 *pmkid, u8 *pmk, size_t *pmk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sm->pmksa = pmksa;
|
|
os_memcpy(pmk, pmksa->pmk, pmksa->pmk_len);
|
|
*pmk_len = pmksa->pmk_len;
|
|
os_memcpy(pmkid, pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
|
|
* callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
|
|
* gets modified.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *prev = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
|
|
group->vlan_id);
|
|
|
|
while (prev) {
|
|
if (prev->next == group) {
|
|
/* This never frees the special first group as needed */
|
|
prev->next = group->next;
|
|
os_free(group);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
prev = prev->next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Increase the reference counter for group */
|
|
static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Skip the special first group */
|
|
if (wpa_auth->group == group)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
group->references++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
|
|
static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Skip the special first group */
|
|
if (wpa_auth->group == group)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
group->references--;
|
|
if (group->references)
|
|
return;
|
|
wpa_group_free(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
|
|
* call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct wpa_group *
|
|
wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->group)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
|
|
vlan_id);
|
|
group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0);
|
|
if (!group)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
group->next = wpa_auth->group->next;
|
|
wpa_auth->group->next = group;
|
|
|
|
return group;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
|
|
* reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
|
|
* even if a negative value is returned.
|
|
* Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
|
|
*/
|
|
int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
while (group) {
|
|
if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
group = group->next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!group) {
|
|
group = wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth, vlan_id);
|
|
if (!group)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
|
|
vlan_id);
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_get(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
group->num_setup_iface++;
|
|
|
|
if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
|
|
* returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
|
|
* -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
|
|
* 0 else
|
|
*/
|
|
int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
group = wpa_auth->group;
|
|
while (group) {
|
|
if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
group = group->next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!group)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
|
|
vlan_id);
|
|
|
|
if (group->num_setup_iface <= 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
|
|
vlan_id);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
group->num_setup_iface--;
|
|
|
|
if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (group->references > 1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
|
|
vlan_id);
|
|
ret = -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_put(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (!sm || !sm->wpa_auth)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
group = sm->wpa_auth->group;
|
|
while (group) {
|
|
if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
group = group->next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!group) {
|
|
group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id);
|
|
if (!group)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sm->group == group)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
|
|
" to use group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
|
|
MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)), vlan_id);
|
|
|
|
wpa_group_get(sm->wpa_auth, group);
|
|
wpa_group_put(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
sm->group = group;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !sm)
|
|
return;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
|
|
" ack=%d", MAC2STR(wpa_auth_get_spa(sm)), ack);
|
|
if (sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout && ack) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
|
|
* for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
|
|
* handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
|
|
* deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
|
|
* handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
|
|
* reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
|
|
* around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
|
|
* the station has received the frame.
|
|
*/
|
|
int timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
|
|
timeout_ms);
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000,
|
|
(timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
|
|
wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
if (sm->eapol_status_cb) {
|
|
sm->eapol_status_cb(sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx1,
|
|
sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx2);
|
|
sm->eapol_status_cb = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE ||
|
|
sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_P2P
|
|
int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm || WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct radius_das_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth->pmksa, attr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_group *group;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return;
|
|
for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next)
|
|
wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data {
|
|
struct wpa_authenticator *auth;
|
|
const u8 *cache_id;
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
|
|
const u8 *spa;
|
|
const u8 *pmkid;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data *data = ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (a == data->auth || !a->conf.fils_cache_id_set ||
|
|
os_memcmp(a->conf.fils_cache_id, data->cache_id,
|
|
FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
data->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_get(a->pmksa, data->spa, data->pmkid);
|
|
return data->pmksa != NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
|
|
wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *pmkid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata;
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth->conf.fils_cache_id_set)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
idata.auth = wpa_auth;
|
|
idata.cache_id = wpa_auth->conf.fils_cache_id;
|
|
idata.pmksa = NULL;
|
|
idata.spa = sta_addr;
|
|
idata.pmkid = pmkid;
|
|
wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_fils_iter, &idata);
|
|
return idata.pmksa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
int wpa_auth_write_fte(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
u8 *buf, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
|
|
return wpa_write_ftie(conf, sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->xxkey_len,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder, conf->r0_key_holder_len,
|
|
NULL, NULL, buf, len, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_get_fils_aead_params(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
u8 *fils_anonce, u8 *fils_snonce,
|
|
u8 *fils_kek, size_t *fils_kek_len)
|
|
{
|
|
os_memcpy(fils_anonce, sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(fils_snonce, sm->SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(fils_kek, sm->PTK.kek, WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN);
|
|
*fils_kek_len = sm->PTK.kek_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_add_fils_pmk_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
size_t pmk_len, const u8 *pmkid)
|
|
{
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->pmkid, pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
sm->pmkid_set = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_set_auth_alg(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u16 auth_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm)
|
|
sm->auth_alg = auth_alg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
|
|
void wpa_auth_set_dpp_z(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const struct wpabuf *z)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sm) {
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(sm->dpp_z);
|
|
sm->dpp_z = z ? wpabuf_dup(z) : NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_set_transition_disable(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
u8 val)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth)
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.transition_disable = val;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_resend_m1(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int change_anonce,
|
|
void (*cb)(void *ctx1, void *ctx2),
|
|
void *ctx1, void *ctx2)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *anonce = sm->ANonce;
|
|
u8 anonce_buf[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
if (change_anonce) {
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(anonce_buf, WPA_NONCE_LEN))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
anonce = anonce_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
|
|
anonce, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_resend_m3(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
void (*cb)(void *ctx1, void *ctx2),
|
|
void *ctx1, void *ctx2)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos;
|
|
u8 *opos;
|
|
size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
u8 *wpa_ie;
|
|
int wpa_ie_len, secure, gtkidx, encr = 0;
|
|
u8 hdr[2];
|
|
|
|
/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
|
|
GTK[GN], IGTK, [BIGTK], [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Use 0 RSC */
|
|
os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
/* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
|
|
wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
|
|
wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
|
|
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
|
|
wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
|
|
/* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSNX)
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN)
|
|
wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
/* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
|
|
secure = 1;
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
gtkidx = gsm->GN;
|
|
_rsc = rsc;
|
|
encr = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
|
|
secure = 0;
|
|
gtk = NULL;
|
|
gtk_len = 0;
|
|
_rsc = NULL;
|
|
if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
|
|
* Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
|
|
* MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
|
|
* if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
|
|
* by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
|
|
* WPA if the supplicant used it first.
|
|
*/
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
|
|
LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
|
|
secure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
|
|
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
|
|
|
|
if (gtk)
|
|
kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
|
|
kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (!kde)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
pos = kde;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
|
|
pos += wpa_ie_len;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
int res;
|
|
size_t elen;
|
|
|
|
elen = pos - kde;
|
|
res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, &elen, sm->pmk_r1_name, true);
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FT: Failed to insert PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
pos -= wpa_ie_len;
|
|
pos += elen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->use_ext_key_id) {
|
|
hdr[0] = sm->keyidx_active & 0x01;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID, hdr, 2, NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gtk) {
|
|
hdr[0] = gtkidx & 0x03;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
}
|
|
opos = pos;
|
|
pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
if (pos - opos >= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN) {
|
|
/* skip KDE header and keyid */
|
|
opos += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
|
|
os_memset(opos, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
|
|
}
|
|
if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos, conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_m3) < 0) {
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
|
|
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
|
|
kde + kde_len - pos >= 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) {
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
|
|
2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
|
|
res = 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1];
|
|
} else {
|
|
res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
|
|
sm->xxkey_len,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder,
|
|
conf->r0_key_holder_len,
|
|
NULL, NULL, pos,
|
|
kde + kde_len - pos,
|
|
NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
"FT: Failed to insert FTIE into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
|
|
os_free(kde);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
pos += res;
|
|
|
|
/* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
*pos++ = 5;
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
*pos++ = 5;
|
|
*pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
|
|
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
(secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) |
|
|
(wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
|
|
_rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, 0, encr);
|
|
bin_clear_free(kde, kde_len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_resend_group_m1(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
void (*cb)(void *ctx1, void *ctx2),
|
|
void *ctx1, void *ctx2)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
|
|
struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
const u8 *kde;
|
|
u8 *kde_buf = NULL, *pos, hdr[2];
|
|
u8 *opos;
|
|
size_t kde_len;
|
|
u8 *gtk;
|
|
|
|
/* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
|
|
os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
/* Use 0 RSC */
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake (TESTING)");
|
|
|
|
gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
|
|
ieee80211w_kde_len(sm) + ocv_oci_len(sm);
|
|
kde_buf = os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
if (!kde_buf)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
kde = pos = kde_buf;
|
|
hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
|
|
hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
gtk, gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
opos = pos;
|
|
pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
if (pos - opos >=
|
|
2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN) {
|
|
/* skip KDE header and keyid */
|
|
opos += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2;
|
|
os_memset(opos, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
|
|
}
|
|
if (ocv_oci_add(sm, &pos,
|
|
conf->oci_freq_override_eapol_g1) < 0) {
|
|
os_free(kde_buf);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
kde_len = pos - kde;
|
|
} else {
|
|
kde = gtk;
|
|
kde_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm->eapol_status_cb = cb;
|
|
sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx1 = ctx1;
|
|
sm->eapol_status_cb_ctx2 = ctx2;
|
|
|
|
wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE |
|
|
(wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len) ?
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC : 0) |
|
|
WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK |
|
|
(!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
|
|
rsc, NULL, kde, kde_len, gsm->GN, 1);
|
|
|
|
bin_clear_free(kde_buf, kde_len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
return eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_auth_rekey_ptk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth || !sm)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
|
|
wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_set_ft_rsnxe_used(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int val)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wpa_auth)
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.ft_rsnxe_used = val;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_set_ocv_override_freq(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
enum wpa_auth_ocv_override_frame frame,
|
|
unsigned int freq)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wpa_auth)
|
|
return;
|
|
switch (frame) {
|
|
case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_EAPOL_M3:
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_eapol_m3 = freq;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_EAPOL_G1:
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_eapol_g1 = freq;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_FT_ASSOC:
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_ft_assoc = freq;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WPA_AUTH_OCV_OVERRIDE_FILS_ASSOC:
|
|
wpa_auth->conf.oci_freq_override_fils_assoc = freq;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_sta_radius_psk_resp(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, bool success)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sm->waiting_radius_psk) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"Ignore RADIUS PSK response for " MACSTR
|
|
" that did not wait one",
|
|
MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RADIUS PSK response for " MACSTR " (%s)",
|
|
MAC2STR(sm->addr), success ? "success" : "fail");
|
|
sm->waiting_radius_psk = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (success) {
|
|
/* Try to process the EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 again */
|
|
sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sm->Disconnect = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void wpa_auth_set_ml_info(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *mld_addr,
|
|
u8 mld_assoc_link_id, struct mld_info *info)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
|
|
struct wpa_auth_ml_rsn_info ml_rsn_info;
|
|
unsigned int link_id, i;
|
|
|
|
if (!info)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
os_memset(sm->mld_links, 0, sizeof(sm->mld_links));
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm), LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
|
"MLD: Initialization");
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->own_mld_addr, mld_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm->peer_mld_addr, info->common_info.mld_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
sm->mld_assoc_link_id = mld_assoc_link_id;
|
|
|
|
os_memset(&ml_rsn_info, 0, sizeof(ml_rsn_info));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, link_id = 0; link_id < MAX_NUM_MLD_LINKS; link_id++) {
|
|
struct mld_link_info *link = &info->links[link_id];
|
|
struct mld_link *sm_link = &sm->mld_links[link_id];
|
|
|
|
sm_link->valid = link->valid;
|
|
if (!link->valid)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(sm_link->peer_addr, link->peer_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(sm_link->own_addr, link->local_addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"WPA_AUTH: MLD: id=%u, addr=" MACSTR " peer=" MACSTR,
|
|
link_id,
|
|
MAC2STR(sm_link->own_addr),
|
|
MAC2STR(sm_link->peer_addr));
|
|
|
|
if (link_id != mld_assoc_link_id)
|
|
sm->n_mld_affiliated_links++;
|
|
|
|
ml_rsn_info.links[i++].link_id = link_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ml_rsn_info.n_mld_links = i;
|
|
|
|
wpa_auth_get_ml_rsn_info(sm->wpa_auth, &ml_rsn_info);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ml_rsn_info.n_mld_links; i++) {
|
|
struct mld_link *sm_link;
|
|
const u8 *rsn_ies;
|
|
u8 rsn_ies_len;
|
|
|
|
sm_link = &sm->mld_links[ml_rsn_info.links[i].link_id];
|
|
rsn_ies = ml_rsn_info.links[i].rsn_ies;
|
|
rsn_ies_len = ml_rsn_info.links[i].rsn_ies_len;
|
|
|
|
/* This should not really happen */
|
|
if (!rsn_ies || rsn_ies_len < 2 || rsn_ies[0] != WLAN_EID_RSN ||
|
|
rsn_ies[1] + 2 > rsn_ies_len) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA_AUTH: MLD: Invalid RSNE");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sm_link->rsne = rsn_ies;
|
|
sm_link->rsne_len = rsn_ies[1] + 2;
|
|
|
|
if (rsn_ies[1] + 2UL + 2UL < rsn_ies_len &&
|
|
rsn_ies[rsn_ies[1] + 2] == WLAN_EID_RSNX) {
|
|
sm_link->rsnxe = rsn_ies + 2 + rsn_ies[1];
|
|
sm_link->rsnxe_len = sm_link->rsnxe[1] + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
|
|
}
|