SSID may include unprintable characters. This change converts
unprintable characters into printable form before printing SSID in the
function wpas_send_ctrl_req(). The conversion is based on the function
wpa_ssid_txt().
Signed-off-by: Kaidong Wang <kaidong@chromium.org>
Add support to specify a Link ID for set key operation for MLO
connection. This does not change the existing uses and only provides the
mechanism for extension in following commits.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
PTK is stored in the PTKSA cache following a successful PASN handshake,
however AKMP is removed upon a WPA PASN reset. The PASN handshake is
used in the Wi-Fi Aware R4 specification to define the pairing setup
process. KDK is used to generate a new set of keys, while AKMP is
required for key derivation for pairing. So, keep AKMP in the PTKSA
cache.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
After the secure association and PTK derivation are completed, if the
device supports LTF keyseed, generate the LTF keyseed using KDK and set
the ranging context to the driver by using the command
QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_SECURE_RANGING_CONTEXT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Add an option for an alternative processing of PTKSA life time expiry.
Register a callback in wpa_supplicant to handle the life time expiry of
the keys in PTKSA cache. Send PASN deauthentication when a PTKSA cache
entry expires.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
On successful PASN handshake or 4-way handshake with a peer, PTK is
derived using the local and peer MAC addresses as input. Store the own
MAC address that is used for key derivation in PTKSA cache to maintain
that state over potential MAC addresses changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
With introduction of newer AKMs, there is a need to update the PMK
length plumbed for the driver based 4-way handshake. To support this,
the current update the PMK length to 48, if the key management type uses
SHA-384. This is needed, e.g., for SUITE-B-192.
Signed-off-by: Vinayak Yadawad <vinayak.yadawad@broadcom.com>
Use the existing helper function instead of maintaining multiple copies
of lists of SAE key management suites.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
RSN design is supposed to encrypt all Data frames, including EAPOL
frames, once the TK has been configured. However, there are deployed
implementations that do not really follow this design and there are
various examples from the older uses of EAPOL frame where those frames
were not encrypted. As such, strict filtering of unencrypted EAPOL
frames might results in undesired interoperation issues.
However, some of the most important cases of missing EAPOL frame
encryption should be possible to handle without causing too significant
issues. These are for cases where an attacker could potentially cause an
existing association to be dropped when PMF is used. EAP-Request is one
potential candidate for such attacks since that frame could be used to
initiate a new EAP authentication and the AP/Authenticator might not
allow that to complete or a large number of EAP-Request frames could be
injected to exceed the maximum number of EAP frames. Such an attack
could result in the station ending up disconnecting or at minimum,
getting into somewhat mismatching state with the AP.
Drop EAPOL-EAP frames when it is known that it was not encrypted but
should have been and when PMF is enabled. While it would be correct to
drop this even without PMF, that does not provide any significant
benefit since it is trivial to force disconnection in no-PMF cases. It
should also be noted that not all drivers provide information about the
encryption status of the EAPOL frames and this change has no impact with
drivers that do not indicate whether the frame was encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It would have been possible for the authentication attemps to go into a
loop if the AP/Authenticator/authentication server were to believe EAP
authentication succeeded when the local conclusion in Supplicant was
failure. Avoid this by timing out authentication immediately on the
second consecutive EAP authentication failure.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Determine if the TDLS peer supports TDLS in 6 GHz band based on the HE 6
GHz Band Capabilities element received in the TDLS Setup Response frame.
Indicate the peer's HE 6 GHz capabilities to the driver through
sta_add().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This makes it convenient for an external test script to use
ext_eapol_frame_io=1 to delay and/or modify transmission of EAPOL-Key
msg 1/4 without having to use separate frame injection mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Determine if the TDLS peer is HE capable based on HE Capability element
received in the TDLS Setup Response frame. Indicate the peer's HE
capabilities to the driver through sta_add().
Signed-off-by: Sreeramya Soratkal <ssramya@codeaurora.org>
Set conf.force_kdk_derivation within the same if block as all the other
parameters. This is used only if ssid is not NULL, so no need to have
any special handling for this parameter.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Enabling beacon protection will cause STA connection/AP setup failures
if the driver doesn't support beacon protection. To avoid this, check
the driver capability before enabling beacon protection.
This commit also adds a capability flag to indicate beacon protection
support in client mode only.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <vjakkam@codeaurora.org>
Derive the KDK as part of PMK to PTK derivation if forced by
configuration or in case both the local station and the AP declare
support for secure LTF.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
PASN requires to store the PTK derived during PASN authentication
so it can later be used for secure LTF etc. This is also true
for a PTK derived during regular connection.
Add an instance of a PTKSA cache for each wpa_supplicant
interface when PASN is enabled in build configuration.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Extend the wpa_pmk_to_ptk() to also derive Key Derivation
Key (KDK), which can later be used for secure LTF measurements.
Update the wpa_supplicant and hostapd configuration and the
corresponding WPA and WPA Auth state machine, to allow enabling of KDK
derivation. For now, use a testing parameter to control whether KDK is
derived.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
This replaces the previously used sae_pk_only configuration parameter
with a more generic sae_pk that can be used to specify how SAE-PK is
negotiated. The default behavior (sae_pk=0) is to automatically
negotiate SAE-PK whenever the AP supports it and the password is in
appropriate format. sae_pk=1 allows only SAE-PK to be used and sae_pk=2
disables SAE-PK completely.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
wpa_supplicant disables PMKSA caching with FT-EAP by default due to
known interoperability issues with APs. This is allowed only if the
network profile is explicitly enabling caching with
ft_eap_pmksa_caching=1. However, the PMKID for such PMKSA cache entries
was still being configured to the driver and it was possible for the
driver to build an RSNE with the PMKID for SME-in-driver cases. This
could result in hitting the interop issue with some APs.
Fix this by skipping PMKID configuration to the driver fot FT-EAP AKM if
ft_eap_pmksa_caching=1 is not used in the network profile so that the
driver and wpa_supplicant behavior are in sync for this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Drivers that trigger roaming need to know the lifetime and reauth
threshold time of configured PMKSA so that they can trigger full
authentication to avoid unnecessary disconnection. To support this, send
dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime and dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold values
configured in wpa_supplicant to the driver while configuring a PMKSA.
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <vjakkam@codeaurora.org>
Check whether the Transition Disable KDE is received from an
authenticated AP and if so, whether it contains valid indication for
disabling a transition mode. If that is the case, update the local
network profile by removing the less secure options.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Support Extended Key ID in wpa_supplicant according to
IEEE Std 802.11-2016 for infrastructure (AP) associations.
Extended Key ID allows to rekey pairwise keys without the otherwise
unavoidable MPDU losses on a busy link. The standard is fully backward
compatible, allowing STAs to also connect to APs not supporting it.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Similarly to the wpa_supplicant_select_config() case,
wpa_get_beacon_ie() needs to handle the special case for OWE transition
mode where the SSID in the network profile does not match the SSID of
the OWE BSS (that has a hidden, random SSID). Accept such a BSS in case
the current scan results needs to be fetched for verifying EAPOL-Key msg
3/4 IEs.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
WEP should not be used for anything anymore. As a step towards removing
it completely, move all WEP related functionality to be within
CONFIG_WEP blocks. This will be included in builds only if CONFIG_WEP=y
is explicitly set in build configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Rekeying a pairwise key using only keyid 0 (PTK0 rekey) has many broken
implementations and should be avoided when using or interacting with
one. The effects can be triggered by either end of the connection and
range from hardly noticeable disconnects over long connection freezes up
to leaking clear text MPDUs.
To allow affected users to mitigate the issues, add a new configuration
option "wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey" to replace all PTK0 rekeys with fast
reconnects.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Add a new wpa_supplicant network profile configuration parameter
beacon_prot=<0/1> to allow Beacon protection to be enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Initial OWE implementation used SHA256 when deriving the PTK for all OWE
groups. This was supposed to change to SHA384 for group 20 and SHA512
for group 21. The new owe_ptk_workaround=1 network parameter can be used
to enable older behavior mainly for testing purposes. There is no impact
to group 19 behavior, but if enabled, this will make group 20 and 21
cases use SHA256-based PTK derivation which will not work with the
updated OWE implementation on the AP side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific
description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to
be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed
Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to
replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have
moved to using the new key_flag.
The following flag are defined:
KEY_FLAG_MODIFY
Set when an already installed key must be updated.
So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed
keys. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT
Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when
deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.)
KEY_FLAG_RX
The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_TX
The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP
The key is a broadcast or group key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
The key is a pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PMK
The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK).
Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are:
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX
WEP key not used as default key (yet).
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT
Default WEP or WPA-NONE key.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX
GTK key valid for RX only.
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT
GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX
Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key.
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX
Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID
support.)
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY
Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX.
KEY_FLAG_RX_TX
Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination
with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX.
This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new
key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using
it, yet.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
In order to correctly encrypt rekeying frames, wpa_supplicant now checks
if a PTK is currently installed and sets the corresponding encrypt
option for tx_control_port().
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
Linux kernel v4.17 added the ability to request sending control port
frames via nl80211 instead of a normal network socket. Doing this
provides the device driver with ordering information between the
control port frames and the installation of keys. This empowers it to
avoid race conditions between, for example, PTK replacement and the
sending of frame 4 of the 4-way rekeying handshake in an RSNA. The
key difference between a TX_CONTROL_PORT and normal socket send is
that the device driver will certainly get any EAPOL frames comprising
a 4-way handshake before it gets the key installation call
for the derived key. By flushing its TX buffers it can then ensure
that no pending EAPOL frames are inadvertently encrypted with a key
that the peer will not yet have installed.
Update the RSN supplicant system to use this new operation for sending
EAPOL-Key frames when the driver reports that this capability is
available; otherwise, fall back to a normal Ethernet TX.
I have tested this on DMG (11ad/ay) devices with an out-of-tree Linux
driver that does not use mac80211. Without this patch I consistently see
PTK rekeying fail if message 4/4 shares a stream with other in-flight
traffic. With this patch, and the driver updated to flush the relevant TX
queue before overwriting a PTK (knowing, now, that if there was a message
4/4 related to the key installation, it has already entered the driver
queue), rekeying is reliable.
There is still data loss surrounding key installation - this problem is
alluded to in IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 12.6.21, where extended Key ID
support is described as the eventual solution. This patch aims to at
least prevent rekeying from totally breaking the association, in a way
that works on kernels as far back as 4.17 (as per Alexander Wetzel
extended Key ID support should be possible on 5.2).
See http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2019-May/040089.html for
a little more context.
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <brendan.jackman@bluwireless.co.uk>
If the AP advertises RSN Extension element, it has to be advertised
consistently in the unprotected (Beacon and Probe Response) and
protected (EAPOL-Key msg 3/4) frames. Verify that this is the case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This makes it easier to add new information to the callbacks without
having to modify each callback function type in EAPOL and EAP code every
time.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
These cases are for the IEEE 802.11 Status Code and Reason Code and
those fields are unsigned 16 bit values, so use the more appropriate
type consistently. This is mainly to document the uses and to make the
source code easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow drivers to indicate support for offloading 4-way handshake for
either IEEE 802.1X (WPA2-Enterprise; EAP) and/or WPA/WPA2-PSK
(WPA2-Personal) by splitting the WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_4WAY_HANDSHAKE flag
into two separate flags.
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
This adds the necessary functions and callbacks to make the channel_info
driver API available to the supplicant state machine that implements the
4-way and group key handshake. This is needed for OCV.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
In the current implementation, upon an EAP method failure, followed by
an EAP failure, the EAP Status is propagated up in wpa_supplicant with a
general failure parameter string "failure". This parameter is used for a
notification on the dbus.
This commit reports the EAP method failure error code in a separate
callback.
The solution in this commit is generic to all EAP methods, and can be
used by any method that need to pass its error code. However, this
commit only implements the reporting for EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA methods
where the Notification Code (in AT_NOTIFICATION) is used as the method
specific error code value.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed ElArabawy <arabawy@google.com>
This can be used to test replay protection. The "RESET_PN" command in
wpa_supplicant and "RESET_PN <addr>" command in hostapd resets the local
counters to zero for the last configured key. For hostapd, the address
parameter specifies which STA this operation is for or selects GTK
("ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff") or IGTK ("ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IGTK").
This functionality is for testing purposes and included only in builds
with CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was originally added to allow the IEEE 802.11 protocol to be
tested, but there are no known fully functional implementations based on
this nor any known deployments of PeerKey functionality. Furthermore,
PeerKey design in the IEEE Std 802.11-2016 standard has already been
marked as obsolete for DLS and it is being considered for complete
removal in REVmd.
This implementation did not really work, so it could not have been used
in practice. For example, key configuration was using incorrect
algorithm values (WPA_CIPHER_* instead of WPA_ALG_*) which resulted in
mapping to an invalid WPA_ALG_* value for the actual driver operation.
As such, the derived key could not have been successfully set for the
link.
Since there are bugs in this implementation and there does not seem to
be any future for the PeerKey design with DLS (TDLS being the future for
DLS), the best approach is to simply delete all this code to simplify
the EAPOL-Key handling design and to get rid of any potential issues if
these code paths were accidentially reachable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This new AKM is used with DPP when using the signed Connector to derive
a PMK. Since the KCK, KEK, and MIC lengths are variable within a single
AKM, this needs number of additional changes to get the PMK length
delivered to places that need to figure out the lengths of the PTK
components.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows the eap_proxy mechanism to be used with multiple SIMs by
following the configured sim_num to index which SIM to use for when
fetching the IMSI through eap_proxy.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add support for setting and deleting PMKSA cache entries based on FILS Cache
Identifer. Also additionally add support for sending PMK as part of
SET_PMKSA to enable driver to derive keys in case of FILS shared key
offload using PMKSA caching.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows PMKSA cache entries for FILS-enabled BSSs to be shared
within an ESS when the BSSs advertise the same FILS Cache Identifier
value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new FILS-HLP-RX control interface event is now used to report
received FILS HLP responses from (Re)Association Response frame as a
response to the HLP requests configured with FILS_HLP_REQ_ADD.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, SIM state change with SIM_STATE_ERROR cleared all PMKSA
entries (including non-SIM networks). Limit this to networks which use
SIM-based authentication methods to avoid unnecessarily removal of PMKSA
entries.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This registers a new callback to indicate change in SIM state. This
helps to do some clean up (more specifically pmksa_flush) based on the
state change of the SIM. Without this, the reconnection using the cached
PMKSA could happen though the SIM is changed.
Currently eap_proxy_sim_state corresponds to only SIM_STATE_ERROR. This
can be further extended.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
