diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
index c913f411d..a66fa2ccb 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -1077,9 +1077,15 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
 	const u8 *key_data;
 	size_t keyhdrlen, mic_len;
 	u8 *mic;
+	bool is_mld = false;
 
 	if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || !sm)
 		return;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
+	is_mld = sm->mld_assoc_link_id >= 0;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
+
 	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data, data_len);
 
 	mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
@@ -1149,6 +1155,11 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/* TODO: Make this more robust for distinguising EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 from
+	 * 4/4. Secure=1 is used in msg 2/4 when doing PTK rekeying, so the
+	 * MLD mechanism here does not work without the somewhat undesired check
+	 * on wpa_ptk_state.. Would likely need to decrypt Key Data first to be
+	 * able to know which message this is in MLO cases.. */
 	if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
 		msg = REQUEST;
 		msgtxt = "Request";
@@ -1157,7 +1168,9 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
 		msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
 	} else if (key_data_length == 0 ||
 		   (mic_len == 0 && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA) &&
-		    key_data_length == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+		    key_data_length == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ||
+		   (is_mld && (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) &&
+		    sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
 		msg = PAIRWISE_4;
 		msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
 	} else {
@@ -4317,10 +4330,68 @@ done:
 }
 
 
+static int wpa_auth_validate_ml_kdes_m4(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211BE
+	const struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
+	const struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
+	struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
+	const u8 *key_data, *mic;
+	u16 key_data_length;
+	size_t mic_len;
+
+	if (sm->mld_assoc_link_id < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
+	 * wpa_receive().
+	 */
+	mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pmk_len);
+
+	hdr = (const struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) sm->last_rx_eapol_key;
+	key = (const struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
+	mic = (const u8 *) (key + 1);
+	key_data = mic + mic_len + 2;
+	key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(mic + mic_len);
+	if (key_data_length > sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
+	    sizeof(*key) - mic_len - 2)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
+		wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, wpa_auth_get_spa(sm),
+				 LOGGER_INFO,
+				 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* MLD MAC address must be the same */
+	if (!kde.mac_addr ||
+	    os_memcmp(kde.mac_addr, sm->peer_mld_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) {
+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+			   "MLD: Mismatching or missing MLD address in EAPOL-Key msg 4/4");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MLD: MLD address in EAPOL-Key msg 4/4: " MACSTR,
+		   MAC2STR(kde.mac_addr));
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211BE */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
 {
 	SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
 	sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = false;
+
+	if (wpa_auth_validate_ml_kdes_m4(sm) < 0) {
+		wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
+				   WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (sm->Pair) {
 		enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
 		int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);